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The current debate on transport policy in the UK is focused on the need for a sustainable 
transport system. Buses play a vital role in achieving this, as they are the most frequently 
used and most accessible mode of public transport. However, the literature shows that the 
delivery of sustainable transport policies is not producing the desired outcomes (Hull, 
2009) and the application of such policies in real situations remains inconsistent. This is 
evident across the UK where there has been a decrease in bus patronage and bus mileage. 
To address this gap, the aim of this research is to identify why bus policies are not imple-
mented successfully at a local level and to provide recommendations for implementation 
and decision making that will aid policy makers, local authority staff, regional transport 
partnerships, bus operating companies and other practitioners working within the field of 
transport. 
A mixed methodology was chosen for this research and is divided into three key 
stages to address the research problem. The first methodology included an online ques-
tionnaire and 143 questionnaires were sent to all public transport officers in Great Britain. 
80 surveys were returned giving a response rate of 56%. The second methodology in-
cluded telephone interviews conducted with 10 of those public transport officers who 
responded to the questionnaire in order to elicit a deeper understanding of the results, 
which could not be achieved from the questionnaire results alone. Finally, the third meth-
odology included four case studies on specific bus schemes within Great Britain. These 
case studies were the Quality Contract Scheme in Tyne and Wear, Fastlink Scheme in 
Glasgow, Bus Priority Scheme in Solihull and Smart Ticketing Scheme in Dundee. While 
the questionnaires and telephone interviews provide an overview of bus policy imple-
mentation across Great Britain, the multiple case studies were required to investigate the 
topic in depth, thus identifying the greatest barriers to bus policy implementation. Anal-
ysis of the three sets of data is based on the application of a new decision support frame-
work developed in this research.  
The findings in this thesis reveal that local authorities in Great Britain are under-
performing in the implementation of bus policy due to the barriers they face. The greatest 
barriers to implementation include the lack of a policy document; the characteristics of 
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the organisation; availability of resources; intra-organisation support and communication; 
economic, social and political environments; and opposition, conflict, and ambiguities. 
Overall, this research has identified several concerns with bus policy implementation. The 
most obvious concern is the unclear link between policy objectives and measures and the 
setting and monitoring of performance targets. Meanwhile, the deregulation of the bus 
sector in the UK means that, in some cases, a lack of control over the implementation of 
certain measures places limits on policy implementation and results in the frequent im-
plementation of policy measures that are achievable rather than those that are necessary 
to the achievement of policy objectives. The findings from this research also help policy-
makers and transport planners to predict what makes implementation successful and to 
address problems and issues through improved policies and regulations, as well as to an-
ticipate and plan for likely barriers. Moreover, addressing these barriers can help tackle 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1 Background and motivation  
Buses are the most frequently used and most accessible mode of public transport in Great 
Britain. They are essential for delivering economic, social and health benefits. In partic-
ular, bus services enable people to get from A to B and provide access to important ser-
vices such as work, health and education. In some instances, bus services are the only 
available mode of transport for those without car ownership. Bus networks are also esti-
mated to generate several billions in economic benefits by providing “access to opportu-
nities, reducing pollution and accidents and improving productivity” (Urban Transport 
Group, 2016).  
However, statistics released by Transport Scotland (2016), the Welsh Government 
(2016) and the UK DfT (2016) show a steady decline in bus mileage across Great Britain 
outside of London. In Scotland, vehicle kilometres have fallen by 12% over the past five 
years, while in Wales, the number of vehicle kilometres travelled by subsidised services 
has fallen by around a third since 2009-10 (Welsh Government, 2016). In England as a 
whole, mileage supported by local authorities decreased by 0.6% when compared with 
the previous year. According to DfT (2016), there was a 10% reduction in local authority 
supported services in England outside London, while commercial mileage increased by 
1.4%. Furthermore, over the last decade in England outside of London, local authority 
supported mileage has decreased by 55 million miles, and commercial mileage has in-
creased by 13 million miles. This is particularly evident where the percentage of bus 
mileage on supported services has decreased from 22% in 2004-05 to 17% in 2014-15. 
Similar to bus mileage, there has also been a decline in bus usage, which has a 
damaging effect on the bus network. Additional statistics released by Transport Scotland 
(2016), the Welsh Government (2016), and the UK DfT (2016) show a steady decline in 
bus patronage across Great Britain outside of London. This is particularly noticeable 
where public transport patronage has more than halved from peak levels in the early 1950s 
(McConville, 1997). In Scotland, around 414 million passenger journeys were made by 
bus in 2014-15, a decrease of 2% on 2013-14 and a 15% fall from the latest peak in 2007-
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08. In Wales, around 101 million passenger journeys were made by bus in 2014-15; how-
ever, the number of journeys decreased over the last six years. In England outside of 
London, around 2.28 billion passenger journeys were made by bus in 2014-15. Again, 
there has been a gradual decline in passenger numbers in recent years including a decrease 
of 1.3% on 2013-14. Figure 1.1 summarises the overall trends in local bus journeys by 
country, giving a clear indication that bus usage in London has risen as bus usage in 
England outside of London and in Scotland, and Wales has declined. 
 
Figure 1.1: Local bus journeys by country and regions 1998-99 to 2014-15 (DfT, 2016) 
A decrease in bus patronage and bus mileage has a damaging effect on the delivery 
of bus services across the UK. As well as having a negative impact on economic, social, 
and health benefits, quality of life suffers due to a lack of physical access to jobs, health, 
education, and amenities (Banister, 2000). To overcome the problems associated with the 
decline in bus patronage and bus mileage, local transport policies are needed in order to 
improve bus services for current and potential new users.  
There have to date been no studies specifically addressing the implementation pro-
cess of bus policies at a local level, however several studies have been carried out to 
identify the barriers to implementing sustainable transport policies at a local level. In 
1995, the Institution of Civil Engineers published a review on transport policy and found 
that policy makers at a local level in the UK were concerned with how transport policy 
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was being implemented.  The review concluded that there was a need for clarity, con-
sistency and commitment from national government in its interactions with local govern-
ment. It also found that the principal barriers to policy implementation included the frag-
mentation of local government and the privatisation of public transport; lack of con-
sistency in policy over time; failure to integrate transport and land use planning; lack of 
funding; inconsistent distribution of finance; and a lack of powers for demand manage-
ment measures (May, 1995). Another review published by ECMT (2002) found that the 
principal barriers to policy implementation were poor policy integration and coordination; 
counterproductive institutional roles; unsupportive regulatory frameworks; weaknesses 
in pricing; poor data quality and quantity; limited public support; and lack of political 
resolve.  
The Department for Transport highlighted a number of weaknesses following the 
first round of Local Transport Plans (LTPs) including conflicts between transport plans 
and those for other public policy sectors, managerial and political barriers, lack of inte-
gration between transport and land use planning, a weak evidence base, limited expertise 
in setting targets, reluctance to share good practice, limitations of staffing and skills, and 
inappropriate financial and political structures (Atkins, 2005). The DISTILLATE re-
search programme also carried out a study on policy implementation barriers and looked 
at six barriers deemed of particular importance to UK local authorities. The study found 
financial restrictions, staff shortages and divided responsibilities to be the most serious 
problems (Hull, 2009). 
To overcome these policy implementation barriers, several research studies have 
attempted to investigate the best theoretical combinations of transport policies. The study 
of policy implementation has grown substantially since the late 1960s and many scholars 
have attempted to develop policy implementation frameworks to address the gaps that 
often occur between policy decision intent and policy performance, or implementation 
outcome. These frameworks are used to find out what makes a policy and its subsequent 
implementation successful, but also to eventually predict implementation success. The 
new decision support framework used for analysis in this research combines top-down 
and bottom-up perspectives. By applying this framework to an analysis of policy imple-
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mentation reporting, it can not only be used to evaluate the quality of reporting in indi-
vidual cases, but also reveal to what extent the reporting process is able to address all the 
required elements of policy implementation, and thus achieve its overall goal of aiding 
policymakers and planners. Being able to some extent predict what makes implementa-
tion successful helps policymakers address problems and issues through  improved poli-
cies and regulations, as well as to anticipate and plan for likely barriers. This research 
will build on previous studies to produce recommendations for implementation and deci-
sion making that will aid local authority staff. 
Two key research gaps emerge from the literature review presented in this thesis. 
Firstly, the implementation of bus policy at a local level has not been sufficiently ex-
plored; this is particularly relevant given the decrease in bus patronage and bus mileage 
has a damaging effect on the delivery of bus services across the UK. Secondly, there is 
an insufficient understanding surrounding bus policy implementation at a local level. This 
thesis aims to address these two key research gaps. 
1.2 Geographical parameters and scope of this study 
This research is focused specifically on the implementation of bus policy in Great Britain, 
outside of London. London has been excluded from this study because unlike the rest of 
Great Britain, buses in London are under the control of local government in the form of 
the elected Mayor and Greater London Assembly, and a transport agency known as 
Transport for London (TfL) (Preston and Almutairi, 2014).  
It has also been decided to limit the geographical outlook of this study to Great 
Britain which includes England, Wales and Scotland. This natural geographical unit 
would allow for a comprehensive sample of the relevant local authorities and would avoid 
non-transport related political factors which might influence strategic decision making in 
Northern Ireland that would be beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse. The different 
structure of transport administration in Northern Ireland would also make it difficult to 
obtain reliable data on bus policy implementation. Therefore, British local authorities will 
be the units of investigation of this study, which includes Welsh County Councils, Scot-
tish County Councils, English Unitary authorities plus the Isles of Scilly, English County 
Councils, and English Combined Local Authorities.  
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It was decided to consider buses rather than other modes of travel for the following 
reasons: 
 Buses are the most frequently used and most widely available mode of transport. 
 There are no studies that specifically address the implementation process for bus 
policies at a local level. 
 It offers an interesting opportunity for comparing the influence of national gov-
ernment policies on local government implementation as buses are considered in 
local transport documents as an important mode of transport, however, there is no 
national bus strategy in the UK.  
1.3 Research questions 
The following research questions will facilitate in addressing the aim and objectives of 
this study as follows: 
1. What are the current perceptions of public transport officers in Great Britain on 
issues associated with the implementation of bus policies? 
2. What factors have been barriers and enablers to the implementation of bus 
schemes within Great Britain? 
3. What are the greatest barriers to bus policy implementation at a local level, as 
identified through the analysis of the data collected in this research?  
1.4 Methodology 
To help answer the research questions, a mixed methodology is adopted in this research 
and is divided into three key stages. The first methodology includes a self-completion 
questionnaire which has been administered via email to all 143 public transport officers 
in Great Britain, outside London. The second methodology includes telephone interviews 
conducted with 10 of those public transport officers from the questionnaire in order to 
elicit a deeper understanding of the results, which simply could not be achieved from the 
questionnaire results alone. Finally, the third methodology includes four case studies on 
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specific bus schemes within Great Britain. These case studies include the Quality Con-
tract Scheme (QCS) in Tyne and Wear, Fastlink Scheme in Glasgow, Bus Priority Scheme 
in Solihull and Smart Ticketing Scheme in Dundee. While the questionnaires and tele-
phone interviews provide an overview of bus policy implementation across Great Britain, 
the multiple case studies were required to investigate bus policy implementation in depth 
and were conducted with a range of representatives from each scheme, thus identifying 
the greatest barriers to bus policy implementation. 
The data collected is specific to the implementation of bus policies at a local level, 
but with particular emphasis on cities that had previous involvement in bus projects or 
schemes. The analysis is based on the application of a new decision support framework 
to the three sets of data. The findings are then triangulated to form a complete whole. A 
multi-method approach was deemed the most appropriate methodological approach to 
answer the research questions for this research. This approach also increases the robust-
ness of results because findings can be strengthened through triangulation – the cross-
validation achieved when different kinds and sources of data converge and are found con-
gruent (Kaplan and Duchon, 1988). 
1.5 Research aim and objectives 
The aim of this research is to identify barriers to implementation of bus policies at a local 
level in Great Britain. 
Five specific research objectives have been identified as key steps required to meet 
the research aim, including: 
1. To develop an understanding of bus policy and the impact bus deregulation and 
privatisation has had on implementing bus policy in Great Britain. 
This objective seeks to understand bus policy in Great Britain by examining the legisla-
tion in place (including historical legislation). This includes a review of the legislation to 
understand the changes to the bus industry, which includes privatised bus companies and 
deregulated bus services outside London. 
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2. To understand the views and experiences of public transport officers regarding 
the key issues associated with the implementation of bus policies within Great 
Britain. 
This objective seeks to use the findings of online questionnaires and telephone interviews 
conducted in Great Britain. This includes the views and experiences of local transport 
officers. It also seeks to understand areas of consensus and differences between respond-
ents on a wide range of policy implementation issues. 
3. To understand the views and experiences of key players/stakeholders regarding 
the challenges, enablers and barriers associated with the implementation of four 
different bus schemes within Great Britain. 
This includes the views and experiences of key transport actors (officials from public 
bodies, public transport operators, local politicians and transport experts/stakehold-
ers/interest groups) in the research process for four bus schemes in Great Britain. These 
case studies explore the success of these schemes to pinpoint challenges and barriers in 
the implementation of these schemes.  
4. To build on theoretical literature and current views and experiences of key play-
ers/stakeholders to help improve the implementation of bus policy at a local level. 
This objective draws on the results from the literature review and empirical analysis in 
order to obtain insights into current bus policy implementation and associated chal-
lenges. This includes theoretical analysis of the data collected to identify the key barriers 
to bus policy implementation at a local level in Great Britain. 
5. To provide policy makers and transport planners with recommendations for effec-
tive implementation and better decision making when implementing bus policy at 
a local level in Great Britain.  
This objective seeks to use the findings in this research to provide recommendations to 
help policymakers and transport planners to predict what makes implementation success-
ful and to address problems and issues through better policies and regulations, as well 
as to anticipate and plan for likely barriers. 
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1.6 Structure of thesis 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. A summary of each chapter is presented below:  
Chapter One explains the contextual background. It outlines the core issues related 
to the research problem and the justification for undertaking this study. It sets out the aims 
and objectives of this research, as well as the research questions which will facilitate in 
addressing the aim and objectives. This chapter also includes the scope and theoretical 
context, and contribution of this study.  
Chapter Two provides a historical review of bus policy in Great Britain since the 
first UK road legislation was introduced in 1285. The purpose of this review is to place 
the research in a historical context and to show developments in bus policy to the present 
day. It critically reviews the current literature to identify any gaps in the existing 
knowledge, allowing this work to add value to the study. 
Chapter Three explores theoretical approaches of policy implementation includ-
ing top-down, bottom up and hybrid theories. Both top-down and bottom-up approaches 
are firstly analysed and then combined to distinguish a relationship between the two. This 
helps to identify emerging themes based on this analysis. 
Chapter Four describes the methodologies and research methods that will be used 
in this study. It explains the process that will be adopted for the application of each 
method, its relevancy to this research and data analysis techniques. This chapter also in-
cludes a review of methodologies used in previous transport policy studies.  
Chapter Five provides the results obtained in online questionnaire conducted in 
Great Britain. This includes the views and experiences of local transport officers on the 
delivery of bus policy in their area. The decision support framework is then used to ana-
lyse the data collected to determine the key issues associated with the implementation of 
bus policy at a local level.  
Chapter Six discusses the results obtained in telephone interviews conducted with 
some of the public transport officers from the questionnaires to elicit a deeper understand-
ing of the results. In line with questionnaires, the decision support framework is also used 
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to analyse the data collected to determine the key issues associated with the implementa-
tion of bus policy at a local level. 
Chapter Seven presents the findings from four case studies that are based on pre-
vious bus schemes in Great Britain. This includes results from face-to-face interviews 
with key transport actors, which are then analysed using the decision support framework 
to determine the key issues associated with the implementation of bus policy at a local 
level. 
Chapter Eight discusses and critiques the findings of this research. The data col-
lected from the questionnaires, telephone interviews and four case studies will be com-
bined for further theoretical analysis. The literature will then be included to compare and 
contrast the findings of this study.  
Chapter Nine consists of conclusions and recommendations and provides a sum-
mary of the main findings. This is used to explain the importance of what has been dis-
covered and to answer the thesis aim and research questions. It will highlight the limita-
tions of the research and identify areas for further research. Finally, it will draw out the 
contribution of this research to existing knowledge. 
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Chapter 2: A historical review of bus policy 
2.1 Introduction 
Governments all over the world are concerned with transport and spend millions on im-
proving the transport system. According to the World Bank, transport is central to devel-
opment and without physical access to jobs, health, education and other amenities, the 
quality of life suffers (Banister 2000). Inappropriately designed transport systems can 
result in a network that excludes certain members of society, harms the environment and 
is detrimental to the economy (Banister, 2000). Therefore, it is absolutely critical to im-
plement networks that encompass all three aspects to ensure that a successful system is 
created. 
However, the governance and the delivery of sustainable transport policies are not 
producing the desired outcomes (Hull, 2009) and the application of such policies in real 
situations remains inconsistent. To explore this matter further, this research will focus in 
on the delivery of sustainable transport policies at a local level, and in particular bus pol-
icy. This is an important area of research as the previous chapter has indicated that a 
decrease in bus patronage and bus mileage has a damaging effect on the delivery of bus 
services across the UK.  
This chapter will therefore explore this gap in research and will give provide a his-
torical review of bus policy. The historical review is focused on examining bus policy in 
Great Britain since the first UK road legislation was introduced in 1285. The purpose of 
this review is to place the research in a historical context to show familiarity with state-
of-the-art developments and to identify the likely directions for future research.  
The Transport Act 1985 radically changed the bus industry by privatising the com-
panies and deregulating services outside London. This chapter describes the effects of 
that legislation and discusses the impact of bus deregulation and privatisation has on bus 
policy. It will then explore several research studies, which have been carried out to iden-
tify the barriers to implementing transport policies at a local level. Being able to some 
extent predict what makes implementation successful helps local authority staff and pol-
icymakers address problems and issues through improved policies and decision making, 
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as well as to anticipate and plan for likely barriers. This chapter therefore aims to extrap-
olate what influences the success of implementation and to generalise that to the imple-
mentation of bus policy at a local level. It will also address the first research objective to 
help meet the aim of this thesis. Table 2.1 provides a recap of the first research objective. 




To develop an understanding of bus 
policy and the impact bus deregula-
tion and privatisation has had on im-
plementing bus policy in Great Brit-
ain. 
This objective seeks to understand bus policy in 
Great Britain by examining the legislation in place 
(including historical legislation). This includes a 
review of the legislation to understand the changes 
to the bus industry, which includes privatised bus 
companies and deregulated bus services outside 
London. 
2.2 Background to bus policy 
The first UK road related legislation was introduced in 1285, which was directly aimed 
at ensuring safe passage for travellers. This Statute was superseded by subsequent legis-
lation from the 19th, through to the 21st centuries and has been responsible for managing 
and maintaining public highways (Webb & Webb, 1913). 
The Local Government Act of 1888 (England and Wales) is another important leg-
islation from the 19th century because it directly elected councils. This Act created 62 
county councils, 61 borough councils and the London County Council. These new county 
councils then became responsible for the highways and maintenance, and remains broadly 
true to this day (Webb & Webb, 1913). 
Meanwhile, in the 1880s, two other major developments were introduced to the 
United Kingdom – the first motor cars and the modern bicycle. Both cars and bicycles 
contributed to changing social habits by increasing the geographical distance individuals 
could travel in a shorter timeframe. These trends became increasingly popular up until 
the 1950s. However, prior to the explosion in car use from the 1950s, roads played a 
secondary role to other modes of transport and communications, such as intercity trams 
and railway systems, the telegraph/phone, cycling and walking (Dennis & Urry, 2009; 
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Hoyle & Knowles, 1998). The following sections provide a historical review of bus policy 
in England and Wales, Scotland and London. 
2.2.1 England and Wales 
In 1909, the Roads Board was set up to build new roads and maintain existing infrastruc-
ture. However, it failed to deliver spending targets and was replaced by the Ministry of 
Transport in 1919, which is now known as the Department for Transport (DfT). By 1930, 
the regulation of passenger-carrying motor vehicles was introduced by the Road Traffic 
Act 1930. The Road Traffic Act 1930 was an Act of the Parliament of the United King-
dom introduced by the Minister of Transport Herbert Morrison. This Act marked the be-
ginning of the bus industry by introducing both quality and quantity regulation. Although 
there were two government reviews in 1953 and 1961, the Act remained unchanged until 
1980 (Poole, 1995).  
The Road Traffic Act 1930 established a system of road vehicle licensing which 
was controlled by regional Traffic Commissioners. This provided quality regulation for 
operators, vehicles and drivers, and quantity regulation for the number and types of ser-
vices operated. It also provided licences to bus operators to run a service defined by a 
route and timetable and by accepted convention with a specified fare scale. Once the li-
cence was granted, the operator had local monopoly rights and particularly where local 
services in urban areas were concerned.  
The next key milestones in relation to bus regulations included the Local Govern-
ment Act of 1972 and of 1973 (England and Wales). Following the introduction of these 
Acts, local authorities were responsible for sustaining public transport through revenue 
support payments, in line with their statutory obligations to provide co-ordinated public 
transport to meet the needs of their populations. The subsidy paid by local authorities and 
the urban Passenger Transport Authorities was vital for bus services in large parts of rural 
Britain and many commuter-based rail and bus networks in the conurbations. The level 
of support was based on factors such as the degree of rurality, bus operating costs, and 
councils' fares policies. Therefore, the supply of public transport in Britain from the 1960s 
and mid-1970s was strongly influenced by national and local government support. This 
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also included bus services being subsidised from Rate Support Grants in Scotland and 
Transport Supplementary Grants in England and Wales (Poole, 1995). 
Although the structure of the bus industry had changed little over the 50 years up 
to 1980, the market in which it operated had changed dramatically with the rise of the car. 
For example, bus patronage halved between the 1960s and 1980s and there were increased 
operating costs, fares and levels of subsidy. Therefore, there was a need for: 
 change to halt the continuing decline in bus services; 
 significant improvements in efficiency and productivity, and reductions in oper-
ating costs and fares; and 
 a transport subsidy system under which the amount for each service was clear. 
   This change in the market resulted in the Government moving towards deregulation 
to reduce the regulations in place concerning the organisation of the bus industry. In 1979, 
the Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher came into power and developed pol-
icies to reduce subsidies to buses, to reduce the role of local government in planning and 
controlling bus systems and to increase competition between bus companies (Poole, 
1995). This included the introduction of the Transport Acts 1980 and 1985 to deregulate 
the bus industry outside London.  
Transport Act 1980 
The Transport Act 1980 was an Act of Parliament in the United Kingdom. It introduced 
deregulation of coach services by lifting regulations on long distance bus services (for 
journeys of over 30 miles) for which road service licences were no longer required. The 
Act also allowed authorities to deregulate bus services on a trial basis and enabled them 
to set up "trial areas" where road service licences were no longer required and operators 
could run services on any routes they wished. A trial was carried out in three areas in-
cluding Devon, Hereford and Worcester, and Norfolk and the Transport and Road Re-
search Laboratory (TRRL) reported on these trials in 1984. They found that Hereford and 
Worcester had a substantial number of new operators and there was a reduction in revenue 
support paid by the County Council. Furthermore, there were dramatic reductions in fares 
and increases in services, however, there were problems caused by overcrowding by 
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buses in the town centre and the operation of the concessionary fare scheme. Finally, all 
three trials had shown reductions in revenue support, as well as lower fares and better 
levels of service while deregulation had provided opportunities for operators to experi-
ment with new services (Butcher, 2010). 
Transport Act 1985: deregulation 
The 1985 Transport Act (part 1) deregulated the provision of bus services, which was 
published in the 1984 in the white paper “Buses” and other detailed consultation papers. 
This Act abolished road service licensing in Great Britain, outside London, from October 
1986. The licensing system now involved a system of registration and removed the duties 
of local authorities to co-ordinate public passenger transport in their area. It also gave 
local authorities the power to subsidise public passenger transport services only on con-
dition that they went out to open tender (Poole 1999). According to Mackie et al. (1995), 
the context at the time was strongly pro-car, against planning and against local authorities 
and any public bodies having more than a residual role. This Act therefore was seen as 
the main obstacle to planning integrated and easily understood public transport networks. 
Poole (1999) pointed out that the Act resulted in the licencing authorities (the traffic 
commissioners) losing many of their former powers. Licenced bus operators were re-
quired to register its intention to set up a service with the traffic commissioner responsible 
for the area, giving at least 42 days' notice. However, the traffic commissioner, in special 
circumstances, could shorten the period of notice on request at their discretion. Subse-
quent variation or withdrawal of the service also required this period of notice. In order 
to register a new service, the bus operator had to provide the traffic commissioner with 
information on the proposed route, on the terminal points, timetable and stopping arrange-
ments, and on the vehicles to be used. The operator is then obliged to run the service 
according to the specification in the registration. Furthermore, the operator was responsi-
ble for the timetable and the introduction of new services, depending on the operator's 
opinion of the demand for it and its commercial viability. Meanwhile, there was no re-
quirement in the Act for the commercial bus operator to consult before making changes 
to the timetable and the position of bus stops. In addition, registration did not include any 
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reference to public demand or to existing services and objections could no longer be made 
by other operators or local authorities. 
Public Transport Authorities (PTA) and county councils were given powers to se-
cure, using subsidy, socially necessary services which were not provided by the commer-
cial market. The bus operators also had the right to participate in concessionary fare 
schemes and the PTA had powers to force participation in the schemes. They would then 
be reimbursed for the net financial loss incurred by participating in the scheme.  
The 1985 Transport Act also abolished the concept of network support. As a result, 
a bus company could register any service which it chose to operate on a commercial, i.e. 
unsupported, basis. Furthermore, if there were social needs not met by commercial ser-
vices then the local authority could invite competitive tenders for additional routes or 
journeys on a case by case basis (Butcher, 2010) 
Transport Act 1985: privatisation  
At the same time proposals were also put forward to change the structure of the bus in-
dustry through privatisation. While deregulation would increase competition through an 
increase in the number of competitors, privatisation, in itself, would not necessarily in-
crease competition. Instead, privatisation was seen by the Conservative Government to 
be a means of achieving a more committed management and better access to private cap-
ital (Butcher, 2010).  
Prior to 1985, the bus industry was dominated by public sector companies. Six Eng-
lish metropolitan counties, Greater Glasgow and the vast majority of urban bus services 
were planned, funded and operated by PTAs. Meanwhile, other cities and towns had mu-
nicipal bus companies under the control of the relevant district council in England and 
Wales, or the regional council in Scotland. The remaining urban services and a high pro-
portion of inter-urban and rural routes were operated by subsidiaries of the state owned 
National Bus Company (NBC) in England and Wales, and by the Scottish Bus Group 
(SBG) subsidiaries in Scotland. 
 Part 3 of the 1985 Act required the sale of the National Bus Company subsidiaries 
to the private sector. Therefore, the company was reorganised into 72 separate companies 
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and then sold to the private sector or to management and/or employee buy-outs by April 
1988. This included 40 companies bought by management or employee teams, while 
many of the sales included provision for employee share schemes or profit-sharing 
schemes (Butcher, 2010). Butcher (2010) further pointed out that gross proceeds of the 
NBC privatisation amounted to £323 million, resulting in a net surplus to the Government 
of £89 million after all debts and privatisation expenses had been accounted for. Mean-
while, The House of Commons Public Accounts Committee did not believe this was an 
accurate value and 10 bus companies were sold between September 1994 and January 
1995 for £233 million (£218 million net). The National Audit Office concluded that the 
key objectives of the sale had all been achieved and that it had raised £30 million more 
than the original indicative offers (Butcher, 2010). 
Section 75 of the 1985 Act also gave local authorities the power to dispose of their 
bus undertakings, subject to the Secretary of State's approval. Portsmouth City Council 
was the first municipal bus company to sell its bus operation in June 1988 and by 1997 
only seven per cent of passenger services were attributable to the municipal bus compa-
nies (Butcher, 2010). 
2.2.2 Scotland 
In contrast to England and Wales, the Scottish Bus Group (SBG) operated the buses and 
coaches in Scotland. However, similar to England and Wales, long distance journeys were 
deregulated by the Transport Act 1980 and local bus services were deregulated in October 
1986 by the Transport Act 1985. Although the NBC were responsible for drawing up 
plans for its privatisation, SBG did not follow the same procedure. It was not until 1988 
that the SBC announced the privatisation of the company. Meanwhile, the Transport 
(Scotland) Act 1989 restructured the SBG into 10 separate independent bus companies 
before being privatised. The sales were then completed by October 1991(Butcher, 2010).  
2.2.3 London 
In London, buses were governed by the London Regional Transport Act 1984, which 
transferred responsibility for the bus network from the Greater London Council (GLC) to 
London Regional Transport (LRT). This Act required London Transport to set up oper-
ating subsidiary companies to run bus and underground services. As a result, London 
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Buses Ltd was created in 1985. Meanwhile, in 1993, the Government announced that it 
would defer the previously intended deregulation of buses in London, although privatisa-
tion of the bus operating subsidiaries of London Transport would proceed. The role of 
London Transport Buses (LTB) was to determine the level and structure of fares to be 
charged, determine the general structure of bus routes and their frequency of operation, 
provide and maintain the infrastructure, promote customer information and develop tech-
nology and ensure operators deliver safe, reliable and clean buses (Butcher, 2010). 
2.3 Bus policy in Great Britain 
To address the concerns with the implementation of bus policy at a local level, this section 
explores the current situation regarding bus policy in Great Britain, while the subsequent 
section explains the impact of bus deregulation. This is followed by a review of literature 
which examines previous studies which have been carried out to address the gaps that 
often occur between policy decision intent and policy performance, or implementation 
outcome. 
Under the regulatory framework for local bus services in Great Britain outside Lon-
don, bus operators are almost all private for-profit companies, and all of them are free to 
set routes, fares, and timetables as they see fit. This situation is unusual in developed 
countries; the findings of this research are nonetheless relevant to other regulatory envi-
ronments. Whenever responsibilities for service planning, strategy, operations, and infra-
structure, for example, are split between different organisations (as is the case in most 
Nordic countries), or even between different parts of the same organisation (the case in 
major cities in Slovenia, for example), there is scope for strategic policy objectives not to 
be realised. 
Currently, bus policies are included in the Local Transport Plans (LTPs) and Local 
Transport Strategies (LTSs) of local authorities in England and Scotland, respectively. 
The first round of these LTPs were submitted by English local authorities in 2001, while 
LTSs were submitted by Scottish local authorities in 2000. The introduction of the LTS 
by Scottish local authorities was voluntary compared to LTPs in England which were 
made a statutory requirement by the 2000 Transport Act (although this requirement was 
repealed in 2017). LTPs and LTSs support local authorities to help improve their current 
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bus services (as well as other modes of transport such as walking and cycling, and policy 
areas such as road safety) and achieve a modal shift from the automobile. According to 
Scottish Government (2005), local bus networks are more likely to be successful if there 
is “a close working partnership between the local authority and the bus operators.” These 
partnerships are vital to overcoming key barriers to bus services in terms of “traffic de-
mand management,” “congestion reduction,” “bus priority measures,” “the provision of 
accessible buses,” “simplified fare structures,” and “route branding.” 
Guidance on LTPs associated with the 2000 Act also required English authorities 
to produce annual monitoring reports to show how their LTPs were progressing. At the 
end of the first five-year LTP period in 2006, a lengthy Delivery Report was produced to 
show what had and had not been implemented, and why, over the previous five years. By 
contrast, Scottish authorities had no statutory requirement to monitor the progress of their 
LTS. However, the Local Transport Act 2008 in England removed this system of close 
monitoring of LTPs. Furthermore, the act also removed the requirement to produce a sep-
arate bus strategy. With the abolition of annual monitoring reports and a separate bus 
strategy, there are currently no statutory requirements in place for local authorities to 
monitor the performance of local bus services in the UK. 
Several studies have highlighted the importance of monitoring LTPs and LTSs. 
Spear and Lightowler (2005) carried out a study on delivering LTSs in Scotland at the 
end of the first five-year Scottish LTS period. They summarised lessons learned from the 
English LTPs which would be useful for preparing and monitoring future LTSs in Scot-
land. However, they suggested that the absence of a systematic LTS annual reporting 
process made it more difficult to assess how Scottish authorities have used their LTSs to 
deliver improvements on the ground, contribute to their objectives or offer value for 
money for the resources provided. Furthermore, the absence of LTS annual monitoring 
also meant the problems with LTSs could not be addressed. Another study by McTigue 
et al. (2017) compared the LTP 2001-2006 and the LTP Delivery Report for three English 
cities to obtain an insight into the importance of reporting in the implementation of local 
bus policy. A lack of policy resources was identified as a key barrier to implementation, 
while key aspects, such as communication and support within the organisation, were not 
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being documented by local authorities. This, in turn, limited the ability of local authorities 
to monitor the reasons for successful implementation or lack thereof. 
2.3.1 The study of bus deregulation in Great Britain 
Although no studies specifically address the implementation process for bus policies at 
the local level, several studies have explored bus deregulation in Great Britain and its 
impact on the sector. White (1995, 1997) examined the short-term impact of deregulation 
and found that while the cost per kilometre operated had fallen, patronage had also fallen 
and profitability only remained marginal. Another study by White (2010) examined the 
conflict between competition policy and the wider role of the local bus industry in Great 
Britain since deregulation, exploring issues such as the removal of previous restrictions 
on routes, service levels and fares and a reversal of the previous emphasis on coordination 
of services. 
A study by Preston and Almutairi (2013) examined bus deregulation and the long-
term impact it had on the sector, using demand, cost, and fares models. They found that 
London (where deregulation is not in place) shows a positive pattern of welfare gains; 
however, passengers received fewer benefits when the subsidy was reduced. By compar-
ison, there is a negative pattern with welfare impacts outside London, and the study con-
cludes a regulated bus service like that in London would be more appropriate. Preston 
and Almutairi (2014) re-evaluated this position and found a considerable welfare loss. 
Another study by Preston (2016) looked at the impact of bus deregulation in Wales in the 
mid-1980s, showing a decrease in bus trips and vehicle mileage, a rise in fares and oper-
ating costs, and a decrease in subsidy. The study concludes that for urban parts of Wales, 
the implementation of a Bus Rapid Transit scheme to complement the existing rail net-
work would help improve the barriers associated with bus deregulation. For rural areas, 
the study indicates that a lack of funding has prevented the development of more flexible 
public transport services and therefore proposes the implementation of other reforms such 
as Quality Contracts, Quality Partnerships, and Community Partnerships. 
Van de Velde and Wallis (2013) examined the longer-term impact of deregulation 
in Great Britain and New Zealand and partial deregulation in Sweden. While they suggest 
there is no clear-cut evidence yet on what is the best deregulated regime, their research 
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highlights some success in terms of patronage growth at a local level. This success is 
dependent on the co-existence of a favourable public transport policy that places limits 
on automobile use by means of parking charges, pedestrian-only zones, and extensive 
park-and-ride facilities. Finally, a study by Van de Velde and Augustin (2014) suggests 
that where deregulation is sustained as a regime, and performance improvement depends 
on avoiding repetition the simplistic and dogmatic interpretations that dominated earlier 
implementations. They believed a more balanced view would need to be developed based 
on theoretical considerations and a thorough review of experience, in terms of perfor-
mance itself and the mechanisms that lead to performance. 
2.3.2 Transport policy implementation 
Other studies have examined various modes of transport policy to identify the barriers to 
developing and implementing sustainable transport policies. These studies include mixed 
data-collection methods such as questionnaires, telephone interviews, and face-to-face 
interviews with key individuals who are knowledgeable or experienced with dealing with 
transport policy. For example, Lindholm and Blinge (2014) assessed the knowledge and 
awareness of sustainable urban freight transport among Swedish local authority policy 
planners. A questionnaire was completed by the planners, and the results identified a “lack 
of coordination, sufficient resources and effective knowledge transfer among stakehold-
ers in urban freight transport” as key barriers related to freight policy implementation. 
Similarly, Ballantyne et al. (2013) carried out 74 interviews with local authorities and 
freight stakeholders in northern Europe to examine a variety of cities on urban freight 
transport, and their inclusion of urban freight stakeholders in local authority transport 
planning. The study concluded that the issues local authorities face also occur in other 
countries and are “not unique to one country or specific category.” Therefore, a generic 
policy framework is recommended to help overcome the barriers associated with the in-
teraction between local authorities and freight stakeholders. 
Some scholars have also explored the barriers related to developing and implement-
ing incentives related to climate policy. Gössling et al. (2016, p.83) carried out interviews 
with 12 European policy officers on the objectives of climate policy in the transport sec-
tor. The study identified key barriers associated with emissions include a “lack of political 
leadership,” “resistance from member states,” “favouring of economic growth over cuts 
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in greenhouse gas emissions,” “pressure from industry and lobby groups,” “policy imple-
mentation delays,” “insufficient forecasting and monitoring tools,” and “overreliance on 
technologies.” Another study on climate policy by Argyriou et al. (2012, p.87) explored 
the progress of UK local authorities and the barriers they face in developing and imple-
menting climate policy initiatives. The main barriers to these policy initiatives include a 
“lack of time, resources and difficulties in engaging with the wider community.” They 
concluded that local authorities need to exchange knowledge on climate change and that 
the effectiveness of these policies can be monitored more closely through UK sub-na-
tional statistics data. 
Several studies have examined the role of policy implementation in travel plan pol-
icies. For example, De Gruyter et al. (2015, p.34) carried out a series of interviews with 
30 transport representatives, primarily from industries in Australia, to develop new initi-
atives to improve travel plans for new residential developments. The key barriers identi-
fied with implementing travel plans were a “lack of enforcement,” “uncertainty over im-
plementation responsibilities,” and a “general lack of ownership.” Similarly, a study by 
Ison and Rye (2003) assessed travel plans and road user charging with respect to a theo-
retical framework developed by Gunn (1978) and found that this framework fails to cover 
all the essentials for policy implementation such as “monitoring,” “a policy champion,” 
“political stability,” “trust in terms of the parties' involved,” “consideration of public re-
lations,” and “careful timing.” Gaffron (2003) carried out a questionnaire survey with UK 
local transport authorities on issues related to walking and cycling. The three most im-
portant factors hindering policy implementation included a “lack of funding,” “lack of 
staff,” and “lack of time.” 
These studies show that barriers related to policy implementation at a local level 
are not restricted to one category and indeed are similar across different transport policy 
sectors and modes such as freight, climate, travel plans, road user charging, walking, and 
cycling. These studies underscore the barriers associated with developing and implement-
ing transport policies and the importance of developing mechanisms to prevent these bar-
riers from arising. The next section explores previous case studies which have been car-
ried out on transport policy implementation.  
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2.3.3 Case study research on transport policy implementation 
Many scholars across the world use case studies to address the gaps that often occur be-
tween policy decision intent and policy performance, or implementation outcome. For 
example, a study by Mulley and Reedy (2015) examined the way in which the connec-
tions between research and policy are made (or not made) between transport researchers 
and transport policy-makers using NSW, Australia as a case-study. This involved previ-
ous research conducted in NSW to provide quantitative and qualitative evidence on the 
needs of researchers, policy makers and other interested parties in NSW. It also helped to 
identify perceived barriers to making connections between the evidence base that exists 
and transport policy for relevant stakeholders. The study concluded with recommenda-
tions which emerged from the NSW case study as well as an exploration of the relevance 
of structural change, such as a government backed Strategic Research Agenda to create a 
transmission mechanism for evidence based public transport policy. 
Another study was carried out by Bray et al. (2011) where 43 transport strategies 
published for the five largest cities in Australia between 1965 and 2010 were reviewed. 
This review consisted of observations from a survey of public servants in the policy and 
strategy divisions of the state and territory transport agencies. One key objective of this 
research was to identify from where policy lessons are learnt by using a framework by 
Dolowitz and Marsh (2000). The study found that there was little published evidence on 
the performance of previous strategies being critically examined. 
A case study by Olsson et al. (2015) combines a backcasting study of urban road 
transport with an analysis of current policy processes in Stockholm, Sweden. The combi-
nation is used to help bridge the implementation gap between scenario-based research 
and actual policy implementation and thus increase the chances of research being imple-
mented in practice. The study identified the need for diverse fuels and vehicles and for 
immediate policy action. Furthermore, the policy analysis demonstrated that, given cur-
rent policy structures, this is difficult to implement. The results of this study identified a 
mismatch between problem definitions and policy goals, and therefore suggested that 
poor policy integration could hamper development towards a more sustainable transport 
system. 
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In the UK, a study by Ison and Rye (2003) analysed travel plans and road user 
charging with respect to a theoretical framework developed by Gunn (1978). The frame-
work sets out 10 conditions, which should be satisfied if perfect implementation is to be 
achieved. The study analysed the model of implementation first proposed by Gunn 
against the empirical experience of attempts to implement travel plans and road user 
charging. This highlighted the most important aspects of the implementation process of 
both, however, the study found that Gunn's conditions do not cover all the essentials of 
implementation where travel plans and road use charging are concerned. These other fac-
tors were found to be a need for monitoring, a policy champion, political stability, trust 
in terms of the parties’ involved, consideration of public relations and careful timing. 
Further case studies were carried out in the UK where Marsden and May (2006) 
reported the results of an investigation of the effects of institutional structure on transport 
policymaking in three UK cities (London, West Yorkshire, and Edinburgh) with very 
different current institutional arrangements and past experience. The results show that 
despite several attempts at local government reorganisation in the United Kingdom, there 
was continuing institutional barriers to the pursuit of sustainable urban transport strate-
gies, and a need to develop conurbation-wide authorities, to introduce franchise-based 
management of public transport services and fares, and to avoid inconsistencies in the 
allocation of funding to larger capital schemes and to revenue-funded projects. The study 
did, however, conclude that experience from London suggests that a combination of the 
right powers and institutional structure, flexible funding, and a strong political champion 
can achieve significant improvements in a short period of time. 
De Gruyter et al. (2015) carried out a case study to identify opportunities to enhance 
the impact of travel plans for new residential developments in Australia. A series of in-
terviews provided insight on their perceived advantages and disadvantages, levels of in-
volvement and stakeholder interactions, implementation challenges and potential solu-
tions, and future expectations. The results showed general support among industry repre-
sentatives for travel plans at new residential developments, but limited confidence in the 
ability to implement them. By applying the interview findings to implementation theory, 
the study identified opportunities to enhance the implementation process and subsequent 
outcomes of travel plans at new residential developments. 
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Furthermore, a study was carried out by Ariffin and Zahari (2013) to analyse the 
implementation of policy and administration of urban transportation system in the Klang 
Valley, Malaysia. This area was chosen due to its phenomenal growth in the last two 
decades that affected the administration of its urban transportation system. Interviews 
were conducted which found that the practices, attitudes and beliefs of those working in 
the transport related field have shed some light on the relationship between agencies and 
the impact that these have upon transportation system in the Klang Valley. The study also 
found that the lack of synergy in the implementation and administration of the system has 
taken its toll on the efficiency and effectiveness of the system. 
Finally, a study was carried out by Tuominen and Himanen (2007) to explore the 
potential of a target analysis method in acting as a link between policy objectives, targets, 
measures and their implementation to intensify the policy process. The study suggested 
this method can be quite useful in bringing transport policy targets closer to policy im-
plementation by considering policy measures to meet the targets and their acceptance as 
a part of the target or objective analysis process. The study therefore concluded that the 
target analysis presented could act as an originator for a more open, interactive and par-
ticularly systematic process in transport policy formulation, leading through social learn-
ing into a more successful implementation of policies. 
These case studies provide exemplars of in-depth investigations into policy imple-
mentation and reveal many challenges. The next section explores the theoretical ap-
proaches to policy implementation meant to overcome these challenges. 
2.4 Summary  
This chapter has provided a historical review of bus policy and has examined bus policy 
in Great Britain since the first UK road legislation was introduced in 1285. The purpose 
of this review was to place the research in a historical context and to show developments 
in bus policy to the present day.   
This chapter has also presented the gaps in literature associated with the implemen-
tation of bus policy at a local level. Firstly, the literature has revealed many studies which 
have been carried out to identify the barriers to implementing transport policies at a local 
Chapter 2: A historical review of bus policy 
   Page 25 
level. However, a gap appeared in the literature where it was found bus policy implemen-
tation has not been sufficiently explored. This is particularly concerning given the de-
crease in bus patronage and bus mileage, and the damaging effect this has on the delivery 
of bus services across the UK. 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical approaches to policy 
implementation 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provided a literature review on bus policy in Great Britain and the 
impact bus deregulation has on bus policy. It also identified a set of research gaps and 
opportunities that will become the focus of this chapter. 
 
This chapter begins with the study of policy implementation, which evolved during 
the late 1960s. It examines the theoretical approaches to implementation and focuses on 
both top-down and bottom-up theoretical approaches. Both approaches are firstly ana-
lysed and then combined to distinguish a relationship between the two. This will help to 
identify emerging themes based on this analysis. The study of policy implementation is 
particularly relevant given the issues associated with implementing bus policy as dis-
cussed in the previous chapter.  
3.2 Theoretical approaches to policy implementation 
The theory of policy implementation has evolved through three generations. The first 
generation ranged from the early 1970s to the ’80s; the second generation from the 1980s 
to the ’90s; and the third generation from 1990 and onwards (Matland, 1995a, 1995b). 
The first generation looked at the problems associated with policy implementation, i.e. 
uncertain relationship between policies, decisions and implemented programmes. Simi-
larly, the second generation focused on the development of an analytical framework of 
implementation, which includes the top-down and bottom-up perspectives. The third gen-
eration is based on implementation theory-building, which has not yet been realised (Pau-
del, 2009).  
The three generations of implementation research can be subdivided into three dis-
tinct theoretical approaches to the study of implementation:  
1. Top-down models put their main emphasis on the ability of decision makers to pro-
duce unequivocal policy objectives and on controlling the implementation stage. 
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2. Bottom-up critiques view local bureaucrats as the main actors in policy delivery 
and conceive of implementation as negotiation processes within networks of imple-
menters.  
3. Hybrid (synthesis) theories try to overcome the divide between the other two ap-
proaches by incorporating elements of top-down, bottom-up and other theoretical 
models.  
During the first generation, there was less emphasis on theory building, whereas the 
second generation began to put forward a whole range of theoretical frameworks and 
hypotheses. It soon became apparent that concerns shifted from the “what” of policy out-
comes to the “why” of perceived policy failure, with more focus on the actual process of 
translating policy into action: the process of implementation (Barrett, 2004).  
During the second generation, theorists on implementation were divided into two 
camps. Those who embraced the top-down perspective believed that centralised policy-
makers should be as clear as possible with their goals, minimize the number of bureau-
crats a policy depends on, and limit necessary change. Bottom-up theorists argue that 
having more freedom to implement a policy will ward off job dissatisfaction and allow 
policies to be more adaptive to local conditions. It can therefore be seen that the two 
approaches vary in several areas, such as the role of actors and their relationships and the 
type of policies they can be applied to.  
During the third generation, several researchers have synthesised elements of both 
top-down and bottom-up approaches to produce new hybrid theories and models. These 
theories and models are developed to combine elements of both sides to avoid the con-
ceptual weaknesses of top-down and bottom-up approaches. For example, Elmore (1985) 
developed an idea to combine the concept of “backward mapping” with “forward map-
ping”, where policy makers should start with the consideration of policy instruments and 
available resources for policy change (forward mapping), but they should also identify 
the incentive structure of implementers and target groups (backward mapping). Matland 
(1995a, 1995b) developed an “ambiguity and conflict model” which combined top-down 
and bottom-up perspectives and identified how ambiguity and conflict affect policy im-
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plementation. Furthermore, Goggin et al. (1990) developed a model which included var-
iables from both top-down and bottom-up approaches and was based on the communica-
tions theory perspective of intergovernmental implementation.  
This research will contribute further to the study of theoretical approaches of policy 
implementation. This will become more apparent in the following sections where litera-
ture on both top-down (section 3.2.1) and bottom-up (section 3.2.2) approaches will be 
examined. It will also reveal emerging themes based on these approaches, which will be 
used to develop a new decision support framework for this research.  
There was no existing hybrid theory that really included all the factors that were 
hypothesized to be important.  Most of the hybrid theories reviewed tended to focus too 
much on one or two explanatory factors rather than the broad range that were felt to be 
important, after having read the existing literature on the topic.  In particular, even theo-
rists such as Winter (1990) and Elmore (1985) tended to place greater emphasis in their 
hybrid models on the more bottom-up elements whereas it was felt by the author that 
certain top down elements, particularly availability of resources and organisational ca-
pacity, were not emphasised sufficiently.  For this reason, a new decision support frame-
work was developed for this research. 
3.2.1 Top-down approaches 
Top-down frameworks suggest that centralised policymakers should be as clear as possi-
ble with their goals, minimize the number of bureaucrats on which a policy depends, and 
limit necessary change (Matland, 1995). Four key theorists embraced this approach: 
Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), Gunn (1978), and 
Sabatier and Mazmanian (1981).  
Pressman and Wildavsky (1973): 
Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) carried out a study on the implementation of public pol-
icies. Most of their work was based on theories about Economic Development Agency 
(EDA) projects in Oakland-California funded by the U.S. federal government in 1965. 
They found the following five points to be essential for policy implementation: 
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1. Implementation should not be divorced from policy and must not be conceived as 
a process that takes place after, and independent of, the design of policy. 
2. Designers of policy must consider direct means for achieving their ends. 
3. Consider carefully the theory that underlies your actions.  
4. Continuity of leadership is important for implementation.  
5. Simplicity in policies is much to be desired.  
The work of Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) did not attempt to construct an ex-
plicit theoretical model of the implementation process. Instead, their observations pro-
vided clear indications of some of the key elements that should be consciously applied by 
public administrators. They considered the policy process to be unidirectional because 
policies were first designed or formulated by leaders and then carried out through inter-
mediary implementers. They believed there was a close relationship between policy de-
sign and implementation. As a result of this, Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) wanted to 
change the “classical” theory by calling for integration, rather than the separation, of pol-
icy formations and policy implementation (Nangpuhan, 2015). 
Van Meter and Van Horn (1975): 
Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) proposed a six-variable model for analysing policy im-
plementation. They argued that the gaps that often occur between policy decision intent 
and policy performance, or implementation outcome, are impediments of policy imple-
mentation.  Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) therefore believe their model would enable 
policy analysts to explain observed policy outcomes and policy makers can utilise that 
information to improve the delivery of public services. The Van Meter and Van Horn 
(1975) model features six factors: the first three factors focus on the policy and the second 
three factors concentrate on aspects of the policy’s implementation.  
1. The first factor of the model examines the policy itself in four categories: statutory 
goals and objectives, the background of the policy, definition of key terms, and 
the policy’s target groups. 
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2. The second factor of the model explores the policy’s resources including funding 
appropriations, technical or legal assistance offered in the law, and political sup-
port for the law itself.   
3. The third factor of the model deals with policy enforcement and compliance which 
details what compliance means in the context of the law, what institutions are 
involved, and delineates sanctions for not non-compliance.   
4. The fourth factor of the model investigates characteristics of the implementing 
agency, including its bureaucratic structure, type of managerial power, organisa-
tional culture, and intergovernmental relations with other agencies and stakehold-
ers.   
5. The fifth factor of the model considers economic, social, and political conditions 
as a factor affecting policy implementation, including the general economic envi-
ronment, prevailing societal ideologies, public opinion and media attention, and 
political support and/or opposition. 
6. The sixth factor of the model evaluates the disposition of implementers, including 
his or her cognitive ability and willingness to understand the policy, his or her 
technical expertise, his or her level of support for the policy, and values like effi-
ciency, effectiveness, equity, ethics, and empathy.   
Gunn (1978): 
Gunn (1978) published a seminal article titled “Why is implementation so difficult?”. 
This article sets out 10 conditions that should be considered if perfect implementation is 
to be achieved for a particular policy. These 10 conditions include: 
1. There are no crippling external circumstances.  
2. Adequate time and resources are available.  
3. The necessary resources are available as needed during implementation. 
4. The policy is based on a valid theory of cause and effect. 
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5. Cause and effect are closely linked. 
6. A single agency can control the whole programme, with minimal dependency on 
others. 
7. Everyone involved agrees on the objectives. 
8. It is possible to specify in advance who needs to do what, and when. 
9. All those involved communicate and co-ordinate well throughout. 
10. Those in authority can obtain obedience throughout. 
These 10 conditions highlight the important issues that need to be addressed if the 
intentions of the policy makers are to be realised. They provide a top-down approach to 
policy implementation whereby getting everything in the right place so that those at the 
top can ensure that those at the bottom do the right thing.  
However, Ison and Rye (2003) point out that Gunn’s conditions do not cover all the 
essentials of implementation. They believe there is a need for monitoring, a policy cham-
pion, political stability, trust in terms of the parties involved, careful consideration of 
public relations and careful timing. Also, they believe Gunn’s framework may require to 
be enhanced, both by the addition of further objectives, and then prioritising these objec-
tives. This enhanced framework could then be used to analyse other areas of transport 
policy. For example, Charles (2005) followed on from the work of Ison and Rye (2003) 
to analyse the implementation of traffic incident management in the Brisbane metropoli-
tan region.  
Sabatier and Mazmanian (1981): 
Sabatier and Mazmanian (1981) developed their top-down theoretical framework for an-
alysing policy implementation in the early 1980’s. This framework applies many statutory 
and non-statutory variables to five identified stages in the policy implementation process, 
as shown in Figure 3.1.  
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The PIF addresses policy implementation issues: (1) the extent to which implement-
ing officials and target groups act consistently with the objectives and procedures outlined 
in the policy decision; (2) the extent to which policy objectives are attained; (3) the prin-
cipal factors affecting policy outcomes and impacts; and (4) the policy's reformulation, if 
any. According to Sabatier and Mazmanian (1981), the crucial role of implementation 
analysis is to identify the variables that affect the achievement of the policy objectives 
throughout the process. These variables can be divided into three broad categories: (1) 
the material variables associated with the problem(s) being addressed, (2) the structural 
dimensions that influence the implementation process, and (3) the net effect of a variety 
of contextual variables to support the policy. Sabatier and Mazmanian (1981) in turn ap-
ply these three independent variables to five stages of policy implementation. However, 
Sabatier and Mazmanian (1981) point out that the timeframe for appropriately applying 
the PIF is between twenty and thirty-five years. 
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Figure 3.1: Policy Implementation Framework (PIF) (Elson, 2006) 
Table 3.1 presents a summary of the top-down approaches by Pressman and Wil-
davsky (1973), Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), Gunn (1978), and Sabatier and Maz-








1. Technical difficulties 
2. Diversity of target group behaviour  
3. Target group as a percentage of the population 
4. Extent of behaviour change required 
Structural Variables 
 
1. Clear and consistent objectives 
2. Incorporation of adequate casual theory 
3. Hierarchical integration within and 
among implementing institutions 
4. Decision rules of implementing agen-
cies 
5. Recruitment  of implementing officials 
6. Initial allocation of financial resources 
7. Formal access by outsiders 
Structural Variables 
 
1. Socioeconomic conditions and tech-
nology 
2. Public support 
3. Attitudes and resources of constitu-
ency groups 
4. Support from legislators 
5. Commitment and leadership skill of 
implementing officials 




policy outputs by 
target groups 
Actual impact of 
policy outputs 
Perceived impact 
of policy outputs 
Major revision 
in policy 
Five stages (dependent variables) in the implementation process 
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Table 3.1: Top-down theorists and factors which influence implementation 
Theo-
rist 






















1. Implementation should not be divorced from policy and must not be conceived 
as a process that takes place after, and independent of, the design of policy. 
2. Designers of policy must consider direct means for achieving their ends. 
3. Consider carefully the theory that underlies your actions. 
4. Continuity of leadership is important for implementation. 




















1. The first factor examines the policy itself in four categories: goals and objectives, 
the background of the policy, definition of key terms, and the policy’s target 
groups. 
2. The second factor explores policy resources such as funding, technical or legal 
assistance, and political support. 
3. The third factor deals with policy enforcement and compliance in the context of 
the law, what institutions are involved, and delineates sanctions for not non-com-
pliance. 
4. The fourth factor investigates characteristics of the implementing agency, in-
cluding its bureaucratic structure, type of managerial power, organisational cul-
ture, and intergovernmental relations with other agencies and stakeholders. 
5. The fifth variable considers economic, social, and political conditions as a factor 
affecting policy implementation. 
6. The sixth variable evaluates the disposition of implementers, including the mo-











1. There should be no crippling external circumstances. 
2. Adequate time and resources are available. 
3. The necessary resources are available as needed during implementation. 
4. The policy is based on a valid theory of cause and effect. 
5. Cause and effect are closely linked. 
6. A single agency can control the whole programme, with minimal dependency on 
others. 
7. Everyone involved agrees on the objectives. 
8. It is possible to specify in advance who needs to do what, and when. 
9. All those involved communicate and co-ordinate well throughout. 





















1. Clear and consistent objectives. 
2. Adequate causal theory. 
3. Implementation process legally structured to enhance compliance by incorpo-
rating officials and target groups. 
4. Committed and skilful implementing officials. 
5. Support of interest groups and sovereigns. 
6. Changes in socio-economic conditions that do not undermine political support 
or causal theory. 
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Six themes have been identified from the top-down approach, including policy 
standards and objectives; availability of resources; intra-organisation support and com-
munication; characteristics of organisations; economic, social and political environments; 
and policy champions. These themes are now used to examine the theories and models 
proposed by top-down scholars for successful policy implementation. Table 3.2 presents 
the analysis of the top-down theoretical approaches. 
Table 3.2: Analysis of top-down theoretical approaches 
 




There needs to be clear and consistent objectives and the priority of 
objectives should not be undermined over time by conflicting public 
policies or changes in socio-economic conditions (S&M). The policy 
implemented must be based upon a valid theory of cause and effect; 
the relationship between cause and effect must be direct and there 
must be few, if any, intervening links; there must be complete under-
standing of, and agreement upon, the objectives throughout the im-
plementation process; and tasks should be fully specified in correct 
sequence (Gunn). Implementation requires (1) statutory goals and 
objectives; (2) the background of the policy; (3) definition of key 
terms; and (4) the policy’s target groups (VM&VH). Implementation 
is an interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to 
achieve those (P&W). 
2 
Availability of  
resources 
Adequate time and sufficient resources must be made available; the 
required combination of resources must be actually available; and 
tasks must be fully specified in the correct sequence (Gunn). Policy 




tional support and 
communication 
Policy needs to be supported by organised constituency groups with 
few key legislators throughout the process (S&M). There needs to be 
consistent inter-organisational communication and enforcement ac-
tivities (P&W). There must be perfect communication and co-ordi-
nation between participants (Gunn). Technical advice and assistance 
should be offered in the law, and political support for the law itself; 





The implementation process needs to be legally structured to enhance 
compliance; and leaders and implementing agencies require signifi-
cant managerial and political skills and commitment to the goals 
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(S&M). There should be minimal dependency relationships between 
implementing agencies (Gunn). Both formal structural features of or-
ganisations and informal attributes of their personnel are important 
(P&W). These include bureaucratic structure, type of managerial 
power, organisational culture, and intergovernmental relations with 





The circumstances external to the implementing agency must not im-
pose crippling constraints (Gunn). Economic, social, and political 
conditions as a factor affecting policy implementation should be con-
sidered (P&W), including the general economic environment, pre-
vailing societal ideologies, public opinion and media attention, and 
political support and/or opposition (VM&VH). The support of inter-
est groups and sovereigns are essential for implementation; it is im-
portant that changes in socio-economic conditions do not undermine 
political support or causal theory; and the priority of objectives is not 
undermined over time by conflicting public policies or changes in 
socio-economic conditions (S&M). 
6 Policy champions 
There must be perfect communication and co-ordination between 
participants; and those in authority must be able to demand and ob-
tain perfect compliance (Gunn). Committed and skilful implement-
ing officials are required for implementation; and leaders and imple-
menting agencies require significant managerial and political skills 
and commitment to the goals (S&M). Implementing agencies should 
express his or her cognitive ability and willingness to understand the 
policy, his or her technical expertise, his or her level of support for 
the policy, and values like efficiency, effectiveness, equity, ethics, 
and empathy (VM&VH) and (P&W). 
Note: S&M refers to Sabatier and Mazmanian; VM&VH refers to Van Meter & Van Horn; P&W refers to 
Pressman and Wildavsky 
3.2.2 Bottom-up approaches 
Bottom-up frameworks emphasise target groups and service deliverers, arguing that pol-
icy is made at the local level (Matland, 1995a, 1995b). Five key theorists embraced this 
approach: Lipsky (1971, 1980), Hjern et al. (1978), Elmore (1980), Rein (1983), and 
Grindle and Thomas (1990). 
Lipsky (1971, 1980): 
The theory proposed by Lipsky (1971, 1980) is that "policy implementation in the end 
comes down to the people who actually implement it". Lipsky (1971, 1980) believes that 
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bureaucrats operate at “street level” which include teachers, social workers, public law-
yers, police officers, judges, health workers, and other public employees who provide 
services, enforce the law, and distribute public benefits to citizens directly. Lipsky (1971, 
1980) also claims that these bureaucrats are in effect, “policy makers”. For this reason, 
Lipsky (1971, 1980) is often cited as the founder of the bottom-up policymaking perspec-
tive. He also argued that state employees should be seen as part of the "policy-making 
community" and as exercisers of political power. 
The street-level bureaucrats are considered to have a clearer understanding of what 
clients need as they have direct contact with the public. Lipsky’s (1971, 1980) theory 
therefore focuses on the discretionary decisions that each street-level bureaucrat makes 
in relation to individual citizens when they are delivering policies to them. This discre-
tionary role in delivering services or enforcing regulations makes street-level bureaucrats 
essential actors in implementing public policies. A summary of the bottom-up approach 
by Lipsky (1971, 1980) includes the following; 
 The essential contradiction: street-level bureaucrats are expected to adhere to rou-
tines and bureaucratic procedures that ensure that all citizens are treated equally, 
while being responsive to unique, individual circumstance. 
 Street-level bureaucrats are “policy makers” due to the inherent discretion in-
volved in their interactions with the public and the astonishing impact that their 
decisions have on the lives of citizens. 
 Disillusioned with their ability to meet their own goals, street-level bureaucrats 
develop coping mechanisms, which are often unsanctioned by the agencies that 
employ them. 
 Lipsky (1971, 1980) does not advocate for or against the discretion of street-level 
bureaucrats. He just acknowledges that it exists. 
Hjern et al. (1978): 
The most extensive empirical work within the bottom-up tradition has been carried out 
by Hjern et al. (1978). The theory proposed by Hjern et al. (1978) was to study a policy 
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problem, asking micro-level actors about their goals, activities, problems, and contacts. 
This technique enabled Hjern et al. (1978) to map a network that identified the relevant 
implementation structure for a specific policy at the local, regional, and national levels, 
and to evaluate the significance of government programs and other influences such as 
markets. This technique also identified strategic coalitions as well as unintended effects 
of policy and the dynamic nature of policy implementation. The theory developed by 
Hjern et al. (1978) found that central initiatives were poorly adapted to local conditions. 
Program success depended in large part on the skills of individuals in the local implemen-
tation structure who can adapt policy to local conditions. This theory provides a mecha-
nism for moving from street level bureaucrats up to the policy-makers in both the public 
and private sectors.  
Elmore (1980): 
Elmore (1980) adopts a bottom-up approach to implementation analysis, which is defined 
as backward mapping. Elmore (1980) identified four main ingredients for implementa-
tion: (1) clearly specified tasks and objectives that accurately reflect the intent of policy; 
(2) a management plan that allocates tasks and performance standards to subunits; (3) an 
objective means of measuring subunit performance; and (4) a system of management 
controls and social sanctions sufficient to hold subordinates accountable for their perfor-
mance. According to Elmore (1980), one of the most important features of policy imple-
mentation is the “process by which policies are translated into administrative actions” and 
“the translation of an idea into action involves certain crucial simplification.” Elmore 
further points out that “virtually all public policies are implemented by large public or-
ganisation” and “organisations are simplifiers; they work on problems by breaking them 
into discrete, manageable tasks and allocating responsibility for those tasks to specialised 
units”. Finally, Elmore (1980) believes failures of implementation are, by definition, 
lapses of planning, specification and control. 
Rein (1983): 
Rein (1983) put forward a theoretical perspective of implementation and questioned the 
controllability of policy implementation using the concept of puzzlement and conflict. 
Rein (1983) stated that “implementation is understood as a declaration of government 
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preferences, mediated by a number of actors, who create a circular process characterised 
by reciprocal power relations and negotiations”. Rein (1983) specifies three types of pri-
mary actors in the implementation process including; 
1. Guideline developers, 
2. Interest groups, and  
3. Programme administrators. 
Furthermore, Rein (1983) believes that policy implementation is a matter of puzzle-
ment where; 
1. Front-line worker don’t know what is expected of them; 
2. There are insufficient resources available; and 
3. Front line workers are incompetent and lack the knowledge and skill to carry out 
tasks. 
This theoretical perspective by Rein (1983) suggests that there is a downward spiral 
of puzzlement where unclear and incompatible policies are passed down to those at a 
lower level. As a result, everyday practitioners become responsible for dealing with these 
issues but become ever more “puzzled” about how to do so. 
Grindle and Thomas (1990): 
Grindle and Thomas (1990) also argue that the top-down models are ineffective. They 
suggest an interactive model is required for implementation, which is a long-term process 
of decision-making and antagonistic reaction (bottom-up). According to Sutton (1999), 
this model is the most widely-held view of the way in which policy is made. It also out-
lines policy-making as a problem solving process which is rational, balanced, objective 
and analytical.  
The complex framework put forward by Grindle and Thomas (1990) describes pol-
icy development that includes an agenda phase, a decision phase, and an implementation 
phase (Figure 3.2). At each stage, the framework suggests that a decision can be made for 
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or against the policy. For example, an issue can either be put on the policy agenda or not 
put on the agenda. At the decision phase, the decision can be for or against policy reform. 
At any of the three stages, a policy either continues to move toward successful implemen-
tation, or else it is derailed. The framework consists of the following phases: 
 Recognising and defining the nature of the issue to be dealt with; 
 Identifying possible courses of action to deal with the issue; 
 Weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of each of these alternatives; 
 Choosing the option which offers the best solution; 
 Implementing the policy; and 
 Evaluating the outcome. 
 
Figure 3.2: The Linear Model (Grindle and Thomas, 1990) 
Grindle and Thomas (1990) updated the linear model and produced an interactive 
model. A central element in the interactive model is that a policy reform initiative may 
be altered or reversed at any stage in its life cycle by pressures and reactions from those 
who oppose it. Grindle and Thomas (1990) pointed out that “unlike the linear model, the 
interactive model views policy reform as a process, one in which interested parties can 
Time 
Reform issue 
Implementation phase Agenda phase Decision phase 
On agenda 
Not on 
Decision for reform 
Decision against 
Successfully implemented 
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exert pressure for change at many points understanding the location, strength and stakes 
involved in these attempts to promote, alter, or reverse policy reform initiatives is central 
to understanding the outcomes”.  
Table 3.3 presents a summary of the bottom-up approaches of Lipsky (1971, 1980), 
Hjern et al. (1978), Elmore (1980), Rein (1983), and Grindle and Thomas (1990). This 
includes the factors which their work argues have an influence on implementation.  
Four themes have been identified from the bottom-up approach, including bureau-
cratic power; collaboration and interaction between those involved in the policy process; 
policy remodelling; and opposition, conflict and ambiguities. These themes are then used 
to examine the theories and models proposed by bottom-up scholars for successful policy 
implementation. Table 3.4 presents the analysis of the bottom-up theoretical approaches. 
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Table 3.3: Bottom-up theorists and factors which influence implementation 
















1. Street-level bureaucrats are expected to adhere to routines and bureaucratic 
procedures to ensure all citizens are treated equally, while being responsive 
to unique, individual circumstance. 
2. Street-level bureaucrats are policy makers due to the inherent discretion in-
volved in their interactions with the public and their decisions have an impact 
on the lives of citizens. 
3. Disillusioned with their ability to meet their own goals, street-level bureau-
crats develop coping mechanisms, which are often unsanctioned by the agen-












) 1. Central initiatives are poorly adapted to local conditions. 
2. Programme success depends on the skills of individuals in the local imple-
mentation structure who can adapt policy to local conditions. 
3. Services are more likely to be delivered by implementation structures than a 
single lonely organisation. 












1. There needs to be clearly specified tasks and objectives that accurately reflect 
the intent of policy. 
2. A management plan that allocates tasks and performance standards to subu-
nits should be in place. 
3. There should be an objective means of measuring subunit performance. 
4. There needs to be a system of management controls and social sanctions suf-









) 1. Front-line worker must know what is expected of them. 
2. There needs to be insufficient resources available. 
3. Front line workers must be competent and have the knowledge and skill to 




















1. The framework proposed by Grindle and Thomas (1991) consists of an 
agenda phase, decision phase, and implementation phase. At each stage, the 
framework suggests that a decision can be made for or against the policy. At 
any of the three stages, a policy can either move towards successful imple-
mentation or be removed. The phases are of the framework include: 
2. Recognising and defining the nature of the issue to be dealt with; 
3. Identifying possible courses of action to deal with the issue; 
4. Weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of each of these alternatives; 
5. Choosing the option which offers the best solution; 
6. Implementing the policy;  
7. Possibly evaluating the outcome. 
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Table 3.4: Analysis of bottom-up theoretical approaches 
 
Critical Variable Theorist 
1 Bureaucratic power 
Decisions and actions do more to influence outcomes than poli-
cies and programmes set by the top (Lipsky). Programme success 
depends in large part on the skills of individuals in the local im-





those involved in the 
policy process 
Specific types of primary actors in the implementation process in-
clude (1) guideline developers; (2) interest groups; and (3) pro-
gramme administrators (Rein). Services are likely to be delivered 
by implementation structures than a single lonely organisation 
(Hjern). Features of policy implementation include the process by 
which policies are translated into administrative actions and the 
translation of an idea into action which involves certain crucial 
simplification. Virtually all public policies are implemented by 
large public organisations where they work on problems by break-
ing them into discrete, manageable tasks and allocating responsi-
bility for those tasks to specialised units (Elmore). 
3 Policy remodelling 
Policy development includes an agenda phase, a decision phase, 
and an implementation phase. At each stage, the framework sug-
gests that a decision can be made for or against the policy. For 
example, an issue can either be put on the policy agenda or not 
put on the agenda. At the decision phase, the decision can be for 
or against policy reform. At any of the three stages, a policy either 
continues to move toward successful implementation, or else it is 
derailed (G&T). When policy is unclear and incompatible, each 
successive stage in the process of implementation provides a new 
context for seeking further clarification. One of the consequences 
of passing ambiguity for an inconsistent legislation is that the 
arena of decision making shifts to a lower level. As a result, the 
everyday practitioners become the ones who resolve the lack of 




Policy implementation be a matter of puzzlement where pro-
gramme administrators and front-line works do not know what is 
required of them, the resources at hand are insufficient for the task 
and workers lack the knowledge and skill to take action (Rein). 
Street-level bureaucrats develop coping mechanisms to deal with 
the challenges brought about by inadequate resources, few con-
trols, indeterminate objectives, and discouraging circumstances. 
Street-level bureaucrats develop patterns of practices, such as rou-
tines and stereotyping, to limit demands on their time and re-
sources. They modify the concept of their job to narrow the gap 
between objectives and resources and they modify the concept of 
their clients to render the inevitable gap between objectives and 
accomplishments (Lipsky). 
Note: Hjern refers to Hjern et al; G&T refers to Grindle and Thomas. 
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3.3 Summary  
The literature has revealed that there has been extensive research into policy implemen-
tation since the late 1960’s and many scholars have attempted to develop policy imple-
mentation theories and models to address the gaps that often occur between policy deci-
sion intent and policy performance, or implementation outcome. Ten key themes have 
been identified to address these gaps, including policy standards and objectives; availa-
bility of resources; intra-organisation support and communication; characteristics of or-
ganisations; economic, social and political environments; policy champions; bureaucratic 
power; collaboration and interaction between those involved in the policy process; policy 
remodelling; and opposition, conflict and ambiguities.  
However, it was found that no existing hybrid theory included all the factors that 
were hypothesized to be important. Therefore, a new decision support framework is pro-
posed in this thesis, which consists of theoretical elements of both top-down and bottom-
up approaches identified in section 3.2.1 and section 3.2.2. 
The next chapter presents the methodological approaches adopted for this study. 
Once the data is collected for this study, the literature and the proposed decision support 
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Chapter 4: Methodology  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will discuss the research approaches, methods used, process adopted for data 
collection and data analysis techniques employed for undertaking this research. Ethical 
considerations will also be addressed, followed by a set of concluding remarks to set the 
scene for the subsequent chapters of this study. 
4.2 Philosophical approach 
A research paradigm is a belief system and set of practices that guides researchers on how 
problems should be understood and addressed. According to Guba (1990), research par-
adigms can be characterised by ontology (What is reality?), epistemology (How do you 
know something?) and methodology (How do go about finding out?). 
The research paradigm adopted for this study depends on the general philosophy 
which underpins the research activity. According to Mikkelsen (2005), the academic ‘po-
sition’ for a study is crucial for the focus of the study, for the questions asked, for deci-
sions on data to be collected, and for intended results of analysis. The most common 
academic ‘positions’ in the social sciences are positivism, constructivism and realism. 
 
1. Positivism advocates the application of the methods of the natural sciences to the 
study of social reality and beyond (Bryman, 2001). It assumes that there are pat-
terns and regularities, causes and consequences, in the social world just like there 
are in the natural world (Denscombe, 2003). 
 
2. Constructivism/interpretivism requires the social scientist to grasp the subjective 
meaning of social action (Bryman, 2001). It regards people as creative interpreters 
of events, and through their actions and interpretations they are ‘agents’ who ac-
tively create an order to their existence (Denscombe, 2003). 
 
3. Critical realism asserts that the study of the social world should be concerned with 
the identification of the structures that generate the world. Practitioners aim to 
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identify structures in order to change them, so that inequalities and justices may 
be counteracted (Bryman, 2001).  
 
Positivist researchers use quantitative tools and techniques that emphasise measur-
ing and counting. They assume that reality is fixed, directly measurable and knowable 
and that there is just one truth and one external reality. In contrast to this, naturalist re-
searchers prefer the qualitative tools of observation, questioning and description. They 
assume that reality constantly changes and can be known only indirectly through the in-
terpretations of people. They also accept the possibility that there are multiple versions 
of reality (Rubin and Rubin, 2011).  
From identifying the various philosophical approaches, this study utilised a natu-
ralistic approach and took place within an interpretive research model. A naturalistic ap-
proach was chosen since the purpose of this research is to explore, understand and explain 
a current situation (Bryman 2001). The research was conducted in a natural setting and 
employed qualitative methods in the data collection and analysis stages, constantly com-
paring emerging patterns and themes and interpreting them. A case study approach was 
also chosen as it follows naturalistic modes of inquiry because the main objective is to 
discover the relationship between different interpretations and build an understanding of 
the meaning of experiences. 
The interpretative paradigm emphasises the importance of understanding the social 
world by examining the participants' perspective and how they construct meaning in nat-
ural settings (Bryman, 2001; Neuman, 2003). This research aims to identify perceptions, 
feelings and views of the key actors involved in bus policy implementation at a local 
level. This qualitative approach was a suitable choice in this study because qualitative 
methods lend themselves to research that attempts to understand the complex nature of 
people's experiences, feelings and emotions, which are difficult to measure using quanti-
tative methods (Strauss and Corbin, 1997). Moreover, qualitative research is concerned 
with understanding the nature of the problem and allows an in-depth analysis (Yin, 2003). 
This research followed both inductive and deductive approaches. According to Bry-
man and Bell (2011, p13), the inductive approach consists of a researcher using their own 
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findings or observations to make up a theory. Saunders et al (2009, p.61) suggests that 
when literature is reviewed in the inductive approach, it is for the researchers to find 
something to connect their own theory to. This research therefore followed an inductive 
approach to begin with. This was evident in chapter 2 where a review of literature was 
conducted to identify the gaps associated with bus policy implementation, followed by 
the development of a decision support framework based on theory identified in this re-
view of literature. This research also followed a deductive approach. A deductive ap-
proach contrasts with an inductive approach and aims to test a theory or to test hypotheses 
derived from findings or observations (Bryman and Bell, 2011, p13). Hence, this research 
followed a deductive approach because it examined the implementation of bus policy 
using the existing decision support framework predetermined in this chapter.  
4.3 Review of research methodology and research methods 
Yin (2012) points out that research questions are the suggested starting points of a re-
search study because they provide important clues about the substance that a researcher 
is aiming to assess. Therefore, three research questions were devised in this research to 
assess the barriers to implementing bus policies at a local level. To help answer these 
research questions, it was important to connect a research methodology and an appropri-
ate set of research methods (Wahyuni, 2012). Research methodology and research meth-
ods are two distinctive concepts. Jonker and Pennink (2010) provide a useful example for 
explaining these concepts and suggest a methodology is a domain or a map, whereas a 
method refers to a set of steps to travel between two places on the map.  
Kaplan (1973) suggests a methodology can be considered as the discipline of ap-
plying appropriate research methods for specific pieces of research. Kothari (2004) also 
suggests the methodology helps to describe the stages of the research and to decide upon 
the best means of addressing the research problem. As there are several key stages in this 
research, a mixed methods research approach was adopted. Mixed methods research is a 
methodology for conducting research that involves collecting, analysing and integrating 
quantitative (e.g., surveys) and qualitative (e.g., interviews) research. This approach to 
research is used when this integration provides a better understanding of the research 
problem than either of each alone. This approach was therefore considered appropriate as 
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a single method would not be capable of achieving all of the research objectives outlined 
in chapter one of this thesis.  
Once a mixed methodology was chosen for this research, it was then necessary to 
choose an appropriate set of research methods. To help select these research methods, 
previous studies were examined to identify methods that were adopted in similar studies. 
However, as previously mentioned in chapter 1 of this thesis, there are no studies which 
have specifically addressed bus policy. Therefore, these studies were established in the 
literature review in the broader context of transport policy. Moreover, these studies have 
been carried out to review, explore and analyse issues related to the implementation of 
transport policy. The methods used in these studies are listed in table 4.1: 
Table 4.1: Research methods used in the study of transport policy 
Research Method Author 
Observations Bray et al (2011) 
Desk review on policy docu-
ments and reports 
Ison and Rye (2003); White (1995, 1997, 2010); Spear 
and Lightowler (2005); Preston and Almutairi (2013, 
2014); McTigue et al. (2017)  
Questionnaires 
Gaffron (2003); Lindholm and Blinge (2014); McTigue et 
al. (2017) 
Interviews and focus group dis-
cussions with transport experts 
and key stake holders 
Marsden and May (2006); Tuominen and Himanen 
(2007); Argyriou et al. (2012); Ariffin and Zahari (2013); 
Ballantyne et al. (2013); Van de Velde and Wallis, 
(2013); White (2013); Van de Velde and Augustin (2014); 
De Gruyter et al. (2015); Mulley and Reedy (2015); Ols-
son et al (2015); Gössling et al. (2016) 
These studies are helpful for understanding the common methods used in transport 
policy and are exemplars of appropriate methods required for examining bus policy. Once 
the common research methods were established, it was then important to understand the 
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merits and demits of these approaches, along with other approaches that could be adopted 
in this research. This in turn would help select the most appropriate research methods to 
be adopted in this study. Table 4.2 presents a summary of research methods and the ad-
vantages and limitations associated with these methods. 
The studies identified in table 4.1 and the research methods identified in table 4.2 
suggest a variety of methods which can be adopted in policy research to review, explore 






















Table 4.2: Summary of common research methods used in transport policy 
Source: Author’s synthesis on literature based on Bryman (2001), Greenfield (2002), Mack et al (2005), Yin (2009) and Hennick et al. (2011)










tions of participants 
in natural settings 
 Can directly observe what participants do rather 
that what they say they do 
 Behaviour can be observed 
 Respondents’ willingness to respond 
 Generally unobtrusive 
 Potential for observer bias 
 Potential for participants to act differently 
 Does not determine why participants behave the way they 
do 
 Privacy or access issues may arise 

















 Generally unobtrusive 
 Potential to provide information that is not di-
rectly observable 
 Can be used for longitudinal analyses 
 Documents may be out of date, incomplete or unavailable 
 Documents may be inaccurate or biased towards selected in-
formation 











 Useful for asking ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions 
 Provides in-depth analysis 
 Potential to probe for additional information 
 Can properly know/understand the participating 
audience 
 Interviewer may be bias 
 Potential for reflexivity bias 
 May be time consuming to conduct, analyse and interpret 
findings 
 Multiple interviews needed to identify a range of issues 











To understand a 
range of opinions 
on a specific issue 
or to seek commu-
nity norms 
 Can thoroughly cover subjects as the discussion 
gets different points of view 
 Can probe for additional information 
 Can explore new topics and issues in depth 
 Potential for dominant characters to influence other partici-
pants so they do not voice their own opinions 
 Time consuming to conduct, analyse and interpret findings 


















isting findings or to 
explore a topic from 
a different angle 
 Inexpensive and quick 
 Published data is generally high quality 
 Can be used for longitudinal analyses 
 Can be analysed across different geographies 
 Can be difficult to get access to data 
 No control over data quality 
 Can be unfamiliar with data 
 May not contain all variables of interest 
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4.4 Overall research approach 
In order to achieve the research objectives outlined in chapter one of this thesis, a mixed 
methods research approach was adopted comprising of both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches. The quantitative methods include questionnaires while the qualitative meth-
ods include a desktop review, telephone interviews, observations and face-to-face inter-
views. Quantitative data collection methods are useful for analysing the quantitative as-
pects related to transport governance and setting targets and suitable measures to achieve 
those targets. Meanwhile qualitative data collection methods are helpful to explore social 
issues by analysing the different perspectives of participants’ experiences, evaluating sub-
jective judgments and the contextual understanding of policy issues (Flick, 2006). A brief 
description of each research method is provided in the following sections. 
4.4.1 Desktop document review 
Most research begins with an investigation to learn what is already known and what re-
mains to be learned about a topic (Creswell, 2009). Chapter three of this thesis revealed 
that there has been extensive research into policy implementation since the late 1960’s 
and many scholars have attempted to develop policy implementation theories and models 
to address the gaps that often occur between policy decision intent and policy perfor-
mance, or implementation outcome. However, it was found that no existing hybrid theory 
included all the factors that were hypothesized to be important.  For this reason, an ex-
tensive desktop review was carried out and a new decision support framework was cre-
ated to analyse the data collected in this research. 
Section 3.2.1 and section 3.2.2 provide fruitful theoretical elements of both top-
down and bottom-up approaches, which can now be combined to develop the new deci-
sion support framework for this study. The new framework consists of a ten-point analyt-
ical matrix based on a synthesis of the frameworks devised by the theorists mentioned in 
chapter three. From analysis of top-down and bottom-up theoretical approaches, the fol-
lowing decision support framework was developed: 
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New decision support framework 
1. Policy objective:  A written bus policy document should be in place, showing a 
clear link between policy objectives, measures and the setting and monitoring of 
targets. 
2. Availability of resources: Resources such as financial support are important; how-
ever, where resources are limited, it is necessary to maximise the use of available 
resources. 
3. Intra-organisation support and communication: Policy staff need relevant train-
ing, supervision and support within their organisation when dealing with complex 
policy issues. 
4. Characteristics of organisations: Both formal structural features of organisations 
and informal attributes of their personnel (including size, competency and work-
load of staff). 
5. Economic, social and political environments: Current and future economic, social 
and political environments play an important role on the outcome of the policy 
process. 
6. Policy champions: Policy implementation should not be restricted to one policy 
champion and instead needs several policy champions who are responsible, com-
petent and motivated to see the policy through from beginning to end. 
7. Bureaucratic power: Hierarchical control in an organisation is important; how-
ever, hierarchical power must not be used to overrule policy decisions by other 
members within the organisation. 
8. Collaboration and interaction between those involved in the policy process: Col-
laboration and interaction is necessary between key actors involved in the policy 
process, including policy makers, local authority staff, local and national govern-
ing bodies, regional transport partnerships, bus operators and transport practition-
ers working within the transport field. 
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9. Policy remodelling: Limited changes to the policy should occur from the design 
stage right through to the implementation stage. 
10. Opposition, conflict and ambiguities: Opposition, conflict and ambiguities are in-
evitable including public opposition, political power, local and national elections, 
conflicts between neighbouring authorities over budgets, bus wars and open-ac-
cess to data by bus operating companies. 
The first part of the framework highlights the importance of setting policy objec-
tives. Objectives should be placed in a written policy document that acts as an umbrella 
for the policy process and specifies targets, measures, and monitoring mechanisms. In 
Great Britain, annual review of these documents is beneficial to see where policy is being 
implemented or where barriers are undermining the implementation process. However, 
annual monitoring reports and a separate bus strategy are no longer statutory requirements 
for local authorities in Great Britain. 
The second part of the framework identifies resources, including financial support, 
as an important factor for implementation. However, where resources are limited, it is 
necessary to maximise their use. One solution for maximising resources is the develop-
ment of a business plan, which sets out clear expectations and realistic time scales, and 
limits resource waste. 
The next part of the framework looks at internal factors that can have an impact on 
policy implementation. These include intra-organisation support and communication 
(e.g., staff training and supervision), characteristics of the organisation (e.g., size, com-
petency, and workload of staff), and bureaucratic power of members within the organisa-
tion. The framework then looks at external factors that can have an impact on policy 
implementation. These include economic (e.g., the impact of globalisation on the 
transport sector), social (e.g., demographic change), and political (e.g., the stability of 
local governments) factors. Other external factors include opposition, conflict, and ambi-
guities (e.g., public opposition, political power, local and national elections, conflicts be-
tween neighbouring authorities over budgets, bus wars, and open access to bus operating 
data). 
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The final part of the framework considers factors with both internal and external 
elements, including policy remodelling (e.g., changes during the design stage that may 
cause unnecessary delays and over-spending), collaboration and interaction between 
those involved in the policy process (e.g., collaboration between local authority and bus 
operators), and policy champions (e.g., advocates who are responsible, competent, and 
motivated to see the policy follow through from beginning to end). This new decision 
support framework will be used to analyse the data collected in this research, which will 
be explained in the next section.  
Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 of this thesis will provide a discussion on the most im-
portant elements of the framework and how they interrelate. However, these issues will 
be discussed once the framework has been used for the empirical data. 
Data was also collected from published journal articles, books, newspaper articles, 
LTPs and LTSs, monitoring and delivery reports, and government publications and re-
ports, relevant to this research. These documents provide rich information regarding the 
way in which policy is translated into action.  
4.4.2 Online questionnaire 
An online self-completion questionnaire administered via email was considered an ap-
propriate method of quantitative data collection for this research. Bryman (2008) indi-
cates that there are two methods for administrating surveys which include self-completion 
questionnaires and structured interviews. Figure 4.1 illustrates the research instruments 
involved for administrating these types of surveys. 
This research used a self-completion questionnaire via internet and embedded in an 
email, as indicated in figure 4.1. This mode of administration was considered more ap-
propriate in comparison to postal and supervised (face-to-face) for several reasons. Bry-
man (2008) points out that one of the most damaging limitations of postal questionnaires 
is their lower response rates. Meanwhile supervised questionnaires were simply not an 
option as this would limit the size and geographical coverage of the survey – every Coun-
cil office in the country could not be visited. By comparison, questionnaires embedded in 
emails have generally a higher response rate as most people have access to emails. The 
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response rate can also be increased by sending reminder emails to the respondents. This 
method is also far more economical as less paper is used. Furthermore, questionnaires 
embedded in emails are generally inexpensive and relatively quick in comparison to 
postal surveys. For these reasons, the questionnaire administered online were selected as 
the most appropriate method for this part of the research. 
 
Figure 4.1: Main modes of administration of a questionnaire survey. 
Based on Bryman (2008, p167) 
4.4.3 Telephone interviews 
Following the completion of the online questionnaire, semi-structured telephone inter-
views were completed to elicit a deeper understanding of the results, which simply could 
not be achieved from the questionnaire results alone. The interview questions included 
open ended questions and provided the interviewee considerable room to freely express 
their perspectives and experiences. This enabled rich and in-depth discussion about the 
results of the online questionnaire survey, which would not be possible with a structured 
interview with specific or closed ended questions. 
Telephone interviewees were self-selected based on positive responses to an invi-
tation question in the survey which enabled in-depth discussion to achieve a full under-
standing of the issues raised in the survey. In comparison to face-to-face survey inter-
views, telephone interviews were considered more appropriate for this research as they 
are far cheaper and quicker to administer. Telephone interviews were also considered 
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more appropriate because in personal interviews, respondents’ replies are often affected 
by characteristics of the interviewer such as “class”, “ethnicity” and their “mere presence” 
(Bryman, 2008). Therefore, respondents’ may reply in ways that they feel will be deemed 
desirable by interviewers. The remoteness of telephone interviews is helpful in removing 
this potential source of bias. Furthermore, hidden personal characteristics of the inter-
viewer are less likely to affect the respondents’ answers.  
4.4.4 Observations 
Observations were also an important research method as they provide a way to check for 
nonverbal expression of feelings, determine who interacts with whom, grasp how partic-
ipants communicate with each other, and check for how much time is spent on various 
activities. DeWalt and DeWalt (2002) point out that observations develop a holistic un-
derstanding of the phenomena under study that is as objective and accurate as possible 
given the limitations of the method. Therefore, observations were used to increase the 
validity of the study as they can provide an understanding of the context and phenomenon 
under study. 
4.4.5 Case studies 
Case study research (CSR) is one of the most critical and approachable methods in qual-
itative research, which has gained significant importance in different disciplines such as 
social science (Reddy, 2015). Contributions of Yin (1984) have made a high impact on 
CSR in terms of application, design and procedure, theory testing and theory develop-
ment. According to Yin (1984, p26) “CSR is remarkably hard, even though case studies 
have traditionally been considered to be ‘soft’ research”. Yin (1994, p.13) further explains 
that CSR is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within 
its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clear evident and it relies on multiple sources of evidence”. CSR was therefore an 
important component of this research to investigate the implementation of local bus pol-
icy and to identify the barriers and enablers of this specific phenomenon.  
Thomas (2011) defines a case study as an analysis of systems that are studied with 
a comprehensive view by either one or several methods. In other words, when a study 
includes more than one single case, a multiple case study is needed. A multiple case study 
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differs to a single case study because multiple cases are required to understand the differ-
ences and the similarities between the cases (Baxter and Jack, 2008; Stake, 1995). In line 
with this, Yin (2009, p.46) proposes four approaches to designing a case study as indi-
cated in table 4.3. This includes single or multiple cases which are embedded or holistic. 
The holistic approach includes single or multiple case studies using a single unit of anal-
ysis, which is largely one dimensional and focused on a specific area of research. Con-
versely, an embedded approach includes single or multiple case studies using multiple 
units of analysis, which helps to answer research questions across a number of dimensions 
within the particular case. 
Eisenhardt (1991) points out that the number of cases to be chosen depends upon 
how much new information the cases can bring and how much is known. This in turn can 
help researchers to decide whether to explore a single case or use multiple cases which 
allows researchers to analyse the data within the case analysis, between the case analyses 
and make a cross-case analysis (Yin, 2003). Similarly, Gronhaug (2001) suggests multi-
ple cases provide an extra dimension of cross-case analysis to be used which can lead to 
richer theory building. This also increases validity, ensures robustness and helps to pre-
vent researcher bias which is more common in single cases (Meyer, 2001). Therefore, an 
embedded approach using multiple cases and multiple units of analysis (Type 4 in table 
4.3) was considered suitable for this research. This approach involved the investigation 
of several bus schemes (multiple cases) using a document review, observations and face-
to-face interviews (multiple units of analysis).  
Table 4.3: CSR design by Yin (2009, p. 46) 
 
Single case design Multiple case design 
Holistic (single unit 
of analysis) 
Type 1: Single case using 
single unit of analysis 
Type 3: Multiple cases using 
single unit of analysis 
Embedded (multiple 
units of analysis) 
Type 2: Single case using 
multiple units of analysis 
Type 4: Multiple cases using 
multiple units of analysis 
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There are many benefits of using this approach in comparison to a single case ap-
proach or multiple cases using a single unit of analysis. The most important reason for 
using multiple cases instead of a single case is to gain a deeper understanding of bus 
policy associated with specific bus schemes. This method is particularly important be-
cause each bus scheme may experience different barriers and enablers and therefore a 
cross-case analysis as suggested by Yin (2003) is essential. According to Herriott and 
Firestone (1983), a multiple-case study has distinct advantages and disadvantages in com-
parison to a single-case study. The evidence from multiple cases is often considered more 
compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust. Therefore, 
this study included four case studies on specific bus schemes in Great Britain to evaluate 
the variety of transport institutional structures, their statutory powers and how their level 
of coordination affects the implementation of transport policy at a local level. Case studies 
allow the assessment of transport policies with respect to institutional arrangements. Ad-
ditionally, case studies provide rich levels of understanding of how transport institutions 
function at a local level. For these reasons, a multiple case study methodology was an 
important approach in this research.  
It is also worth noting that there are several barriers associated with multiple cases. 
For example, multiple cases can be expensive, time-consuming and have the potential to 
lose depth. There are also concerns over the number of cases which should be included 
in the study. Dyer and Wilkins (1991) point out that the page length and the number of 
cases is not the key issue. Instead, they believe the researcher must be able to describe 
and understand the context of the scene in question. However, Eisenhardt (1989) argues 
that the number of cases are important and a minimum of four to a maximum of 10 should 
be included. Hence, this research included four case studies which was considered suffi-
cient to overcome the barriers associated with multiple cases.  
Once the case studies were chosen, the interviews were conducted face-to-face as 
they offer more flexibility and have several key strengths. The interview questions were 
open-ended which provided opportunity for the interviewee to discuss some topics in 
more detail. Open-ended questions are useful when an interviewee has difficulty answer-
ing a question or provides only a brief response because the interviewer can prompt or 
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encourage the interviewee to consider the question further. They also allow the inter-
viewee to elaborate on an original response, probe for additional information, clarify 
questions and correct misunderstandings (Mathers et al., 2002). However, there are also 
disadvantages of using face-to-face interviews as indicated in table 4.2. They involve high 
costs, geographical limitations, time pressure on interviewee and biased answers from 
interviewee (Holbrook et al., 2003a, 2003b; Alreck and Settle, 2004). 
4.4.6 Pilot study  
There are two terms in social science research to explain the term pilot study. Polit et. al. 
(2001) suggests a pilot study can be referred to as feasibility studies which are small scale 
versions or trial run, done in preparation for the major study. Meanwhile, Baker (1994) 
suggests a pilot study can also be the pre-testing or 'trying out' of a particular research 
instrument. Thus, a pilot study is a small-scale implementation of a larger study or a part 
of a larger study. A pilot study can last for a shorter period of time and usually involve a 
smaller number of participants, sites or organisations. They can also be used in any 
methodological setting, especially when attempting to collect data in a new format or 
location or to simply examine potential problems that may be encountered. According to 
Peat et al. (2002), there are many advantages of a pilot study for preparing a questionnaire 
or interview schedule:  
 Pilot is administered in exactly the same way as it would be administered in the 
main study 
 Feedback can be received to identify ambiguities and difficult questions 
 Time to complete pilot can be recorded so the researcher can decide whether it is 
reasonable 
 Helps to discard all unnecessary, difficult or ambiguous questions 
 Helps to assess whether each question gives an adequate range of responses 
 Helps to check that all questions are answered 
 Allows researcher to re-word or re-scale any questions that are not answered as 
expected 
 Allows researcher to shorten, revise and, if required, pilot again. 
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Pilot studies are also important because they provide the researcher with ideas, 
approaches and clues the researcher may have missed. They enable a thorough check of 
the planned statistical and analytical procedures, giving the researcher a chance to 
evaluate their usefulness. Moreover, the researcher may then be able to make alterations 
in the data collecting methods and therefore analyse data in the main study more 
efficiently. Also, the pilot study can save time, money, and enough data for the researcher 
to decide whether to go ahead with the main study. Finally, pilot studies are beneficial 
because the researcher may try out a number of alternative measures and then select those 
that produce the clearest result for the main study. 
As there are three key stages in this research (questionnaire, telephone interviews 
and case studies), this research completed three separate pitot studies. First, after the ini-
tial design stage, the questionnaire was piloted to identify any deficiencies so necessary 
improvements could be applied. The questionnaire was prepared and was distributed by 
a link via email to a small group of people including research supervisors, colleagues at 
Edinburgh Napier University and staff at SEStran. This group of people were chosen to 
complete the questionnaire as they were familiar with experienced in survey design. Once 
the pilot study was completed, any difficulties in understanding the questions were re-
moved and it was ensured that questions produced were insightful enough to be later 
analysed. Next, a pilot study was completed for the telephone interviews. This pilot study 
was conducted by telephone with the same group of people to identify any deficiencies 
so necessary improvements could be applied to the interview questions. Finally, a pilot 
study was completed prior to conducting the four case studies. The same group of people 
completed the face-to-face interviews which helped to identify any deficiencies so nec-
essary improvements could be applied to the case study questions. 
4.5 Data collection 
This research employed both primary and secondary sources for data collection. Primary 
sources consisted of qualitative methods such as observations, telephone interviews and 
in-depth face-to-face interviews. It also included quantitative methods such as question-
naires. The aim of these methods was to collect data to elicit a deeper understanding of 
the experiences and perceptions of key actors involved in bus policy implementation at a 
local level. Secondary sources included a review of documents including LTPs and LTSs, 
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monitoring and delivery reports, and government publications and reports.  These docu-
ments consisted of secondary data which were collected to verify information that can 
serve as a baseline for understanding local bus policy implementation, present an initial 
assessment of the situation and to identify gaps in knowledge. This multi-method ap-
proach was considered the most appropriate approach to overcome the limitation of using 
a single method, yet it also enables triangulation of the findings and therefore greater 
confidence in the results (Bryman 2001). This approach was also considered appropriate 
as a single method would not be capable of achieving all of the research objectives iden-
tified in section 1.5 of this thesis. The following sub-sections describe the data collection 
methods chosen for this research which in turn helps answer the research questions.  
4.5.1 Desktop document review 
Data was collected from published journal articles, books, newspaper articles, LTPs and 
LTSs, monitoring and delivery reports, and government publications and reports, relevant 
to this research. These documents provide rich information regarding the way in which 
policy is translated into action. In particular, a review of monitoring and delivery reports, 
produced by local authorities in Great Britain, helped to identify themes based on the key 
areas of bus policy discussed in these documents. The questions for the online question-
naire and telephone interviews were then structured under these five bus policy themes. 
The five themes were also used to organise the findings of this study and include: policy 
documentation; policy responsibility; policy targets; performance monitoring; and imple-
mentation barriers. Once the questionnaire was prepared, a desktop review was required 
to find the contact details of all 143 PTO’s in Great Britain, outside London. This would 
also ensure that a census survey could be completed and the entire population of public 
transport officers in British local authorities were contacted about the questionnaire.  
Meanwhile, the case study questions were placed under three common themes. 
These themes were identical to those used for the questionnaire and telephone interviews, 
which allowed results to be also analysed accordingly. The multiple case studies also 
included a document review of local transport documents and government publications 
and reports. A document review method has many benefits which were useful for this 
research, as indicated in table 4.2. These documents were particularly helpful because 
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they were inexpensive, unobtrusive and had the potential to provide information that was 
not directly observable.  
A desktop review was also important for this research as it helped to choose the 
schemes for the case studies. This included schemes which appeared successful or less 
successful. As a desktop review revealed several examples of successful bus schemes, it 
was decided to choose bus schemes which included a range of bus policies which influ-
enced implementation. A desktop review was particularly important for obtaining this 
information, as no other research method would have provided access to this information. 
Once the schemes were chosen, a desktop review was then required to find the most suit-
able participants to complete the interviews. This involved contacting as many partici-
pants as possible who were involved in the planning, preparing or implementation of the 
schemes. Finally, a desktop review was also important for this research as academic, in-
dustry and government literature were used to supplement the interview results and to 
check the accuracy of interview statements when necessary. 
4.5.2 Online questionnaire 
A census survey is an attempt to list all elements in a group and to measure one or more 
characteristics of those elements. It is a method of data collection and can provide detailed 
information on all or most elements in the population, thereby enabling totals for rare 
population groups or small geographic areas (Sage, 2008). Sample surveys are similar to 
census surveys, however only a subset of the elements in the population are considered. 
For this reason, a census survey was deemed the most suitable survey to administer the 
questionnaire to, and so the entire population of public transport officers in British local 
authorities was the target audience.  
To help develop an understanding of the issues related to the implementation of bus 
policies at a local level, a self-completion questionnaire was designed and administered 
online to all 143 public transport officers in the Great Britain, outside of London. A ques-
tionnaire is considered the most appropriate method to address the thesis research ques-
tions which includes “what” and “how” type questions. The questionnaire was also hosted 
online to simplify the administration and data analysis process.  
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Once the appropriate audience was identified, the questionnaire then needed to be 
designed to draw out opinions and perceptions of those taking part in the questionnaire. 
The questionnaire had a semi-structured format as this allowed answers to be obtained, 
whilst still enabling issues to be widely explored, meaning that each question could be 
tailored to the respondent, yet also be comparable.  
The questionnaire consisted of 16 open-ended questions ranging from dichotomous, 
multiple choice, rank order scaling and rate scaling questions. These questions were struc-
tured under five policy themes which arose from the research questions. The five themes 
were also used to organise the findings of this study and include: policy documentation; 
policy responsibility; policy targets; performance monitoring; and implementation barri-
ers. A consent form was required to be completed by each participant before the ques-
tionnaire could commence. This included a brief introduction in line with the University’s 
code of ethics, which highlights the confidentiality and anonymity of respondents and 
their council. The participants were also given the opportunity to leave questions blank 
and they were advised that the survey would take no more than 15 minutes of their time. 
Appendix A presents the online questionnaire sent to all public transport officers within 
Great Britain.   
The next step included authorisation to carry out the questionnaire. Authorisation 
was granted by Edinburgh Napier University to use a web-based survey application called 
Novi. A new template was designed to produce a questionnaire most suitable for the 
online viewer. Ethics approval was also provided by the University Research Integrity 
Committee prior to conducting the questionnaire. This was to ensure the questionnaire 
met the requirements of the University Code of Practice for Research Integrity. After the 
initial design stage, the questionnaire was piloted with a small group of people to identify 
any deficiencies so necessary improvements could be applied. The questionnaires were 
then distributed over several weeks and this included a link to the questionnaire embedded 
in an email with instructions for clarity.  
4.5.3 Telephone interviews 
Questionnaires provide evidence of patterns amongst large populations, however qualita-
tive interview data often gather more in-depth insights on participant attitudes, thoughts, 
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and actions (Kendall, 2008). Therefore, telephone interviews were considered a suitable 
approach for achieving the research first objective as perceptions, beliefs and experiences 
were being sought from specific representatives i.e. public transport officers who origi-
nally conducted the questionnaires and was familiar with the topic. This contrasts with 
‘how much’ or ‘what proportion’ type questions where a survey is generally more suitable 
(Richardson et al. 1995). 
A criterion-based strategy (Miles and Huberman, 1994) was utilised to select par-
ticipants who had already conducted the questionnaire. This is a form of purposive sam-
pling which is a technique used in qualitative research for the identification and selection 
of information-rich cases for the most effective use of limited resources (Patton, 2002). 
This technique was chosen because it involves identifying and selecting individuals who 
are especially knowledgeable about or experienced with a phenomenon of interest 
(Cresswell and Clark, 2011). Hence, participants were purposively contacted because 
they had previously taken part in the questionnaire and were knowledgeable and experi-
enced with dealing with the implementation of bus policy at a local level.  
Question 14 of the questionnaire asked the public transport officers if they would 
like to take part in a follow-up interview. 10 respondents offered to take part in a follow-
up interview and submitted their contact details. This highlights the availability and will-
ingness of the participants, which Bernard (2002) and Spradley (1979) note as important. 
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Table 4.4: Telephone interviewees 
Interview Local Authority Location Classification 
1 Midlothian Scotland Semi-rural 
2 Aberdeenshire Scotland Rural 
3 Northamptonshire England Rural 
4 Medway Unitary Urban-Rural 
5 City of Cardiff Welsh Urban 
6 Borough of Poole Unitary Urban-Rural 
7 East Lothian Scotland Urban-Rural 
8 Wokingham Unitary Urban-Rural 
9 Northumberland Unitary Rural-Urban 
10 Leicestershire England Rural-Urban 
The interviews consisted of 11 open-ended questions under common themes related 
to bus policy implementation. These questions allowed participants to elaborate the con-
text of their answers from the questionnaire by means of a relaxed and confidential inter-
view process. Semi-structured interviews were therefore chosen because they provide the 
best opportunity for in depth discussion to achieve a full understanding of the issues (Bry-
man and Bell, 2007). Appendix B presents the interview questions which were discussed 
with the 10 public transport officers from the questionnaire. A pilot study was conducted 
by telephone with a small group of people to identify any deficiencies so necessary im-
provements could be applied. Participants were then contacted by email to describe the 
procedure of the interviews to be carried out in accordance with the ethical procedures 
and guidelines set out by Edinburgh Napier University (ENU). Once the participants re-
plied, a suitable time was set up to conduct the semi-structured interview via telephone. 
Each interview began by obtaining consent to record the conversation using a “call re-
corder” app.  
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4.5.4 Observations  
Observations were carried out by attending interviews conducted with employees from 
relevant organisations who were involved with transport policy development and imple-
mentation. The aim of this method was to observe those involved in the interviews and to 
gain insight into the techniques used by the interviewer that could be helpful for conduct-
ing the interviews in this research. This approach was adopted prior to developing ques-
tionnaires and conducting interviews. 
Observations were also carried out by conducting site visits. Three out of the four 
case studies involved site visits to visualise the schemes that were being investigated. 
Observations were not a major part of the data collection, however, it was helpful to ob-
serve the operation of these schemes before the interviews took place. They also provided 
the opportunity to include additional interview questions which may have been prompted 
by observations at these site visits.  
4.5.5 Case studies 
Several prerequisites were required for a case study to be selected for this research. As 
the aim of this research is to identify barriers to the implementation of bus policies in 
Great Britain, only case studies were selected which were based in Great Britain. These 
case studies were selected due to their comparability where they include the same phe-
nomenon under investigation (implementation of bus policy) and follow similar transport 
policy frameworks (Scotland and England). According to Patton (1990), the case study 
approach is a specific way of collecting, organising and analysing data.  As Yin (1989) 
points out, case studies are an “empirical enquiry that:  
 investigates a contemporary phenomenon [the implementation of bus policy] 
within its real life context [the scheme]; when  
 the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in 
which  
 multiple sources of evidence are used [document review, observations and face-
to-face interviews]”  
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Therefore, this research investigates the implementation of bus policy in the context 
of a number of different schemes and included face-to-face interviews with industry rep-
resentatives involved in those schemes.  
The case studies involve previous bus schemes that have been implemented, or at-
tempted to be implemented, in different locations within Great Britain. These types of 
bus schemes were chosen so more focus can be placed on the outcomes of these schemes, 
rather than expected outcomes if they were not yet completed. As it was important to 
include schemes which have appeared successful or less successful, a desktop review was 
carried out to help choose these schemes. It was discovered that a scheme proposal for a 
Quality Contract (QC) in Tyne and Wear was rejected in November 2015. Therefore, this 
case study was important to investigate as it is an example of a scheme which was less 
successful in terms of implementation. This case study would also help determine the 
barriers which had an impact on the implementation of this scheme.  
Next, it was important to choose schemes which appeared successful. As a desktop 
review revealed several examples of successful bus schemes, it was decided to choose 
bus schemes which included a range of bus policies which influenced implementation. 
For example, the Fastlink Scheme in Glasgow appeared to be an example of a successful 
bus scheme in terms of implementing specified facilities which included extensive bus 
priority measures along the routes, improved bus stop and access measures, improved bus 
shelters and enhanced bus route monitoring. Another example of successful implementa-
tion included a Bus Priority Scheme in Solihull. This included new bus lanes along three 
sections of a road on Lode Lane, along with infrastructure improvement measures. A 
similar scheme included the Musselburgh High Street Improvement Works, which in-
cluded improvement works to the High Street, Musselburgh between Kilwinning Street 
and Pinkie Pillars. However, it was difficult to gather the appropriate contacts required 
for this case study due to a limited number of actors involved. Therefore, the proposed 
case study was excluded from this research.  
It was also decided to choose a case study which was successful in terms of smart 
ticketing. Oxford Smartzone and South Oxfordshire integrated ticketing scheme was pro-
posed as a potential case study, however, due to the restructuring of Oxfordshire County 
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Council it was advised by the council that key actors involved in this scheme would be 
unavailable to take part in this study. Therefore, this case study was excluded from the 
research. Another example of a successful smart ticketing included the ABC (All Bus 
Companies) Multi-Operator Smart Ticketing Scheme in Dundee. This scheme included 
the introduction of smart ticketing which is valid on all bus company routes across Dun-
dee and the surrounding areas. 
Table 4.5 shows a decision table created to determine the selection of case studies 
most suitable for this research. Following the examination of potential case studies, it was 
decided four case studies would be sufficient to examine the barriers and enablers asso-
ciated with the implementation of bus schemes. It was particularly important that con-
ducting the case studies would meet the resources available to the researcher, such as time 
and expenses. In meeting these requirements, the chosen case studies included a scheme 
proposal for a QCS in Tyne and Wear, the Fastlink Scheme in Glasgow, a bus priority 
scheme in Solihull, and the ABC multi-operator smart ticketing scheme in Dundee.  
Table 4.5: Decision table for case study selection 
Scheme Criteria QCS Fastlink LLRE ABC 
Based in Great Britain √ √ √ √ 
Completed  √ √ √ 
An example of sucessful implementation  √ √ √ 
An example of less successful implementation √    
Implementation of specified facilities  √   
Implementation of bus priority   √  
Implementation of smart ticketing    √ 
Implementation of a quality contract √    
Resources available to conduct case study √ √ √ √ 
 
Based on the CSR design outlined in table 4.3, this study used “Type 4” which in-
cludes an embedded approach using multiple cases and multiple units of analysis. This 
approach helps address the specific phenomenon of this research (local bus policy) using 
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multiple cases (4 specific bus schemes). This was considered a suitable approach because 
the multiple cases enable a cross-case comparison and complement the findings of the 
online questionnaire and telephone interviews. Thus, this helped to increase the validity 
and ensure robustness in transferability of results to the larger population. Furthermore, 
it provided in-depth analysis of complex issues that may not be discovered in question-
naire surveys (Larsson, 1993) or telephone interviews.  
Meanwhile, Yin (1989) cautioned that during CSR, cases are not sampling units 
chosen at random from a population but instead they are individually selected using spe-
cific criteria. This research selected individuals for the case study interviews who were 
previously involved in the specific bus schemes of each case study. The findings from the 
case studies can be interpreted by inference or analytical generalisation rather than 
through statistical analysis. This process results in the expansion and generalisation from 
the cases to theory rather than to the larger population (Yin, 1989). In other words, the 
case studies can be tested using the new decision support framework to identify the key 
barriers and enablers that impacted the individual bus schemes, rather than suggesting 
that every bus scheme experienced the same barriers and enablers by taking the same 
approach. Figure 4.2 demonstrates the case study design and procedure adopted in this 
study.  
 
Figure 4.2: Case study design and procedure. Based on Yin (2003) 
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A desktop review was carried out on the chosen schemes and a list of potential 
contacts were gathered based on their involvement with the scheme. Unlike the question-
naire and telephone interviews where only public transport officers were contacted, a va-
riety of actors were contacted for the case studies because they have different perspectives 
of the implementation process for the scheme under investigation. This was considered 
particularly important because the data collected through interviews can inform local gov-
ernments in their efforts to implement current bus policies and to overcome obstacles 
which might currently impede the implementation process. A document review was also 
carried out to identify relevant documents (previous or current LTP/S, bus strategies, 
press releases, news articles, reports etc.) that would include information about the case 
studies under investigation. 
Similar to the telephone interviews, purposive sampling was the chosen technique 
for the selection of participants for the face-to-face interviews. Participants were selected 
for each case study because they are especially knowledgeable or experienced with re-
gards to the specific bus scheme that was under investigation. Existing contacts were first 
used to recruit participants, followed by the adoption of a ‘snowballing’ technique where 
the contacts were asked to suggest other representatives that might be suitable for inter-
viewing.  
In identifying the target audience for the interviews, 29 semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with 36 industry representatives (some interviews involved more than 
one participant). The organisations involved include local authorities, combine authori-
ties, National Government, bus operators, public transport user groups (PTUG), bus rep-
resentation groups, consultants, and other organisations interested in the schemes. Inter-
views with a variety of experts enabled a wider range of views on the given topic (Hen-
nink et al. 2011) and therefore results would be subject to less bias.  
The case study questions consisted of 23 open-ended questions under three common 
themes. These themes are identical to those used for the questionnaire and telephone in-
terviews, which allows results to be analysed accordingly. Appendix C presents the list 
of interview questions which were discussed with the case study interviewees. Given the 
variety of actors selected for each case study, expertise on topics was varied. Participants 
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therefore had the option to avoid answers in which they didn’t feel reflected their exper-
tise. For example, bus operator representatives would be less inclined to speak about 
questions related to bus policy targets, whereas local authority representatives would be 
more inclined to speak about this topic because they are responsible for setting or meeting 
targets. 
Once the questions were prepared, a pilot study was conducted with a small group 
of people to identify any deficiencies so necessary improvements could be applied. Par-
ticipants for the case studies were then contacted by email to describe the procedure of 
the interview to be carried out in accordance with the ethical procedures and guidelines 
set out by ENU. Once the participants agreed to take part, a suitable time was set up to 
conduct the semi-structured interview. 
Each interview was conducted at a location chosen by the participant. Prior to the 
interview, the participants were assured their responses would remain anonymous, which 
would then enable them to talk openly about the specific scheme, thereby providing an 
accurate and honest responses. This was an important element to consider as Yin (2009) 
points out that results from interviews can be biased because participants give an answer 
they think the interviewer wants to hear. On average, each interview lasted 40 minutes, 
however they ranged from 20 minutes to 90 minutes. All participants agreed to have their 
interview recorded by a Dictaphone.  
4.6 Data analysis 
The data analysis stage is a very important aspect of the research since it changes the raw 
data obtained from the data collection tools into meaningful information. The primary 
data was collected using quantitative data (questionnaire) and qualitative data (telephone 
interviews, observations and case studies). These methods aimed to elicit the experiences 
and perceptions of key actors on the implementation of bus policy at a local level.  
The quantitative data was first addressed using descriptive statistics. Descriptive 
statistics are useful to present the quantitative descriptions in a manageable form by sum-
marising and describing the data collected in the questionnaires. Following completion 
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of the online questionnaire, the results were imported into SPSS and analysed using de-
scriptive statistics. This includes the use of a 2 × 2 cross-tabulation, and chi-square anal-
ysis to determine whether the policy objectives and measures were statistically independ-
ent. The chi-square is a non-parametric, bi-variate test that makes use of two nominal 
variables for testing statistical significance (Bryman, 2008). The results of these statistical 
tests were only considered significant if the probability p of making the recorded obser-
vation by chance was less than 5% (p<0.05). This method of data collection is considered 
to be “hard” and “reliable” (Bryman, 2008) and the processes involved are predominantly 
deductive. Quantitative methods also answer descriptive questions such as “when?”, 
“where?”, “how many?” and “how often?”. The aim of the questionnaire was to provide 
a descriptive summary of what the data showed in terms of these questions and to help 
understand the impact, benefits and limitations of local bus policy in Great Britain, out-
side London. Therefore, inferential statistics were not required, which infers properties 
about a population and includes testing hypotheses and deriving estimates.  
The qualitative data was then addressed in this study. This included semi-structured 
telephone interviews which were conducted with ten of the public transport officers from 
the questionnaire. These interviewees were self-selected based on positive responses to 
an invitation in the questionnaire. This research method enabled in-depth discussion to 
achieve a full understanding of the issues raised in the questionnaire.  
The next stage of qualitative data analysis for this study included observations. Be-
fore the case study interviews could commence, site visits were carried out at bus scheme 
locations for three of the case studies. This simply involved taking notes at the sites for 
the opportunity to include additional interview questions or raise any uncertainties during 
the interviews that followed.   
The final stage of qualitative data analysis included face-to-face interviews which 
were the main source of data collection for the four case studies. This included a scheme 
proposal for a QCS in Tyne and Wear, the Fastlink Scheme in Glasgow, a bus priority 
scheme in Solihull, and the ABC multi-operator smart ticketing scheme in Dundee. 
Once the telephone interviews and case study interviews were completed, the re-
cordings were immediately summarised (Yin, 2003), while the audio recordings were 
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verbatim transcribed and analysed in sequence. According to Rabiee (2004), the analysis 
of a large amount of data obtained through in-depth interview is a huge task for research-
ers. Therefore, analysis of this data is the most critical and challenging aspect of the re-
search design process. Meanwhile, Britten (1995) points out that costs associated with 
interview transcription, in terms of time, physical, and human resources, are significant. 
It is particularly time consuming because for every hour of taped interview, 6–7 hours of 
transcription is required. Transcription is also considered complex whether the researcher 
transcribe the tapes themselves or engage professionals, thus transcription is open to a 
range of human errors (Easton et al., 2000). However, given the resources available for 
this research, the researcher solely transcribed all the data collected from both telephone 
interviews and case studies. 
 Finally, the transcribed recordings were imported into Nvivo (software program 
used for qualitative and mixed-methods research to help analyse and organise unstruc-
tured text, audio, video, or image data) for further analysis. King (2004, p. 263) points 
out that NVivo is invaluable in helping the researcher index segments of text to particular 
themes, to link research notes to coding, to carry out complex search and retrieve opera-
tions, and to aid the researcher in examining possible relationships between the themes.  
 This study used a ‘thematic analysis’ technique to analyse the collected data. The-
matic analysis is a qualitative data analysis method used to identify patterns (themes) of 
meaning across a dataset and to provide answers to the research questions being addressed 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006). It is also the most widely used qualitative approach to analys-
ing interviews. The data collected from the interviews were analysed using a three-stage 
procedure suggested by Creswell (2007). This includes preparing the data for analysis by 
transcribing; reducing the data into themes through a process of coding; and representing 
the data. In accordance with these guidelines, the telephone interviews were firstly tran-
scribed and then imported into Nvivo. The data was then analysed based on key themes 
that arose from the literature. These are similar to the themes found in the questionnaire 
and interviews and include issues related to scheme design; existing bus policy docu-
ments, policy targets and monitoring of bus polices; and policy implementation and bar-
riers to implementation. Three themes were used instead of five in order to discuss the 
results of the interviews from each case study in a more understandable and presentable 
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manner. Nvivo was particularly helpful in this research because it helped to separate the 
large amount of data collected from the interviews. For example, there is an option next 
to each interview question node, which categorises all responses to each question. This 
was helpful to see common themes among different responses for the same question. 
Overall the data analysis for this study included theoretical analysis of the three 
main sources of data collected (questionnaires, telephone interviews and case study inter-
views). The theoretical analysis was based on the application of the decision support 
framework to the three sets of data, separately. By correlating participants’ opinions and 
perceptions, the analysis was used to categorise information about the similarities and 
differences in viewpoints on bus policy implementation under the 10 critical variables of 
the framework. Finally, the literature review and theoretical analysis of the questionnaire, 
telephone interviews and case studies were triangulated in order to interpret and present 
the results. Triangulation refers to a combination of two or more methods in one study 
and can be employed in both quantitative and qualitative studies (Yeasmin, and Rahman, 
2012). Triangulation is an important process of verification and increases validity by in-
corporating the various methods used in this research. 
4.7 Ethical considerations 
According to Flick (2014) codes of ethics are formulated to regulate the regulations of 
researchers to the people and fields they intend to study. In particular, research ethics 
require researchers to avoid harming participants involved in the process by respecting 
and taking into account their needs and interests. Therefore, data collection and analysis 
for this research was carried out in accordance with the ethical procedures and guidelines 
set out by ENU. 
All the necessary arrangements and conditions were met by the researcher in seek-
ing approval for the research project from the ENU Ethical Committee. Furthermore, all 
respondents involved in this research were required to complete an informed consent 
form. This ensured respondents understood the research process, their willingness to par-
ticipate in the study, and their consent to use data/information for the current research 
study. There were also no direct references made in this thesis to specific interviewees 
and any comments flagged by participants as confidential were respected. The university 
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also encourages staff and students to use Novi survey tool and should be replaced by other 
survey tools to ensure compliance with data protection legislation. Novi is considered 
more secure and reliable than other survey tools available on the Internet such as Ulti-
mateSurvey or SurveyMonkey. 
4.8 Summary 
This chapter has identified the research paradigm adopted for this study. From identifying 
the various philosophical approaches, this research utilises a naturalistic approach and 
takes place within an interpretive research model. This research also follows both induc-
tive and deductive approaches. 
Revisiting the studies identified in the previous chapter was helpful to understand 
the common research methods used in transport policy and were exemplars of appropriate 
methods required for examining bus policy. 
In order to achieve the research objectives outlined in chapter one of this thesis, a 
mixed methods research approach is adopted comprising of both quantitative and quali-
tative approaches. The quantitative methods include questionnaires while the qualitative 
methods include a document review, telephone interviews, observations and face-to-face 
interviews. 
Analysis of the data collected was discussed which includes the application of the 
decision support framework and triangulation of the findings. The next chapter will in-
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Chapter 5: Online questionnaire results 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the first set on research results by detailing the findings from the 
online questionnaire. The questionnaire was conducted of 56% of public transport officers 
from Welsh County Councils, Scottish County Councils, English Unitary authorities plus 
the Isles of Scilly, English County Councils and English Combined Local Authorities. 
The aim of this chapter is to elicit the experiences and perceptions of these public 
transport officers who are involved in bus policy implementation at a local level.  
Sections 5.2 presents the questionnaire results. These results are then analysed in 
section 5.3 which is based on the application of the ten-point framework. Finally, this 
chapter will address the second research objective to help meet the aim of this thesis. 
Table 5.1 provides a recap of the second research objective. 




To understand the views and experi-
ences of public transport officers re-
garding the key issues associated 
with the implementation of bus pol-
icies within Great Britain. 
This objective seeks to use the findings of online 
questionnaires and telephone interviews conducted 
in Great Britain. This includes the views and expe-
riences of local transport officers. It also seeks to 
understand areas of consensus and differences be-
tween respondents on a wide range of policy im-
plementation issues. 
5.2 Questionnaire results 
The self-completion questionnaire was administered via internet and embedded in an 
email. As previously mentioned in the last chapter, the questionnaire questions were 
structured under five policy analysis themes used to organise the findings of this study. 
These include; policy documentation; policy responsibility; policy targets; performance 
monitoring; and implementation barriers. These themes were considered important as 
they enabled the overall analysis of this study to be coherent and presentable to the reader. 
Since the questionnaire sample was designed to reflect the views of a large population in 
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comparison to the data collection methods which followed (telephone interviews and case 
study interviews), a section called ‘local authority staff profile’ was added at the begin-
ning of the questionnaire. The following sub-sections present the questionnaire results of 
the 16 open-ended questions under the common themes. 
5.2.1 Local authority staff profile 
The first question in this section asked the officers to provide their council name. 76 Local 
Authorities provided their council name while four local authorities remained anony-
mous. The highest response rate was from combined local authorities (57%) while the 
lowest response rate was from Welsh local authorities (41%). There was reasonable var-
iation of local authority areas with respect to geographical locations in the UK. Table 5.2 
provides a summary of the returned questionnaires based on location: 
Table 5.2: Returned questionnaires and location 
Location 
No. of Returned 
Surveys 
Response Rate for 
Location 
Welsh County Councils 9/22 41% 
Scottish County Councils 18/32 56% 
English Unitary authorities plus the Isles of Scilly 30/55 53% 
English County Councils 15/27 56% 
English Combined Local Authorities 4/7 57% 
Anonymous 4 N/A 
Total 80/143 56% 
To determine the rural-urban classification for the UK local authorities used in this 
study, this research follows the guidelines provided by Defra, which defines rural-urban 
classification for local authority districts and unitary authorities in England and Wales. 
Authorities are classified as predominantly rural, significantly rural, or predominantly 
urban. A three-way classification was created for this research for ease of reference be-
cause the Scottish Government has a different system than England and Wales. Although 
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the thresholds for England, Wales, and Scotland differ, any settlement in the UK with a 
population greater than 10,000 people is defined as urban. However, settlements with a 
population between 3,500 and 10,000 people are defined differently (Pateman, 2011). For 
the purposes of this research, these thresholds are aggregated (figure 5.1) to identity re-
gions as predominantly urban, urban with substantial rural, and predominantly rural in 
accordance with Defra.  
 
Figure 5.1: Aggregating the rural urban classification 
A multinomial logistic regression test was carried out to determine the difference 
in geographical classification of different authority types. However, there were no differ-
ence in geographical classification of different authority types – no authority type was 
more likely than any other to be predominantly urban, predominantly rural or signifi-
cantly rural. Table 5.3 shows the completed questionnaires by area and classification. 
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2 13 19 1 3 0 38 
Predominantly 
Rural 
4 3 6 5 0 0 18 
Significantly 
Rural 
3 2 5 9 1 0 20 
Anonymous 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 
Total 9 18 30 15 4 4 80 
A second question in this section of the questionnaire asked the officers to list the 
ways in which they are involved with bus policy in their council area. Table 5.4 shows 
that between 51 to 75% of officers included the listed areas of involvement which demon-
strates that officers have multiple roles when dealing with bus policy in their council area. 
There was also no statistical association between the bus policy roles and the area or 
region of the councils.  
Table 5.4: Officer’s involvement with bus policy 
Answer Count % 
Writing or developing bus policies for your city 50 63% 
Setting targets for local bus policy 41 51% 
Monitoring bus polices that are in place 48 60% 
Implementing the measures to achieve local bus policy objectives 60 75% 
Not answered 4 5% 
5.2.2 Theme 1 – Policy documentation 
This series of questions asked the officers about their current bus policy, key objectives, 
and the measures required to achieve these objectives. The first question in this section 
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asked the officers how long their council had a written local bus policy in place. Table 
5.5 indicates that 73.9% of councils had a written bus policy in place, almost half of them 
for 11 or more years. 1.3% said they were in the process of developing a policy; 17.6% 
said they do not have a local bus policy written down in a single document or do not have 
any local bus policy. The lack of a local bus policy document is most likely linked to the 
abolition of the requirement for a separate bus strategy in the 2008 Local Transport Act. 
Although there was no statistical association between the urban or rural location of 
local authorities and the number of years they have had a written local bus policy in place, 
the findings in table 5.5 indicate that 16% of local authorities “don’t have a local bus 
policy written down in a single document.” This could be associated with both the size 
and region of the local authority. It may be that local authorities in rural areas find it 
more appropriate and simpler to have a single document due to being smaller in size or 
to the extent of bus provision in the area, in comparison to larger urban authorities that 
have more bus provision and improvements to consider.1 
Table 5.5: Number of years written bus policy document in place 
Answer Count % 
Less than 1 year 1 1% 
1 to 5 years 11 14% 
6 to 10 years 8 10% 
11 or more years 39 49% 
We don’t have a local bus policy written down in a sin-
gle document – it is more a collection of actions and 
policies from different documents 
13 16% 
We don’t have any kind of local bus policy 1 1% 
We are in the process of developing one 1 1% 
Not answered 6 8% 
                                                 
1 However, because the bus policy documents of every responding authority were not received, it is not 
possible for the author to be certain that this is the case for every authority. 
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The next question asked the officers to identify their bus policy objectives. Of the 
officers who answered this question, 93% indicated councils are setting objectives. Table 
5.6 shows that between 51.3 to 88.8% of officers included the listed policy objectives, 
which demonstrates that councils recognise the importance of stated bus policy to overall 
transport objectives.  
Table 5.6: Bus policy objectives 
Answer Count %  answer 
To promote equal access to transport 71 89% 
To improve environmental quality and reduce the effects of 
transport pollution on air quality 
63 79% 
To help the transport system operate more efficiently 60 75% 
To provide opportunities for fostering a strong, competitive 
economy and sustainable economic growth 
57 71% 
To maintain the transport infrastructure to standards that al-
low safe and efficient movement of people and goods 
56 70% 
To contribute to national and international efforts to reduce 
transport's contribution to overall greenhouse gas emissions 
47 59% 
To improve safety, security, and health, and in particular to 
cut the number and severity of road casualties 
41 51% 
The last question in this section asked the officers to select from a list provided the 
stage at which bus measures are in their city, in order to judge the implementation of 
different types of measure (Table 5.7). Successful measures included the provision of bus 
information, bus shelters and improved pedestrian access to stops. Real time passenger 
information (RTPI) is also becoming more successful where 25% have considered this 
and will implement it in the future. Similarly, 21.3% said they will also implement multi-
operator integrated tickets and review current bus lane networks and ensure they are ef-
fective, legible and enforced. However, some measures appeared to be less successful 
including tickets which can be bought before boarding buses, personal security (CCTV, 
lighting) and new bus lanes. The least successful measure (maximum fares) could argua-
bly be a result of its applicability to the officers interviewed whereby maximum fares can 
only be set by English and Welsh councils if they have a statutory quality partnership 
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(SQP) in place (under the 2008 Local Transport Act), and very few Councils do so. In 
Scotland, there is no legal possibility for councils to set maximum fares. 
   Table 5.7: Bus policy measures 
Answer 12 23 34 45 
Bus Information – timetables and bus stop 
flags 
72 (90%) 4 (5%) 2 (3%) 0 (0%) 
Shelters 67 (84%) 4 (5%) 2 (3%) 3 (4%) 
Improved pedestrian access to stops 64 (80%) 11 (14%) 1 (1%) 4 (5%) 
Unobstructed level kerb access for buses 62 (78%) 10 (13%) 1 (1%) 5 (6%) 
Printed leaflets and other paper-based 62 (78%) 3 (4%) 9 (11%) 0 (0%) 
Quality bus stops 59 (74%) 9 (11%) 0 (0%) 7 (9%) 
Quality bus infrastructure 57 (71%) 12 (15%) 1 (1%) 7 (9%) 
Marketing of bus services 56 (70%) 9 (11%) 4 (5%) 2 (3%) 
Quality information 55 (69%) 9 (11%) 2 (3%) 8 (10%) 
RTPI 52 (65%) 20 (25%) 4 (5%) 3 (4%) 
Seating 52 (65%) 7 (9%) 6 (8%) 4 (5%) 
Clean accessible quality vehicles 51 (64%) 11 (14%) 4 (5%) 6 (8%) 
Quality customer care 45 (56%) 11 (14%) 5 (6%) 7 (9%) 
Pump-priming funding for bus routes 45 (56%) 6 (8%) 8 (10%) 3 (4%) 
Marketing targeted at persuading regular car 
commuters to use public transport 
43 (54%) 16 (20%) 7 (9%) 7 (9%) 
Multi-operator integrated tickets 40 (50%) 17 (21%) 6 (8%) 11 (14%) 
Integrated ticketing 38 (48%) 20 (25%) 3 (4%) 12 (15%) 
                                                 
2 1 = We have implemented this 
3 2 = We considered this, and we will implement in the future 
4 3 = We considered this, but we will not implement it 
5 4 = We will look at this in the future 
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Table 5.7 contd. 
Answer 1 2 3 4 
Bus priority at signals 38 (48%) 16 (20%) 10 (13%) 13 (16%) 
Reviewing current bus lane network and 
its operation to ensure it is effective, leg-
ible and enforced 
29 (36%) 17 (21%) 10 (13%) 15 (19%) 
Tickets which can be bought before 
boarding buses 
29 (36%) 10 (13%) 8 (10%) 21 (26%) 
Personal security (CCTV, lighting) 28 (35%) 13 (16%) 13 (16%) 16 (20%) 
New bus lanes 26 (33%) 16 (20%) 19 (24%) 10 (13%) 
Maximum fares 9 (11%) 10 (13%) 21 (26%) 18 (23%) 
Table 5.8 shows the relationship between bus policy objectives (Table 5.6) and bus 
policy measures implemented to achieve those objectives (Table 5.7). These findings re-
veal that, regardless of the policy objectives selected, the same policy measures were the 
most popular. With only a few minor exceptions, the order of popularity of measures was 
the same when cross-referenced against all of the policy objectives. This suggests that 
these measures were not chosen to meet specific policy objectives but for other reasons 
such as contributing towards several objectives simultaneously or being easier or cheaper 
to implement. For example, bus information is likely to be easier to implement due to the 
duties and powers that local authorities have in this area under both the 1985 and 2000 
Transport Acts. In comparison to this, control over maximum fares is something much 
more difficult to implement due to limited legal powers for local authorities in this area, 























































































































































































































































































                                                 




















Table 5.8 contd. 
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5.2.3 Theme 2 – Policy responsibility 
This section of the questionnaire investigated policy implementation related to the council 
area of each officer. The officers were first asked to indicate the number of teams within 
the council's transport department who have responsibility for the implementation of bus 
policies. The average number of teams within the council responsible for the implemen-
tation of bus policies was two. Surprisingly, 15 officers did not answer this question 
which could suggest they did not know whether there were such teams within the council, 
or perhaps they simply do not have teams within the council responsible for the imple-
mentation of bus policies. Although the questionnaire reveals the number of teams the 
respondents think there are, the nature of the teams is unknown (for example, if there are 
separate teams for making implementing policy). Some of the confusion in the answers 
may arise from the fact that small authorities especially have very small staffs in transport 
and therefore the notion of a team only for bus policy becomes a bit artificial.  
Another question in this section asked the officers for their perception of planned 
and actual implementation for the previous LTP/S. The majority of officers said that ei-
ther most (31%) or more than half (45%) of the planned policies were implemented. The 
fact that 14% of officers did not answer this question could indicate that they were not 
aware of success. Based on the results from the previous section, it appears that officers 
are more positive when asked to report on the percentage of policies implemented overall 
than when asked to consider specific policies and measures.  
The final question in this section asked the officers if bus measures in their cities 
were implemented as planned and without problems. The officers agreed or strongly 
agreed that the bus policy measures that were implemented as planned and without prob-
lem included bus information (timetables and bus stop flags, 73%), improved pedestrian 
access to stops (68%), and quality bus stops (66%). However, the bus policy measures 
that were not implemented as planned included new bus lanes (38%), maximum fares 
(33%) and multi-operator integrated tickets (29%). This result indicates that the policy 
measures facing barriers are those that require collaboration and action by the operators, 
where the local authority has little control. In particular, multi-operator integrated ticket-
ing has been an unattainable goal for many years, partly as a result of on-road competi-
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tion; hence, operators do not view participation in such schemes to be in their best com-
mercial interests. Furthermore, the 2008 Local Transport Act in England made multi-
operator ticketing easier and more of these schemes have come into being. However, these 
are not often as a result of work by local authorities but they are instead operator initia-
tives. Interestingly, these results are similar to those found in the previous section where 
the officers were asked to state the stage at which various measures are in their city. This 
result clearly indicates there has been little implementation progress with certain bus 
measures since the last LTP/S and that certain measures that present particular implemen-
tation difficulties. 
These findings suggest that there is more potential for persuading urban residents 
to shift mode from automobile to bus than in rural areas, which is understandable given 
the higher frequency and connectivity of services in urban areas. 
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Bus Information – timetables and 
bus stop flags 
24 (30%) 34 (43%) 5 (6%) 0 (0%) 
Improved pedestrian access to stops 18 (23%) 36 (45%) 9 (11%) 0 (0%) 
Quality bus stops 13 (16%) 40 (50%) 3 (4%) 0 (0%) 
Printed leaflets and other paper-
based information 
20 (25%) 30 (38%) 6 (8%) 1 (1%) 
Clean accessible quality vehicles 13 (16%) 36 (45%) 7 (9%) 0 (0%) 
Unobstructed level kerb access for 
buses 
19 (16%) 34 (43%) 10 (13%) 0 (0%) 
Seating 13 (16%) 33 (41%) 2 (3%) 0 (0%) 
Shelters 15 (19%) 29 (36%) 10 (13%) 1 (1%) 
Quality customer care 10 (13%) 33 (41%) 6 (8%) 
0 (0%) 
 
RTPI 15 (19%) 23 (29%) 12 (15%) 5 (6%) 
Marketing of bus services such as 
school and business travel plans 
6 (8%) 29 (36%) 7 (9%) 2 (3%) 
Marketing targeted at persuading 
regular car commuters to use public 
transport 
5 (6%) 26 (33%) 11 (14%) 1 (1%) 
Pump-priming funding for bus routes 7 (9%) 23 (29%) 9 (11%) 3 (4%) 
Integrated ticketing 7 (9%) 23 (29%) 14 (18%) 5 (6%) 
Multi-operator integrated tickets 6 (8%) 17 (21%) 14 (18%) 9 (11%) 
Bus priority at signals 4 (5%) 19 (24%) 16 (20%) 4 (5%) 
Personal security (CCTV, lighting) 4 (5%) 18 (23%) 12 (15%) 2 (3%) 
Reviewing current bus lane network 
and its operation to ensure it is effec-
tive, legible and enforced 
3 (4%) 17 (21%) 16 (20%) 5 (6%) 
Tickets which can be bought be-
fore boarding buses 
2 (3%) 18 (23%) 10 (13%) 5 (6%) 
New bus lanes 3 (4%) 10 (13%) 19 (24%) 11 (14%) 
Maximum fares 1 (1%) 9 (11%) 14 (18%) 12 (15%) 
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5.2.4 Theme 3 – Policy targets 
The questionnaire included a section asking whether councils set targets and whether they 
were met. The results show 44% of councils met most or more than half of the targets set 
in the LTP/S, while 19% did not have targets related to bus policy (table 5.10). The results 
also showed that councils did not set targets for the number of vehicle kilometres per 
annum (74%), fares (70%), cost per passenger journey for services (65%), and age and 
quality of vehicles (51%). These findings show inconsistency among councils in Great 
Britain, and the results of the questionnaire showed that in many Councils setting targets 
is apparently not considered as an important aspect of the policy process. The lack of 
targets highlights a broken link between setting objectives and implementing measures to 
achieve them, and could even be related to political decisions not to want to identify un-
met targets or may relate to the difficulty of collecting data and monitoring progress in 
the achievement of certain policies. 
Table 5.10: Identifying whether targets were met 
Answer Count % 
Most of the targets set in the local transport plan/strategy are 
met 
8 10% 
More than half of the targets set in the local transport plan/strat-
egy are met 
27 34% 
Less than half of the targets set in the local transport plan/strat-
egy are met 
11 14% 
Very few of the targets set in the local transport plan/strategy are 
met 
3 4% 
We have no targets related to bus policy 15 19% 
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Table 5.11: Bus policy targets 
5.2.5 Theme 4 – Performance monitoring 
The officers were asked how bus policies and measures are currently monitored by their 
council. The most popular form of monitoring included service reliability and punctuality 
(60%), number of passengers per annum (53%), and number of passengers satisfied with 
bus services (41%). It was interesting to see continued monitoring carried out by councils 





Target Yes No 
We didn’t 
set a target 
Number of passengers per annum 13 (16.3%) 12 (15.0%) 36 (45.0%) 
Number of vehicle kilometres per annum 2 (2.5%) 1 (1.3%) 59 (73.8%) 
Cost per passenger journey for services 8 (10.0%) 1 (1.3%) 52 (65.0%) 
Number of passengers satisfied with bus ser-
vices 
22 (27.5%) 6 (7.5%) 34 (42.5%) 
Service reliability and punctuality 27 (33.8%) 9 (11.3%) 25 (31.3%) 
Age and quality of vehicles 17 (21.3%) 3 (3.8%) 41 (51.3%) 
The things we have implemented, e.g., km of 
new bus lanes opened, number of new shelters 
installed, etc. 
19 (23.8%) 3 (3.8%) 41 (51.3%) 
Fares 4 (5.0%) 1 (1.3%) 56 (70.0%) 
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Table 5.12: Monitoring of bus policies and measures 
Answer Count % 
Number of passengers per annum 42 53% 
Number of vehicle kilometres per annum 9 11% 
Cost per passenger journey for services 25 31% 
Number of passengers satisfied with bus services 33 41% 
Service reliability and punctuality 48 60% 
Age and quality of vehicles 19 24% 
The things we have implemented e.g. km of new bus lanes opened, 
number of new shelters installed etc. 
23 29% 
Fares 4 5% 
Not answered 20 25% 
5.2.6 Theme 5 – Implementation barriers 
The last section of the questionnaire asked the officers to identify which barriers have the 
greatest and least impact on implementation. The greatest barriers identified in the ques-
tionnaire included the availability of resources, characteristics of local authority (e.g.  
competence and size of staff) and coherence and comprehensibility of the written policy. 
Barriers identified in the questionnaire as having a lower impact on implementation in-
cluded public opposition, the relationship between key people in council and local bus 
operators (which does not automatically imply that a poor relationship leads to a lack of 
collaboration, identified earlier as a likely reason for the low level of implementation of 
more complex measures), and reshaping or changes to policy measures by local imple-
mentation frontline staff.  





















Table 5.13: Barriers which have the greatest and least impact on implementation 
Matrix row 1 2 3 4 5 
Availability of resources (e.g. funding) 0 (0%) 3 (5.0%) 1 (1.7%) 15 (25.0%) 41 (68.3%) 
Characteristics of local authority (e.g. competence and size of staff) 8 (13.1%) 18 (29.5%) 10 (16.4%) 16 (26.2%) 9 (14.8%) 
Coherence and comprehensibility of the written policy 13 (22.0%) 23 (39.0%) 14 (23.7%) 8 (13.6%) 1 (1.7%) 
Communication amongst staff involved in the policy implementation process 19 (31.7%) 20 (33.3%) 10 (16.7%) 9 (15.0%) 2 (3.3%) 
Conflict, ambiguities or disputes between those involved within the imple-
mentation process i.e. not everyone involved has a shared understanding of 
what is to be implemented 
5 (8.3%) 22 (36.7%) 19 (31.7%) 9 (15.0%) 5 (8.3%) 
Economic situation of local bus operator(s) 2 (3.5%) 13 (22.8%) 13 (22.8%) 18 (31.6%) 11 (19.3%) 
General economic, social and political conditions outside Council 0 (0%) 4 (6.7%) 16 (26.7%) 19 (31.7%) 21 (35.0%) 
Interaction between policy makers, implementers from various levels of gov-
ernment, and other actors (e.g. interaction between council and bus operator) 
4 (6.7%) 9 (15.0%) 21 (35.0%) 18 (30.0%) 8 (13.3%) 
  





















Table 5.13 contd. 
Matrix row contd. 1 2 3 4 5 
Local politics e.g. change of political control of Council or change of cabinet 
member responsible for transport 
6 (10.0%) 9 (15.0%) 14 (23.3%) 15 (25.0%) 16 (26.7%) 
Motivation and attitudes of those responsible for developing bus policies 15 (25.4%) 19 (32.2%) 14 (23.7%) 7 (11.9%) 4 (6.8%) 
Motivation and attitudes of those responsible for implementing bus policies 13 (21.7%) 21 (35.0%) 10 (16.7%) 10 (16.7%) 6 (10.0%) 
Public opposition 2 (3.3%) 12 (20.0%) 15 (25.0%) 23 (38.3%) 8 (13.3%) 
Relationship between key people in Council and local bus operator(s) 13 (21.7%) 16 (26.7%) 13 (21.7%) 11 (18.3%) 7 (11.7%) 
Reshaping or changes to policy measures by local implementation frontline 
staff 
13 (23.2%) 13 (23.2%) 23 (41.1%) 7 (12.5%) 0 (0%) 
Unforeseen practical problems (e.g. due to failure to achieve planning per-
mission for a park & ride site) 
6 (10.0%) 17 (28.3%) 22 (36.7%) 12 (20.0%) 3 (5.0%) 
 Chapter 5: Online questionnaire results 
   Page 94
  
A comment box also enabled the officers to identify key barriers to implementation 
in their council area. Comments include: "limited funding," "fierce competition between 
operators," "political will of members," "physical space and layout of roads," "high car 
ownership," and "public opinion influencing outcomes." These listed barriers, particularly 
lack of resources, are expected; however, the contentiousness of some local transport in-
itiatives raises questions as to whether public opposition is one of the least important 
barriers. Some of the comments, moreover, may be seen to contradict the questionnaire 
responses, as political will and public opinion were highlighted as important barriers. 
These findings provide the basis for deeper exploration through interviews with local au-
thority officers, the findings of which are presented in the next chapter.  
5.3 Theoretical analysis of online questionnaire 
This section will analyse the results obtained in the survey conducted by 56% of public 
transport officers in the UK. The 10 variables of the new decision support framework are 
used to analyse the results and this in turn will help determine the barriers and enablers 
which have an impact on the implementation of local bus policy and the impact these 
barriers have on achieving objectives and reaching targets. Furthermore, it will help meet 
the second research objective identified in table 5.1. 
1. Policy objective:  A written bus policy document should be in place, showing a 
clear link between policy objectives, measures and the setting and monitoring 
of targets. 
The questionnaire revealed a view that a written bus policy document should be in place 
to implement bus policy at a local level. The officers identified “coherence and compre-
hensibility of the written policy" as one of the greatest barriers to implementation. Mean-
while, it was found that 18% of local authorities do not have a specific bus policy docu-
ment in place. In terms of policy objectives, 51.3 to 88.8% of officers included the listed 
policy objectives mentioned in the questionnaire, which demonstrates that councils rec-
ognise the importance of bus policy to overall transport objectives. However, although 
the questionnaire results reveal that councils are setting objectives, there were many areas 
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of concern highlighted throughout the questionnaire in terms of setting targets and imple-
menting measures to achieve these objectives.  For example, 44% of councils met most 
or more than half of the targets set in the LTP/S, while 19% did not have targets related 
to bus policy. These findings show inconsistency among councils in Great Britain, and 
setting targets is not considered as an important aspect of the policy process. Officers 
were also asked to select from a list provided the stage at which bus measures are in their 
city, in order to judge the implementation of different types of measure. However, some 
measures appeared to be less successful. The results also indicated there has been little 
implementation progress with certain bus measures since the last LTP/S and that certain 
measures present particular implementation difficulties. The results also revealed that 
continued monitoring is being carried out by councils. Overall, the results revealed a 
somewhat broken link between policy objectives, measures and the setting and monitor-
ing of targets.  
2. Availability of resources: Resources such as financial support are important; 
however, where resources are limited, it is necessary to maximise the use of 
available resources. 
The officers were asked to identify which barriers have the greatest and least impact on 
implementation. The greatest barriers included the availability of resources, while “lim-
ited funding” was identified as a key reason for this barrier. However, the first point in 
this framework also revealed concerns with the unclear link between policy objectives 
and measures and the setting and monitoring of performance targets. Therefore, one rea-
son for this may be the over-emphasis on the availability of resources, which is seen as 
the greatest barrier to implementation based on several references made throughout the 
surveys. This unclear link indicates that councils are in fact placing too much emphasis 
on "what" is needed to implement policy (i.e., resources) and instead they should be plac-
ing more emphasis on "how" to implement the policy in terms of targets, measures, and 
performance monitoring. Once this is clear, councils can then direct resources where 
needed. 
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3. Intra-organisation support and communication: Policy staff need relevant 
training, supervision and support within their organisation when dealing with 
complex policy issues. 
The results provided limited information about intra-organisation support and communi-
cation. This could be due to officers answering the questionnaire questions in a much 
broader context in relation to their experiences of bus policy in their city, and not within 
their organisation. Therefore, further methods of data collection were employed later in 
the research to explore this issue.  
4. Characteristics of organisations: Both formal structural features of organisa-
tions and informal attributes of their personnel (including size, competency and 
workload of staff). 
The characteristics of organisations appeared to be a barrier for the implementation of 
bus policy at a local level.  Some 15 officers could not indicate the number of teams 
within the Council's transport department who have responsibility for the implementation 
of bus policies. This could suggest they did not know whether there were such teams 
within the council, or that such teams do not exist. Another question in the questionnaire 
asked the officers for their perception of planned and actual implementation for the pre-
vious LTP/S. The fact that 14% of officers did not answer this question could indicate 
that they were not aware of success. These examples suggest that the characteristics of 
organisations are a barrier for the implementation of bus policy, however further methods 
of data collection such as telephone interviews and case studies were also used to explore 
this issue in detail.  
5. Economic, social and political environments: Current and future economic, so-
cial and political environments play an important role on the outcome of the 
policy process. 
The questionnaire results provided limited information about economic, social and polit-
ical environments. However, it should be cautioned that questionnaires are sometimes 
completed by respondents in an abstract way without linking consideration of the ques-
tions to particular cases of implementation that might have made respondents think about 
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the issues in a more "hands-on" way.  For example, it is quite surprising that “economic, 
social and political environments” was judged to be less important in their influence on 
the implementation process than some other factors, as one might expect such factors to 
be quite critical to political support for a scheme or measure. This demonstrates the value 
of the other forms of data collection used later in the research.  
6. Policy champions: Policy implementation should not be restricted to one policy 
champion and instead needs several policy champions who are responsible, 
competent and motivated to see the policy through from beginning to end. 
The questionnaire also revealed limited information on policy champions and whether 
they had an impact on the implementation of bus policy at a local level. Again, this could 
be due to officers answering the questionnaire questions in a much broader context in 
relation to their experiences of bus policy in their city, and not within their organisation 
or with reference to specific schemes.  
7. Bureaucratic power: Hierarchical control in an organisation is important; how-
ever, hierarchical power must not be used to overrule policy decisions by other 
members within the organisation. 
The questionnaire also revealed limited information on bureaucratic power and whether 
it had an impact on the implementation of bus policy at a local level.  The questionnaire 
was not an ideal method to obtain this kind of quite qualitative data.  
8. Collaboration and interaction between those involved in the policy process: Col-
laboration and interaction is necessary between key actors involved in the policy 
process, including policy makers, local authority staff, local and national gov-
erning bodies, regional transport partnerships, bus operators and transport 
practitioners working within the transport field. 
Collaboration and interaction (or lack of it) between those involved in the policy process 
appeared to be a barrier for the implementation of bus policy at a local level. For example, 
a question in the questionnaire asked the officers if bus measures in their cities were im-
plemented as planned and without problems. The result indicated that the policy measures 
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facing barriers are those that require collaboration with and action by the operators, where 
the local authority has little control. It was also found that operators do not always view 
participation in various bus schemes to be in their best commercial interests. This key 
issue was explored further in telephone interviews and case studies.  
9. Policy remodelling: Limited changes to the policy should occur from the design 
stage right through to the implementation stage. 
As with point 7, the questionnaire also revealed limited information on policy remodel-
ling.  
10. Opposition, conflict and ambiguities: Opposition, conflict and ambiguities are 
inevitable including public opposition, political power, local and national elec-
tions, conflicts between neighbouring authorities over budgets, bus wars and 
open-access to data by bus operating companies. 
Opposition, conflict and ambiguities were identified as a key barrier for the implementa-
tion of bus policy at a local level. The survey revealed that some officers identified key 
barriers in their area as "bus wars between operators" and "public opinion influencing 
outcomes." The findings from the questionnaire also suggest that the unclear link between 
policy objectives, measures and the setting and monitoring of targets, could even be re-
lated to political decisions not to want to identify unmet targets or may relate to the diffi-
culty of collecting data and monitoring progress in the achievement of certain policies. 
On the other hand, like “economic, social and political environments”, it was also sur-
prising that opposition, conflict, and ambiguities were judged to be less important in their 
influence on the implementation process than some other factors. It was also expected 
that such factors would to be quite critical to political support for a scheme or measure.  
5.4 Summary 
This chapter has presented the findings from the questionnaire conducted by 56% of pub-
lic transport officers in the UK. The decision support framework was used to analyse the 
questionnaire results and this in turn helped to determine the barriers and enablers which 
have an impact on bus policy implementation in the UK. Furthermore, this chapter helps 
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answer the second research objective identified in table 5.1, which will be discussed in 
detail in chapter 9. 
The theoretical analysis has identified five key elements of the framework that in 
the responses to the questionnaire were judged to have a significant impact on bus policy 
implementation at a local level. These include policy objectives; availability of resources; 
characteristics of organisations; collaboration and interaction between those involved in 
the policy process; and opposition, conflict and ambiguities. However, five elements of 
the decision support framework were not explored because there was limited data avail-
able on the issues associated with these elements. It is important to remember that the 
abstract nature of the questionnaire differs to the real-world experience of the interview-
ees. Therefore, complementary research methods were conducted to examine these ele-
ments further.  
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Chapter 6: Telephone interview results 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented the first set of research results from the questionnaires 
conducted of 56% of public transport officers in Great Britain. This chapter will now 
present the second set of research results by detailing the findings from the telephone 
interviews. The telephone interviews were conducted with 10 of those public transport 
officers who answered the questionnaire to elicit a deeper understanding of the results, 
which simply could not be achieved from the questionnaire results alone. The telephone 
interviews aimed to elaborate on the answers from the questionnaires through a relaxed 
and confidential interview process. 
Sections 6.2 presents the telephone interview results. These results are then ana-
lysed in section 6.3 which is based on the application of the ten-point framework. Similar 
to the questionnaires, the findings from the telephone interviews also address the second 
research objective to help meet the aim of this thesis. For ease of reference, the second 
research objective is addressed in table 6.1. 




To understand the views and experi-
ences of public transport officers re-
garding the key issues associated 
with the implementation of bus pol-
icies within Great Britain. 
This objective seeks to use the findings of online 
questionnaires and telephone interviews conducted 
in Great Britain. This includes the views and expe-
riences of local transport officers. It also seeks to 
understand areas of consensus and differences be-
tween respondents on a wide range of policy im-
plementation issues. 
6.2 Telephone interview results 
Similar to the questionnaires, the telephone interview questions were structured under 
five themes used to organise the findings of this study and include: policy documentation; 
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policy responsibility; policy targets; performance monitoring; and implementation barri-
ers. The following sub-sections present the telephone interview results of the 11 open-
ended questions under the common themes. As the names of the interviewees remain 
anonymous, each interviewee is coded with ‘PTO’, as seen in table 6.2, along with their 
local authority area.  
Table 6.2: Public transport officer name and local authority 







PTO5 City of Cardiff 
PTO6 Borough of Poole 




6.2.1 Theme 1 – Policy documentation 
The LTP/S sets out transport policies, objectives and vision for the longer term. The pro-
duction of these documents is a statutory requirement of the Transport Act 2000 and Local 
Transport Act 2008. All Local Authorities in the UK (outside of London) are required to 
set out their plans and policies for transport and how they intend to implement them. Most 
officers interviewed said they did not have a specific bus policy document in place. How-
ever, some of the officers said the LTP/S is used as a reference and their “local bus policy 
is all contained with the LTP/S” (PTO6). Only one officer said they had a specific bus 
policy document which was a “daughter document” (PTO1) to their LTP that was adopted 
in 2012. The interviews identified several barriers that prevented councils from having a 
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specific bus policy document in place. For example, one officer said there was no “spe-
cific strategy” (PTO4) added to the latest LTP as it was a more “laid back” document this 
time round, with no need identified for a supporting strategy. Another officer highlighted 
that financial constraints and limited staff has resulted in their council not having a spe-
cific bus policy documents. 
“…we have a section in the LTS, last one in 2007-2010. We were told in 2010 
that the government had taken over but there has been no update since then... 
coming out of the recession it was to keep the previous plan going instead of 
coming up with a new one. Since then, it was supposed to be looked at 2015... 
Limited staff was devoted to that and now in 2016 it’s still not done”. (PTO1) 
In response to a further question, all officers agreed that having a policy document 
in place is important – yet few said that they actually had one. This is intriguing especially 
considering that 74% of the questionnaire respondents had claimed to have a written pol-
icy in place, with 49% claiming to have had one for greater than 11 years. Several exam-
ples of this discrepancy were raised in the interviews. One officer believed “councils want 
to give the impression how well they did,” while another officer thought it was a “reflec-
tion of the severe financial challenges that councils are facing now and in the future.” 
Another officer supported both these statements by saying there was a discrepancy be-
cause “people will always say they implemented their LTP successfully because they 
would have made sure they spent it [funding].”  
Nonetheless, the officers noted the importance of this document in terms of com-
municating with local stakeholders and politicians, understanding of what they need to 
achieve, dealing with conflict from the public and politicians who might have a different 
perception on a particular policy, and a way to identify key milestones to be achieved. 
“I do think they are helpful and how they are perceived by local stakeholders 
and politicians - both in terms of communication and getting a better under-
standing of what you want to achieve. It is helpful to have a strong written 
policy in place if ever dealing with conflict from the general public. It is also 
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helpful when discussing with politicians when they might have a different per-
ception on a particular policy”. (PTO2) 
However, as one officer pointed out, there are “no sanctions” (PTO1) if the council 
didn’t have this document in place and therefore there was no drive to use this document. 
Another officer also highlighted a lack of support and miscommunication for the docu-
ment as key barriers related to a bus policy document. 
“In 2010 I appointed a consultant to lead and got the funding to go forward, 
but [Regional Transport Partnership] came up with a template instead of pay-
ing a consultant. We were promised this new template and [Regional 
Transport Partnership] would pay for it. We were also told we could edit this 
template. This would have been fantastic savings, subsequently it took a long 
time to go through and the council didn’t take it”. (PTO1) 
6.2.2 Theme 2 – Policy responsibility 
This aim of this section was to unpack why certain answers were provided in the ques-
tionnaires in relation to responsibility for policy implementation. Eight out of ten officers 
interviewed said they knew the number of teams within their council's transport depart-
ment; however, two officers said they do not know or that they would not call it a “team.” 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, this could also indicate confusion about small au-
thorities having very small staff numbers in transport. The next question asked the officers 
to consider why 15 respondents in the survey did not identify how many different teams 
were within their council's transport department. The officers suggested they “don't have 
the teams” or it was a combination of both answers. Three officers thought it was related 
to communication issues and that “people can be naïve and don't want to take responsi-
bility.” 
“I think it’s a bit of both to be fair. Each team have different budgets and 
reporting structures. It comes down to communication a lot of the time, for 
example people changes positions so you don’t know who is coming or going 
in the council.” (PTO4) 
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“A lot of it is simply a communication issue.” (PTO5) 
“I think a lot of councils are, like ours, naive and thought transport was a black 
art and only the people who deal with transport know anything about it…It 
can also be because the people in those positions are long in the tooth and a 
bit like dinosaurs. They are empire building rather than being able to work 
across partnerships and shareholders.” (PTO7) 
This suggests a certain level of miscommunication and indeed lack of clearly allo-
cated responsibilities within local authorities when it comes to bus policy implementation, 
which then undermines the broader process (including monitoring). 
It was evident in the questionnaires that there were areas of concerns highlighted 
throughout (in terms of achieving bus policy objectives, meeting targets, and barriers re-
lated to policy implementation). The interviews revealed that the majority of officers 
agreed that there were inconsistencies and councils want to “give the impression how 
well they did.” This relates to the political pressure underlying the entire policy process, 
from design to implementation to monitoring. 
“I think this is what they will say that about their LTP. They will spend the 
money every year which is often how people see the success of an LTP. 
Whether they have spent it on the right things or not is a different question. 
So, I think that’s where there is probably a little bit of a discrepancy. People 
will always say they implemented their LTP successfully because they would 
have made sure they spent it.” (PTO9) 
Another question in this section asked the officers to comment on bus policy 
measures in their city. Fewer than half of the officers said they have implemented bus 
policy measures while three officers referred to political constraints that prevent bus pol-
icy measures being implemented as planned. This could help explain similar results found 
in the questionnaires where councils were less successful at implementing certain bus 
policy measures. 
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“What we really need is strong political will to overcome whatever opposition 
there may be” (PTO5) 
“I think ours were implemented. It was just a case of having it supported 
properly so we could monitor what we achieved.” (PTO7) 
“The very nature of implementing policy measures means that they may get 
changed along the way i.e. through political engagement and public consulta-
tion. This goes with the territory of working in a political environment.” 
(PTO10) 
A final question in this section asked the officers to comment on why the survey 
revealed “maximum fares” and “reviewing current bus lanes” as the least successful bus 
measures. As previously suggested in chapter 5, maximum fares were not applicable to 
the officers involved while all officers said they had no involvement with maximum fares. 
One officer did however comment on the difficulties with maximum fares, stating: 
“Maximum fares don’t work as far as we are concerned. It puts too much 
pressure on the operator, especially if their costs are higher that what the max-
imum fare is.” (PTO7) 
In terms of reviewing current bus lanes, two officers said bus lanes weren’t a prob-
lem as they were a “rural authority” and there was “no appetite” to review current bus 
lanes.  
“I don’t think we had any major problems in implementation, we are a rural 
authority so possibly we are implementing different policy measures.” (PTO2) 
“Reviewing current bus lanes, we have 6 bus lanes although we have no ap-
petite and no pressure to remove existing ones. We don’t have issues here.” 
(PTO4) 
Meanwhile, two officers noted the difficulty in implementing bus lanes. 
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“One of the issues is implementing bus lanes, we haven’t introduced any for 
the last 10 years.” (PTO3) 
“Bus lanes are positive if you had the road infrastructure for it. Unfortunately, 
in our area we don’t have the road infrastructure for them” (PTO7) 
This suggests that reviewing of bus lanes was identified in the survey as the least 
successful bus measure to be implemented because some respondents may not have to 
deal with bus lanes and therefore this measure was not applicable to them. It could also 
suggest that, as PTO2 pointed out, there is no appetite and no pressure to deal with exist-
ing bus lanes.  
6.2.3 Theme 3 – Policy targets 
This series of questions asked the officers about bus policy targets in their city. Only one 
council said they met all their targets while three officers said they met most of their 
targets. Reasons for not meeting targets included a “lack of communication within the 
council and the community” and “a lack of advertisement and marketing,” which are 
closely related issues and essentially relate to difficulties with building public acceptabil-
ity for new policy measures.  
“The targets we had related to buses – the main one was bus patronage, which 
we were very successful with, we had another form of indicator which is ac-
cess to employment by mode (walking and cycling), bus punctuality is another 
indicator and this was green. Satisfaction with bus services, we collect that 
one annually through a survey. It fluctuates between amber and green but is it 
relatively successful.” (PTO6) 
“We managed to meet about 70% of the targets that the council set. The failing 
that we had was because we weren’t working across councils properly, not 
working with community groups and not using advertisement and marketing 
as well as we could have.” (PTO7) 
When asked what more councils could do to achieve targets, three officers high-
lighted the need for further “financial support” to help achieve targets. However, one 
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officer said they succeeded in their own territory, and it was the “neighbouring authority 
that affected the outcome of targets,” while two officers said it was more of an issue with 
the actual targets. Other factors that are preventing councils from achieving targets in-
clude a “lack of funding” or “financial support” and “political will.” 
“Funding. This year we only have a budget of £30,000. A new shelter can cost 
between £7,000 and £10,000. One raised curb could be £1200 so this £30,000 
could only buy you a shelter and few raised curbs.” (PTO4) 
“The political dimension comes in here. The council tries to set a LTS for 10 
years, but in that time, you could have 2 different cabinets. Depending on their 
political view of the councils at the time, impacts on what you are able to 
deliver, or shapes what you are able to deliver. You may have to make adjust-
ments.” (PTO7) 
The officers were then asked if their council had policy targets. Six of the officers 
said they set targets in their council. In contrast to this, three officers said there was “little 
progress on setting targets since the latest LTP/S came into effect.” 
“Apart from the ones from original strategy 07-10, the only extra target was 
on how to save money. We used to have a section in the strategy on how many 
shelters we had with disabled access built in and how many buses in the area 
were wheel chair friendly (equality act) However, that was stopped because 
we were near 100% so we took the target away as part of savings.” (PTO1) 
“We don’t have targets since LTP2. We reduced down the level of targets and 
reporting measures back.” (PTO4) 
“We achieved bus patronage. But there is no statutory requirement to set tar-
gets in the LTP.”  (PTO5) 
These results could help explain why targets are not seen as an important factor as 
identified in the questionnaires. The final question in this section asked officers if targets 
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have an impact on how policies are implemented in their city. More than half of the of-
ficers said targets have an impact.  
“They do have an impact on how policies are implemented. In particular, they 
improved cycling facilities around the city and more trips are made by bike.” 
(PTO5) 
“Yes. I do think they are beneficial to demonstrate previous success of activity 
and to support decisions for future investment.” (PTO6) 
“The targets do impact on how we do the policies. They allow us to shape it 
better. Half way through the next transport strategy, I’m going to have to do a 
re-tender of the supported services…So when you put a tender out, those who 
are bidding for the route know exactly what milestones they want to achieve 
and when you want to achieve them.” (PTO7) 
“Yes. They influence decision making and provide sound evidence base.” 
(PTO10) 
There appears to be some confusion on this topic between a recognition of the im-
portance of targets but unclear responsibility and focus on setting and meeting them. No 
doubt, the political sensitivity of the topic and public accountability exert some influence 
in this area, but there is a risk that the entire policy implementation process is undermined 
in the absence of a clear chain from setting objectives to implementing measures to setting 
targets and then monitoring the outcome. Without such a framework, it becomes difficult 
to gauge the success of particular measures and decide on future action. 
6.2.4 Theme 4 – Performance monitoring 
This section asked the officers if they thought it was important for monitoring to be in 
place to achieve bus policy. Eight officers felt it was important to have monitoring in 
place as it demonstrates that they are “…achieving objectives and public money is achiev-
ing outcomes” (PTO6) and it helps to “…develop a sound evidence base to influence 
decision making” (PTO10). Two of those eight officers also highlighted the importance 
of monitoring, stating: 
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“I think certain information that is required can show a trend of people using 
the bus services. Although we don’t have specific targets, we still have a lot 
of data coming in e.g. concessionary bus pass usage and the information that 
comes out of that can project bus usage. We have congestion measures which 
can also influence schemes going forward.” (PTO4) 
“It’s very important to monitor. The biggest one to monitor is reliability. If 
reliability in the services isn’t there, then you get compliant after complaint 
after complaint. The next thing they talk about is comfort and again if the 
comfort isn’t right, it puts the people off. The number of passengers drop and 
services will start to be curtailed because operators won’t want to run them. 
Therefore, monitoring of services is a big one.” (PTO7) 
However, two officers said there should be “less concentration on bus policies” and 
that it was less important now because there is no funding attached.  
“I think it is more of a long-term process working with bus operators instead 
of working on policies. We need to concentrate on congestion in the area, not 
policies.” (PTO3) 
“Previously there were rewards for meeting your targets. We used to get inte-
grated transport blocked funding. But it’s not really important now because 
there is no funding attached to doing well and achieving bus policy measures.” 
(PTO4) 
This result could indicate a concerning lack of focus on targets as a result of the 
decreased importance of the LTP/S, although this does not imply an abandonment of bus 
policies. Another question in this section asked officers what they thought constitutes 
good practice in monitoring. Examples of good practice include “consistency”, “reliabil-
ity”, “monitoring something that is measurable”, “being able to present results clearly so 
non- transport people understand”, “customer satisfaction and finding out what the public 
think of the service”, “good policy document in place”, “monitoring punctuality statis-
tics”, “simple and easy measurable targets in place”, “funds for future monitoring”, and 
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“regular bus forum meetings”. These examples suggested by the officers indicate that 
there needs to be a solid regime in place at a local level to monitor bus policies. 
This section also asked the officers if more bus policy measures would be imple-
mented as planned and without problems if stricter monitoring were in place, to which 
nine out of ten officers agreed. For example, one officer said it is crucial to have a “robust 
monitoring regime in place” because without that, “you won't be able to monitor perfor-
mance.” Another officer said it demonstrates that they are “achieving objectives and pub-
lic money is achieving outcomes” while another said, “without robust monitoring regimes 
you cannot develop a sound evidence base to influence decision making.” Two of those 
nine officers also highlighted the difficulties of having monitoring in place, stating: 
“Yes. Our principal indicator is the number of people travelling on buses. That 
used to be a statutory indicator but it’s no longer a statutory indicator. We 
have continued to apply that information and use it. I can’t understand why 
the government don’t think it’s important for it to be statutory. Punctuality is 
statutory and we can see the benefits of that. But overall, we don’t have to 
collect bus patronage which is quite bizarre really.” (PTO6) 
“Yes definitely. The more monitoring you have in place, the more likely you 
are to achieve what you wanted to achieve. The biggest difficulty there is to 
figure out how you are going to do the monitoring, whether you have your 
balanced key card for what you want to implement as your strategy. You also 
have to have a balance on how you respond to the general public and day to 
day problems.” (PTO7) 
This highlights the importance of having clear strategies and tactics, rather than 
simply implementing policies that are “do-able.” This, in turn, may improve policy de-
velopment and collaboration, and promote an environment of stakeholder engagement 
because external stakeholders can understand the guiding logic and see evidence of pro-
gress. 
Regarding the impact of funding on monitoring, one officer raised this issue by 
saying “council cuts” prevent putting monitoring in place. Similarly, another officer said 
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monitoring is “useful for driving future funding bids. If you can prove what you have 
done and that it can be achieved … you have a good chance of continuing with your 
policy.” This indicates that councils want monitoring in place to improve their chances 
of future funding to monitor the measures that are in place. Again, this was an interesting 
result given the abolition of monitoring subsequent to the Local Transport Act 2008 and 
elaborates on findings in the previous sections. 
6.2.5 Theme 5 – Implementation barriers 
The last section asked the officers to rank the greatest and least barriers to impact imple-
mentation as identified in the questionnaire. In line with the survey findings, eight officers 
ranked availability of resources (e.g., funding) as the greatest barrier to implementation 
in their city. 
“Funding has been an issue because we’re not in a position to subsidise even-
ing or weekend buses.” (PTO3) 
“Funding is the biggest barrier to implementation. When funding is scarce, we 
end up fighting with our local bus schemes. We are a very small team so we 
have a lack of resources and time put into certain things… The politicians 
around here do see the importance of it but I would say in the current financial 
climate, it’s fighting amongst others across all local authority budgets, not just 
transport that is a greater barrier.” (PTO4) 
“Yes, funding is an increasing problem and we rely to a great extent on win-
ning funding for specific projects like the local sustainable transport fund 
which has really helped us in recent years. But revenue funding is being 
squeezed to the extent that my authority and other authorities are in the process 
of reducing the amount they spend on supporting bus services.” (PTO6) 
Meanwhile, eight officers did not agree that characteristics of the local authority 
was one of the greatest barriers. 
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“Characteristics of local authority is a relevant factor and we are fortunate in 
Aberdeenshire that we have competent staff and are quite well organised.” 
(PTO2) 
“We are lucky here because we have a good group of people here who under-
stand how it works and we have a good relationship with bus operators and so 
it does work well here. This is why we have a good partnership arrangement 
and we have been able to grow bus patronage in recent years.” (PTO6) 
“For characteristics of local authority, it’s how well you are at talking to each 
other. Your bus policy and how it’s written could have a huge impact on young 
people and how they are able to access services. If you’re not talking to new 
services, that could be something totally missed.” (PTO9) 
These findings are consistent with research by McTigue et al. (2017), Preston 
(2016), Lindholm and Blinge (2014), Argyriou et al. (2012) and Gaffron (2003) high-
lighting the difficultly that local authorities face in allocating resources to new transport 
policy initiatives. This is unsurprising, as lack of funding is the easiest and most natural 
barrier to nominate, but this does not mean that unlimited resources would ensure suc-
cessful bus policy. In fact, one interviewee pointed out that “Resources is a bit of a red 
herring. It's important, but everyone will say that. I think you can do a lot without it. It's 
actually dealing with what you have got, than without.” Nonetheless, undertaking a policy 
initiative and without financial resources to follow it through suggests poor planning. 
Most officers did not agree that public opposition had a minor impact on implemen-
tation. This response is in keeping with the findings across all sections of both the survey 
and the interviews. For example, some of the officers suggested public opposition has 
previously been a barrier in their area, stating: 
“That’s becoming more noticeable over the years because of Facebook and 
Twitter complaints. Also, there’s a petition committee created by SMP, simi-
lar to what happens in parliament.” (PTO1) 
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“Public opposition can be problematic at times but being a rural authority, we 
have less controversial policies (e.g. removing parking). We have seen how-
ever, where people mightn’t like a particular bus stop but that’s about it.” 
(PTO2) 
“Public opposition has the most impact on us. A lot of schemes do get stopped 
because of concerns from the general public and it has been a big challenge to 
try overcome this.”  (PTO4) 
“With some of the schemes we have put in place, there can be local opposition. 
I think it can be a bit of a problem because they can’t see the benefits of it. 
Same with bus services, people can be upset about not being able to get out of 
their house when they think the bus is on the way but it stopped outside their 
house. It’s just about their concerns and doing as much as we can.” (PTO8) 
Similarly to public opposition, the majority of officers did not feel that the relation-
ship between key people in council and local bus operators had a minor impact on imple-
mentation. Again, this response is in keeping with the findings across all sections of both 
the survey and the interviews. Some of the officers expressed the importance of the rela-
tionship between key people in council and local bus operators, stating: 
“The relationship between the council and bus operators is key. We have a bit 
of an advantage there because our authority is a unity operation and we can’t 
interfere with the day to day operations.” (PTO5) 
“…if you don’t have a good relationship with your operators, you will find it 
harder to achieve things and you could end up with people saying it’s not go-
ing to work. Your resources get smaller and smaller for what you actually 
want and this could be a big thing for councils in the future because of budget 
constraints. Each team within councils are being cut and then you lose your 
continuity with the operator and how people speak to them.” (PTO7) 
“Absolutely, relationship between key people in council and local bus opera-
tors are critical and you need to get that good as possible.” (PTO9) 
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In comparison to the questionnaires, four officers believed reshaping or changes to 
policy measures by local implementation frontline staff had a lesser impact. However, 
three officers shared similar views to the survey findings and believed reshaping or 
changes to policy measures by local implementation frontline staff had an impact on im-
plementation, stating: 
That’s becoming more noticeable over the years because of Facebook and 
Twitter complaints.” (PTO1) 
“Reshaping or changes to policy measures by local implementation frontline 
staff is a big barrier because you can get people who are very ‘anti’ and who 
won’t operate because they had bad experience. This is key because they do 
things or shape things, they try do it to suit other people and means you could 
end up losing that operator out of that area. That happened to two of our neigh-
bours which happened drastically a few years ago.” (PTO7)  
“For reshaping or changes to policy measures by local implementation front-
line staff, I do think you need a one council approach and not feeling like 4 
different departments not telling each other everything” (PTO9) 
Finally, the officers were asked to comment on other barriers highlighted in the 
survey. About half of the officers said communication among staff involved in the policy 
implementation process was not a barrier in their city. Some of the officers expressed 
their success in communication, stating: 
“We have good relationship with colleagues... We work well with all services 
in the organisation. We have good communication with operators. There is an 
obvious means of communications with other authorities.”(PTO2) 
We are a small team and we communicate well with each other and we com-
municate well with neighbouring authorities and the bus operators. It’s work-
ing well here.” (PTO7) 
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 “I think communication amongst staff involved in the policy implementation 
process is fine as we try bring all teams together and we have fortnightly meet-
ings called “transport matters” and that’s a place we have good communica-
tion. But we had to put it in place because we didn’t have good communica-
tion.” (PTO9) 
Similarly, about half of the officers said motivation and attitudes of those responsi-
ble for developing or implementing bus policies was not a barrier in their city. For exam-
ple, some officers expressed that there was positive motivation and attitudes in their coun-
cil, stating:  
“We have a very passionate team and are striving to improve the bus situation. 
Within the council, the head of service and assistant director have less involve-
ment and so there is less importance attached to bus services. Like with all 
authorities, if you don’t have an interest or particular involvement, buses can 
be seen as a second-class mode of travel.” (PTO4) 
“The motivations and attitudes of those responsible for developing or imple-
menting bus policies isn’t a particular problem here. Most people are actually 
keen to implement schemes.” (PTO5) 
There was also considerable mention of “political will” or lack thereof as a barrier. 
There may seem to be some contradiction in this finding since most authorities studied 
appeared to have documented bus policies that had been adopted politically. However, as 
identified by Schade (2003), measures that get political support at a general level (e.g., 
there should be more bus priority) may attract much less support once they require adding 
a bus lane on a specific street. 
6.3 Theoretical analysis of telephone interviews 
This section will analyse the results obtained in the follow-up telephone interviews con-
ducted with 10 public transport officers who also completed the questionnaires. The 10 
variables of the new decision support framework are used to analyse the results and this 
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in turn will help determine the barriers and enablers which have an impact on the imple-
mentation of local bus policy and the impact these barriers have on achieving objectives 
and reaching targets. Furthermore, it will help meet the second research objective identi-
fied in table 6.1. 
1. Policy objective:  A written bus policy document should be in place, showing a 
clear link between policy objectives, measures and the setting and monitoring 
of targets. 
The majority of officers interviewed said they did not have a specific bus policy document 
in place. It is therefore difficult for local authorities to determine their bus policies, stand-
ards and objectives for the longer term. Interestingly, the interviews found that all officers 
agreed that it is important to have this document in place. The majority of officers also 
felt it was important to have monitoring in place to achieve bus policy measures. Further-
more, the majority of officers agreed bus policy measures would be implemented as 
planned and without problems, if stricter monitoring was in place. However, there was 
some contradiction between the survey results and the telephone interviews when asked 
what they thought constituted good practice in monitoring. According to the survey, “co-
herence and comprehensibility of the written policy” was one of the greatest barriers to 
impact implementation, whereas most officers from the telephone interviews did not 
agree with this being one of the greatest barriers. In terms of targets, only one officer said 
they met all their targets while three officers said they met the majority of their targets. 
The interviews revealed that there is confusion on this topic between a recognition of the 
importance of targets but unclear responsibility and focus on setting and meeting them. 
Similar to the questionnaire results, the telephone interviews have revealed that there is a 
broken link between policy objectives, measures and the setting and monitoring of targets. 
2. Availability of resources: Resources such as financial support are important; 
however, where resources are limited, it is necessary to maximise the use of 
available resources. 
Similarly to the questionnaire, the availability of resources was ranked as the greatest 
barrier to impact implementation. The telephone interviews revealed that a lack of policy 
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resources prevented the councils having a bus policy document, achieving targets, bus 
policy measures and working to their full potential. However, as mentioned in the previ-
ous chapter, there may be over-emphasis on the availability of resources and councils are 
in fact placing too much emphasis on "what" is needed to implement policy (i.e., re-
sources) and instead they should be placing more emphasis on "how" to implement the 
policy in terms of targets, measures, and performance monitoring. 
3. Intra-organisation support and communication: Policy staff need relevant 
training, supervision and support within their organisation when dealing with 
complex policy issues. 
The telephone interviews revealed that a lack of communication can have a negative 
impact on how policies are implemented. For example, half of the officers said commu-
nication was a barrier to implementation and this was particularly a barrier between neigh-
bouring authorities, bus operators, stakeholders, politicians and the general public. The 
telephone interviews also revealed that a lack of intra-organisation support and commu-
nication can also have an impact on how councils meet targets and how bus policies are 
monitored. 
4. Characteristics of organisations: Both formal structural features of organisa-
tions and informal attributes of their personnel (including size, competency and 
workload of staff). 
In contrast to the questionnaire, the majority of officers interviewed did not agree char-
acteristics of organisations was one of the most significant barriers to implementation. 
However, staffing difficulties such as shortage of staff or over-worked staff was raised 
on several occasions and were found to have an impact on policy implementation. Also, 
two officers did not know the number of teams responsible for implementation of bus 
policies. This may hint at a lack of clear lines of responsibility within local authorities 
when it comes to bus policy implementation.  
5. Economic, social and political environments: Current and future economic, so-
cial and political environments play an important role on the outcome of the 
policy process. 
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The telephone interviews identified several examples of where political conditions had 
an impact on the relationship between objectives and results. Political constraints and 
(lack of) support prevented councils from having a bus policy document in place, imple-
menting bus policy measures and achieving targets. In terms of social conditions that have 
an impact on the relationship between objectives and results, the results found neighbour-
ing authorities and the current economic climate affected the outcome of their targets and 
monitoring of bus policy measures. Public opposition was also identified as another im-
portant factor that influenced the relationship between objectives and results. This con-
tradicts the findings of the questionnaires where public opposition was not seen as a major 
barrier to impact implementation. 
6. Policy champions: Policy implementation should not be restricted to one policy 
champion and instead needs several policy champions who are responsible, 
competent and motivated to see the policy through from beginning to end. 
In comparison to the questionnaires, four officers did not agree policy champions had a 
minor impact on implementation. The telephone interviews revealed several examples of 
how competent and motivated staff can have an impact on other staff involved in the 
policy process. Furthermore, policy champions can have an impact on the development 
and implementation of bus policies and achieving targets. The interviews also revealed 
negative motivation and attitudes of staff could potentially jeopardise the working rela-
tionship between the council staff and bus operators. However, further methods of data 
collection such as case studies are required to explore the importance of policy champions 
when dealing with bus policy implementation. 
7. Bureaucratic power: Hierarchical control in an organisation is important; how-
ever, hierarchical power must not be used to overrule policy decisions by other 
members within the organisation. 
In contrast to the questionnaires, three officers did not agree bureaucratic power had a 
minor impact on implementation. The telephone interviews revealed several examples of 
how bureaucratic power had a negative impact on councils. For example, one officer in-
dicated that there needs to be a “one council approach” instead of several departments 
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because they had many instances of departments not telling each other everything and 
scowling with each other over resources. However, similar to the findings in the ques-
tionnaires, further methods of data collection such as case studies are required to explore 
the impact of bureaucratic power in detail. 
8. Collaboration and interaction between those involved in the policy process: Col-
laboration and interaction is necessary between key actors involved in the policy 
process, including policy makers, local authority staff, local and national gov-
erning bodies, regional transport partnerships, bus operators and transport 
practitioners working within the transport field. 
In contrast to the questionnaires, most officers highlighted the importance of the interac-
tion between the councils and bus operators and felt it was key to implementation to have 
a partnership arrangement. Several examples were also mentioned during the interviews 
that highlighted the importance of the interaction between policy makers, implementers 
from various levels of government, and other actors. The officers felt good interac-
tion/collaboration was needed for policy implementation, achieving targets and to grow 
bus patronage. 
9. Policy remodelling: Limited changes to the policy should occur from the design 
stage right through to the implementation stage. 
The telephone interviews provided evidence of how policy may change during imple-
mentation. For example, one officer said policy change prevented their council imple-
menting particular policy measures. Another officer said partners and stakeholder work-
ing groups are key so that policy does not change during implementation. This highlights 
the importance of limited policy remodelling, however, similar to the findings in the ques-
tionnaires, further methods of data collection such as case studies will be required to de-
termine whether policy remodelling has an impact on bus policy implementation. 
10. Opposition, conflict and ambiguities: Opposition, conflict and ambiguities are 
inevitable including public opposition, political power, local and national elec-
tions, conflicts between neighbouring authorities over budgets, bus wars and 
open-access to data by bus operating companies. 
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The results of the telephone interviews revealed that there were contradictions with the 
questionnaires and the majority of officers did not agree public opposition had a minor or 
less significant impact on implementation. In fact, the interviews provided several exam-
ples of barriers including conflict and ambiguities between councils and the public, local 
bus operators who competed with each other, and neighbouring councils who were 
fighting amongst each other for budgets. Furthermore, the interviews revealed that these 
conflict and ambiguities can have an impact on developing measures and implementing 
bus policies at a local level. 
6.4 Summary  
This chapter presented the second set of research results by detailing the findings from 
the telephone interviews conducted with 10 public transport officers from the question-
naire. The new decision support framework was used to analyse the interview results and 
this in turn helped to determine the barriers and enablers which have an impact on bus 
policy implementation in the UK. Furthermore, this chapter helped meet the second re-
search objective identified in table 6.1. 
The theoretical analysis has identified eight key elements of the framework that 
have an impact on bus policy implementation at a local level. These include policy ob-
jectives; availability of resources; intra-organisation support and communication; charac-
teristics of organisations; economic, social and political conditions; bureaucratic power; 
policy remodelling; and opposition, conflict and ambiguities. Meanwhile, the framework 
identified two enablers which help to implement bus policy. These enablers include pol-
icy champions and collaboration and interaction between those involved in the policy 
process. However, three elements of the decision support framework will require further 
exploration as there was limited data available on the issues associated with these ele-
ments. These include policy champions; bureaucratic power; and policy remodelling.  
Table 6.3 presents the application of the decision support framework to the two sets 
of data. Based on the results, each element in the framework was ranked as high, medium, 
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or low to identify the barriers to implementation. This is a qualitative ranking by the au-
thor not intended for robust application but merely for ease of presenting and discussing 
the results.  
The next chapter will present the final set of research results from four case studies 
carried out in UK cities. These case studies provide a deeper understanding of the issues 
associated with bus policy implementation at a local level which may not be evident from 
the questionnaires and telephone interviews alone. The findings in table 6.3 will then be 
triangulated with the findings of the case studies to determine the greatest barriers to im-
plementation. Moreover, this method of triangulation is important for verification and 
increases validity of the research findings. 

















18% of local authorities do 
not have a specific bus policy 
document in place. "Coher-
ence and comprehensibility 
of the written policy" was 
identified as one of the great-
est barriers to implementa-
tion. 
A majority of officers said they 
do not have a specific bus policy 
in place. All agreed it is im-
portant to have a policy docu-
ment in place. The majority felt 
it was important to have moni-
toring in place to achieve bus 
policy measures. Policy 
measures would be implemented 
as planned and without prob-




















Ranked as the greatest barrier 
to implementation. "Limited 
funding" identified as a key 
barrier. 
Ranked the greatest barrier to 
impact implementation. Lack of 
resources prevented councils 
meeting targets. 
High 
 Chapter 6: Telephone interview results 


































Ranked fourth highest barrier 
to implementation. 
Half of the officers said commu-
nication was a barrier to imple-
mentation. Communication bar-
riers highlighted between neigh-
bouring authorities, bus opera-
tors, stakeholders, politicians 























Ranked as the second highest 
barrier to implementation. 15 
officers could not indicate 
the number of teams within 
the council's transport depart-
ment who have responsibility 
for the implementation of bus 
policies. 
A majority of officers did not 
agree this was one of the great-
est barriers. But staffing difficul-
ties such as shortage of staff or 
over-worked staff was raised on 
several occasions. Two officers 
did not know the number of 
teams responsible for implemen-































 Officers identified key barri-
ers in their area as "bus wars 
between operators"; "politi-
cal will of members"; "physi-
cal space and layout of 
roads" and "high car owner-
ship." 
Barriers include political con-
straints and support, the impact 
of neighbouring authorities, cur-















Ranked as having a lesser 
impact on implementation. 
Four officers did not agree with 
the survey that this had a lesser 















Ranked as having a lesser 
impact on implementation. 
Three officers did not agree with 
the survey that this had a lesser 
impact on implementation. 
Low 
 Chapter 6: Telephone interview results 





















































 Ranked as having a lesser 
impact on implementation. 
A majority of officers high-
lighted the importance of the in-
teraction between the councils 
and bus operators and felt it was 

















Ranked as having a lesser 
impact on implementation. 
One officer said policy change 
prevented their council imple-
menting particular policy 
measures. Another officer said 
partners and stakeholder work-
ing groups are key so that policy 





























Ranked as having a lesser 
impact on implementation. 
Some officers identified key 
barriers in their area as "bus 
wars between operators," 
"public opinion influencing 
outcomes." 
Barriers include conflict and 
ambiguities between councils 
and the general public, local bus 
operators who competed with 
each other, and neighbouring 
councils who were fighting 
amongst each other for budgets. 
Medium 
  
 Chapter 7: Case study results 
   Page 124
  
Chapter 7: Case study results 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters presented the results from the questionnaires and telephone 
interviews respectively, which were conducted specifically with British local authority 
public transport officers. This chapter will now present the finding from four case studies 
with a much broader audience to complement the findings from the questionnaires and 
telephone interviews and in turn help inform the research questions. The case studies in-
clude interviews conducted with industry representatives based on specific bus schemes 
within the UK. The four schemes chosen include the Quality Contract Scheme in Tyne 
and Wear, the Fastlink Scheme in Glasgow, Lode Lane Route Enhancement Scheme 
(LLRE) in Solihull, and the ABC Smart Ticketing Scheme in Dundee. The findings from 
these case studies also address the third research objective to help meet the aim of this 
thesis. For ease of reference, the third research objective is addressed in table 7.1. 




To understand the views and experi-
ences of key players/stakeholders re-
garding the challenges, enablers and 
barriers associated with the imple-
mentation of four different bus 
schemes within Great Britain. 
This includes the views and experiences of key 
transport actors (officials from public bodies, 
public transport operators, local politicians and 
transport experts/stakeholders/interest groups) in 
the research process for four bus schemes in 
Great Britain. These case studies explore the suc-
cess of these schemes to pinpoint challenges and 
barriers in the implementation of these schemes. 
This chapter begins by describing the research method used to carry out the four 
case studies. Each case study is then presented separately which discusses the scheme 
background, interview results, theoretical analysis of results using the new decision sup-
port framework and concluding remarks. Finally, this chapter will conclude by combining 
the finding from each case study to identify the key barriers and enablers for policy im-
plementation. The findings from this chapter with then be triangulated with the findings 
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from the questionnaires and telephone interviews to develop an overall understanding of 
bus policy implementation, which is presented in the next chapter of the thesis. 
7.2 Case study 1 – Quality Contract Scheme, Tyne and Wear 
The first case study examines the QCS in Tyne and Wear.  This includes a case narrative, 
which will help inform issues arising from the case, followed by theoretical analysis and 
concluding remarks on this case study. 
7.2.1 Case narrative 
A total of eight interviews were carried out with representatives who were involved in the 
QCS scheme. Nexus, on behalf of North East Combined Authority (NECA) and the three 
bus companies (Stagecoach North East, Arriva North East and Go North East) played a 
key role in the schemes proposal, while the North-East England Chamber of Commerce 
(NEECC) and INTU had less involvement and therefore remained apolitical during the 
interviews. A list of interviewees and their role can be seen in table 7.2 below.  




Role of participant in   
organisation 
1 
Executive body of the North East 





Bus Company – Stagecoach North 
East 
1 Managing Director 
3 
Executive body of the North East 
Combined Authority –  NEXUS 
1 
Corporate Manager of Bus 
Services 
4 





5 Bus Company – Arriva North East 1 Commercial Manager 
6 
North East England Chamber of 
Commerce (NEECC) 
1 Policy Advisor 
7 Bus Company – Go North East 2 
Managing Director and 
Head of Network Analysis 
8 Tyne and Wear PTUG 2 
Chair of group and mem-
ber of group 
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7.2.1.1 Quality Contract Scheme (QCS) 
Since the 1985 Transport Act deregulated bus services in the UK, with the exceptions of 
Northern Ireland and London, bus companies are free to run bus services where they 
choose and at their own commercial risk. They are responsible for routes, frequencies, 
fares, ticket types, vehicle types and customer service provision. Meanwhile, local 
transport authorities identify which routes are not covered by commercial bus companies 
and therefore invite tenders from them to operate these so-called “socially necessary” 
services.  
Amendments were later made to the 1985 Transport Act and the 2000 Transport 
Act was introduced following the 1998 White Paper “A New Deal for Transport: Better 
for Everyone”. There have been several amendments to the act, with the latest being made 
by the Local Transport Act 2008 in England. The amended Acts saw the introduction of 
the possibility of different forms of partnerships and levels of partnership between bus 
companies and local authorities. These include Voluntary Quality Partnership, Statutory 
Quality Partnership, and Quality Contract. According to the 2008 Local Transport Act, a 
scheme can be made: 
“if the relevant authorities are satisfied that it will help implement their bus 
strategies and policies and will improve the quality of local services by bring-
ing benefits to persons using those services, or reduce or limit traffic conges-
tion, noise or air pollution.” 
Nexus, on behalf of NECA, were one of the first areas to put forward proposals to 
make a Quality Contract Scheme. The Act defines a Quality Contract Scheme as a scheme 
under which: 
“a. the authority or authorities determine what local services should be pro-
vided in the area to which the scheme relates and any additional facilities or 
services which should be provided in that area; and b. local services may only 
be provided in that area in accordance with quality contracts (subject to some 
exceptions).” 
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Amendments to the 2008 Local Transport Act should make it easier for local author-
ities to enter into quality contracts. Nexus would therefore follow these latest amendments 
to the Act which include: 
 
 Replacement of the existing requirement that a QCS must be the “only practicable 
way” of achieving the local authority’s policies with a more balanced set of public 
interest criteria; and 
 Replacement of the requirement for schemes in England to be approved by the 
Secretary of State with a new duty to seek an opinion from an independent “QCS 
board” and to publish a response to that opinion. 
The introduction of a QCS in Tyne and Wear would mean the local authority in 
place would take control of the entire bus networks in Tyne and Wear. The commercial 
network would be suspended and the local authority would oversee planning the bus ser-
vices and timetables, and setting fare levels. They would be responsible for marketing the 
service and running the ticketing system. Bus companies would then bid for a contract to 
run the bus services and they would be paid by the relevant authority to do so. Fares 
collected on the bus would be paid to the local authority and competition between bus 
companies on the street would no longer take place, the competition instead taking place 
at the contracting stage.  
7.2.1.2 QCS proposal 
According to the Tyne and Wear Integrated Authority (2012), local bus services make an 
important contribution to the economy and the environment in Tyne and Wear. However, 
the Department for Transport (2012) pointed out that there are many long term issues to 
address when aiming to improve bus services. These issues include the decline in bus 
passenger numbers, fare prices increasing above inflation, lack of competition between 
bus companies, and services for communities not well-served by commercial services. 
With these issues in mind, the ITA, who were the predecessor body of NECA, pro-
duced the 2012 bus strategy for the Tyne and Wear area. This strategy is aligned with 
current national policy and the third LTP for Tyne and Wear (2011-2021). It sets out the 
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three overarching objectives of the ITA and a list of specific deliverables derived for each 
objective. It also includes targets, monitoring, delivery options and action plans to achieve 
the objectives set out by the ITA. The ITA (2012) had three main objectives which were 
closely aligned to the Tyne and Wear LTP which were to: 
 
 Arrest the decline in bus patronage 
 Maintain (and preferably) grow accessibility 
 Deliver value for public money 
 
The 2012 bus strategy also includes three supporting targets that have been chosen 
to underpin the principal targets by allowing a more detailed examination of the influenc-
ing factors when reviewing delivery options and action plans. For example, the strategy 
mentions the importance of including customer satisfaction with fares and ticketing be-
cause research carried out by the Department for Transport (2009) shows that within the 
Tyne and Wear market, simplifying fares could increase demand by 2.7% and developing 
a Customer Charter could increase demand by 1.7%. According to ITA (2012), the three 
bus policy targets include: 
 “Increase total bus passenger journeys in Tyne and Wear from a baseline of 139 
million to 149 million by 2022  
 Maintain or increase the percentage of the Tyne and Wear population within 
400m of a frequent (10 minute) daytime service at 56.8% by 2022  
 Reduce the reliance of the Bus Network on public sector support from the bench-
mark of £0.49 in 2012.” 
 
Interviews with Nexus revealed other plans for targets which were not included in 
the 2012 bus strategy. These targets include accessibility and number of people using 
buses, while targets for air quality will be considered in the future.  
“…we wanted to increase bus punctuality, they were checked every 6 months 
to see how we were achieving. If you set yourself clear objectives, with targets 
 Chapter 7: Case study results 
   Page 129
  
and measure against those targets to see if you’re achieving or not, you can 
then decide if your intervention is successful or not.” [Interview 1] 
The 2012 bus strategy states that reporting on these targets would take place on an 
annual basis to review the deliverables, as well as any changes. It also states that the 
strategy would be refreshed annually to take account of changing circumstances. 
On 24th November 2011, the ITA directed Nexus to investigate the possibility of 
developing a QCS across the region as a possible mechanism for achieving the objectives 
set out in the 2012 bus strategy. This document includes a list of strategic deliverables to 
help achieve the objectives (ITA, 2012), which include: 
 “Fully integrated, multi-modal public transport network 
 Unified and consistent customer offer and guaranteed standards of service 
 Enhanced consultation on network changes 
 All infrastructure is accessible and of high standard 
 Adopt accessibility standards and targets 
 Common brand and accessible, high quality buses 
 Integrated network 
 Affordability for the customer and taxpayer 
 Simplified fares and ticketing offer 
 Improved environmental standards.” 
 
The bus policy document also identifies key problems associated with the bus mar-
ket in the Tyne and Wear area that the QCS was intended to tackle. The key issues include 
a long-term trend in the decline in bus passenger numbers for full fare paying adults and 
an increase in concessionary travel. It was proposed that the scheme would cover the 5 
districts in Tyne and Wear mentioned in the bus strategy document, including Newcastle, 
North Tyneside, Gateshead, South Tyneside and Sunderland. However, the scheme would 
not extend to Durham and Northumberland which are areas covered by NECA. The fol-
lowing figure 7.1 illustrates the areas which the QCS would cover. 
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Figure 7.1: Geographical location of QCS bus services (TransportXtra, 2013) 
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Nexus revealed that having a bus policy document in place to help plan and imple-
ment the QCS scheme was “massively important” and “absolutely vital.” They felt this 
document gave them an opportunity to provide a case to the QCS Board that all policies 
were a-lined. They also mentioned that one of the statutory requirements of the QCS was 
to demonstrate that it would contribute towards the bus policy objectives and therefore it 
was important to have this document in place to demonstrate that.  
INTU Group pointed out that they meet with Nexus regularly to discuss the chal-
lenges in Tyne and Wear. When the QCS was being proposed, they were keen to improve 
links to their shopping centre in the city centre and therefore felt that there should be one 
policy document in place to alleviate the challenges in place. 
“You could argue if the QCS was the way forward. It’s important to meet 
because we are a travel generator and we rely of on the bus companies and 
they rely on us so we have to work together. I would like to see one document 
in place and having one common goal has to happen. At the end of the day we 
need to relieve congestion and get people to our centres.” [Interview 6] 
The 2012 bus strategy also demonstrates how the targets would be monitored across 
Tyne and Wear which can be seen in table 7.3. These targets were designed through on-
going market research conducted both locally and nationally (ITA, 2012). However, a 
desktop review revealed that there are no specific monitoring reports available to check 
the progress of these targets. 
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Table 7.3: Measures, benchmarks and targets (The ITA Bus Strategy for Tyne and Wear, 2012) 
Measure Benchmark Target 2022 
Improve perception of punctuality 68% 78% 
Improve actual punctuality of non-frequent services 90% 95%7 
Ensure that excess waiting time for frequent services is never 
more than Traffic Commissioner target of 1.25 mins 
0.81 1.25 (mins)8 
Improve perception of reliability 65% 70%9 
Improve actual reliability 99% 99.5% 
Improve overall customer satisfaction 80% 85% 
Improve satisfaction with cost of fares 58% 68% 
Improve customer satisfaction with range of available tickets 76% 85% 




80.1 grams per 
passenger km 
Maintain access to main centres within 30 mins (% of house-
holds in Tyne and Wear) Day time (10am) 
57.1% 57.1% 
Maintain access to main centres within 30 mins (% of house-
holds in Tyne and Wear) Evening (8pm) 
52.1% 52.1% 
Maintain access to local Centres within 30 mins (% of house-
holds in Tyne and Wear) Day time (10am) 
97.7% 97.7% 
Maintain access to local Centres within 30 mins (% of house-
holds in Tyne and Wear) Evening (8pm) 
95.5% 95.5% 
Maintain access to key employment sites within 30 mins (% 
of households in Tyne and Wear) Day time (10am) 
62.2% 62.2% 
Maintain access to key employment sites within 30 mins (% 
of households in Tyne and Wear) Evening (8pm) 
41% 41% 
Maintain access to General Hospital within 30 mins (% of 
households in Tyne and Wear) Day time (10 am) 
67.5% 67.5% 
Maintain access to General Hospital within 30 mins (% of 
households in Tyne and Wear) Evening (8pm) 
57.6% 57.6% 
Maintain access (within 400m) to frequent (10 mins) Service 
Day time (10am) 
56.8% 56.8% 
                                                 
7 Target set nationally by Traffic Commissioner 
8 Target set nationally by Traffic Commissioner 
9 Target set nationally by Traffic Commissioner 
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Maintain access (within 400m) to frequent (10 mins) Service 
Evening (8pm) 
0.2% 0.2% 
Maintain access (within 400m) of a 15min Service Day time 
(10am) 
77.7% 77.7% 
Maintain access (within 400m) of a 15min Service Evening 
(8pm) 
17.5% 17.5% 
While the QCS was being prepared, it was intended that Local District Boards for 
the 5 districts would be set up and Nexus would provide regular monitoring reports to 
these Boards on the performance of the network in terms of how many passengers were 
being carried, what revenue was being taken, accessibility levels, customer complaints, 
passenger satisfaction etc. There would also be regular updates on these areas to be mon-
itored which would have been defined in the QCS. 
7.2.1.3 QCS preparation 
Nexus were instructed to liaise with the bus operators in the area to determine whether a 
Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) could be an alternative mechanism to a QCS. 
Amendments to the 2000 Act made by the 2008 Act introduced VPA which is a non-
statutory term used to describe any agreement entered into voluntarily by one or more 
local authorities and one or more bus operators, and possibly other relevant parties. The 
Act also introduced Qualifying Agreement (QA), which is an agreement ‘certified’ by the 
Local Transport Authority to permit operators to agree to run services on the same route 
in a coordinated way (Rye and Wretstrand, 2014). Nexus was then instructed to report to 
the ITA on both proposals so the appropriate scheme could be chosen.  
The key stakeholders involved in the scheme proposal included Nexus on behalf of 
NECA, 3 bus operators (Stagecoach, Go North East and Arriva), 5 districts (Newcastle, 
North Tyneside, Gateshead, South Tyneside and Sunderland) and their elected members 
that sit on the sub-committees. Nexus also revealed that they “…spent over a period of 5 
years and 2.5 million on an internal team and advisors.” 
While Nexus prepared for a QCS proposal, they followed a “Do Minimum” sce-
nario which sets out a forecast of what would happen if no intervention were made, and 
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which is used to measure the benefits of the QCS and VPA. They predicted that bus pat-
ronage would continue to decline and that there would be severe cuts to bus services and 
discounted fares. At the time, Nexus completed “accessibility mapping” within each dis-
trict and found a gradual decline in patronage because in some areas, “buses were re-
trenching back to the main roads and you didn’t have the penetration for those services”. 
There was also concerns over funding from the taxpayer, with Nexus stating: 
“The main expenditures are concessionary expenditures and we are paying the 
bus operators subsidy. These include child concessionary, about 12 million 
goes of subsidised services and providing services such as night time and Sun-
days when the bus operator doesn’t see a commercial opportunity for these 
services.” [Interview 1] 
Therefore, they could see many benefits of introducing the scheme such as arresting 
the decline in patronage, maintaining accessibility and providing good value for money 
for the tax payer. The scheme would also use public subsidy to improve the bus services 
in the area. Nexus suggested the amount of public subsidy used to support bus services 
was unreasonable because “40% of public money is paid to the bus operators to carry the 
elderly and disabled”. They were also concerned over falling patronage while fares were 
“continuously increasing above levels of inflation.” 
Further motivations for the scheme were recognised by NEECC and the Tyne and 
Wear PTUG, who felt there was a need to improve bus services. They also felt the moti-
vation for the QCS was driven by local authorities responding to public pressure.  
In terms of networks, Nexus would be in charge of the whole network and produce 
a yearly plan setting out proposed changes to the network on which there would be public 
consultation. Changes to the network would then take place once a year and there would 
be board meetings every few months between Nexus, bus operators and members of the 
public to talk about issues effecting the bus network.  
The scheme would include a new governance system involving Nexus, the bus op-
erators and members of the public to talk about issues effecting the bus network. Nexus 
would contract out every bus in Tyne and Wear with the exception of a number of routes 
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coming in from Durham and Fulham. These routes would bring people to Newcastle and 
would be classed as cross-boundary routes and so they would be considered separately. 
As Nexus owns the Tyne and Wear metro system which operates in all 5 districts, the 
QCS would introduce integrated bus-metro ticketing, similar to that in use before dereg-
ulation in 1986.  
Nexus proposed that each bus operator would buy their own buses which last have 
a service life of approximately 15 years and the network would include a full fleet of Euro 
5 buses. They suggested this was a way of bringing forward improvements and environ-
mental benefits for people because the bus operators “…will not reach Euro 5 standards 
until 2019/20.” They also indicated that there would be one set of fares applicable to all 
services and the QCS would provide simplified fares valid on any bus, with overall fare 
reductions for adults and significant discounts for children and young people. A single 
smartcard would also offer a “best price guarantee” for passengers. Other proposed 
changes included CCTV on board the buses and every bus would be painted the same 
colour so the buses would look the same to the members of the public.  
During the QCS preparation, it was proposed that 5 Local District Boards would 
be set up in the area and Nexus would provide regular monitoring reports to these Boards 
on the performance of the network. These reports included passenger numbers, revenue 
taken, accessibility levels, customer complaints, passenger satisfaction etc. Nexus would 
also provide regular updates on these areas to be monitored and it would have been char-
tered throughout the QCS. The QCS was planned for a 10-year term to commence in 
April 2017. 
While Nexus prepared a QCS proposal, the North-East Bus Operators' Association 
(consisting of three larger bus operators in Tyne and Wear) prepared for a VPA proposal. 
They argued a VPA would provide several benefits such as reduced multi-operator bus 
fares, 50 additional buses in the network, improvements to vehicle quality, some reduc-
tions in public expenditure on maintaining socially necessary bus services, and a far 
greater degree of dialogue between bus operators and the NECA. 
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7.2.1.4 QCS outcome 
In July 2013, the ITA selected a QCS proposed by Nexus as the most suitable scheme for 
Tyne and Wear. Nexus were then instructed to conduct the formal consultation process 
and on 23 October 2014, the ITA sent a written request to the QCS Board for it to begin 
the performance of its functions under section 126D TA 2000 in respect of the proposed 
QCS. The legislation in place (Article 8) required Durham and Northumberland County 
Councils to be also included in the QCS since the ITA was being replaced by NECA. 
In November 2014, Arriva also wrote a letter to the QCS board and contended that 
“NECA’s interests and those of the previous ITA were divergent in legal and factual terms 
because NECA was established on a different basis and its responsibilities covered a dif-
ferent geography”. They argued that NECA could therefore not satisfy the statutory test 
for making a QCS. 
The QCS board took both sides into consideration and the Traffic Commissioner, 
who was the board lead, wrote to the Secretary of State for Transport to confirm the 
board’s intentions for hearings to take place with Nexus and the 3 bus operators (Arriva 
North East, Go North East and Stagecoach).  The 3 operators were required to provide 
written statements of evidence, supporting documents and matters of issue by 30 January 
2015. Meanwhile, Nexus were required to consider all points raised by the operators and 
provide their written evidence and matters of issue by 20 February 2015 (Traffic Com-
missioners for Great Britain, 2014). 
The functions of the QCS Board, which consisted of the Traffic Commissioner who 
was chairperson of the board, were governed by the statutory provisions contained in the 
amended 2008 Transport Act and the associated Quality Contracts Schemes Regulations. 
Their role was to: 
 “To form an opinion on whether the conditions set out in the paragraphs of section 
124(1) TA 2000 [“the Public Interest Tests”] are met in the case of the Proposed 
QCS” 
 “To form an opinion on whether the authority or authorities have complied with 
the requirements of section 125(1) to (3) TA 2000”. 
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On the 3rd November 2015, the QCS Board issued their decision and rejected the 
scheme proposal for a QCS. They concluded that Nexus failed to meet 3 out of the 5 tests 
and failed to comply with the statutory requirements on consultation in accordance with 
the Transport Act 2000. In addition to this, they felt the scheme could not demonstrate it 
would increase use of bus services, would not have provided value for money, and it 
would have imposed disproportionate adverse effects on operators. Therefore, the Traffic 
Commissioners decided the scheme was unaffordable and the councils would eventually 
have run out of money to keep the buses running. Table 7.4 illustrates the findings of the 
QCS Board’s decisions and where they failed the tests.  
Table 7.4: QCS board decision 
QCS Board Opinion 
The Transport Act 2000 
Section 125: Nexus fails to comply with the statutory requirements on consultation 
 Section 124(1)(a): The proposed scheme cannot demonstrate that it would increase use 
of bus services because its affordability is not demonstrated 
 Section 124(1)(b): Service quality would improve 
 Section 124(1)(c): The proposed scheme would contribute to the implementation of the 
local transport policies 
 Section 124(1)(d): The proposed scheme does not provide value for money 
 Section 124(1)(e): The proposed scheme imposes disproportionate adverse effects on 
operators 
7.2.2 Issues arising from the case 
The following sub-sections discuss the issues that arose from the case study in terms of 
design, existing bus policy document, policy targets, monitoring of bus polices and bar-
riers to implementing the scheme. 
7.2.2.1 Issues with scheme design 
One of the issues with the scheme design was that Nexus were the first area in the UK 
(outside of London) to try bring in a QCS and many other areas in the UK wanted to learn 
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from their experience. For this reason, both interviewees from Nexus felt they were at a 
disadvantage. One Nexus representative stated; 
“…we took this as far as we could and we were testing the water for the whole 
country. In the court room, we had people from Manchester and Leeds watch-
ing to see what happens. So now it’s for someone else to try it and learn from 
our lessons. When the report came out to say we failed some of the tests, other 
areas stopped straight away and were turned off by the idea of implementing 
a QCS.” [Interview 1] 
Nexus also encountered problems with the scheme design because they found it 
difficult to prove the benefits of the scheme outweighed the costs. The QCS Board found 
the scheme proposed by Nexus would cost more than they anticipated and the cost didn’t 
match that of the bus operators. Interviews with the bus operators revealed that they were 
of the opinion scheme would “cost millions and that’s the main reason it didn’t work.” 
They also indicated that the Quality Contract Board decided that Nexus hadn’t taken ac-
count of the risks properly and their numbers were “basically flawed”.  
Nexus could have potentially made better predictions for the costs and benefits of 
the scheme if they had access to financial data by the bus operators. They revealed during 
the interviews that they had to “make some guesses about bus services and revenue being 
made by each of the services”. They also mentioned that “in an ideal world” the operators 
would have provided them with the data. However, the bus operators were not duty-bound 
or legally required to provide financial data to Nexus. While Nexus did ask for this finan-
cial data, one bus operator interviewee pointed out that: 
“Possibly if they had our financial data, it would have verified their projec-
tions more accurately. A lot of the work our financial advisors did was proving 
the QCS wasn’t sustainable and Nexus’ figures were wrong based on our fi-
nancial data.” [Interview 7] 
Nexus admitted that there were avoidable problems when making a case for a QCS 
and this would have contributed to the scheme not being implemented. In their method-
ology, Nexus made changes along the way and they felt these changes were held against 
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them. As a result, the bus operators believed Nexus were “making it up as they went 
along” and there were mistakes made by their consultants. This in turn made the bus 
operators believe Nexus were plugging the gaps as they went along and developed a new 
plan for the scheme. 
 “As they realised the first idea wasn’t going to work, they came out with the 
second scheme which was basically the network of Tyne and Wear as it is, 
split up into 11 contracts.” [Interview 9] 
With a lack of access to data and changes made during the methodology, the bus 
operators were then able to demonstrate to the QCS Board that Nexus had underestimated 
the costs of the scheme. The bus operators also believed that Nexus failed to carry out 
optimism bias correctly and “put the most optimistic view on it to deflate the cost of the 
QCS”. This was picked up by the QCS Board and therefore can be identified as another 
barrier which prevented the scheme from being implemented.  
Although the scheme was rejected, Nexus declined the opportunity to appeal the 
decision by the transport commissioner because of the cost implications, stating; 
“…it’s very risky if you’ve been told by an independent panel that you didn’t 
pass the tests, there would be massive legal challenges. It would be very costly 
and another 2 or 3 years of court cases and arguing and that’s not delivering 
anything for the passengers.” [Interview 1] 
Another issue with the scheme design was evident where Nexus were unable to 
predict the outcome of the scheme. According to the bus operators, Nexus said their risk 
model could prove for most scenarios that they would be “making a surplus” and that 
they had steps in place if the scheme were to struggle financially in the long term. How-
ever, this was overturned by the QCS Board and they felt the scheme proposal from Nexus 
was financially unsustainable. In contrast to this, the bus companies argued that the QCS 
failed because Nexus were looking for new ways to generate cash and there was less 
emphasis on the importance of the customer and passenger.   
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“It was funding issues that we thought generated what they were after…they 
saw it a way forward of driving the economy. They saw the operators making 
profit and they felt they should tap into that. My view is that it was all about 
funding. As we went through the QC proposal and went to the public inquiry, 
it became more apparent to me it wasn’t about the customer. In some of the 
documents, the word “customer” or “passenger” were never mentioned.” [In-
terview 9] 
“They just see the profits bus companies make each year and think that will 
shoot up some of the finances. But when you actually look at the finances of 
what they are wanting, it’s just not feasible.” [Interview 4] 
Nexus said they were aware of the implications of the scheme design and that bus 
drivers might have to move companies. They were also aware that this could cause con-
flict between trade unions and drivers. They felt it was a “…big risk because drivers don’t 
like change”. Nexus also pointed out that this move would create industrial relations is-
sues due to the different prices in wages for doing the same job. Meanwhile, the bus 
operators pointed out the implications of the scheme design and believed they would lose 
subsidy and revenue on their bus routes and it would have “confiscated” their business. 
They were also concerned with the impact of the cross-boundary services on their busi-
ness if one of the companies did not win any of the franchise networks.  
A document review also revealed that Nexus had difficulties with designing the 
scheme due to the legislation in place. While the policy in place was seen as “sound”, the 
legislative requirements were undoubtedly an issue and Nexus in turn failed three out of 
the five tests. This is particularly noticeable where a document review revealed that no 
QCS has been implemented in the UK since it was introduced in the 2000 Transport Act, 
which therefore indicates concerns about the legislation currently in place. An interview 
with INTU revealed “looking from the outside…the policies look tricky and hard to get 
by” which suggests the level of difficulty for implementing a QCS. Meanwhile, one in-
terviewee from Nexus pointed out: 
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“…there were 3 tools, and if there were other options available or different 
models then it couldn’t have been different. There were probably tools we 
could have used but we had to stick by legislation and we could only deliver 
what the legislation would let us deliver.” [Interview 1] 
7.2.2.2 Existing bus policy document, policy targets and monitoring of bus policies 
As previously mentioned, in November 2011 Nexus were instructed to consider alterna-
tive structures to deliver the bus strategy for Tyne and Wear and to investigate the possi-
bility of developing a QCS across the region as a possible mechanism for achieving 
TWITA’s objectives. Nexus also mentioned in the interviews that the QCS was designed 
to deliver the 2012 bus policy objectives and it “fits very snugly” within the policy docu-
ment. The 2012 bus strategy also indicates that these supporting targets have been chosen 
to underpin the principal targets by allowing a more detailed examination of the influenc-
ing factors when reviewing delivery options and action plans. However, Nexus pointed 
out the new strategy is looking to see if they need to set new targets. Therefore, more 
work is needed on these targets to help improve the transport system in the area.  
“We do have some targets, such as accessibility and the new strategy is look-
ing to see if we need to set new targets. We have targets for the number of 
people using buses where we subsidise the buses and the operators themselves 
will have targets too. One of the things we will look at in the near future is air 
quality in city centres so in future there will probably be targets. We can’t 
illuminate pollution but we can reduce it with cleaner buses.” [Interview 5] 
The 2012 bus strategy states that reporting on these targets would take place on an 
annual basis to review the deliverables, as well as any changes. It also states that the 
strategy would be refreshed annually to take account of changing circumstances. How-
ever, interviews with Nexus revealed that the 2012 bus strategy which led the QCS has 
not been updated since and there are no documents available to check the progress of the 
targets set out in the bus strategy. Nexus said they failed to meet some of their targets due 
to “funding cuts” and were unaware of the current progress of meeting the targets. 
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“In hindsight it would have been good to measure our targets. I think that’s 
why we didn’t meet a lot of our targets and it just gets brushed to one side. If 
it was transparent, you would put that document out each year to check. What 
actually happens is we don’t recognise these missed targets and we decide not 
to talk about them. We did set targets in previous LTP but since then you 
won’t find any document to show you the progress against those and actually 
we have stopped checking now because of funding cuts. I couldn’t tell you 
now where we are against those targets and that’s a downside of all this.” 
[Interview 1] 
Nexus felt setting targets is an important part of the policy process because it “de-
termines the success of the policy”, however they also believe having less targets was 
more realistic for implementing bus policy because “…there is a temptation to set a lot of 
targets that are unattainable”. 
Nexus are currently developing a new bus strategy for Tyne and Wear, which is a 
daughter document of NECA’s LTP, with the involvement of local bus operators. How-
ever, they pointed out that they “don’t want the bus operators to write it” but we want 
their “involvement and endorsement for the plan.” During the preparation of this docu-
ment, the NECA area were unable to decide on the election of a new mayor which is a 
significant barrier to developing a new bus strategy for the Tyne and Wear area. This also 
indicates a political barrier which has an impact on developing a new bus strategy.  
“There was a problem were the NECA area was supposed to get a new mayor 
and they would have received a lot of money but all the seven areas couldn’t 
agree on the package from Government. They asked the Government for more 
money and the Government then scraped the deal. It’s very political and eve-
ryone wants to be the leader. Now there won’t be a mayor or a joint authority 
for the whole seven.” [Interview 1] 
It was quite evident from the interviews that monitoring in place would help aid the 
implementation of bus policy measures in Tyne and Wear. Furthermore, setting targets 
from the start of the policy process and then periodically checking the performance of 
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these targets would help to inform future policy making decisions “because you have an 
idea of what’s working and what’s not.”  
INTU agreed from an apolitical position that monitoring is important if it is used 
correctly and as a benchmark to work towards. However, the interviews revealed that 
there are concerns over monitoring in general because it is seen as an expensive process 
and time consuming. There were also concerns over the relevance of some targets being 
monitored and Nexus stated that they no longer track accessibility. Although the majority 
interviewed suggested it was important for monitoring to be in place to aid the implemen-
tation of bus policy measures in Tyne and Wear, they did not necessarily agree that if 
stricter monitoring was in place, the QCS would have increased chances of being imple-
mented. They feel the QCS failed for other reasons such as affordability, risks involved 
and access to data from the local bus operators. For example, one interviewee from Nexus 
said; 
“If you have lots of data that can demonstrate bus fares are going up, patronage 
is going down, the bus company is contracting and getting smaller around the 
edges, then that helps to build a case. That’s the power of monitoring. A, you 
know where you are and B, you got the evidence to show how buses are op-
erating in an area. We had that in place for the QCS which suggested for the 
board to think our scheme wasn’t going to get to where we wanted to be.” 
[Interview 5] 
A document review on previous and current bus policy for the Tyne and Wear area 
has revealed that there were positive intentions to deliver bus policy by setting objectives 
and targets to achieve these objectives, as stated in the LTP3 and 2012 bus strategy. In 
particular the 2012 Bus Strategy was developed as an alternative structure to deliver the 
bus strategy for Tyne and Wear and to investigate the possibility of developing a QCS 
across the region as a possible mechanism for achieving TWITA’s objectives. However, 
the interviews have revealed concerns over the relevance of some of those targets listed 
in the strategy and uncertainty as to whether there is monitoring in place. Coincidentally, 
there are no monitoring documents available to check the performance of the specific 
 Chapter 7: Case study results 
   Page 144
  
targets mentioned in the bus strategy which could suggest there has been less interest in 
bus policy since the QCS rejection.  
7.2.2.3 Policy Implementation and barriers to implementation 
A key barrier for the implementation of the QCS was that Nexus were unable to gain 
access to data from the bus operators. This clearly demonstrates opposition from the bus 
operators who were unwilling to share this data and as a result the relationships between 
Nexus and the bus operators were “damaged”. Resources in place were also seen as a 
barrier for Nexus because the bus operators were more successful at using what they had 
to fight the case for a QCS. Nexus admitted this was a key barrier stating the bus operators 
also “…committed a lot of time and resources to fighting…” and were ultimately suc-
cessful.  
Meanwhile, the bus operators felt the relationship with the bus operators was 
“pushed” and the interviews revealed that there were statements from one of the bigger 
bus operators about “burning down bus operators than giving it over to Nexus if the 
scheme happened”. However, following the rejection of the QCS, the bus operators sug-
gested a “fresh start” and to “move on” would help improve this broken relationship, 
stating: 
“The relationship between the bus operators and council was a problem but 
we need to start fresh and we need to move on now. The only way we can do 
that is if we work together. Quite a few of the offices we deal with have ac-
cepted that and are starting to work with us and we’re working together.” [In-
terview 4] 
From an outside point of view, an interview with INTU suggested both Nexus and 
the bus operators were actually trying to deliver the same thing but arguing over who was 
better placed to do so. Meanwhile, NEECC pointed out that both Nexus and the bus op-
erators got lost in the debate and ultimately missed out on important parts of the QCS 
proposal, which was the provision of an improved bus service. They also indicated the 
breakdown in the relationship between Nexus and the bus operators was obvious through 
press coverage. A desktop review of previous newspaper articles supported this statement 
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and according to The Guardian (2015), the QCS proposal was a “…culmination of a bit-
ter, drawn-out battle…” between Nexus and the local bus operators. 
Public opposition was also a key barrier for the implementation of the QCS and 
according to NEECC, the QCS was driven by local authorities responding to public pres-
sure. They also believe this public pressure is due to a lack of competition and bus oper-
ators are making significant profits out of the service. However, they suggested the bus 
companies would argue otherwise because some areas are served well by the network.  
While some people were in favour of the scheme, other people wrote to Nexus to 
express their opposition to the scheme because they felt Nexus were trying to take too 
much control. Nexus felt opposition was a key barrier for the scheme because “the bus 
drivers, bus companies and a lot of passengers didn’t want change.” Meanwhile, the bus 
companies understood the opposition from the public and believed there would be greater 
opposition if the scheme went ahead. For example, they mentioned: 
“The public know what they currently got. The local authority suggested it 
would be helpful to control the bus service but ultimately, they can’t afford to 
give everyone what they want which is a bus from door to door for whatever 
journey. It’s just not sustainable.” [Interview 4] 
“It’s really difficult for the average person to understand how buses work and 
are financed. Nexus got that wrong in terms of fleet replacement because they 
never had to do it. In the public mind, bus operators make lots of profits and 
don’t put that back into the services to create more buses.” [Interview 7] 
In contrast to this, the Tyne and Wear PTUG were in favour of the scheme and 
therefore were reluctant to communicate with the bus companies. An interview with the 
bus operators revealed that: 
 “Through the process, we had the public transport users group opposing. We 
invited them in to talk to us, we invited them to presentations but the difficulty 
was that didn’t want to listen and they didn’t want to hear what we had to say 
– they had already made their minds up... If it had come in, I think there would 
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be a lot of opposition because it wasn’t going to deliver what it promised in 
the proposal.” [Interview 9] 
Meanwhile, INTU revealed that they didn’t see public opposition because “…peo-
ple thought they were getting the London [system] and the Oyster card”. Similarly, an 
interview with NEECC suggested there wasn’t any public opposition because they didn’t 
feel the public were “engaged with the debate”. They also suggested that: 
“…where you do have public opposition, it is the scepticism about the ability 
of the council to run any service and if you look at any of the debates online 
you would notice the scepticism coming up time and time again. They might 
be unhappy with a private bus operator running it but they aren’t necessarily 
assured a council running it is going to be any better.” [Interview 8] 
Nexus felt a new governance system was needed because in some areas, local coun-
cillors “have no say at all” and they need to approach Nexus to resolve complaints or 
issues from the public. Meanwhile, they feel “the private bus company can do what they 
want.” According to Nexus, there would be a more stable network because changes would 
only occur “through a democratically accountable process”. Nexus also pointed out the 
motivation for less changes, stating: 
“Each operator is responsible for designing their own network. They tend to 
change the network 8 or 9 times a year reflecting changes in demand such as 
a new shopping centre opening. This creates a lot of instability in the network 
and then people can’t rely on the services. People can make big decisions 
based on bus services, for example buying a house or going to work, you check 
which buses go past it.” [Interview 1] 
An interview with INTU revealed that they believed the QCS would bring “more 
customers, easier access and congestion alleviation”. They also believed it could have 
helped improve certain bus routes and improve currently poor public transport accessi-
bility in some locations, for example: 
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 “In East Gatehead, you have to change once and there doesn’t seem to be 
appetite to make the journeys across these regions. We would like to experi-
ment with these links but there are places you can’t get the bus from.” [Inter-
view 6] 
Other proposed changes included CCTV on board the buses and every bus would 
be painted the same colour so the buses would look the same to the members of the public. 
Nexus pointed out the importance of these changes stating: 
“Here if you want to make a five minute journey up the road you could pay 
three different prices. That’s quite confusing for passengers so we thought 
let’s have a model like Edinburgh and use 3 zones as it’s a much bigger area 
than Edinburgh…” [Interview 1] 
The characteristics of the organisations involved also had an impact on the imple-
mentation of the QCS. For example, Nexus drafted in people from key departments at a 
senior level. They believed they were competent staff for delivering the scheme, however, 
they did admit to making changes to their methodology when preparing the QCS pro-
posal. Mistakes were also made by their consultants which were in turn picked up by the 
QCS Board which was one of the reasons why they rejected the scheme. It would there-
fore appear that Nexus struggled to compete against the bus operators because they had a 
smaller organisation with less skilful and competent staff. One interviewee from Nexus 
pointed out that: 
“We are a small firm will a small legal team and economic advisers. The 3 
bus companies are much bigger firms that us and corralled much bigger legal 
teams to take us on. Ultimately, when we got in front the QCS board, we took 
about a year to educate 3 people on the work we had done for the previous 5 
years.” [Interview 5] 
In comparison to Nexus, it would appear that from the decision of the QCS Board, 
the bus operating companies held were stronger in terms of size and competency of staff 
and were able to present a stronger case to the QCS Board on the prediction of the scheme. 
Nexus also admitted it was difficult to compete with the bus operators, stating: 
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“The staff are commercially minded and had some clever people to work 
against what we were trying to do. If we had more of a commercial back-
ground, we could have had stronger arguments that we later got challenged 
on.” [Interview 1] 
The interviews also revealed the bus operators could see these weaknesses with 
Nexus in terms of characteristics. For example, the bus operators said there needs to be 
“a whole army of people” to run a bus network and Nexus didn’t have that because they 
had to “slim down in recent years”. They also felt Nexus was short of skilled people and 
some staff were employed because there is a current shortage of people who specialise in 
bus management within the UK. An interview with the operators revealed that: 
“When you’re in a commercial business, particularly for buses where there is 
a shortage of skilled people across the UK, it’s not difficult to find a job in bus 
management. The likelihood is that the people working in the commercial 
field in Tyne and Wear would go work somewhere else than Nexus. It was 
rather optimistic to assume all the expertise would suddenly go and work for 
Nexus. Nexus are actually short of that expertise.” [Interview 7] 
Although the bus operators felt size of staff and competency were key barriers, they 
did however mention that they were working with “good people” at Nexus. However, 
they felt that in terms of preparing a QCS, many of the people working there “…would 
be way out of their depth and they wouldn’t have the expertise to deal with this.” 
The availability of resources was also another barrier for the implementation of the 
scheme and was one of the key reasons why the QCS Board rejected the scheme proposal 
from Nexus. They felt the bus operators should be compensated if the scheme was intro-
duced. The interviews revealed that the bus operators also felt this was a barrier and said 
it was “…simply not financially sustainable”, would “…cost the local tax payer a huge 
amount of money with no real benefits”, and involve “…issues in the future in terms of 
pension liabilities”. However, Nexus were reluctant to say resources such as funding were 
an issue and said the decision came down to modelling predictions and they couldn’t 
convince the QCS Board that the scheme was affordable.  
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In terms of preparing the actual scheme, resources were not a barrier for Nexus and 
they revealed that they “…spent over a period of 5 years and 2.5 million on an internal 
team and advisors.” Given the recent cutbacks and a lack of funding in local authorities 
across the UK, this would undoubtedly have been a barrier for other local authorities. 
Nexus did however highlight the importance of having support from the five districts in 
Tyne and Wear and said: 
“At the time, money wasn’t an object. They could see the prize at the end and 
were willing to chuck money at it. We spent millions putting this business 
case together and making sure it was legally sound.” [Interview 1]  
7.2.3 Theoretical analysis of Quality Contract Scheme 
In line with the theoretical analysis carried out on the questionnaires and telephone inter-
views, this section will also analyse the results obtained in the interviews carried out with 
representatives from the Tyne and Wear on the QCS. The 10 variables of the decision 
support framework are used to analyse the results of the interviews and this in turn will 
help determine the barriers and enablers which have an impact on bus policy implemen-
tation. Furthermore, it will address the third research objective to help meet the aim of 
this thesis. 
1. Policy objective:  A written bus policy document should be in place, showing a 
clear link between policy objectives, measures and the setting and monitoring 
of targets. 
The results of the interviews indicate that at the time of the QCS proposal, a written bus 
policy document was in place which included a bus strategy document prepared on behalf 
of the Tyne and Wear Integrated Transport Authority. This document covered bus policy 
for the 5 districts in Tyne and Wear which includes Newcastle, North Tyneside, Gates-
head, South Tyneside and Sunderland. Interviews with Nexus revealed that they had taken 
into consideration policy objectives, measures and setting and monitoring of targets. They 
mentioned that policy documents are “absolutely vital to have in place” and that the mo-
tivations for the QCS was to meet the three objectives of the bus strategy.  
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In terms of policy targets, both interviewees from Nexus believed targets have an 
impact on how bus policies are implemented in the Tyne and Wear area. The current bus 
strategy includes targets while a new bus strategy will look to see if they need to set new 
targets. However, it would also appear that targets can sometimes be perceived as a “nui-
sance” and this was noticeable when Nexus said “…there is a temptation to set a lot of 
targets that are unattainable but our view is to have less targets but more realistic.” Fur-
thermore, it would appear targets are less important now that the QCS didn’t follow 
through. This was noticeable when Nexus revealed “…a lot has changed since that work 
was done on the QCS so you could question how relevant some of those targets are to 
what we’re currently working on.” 
The interviews revealed that monitoring was an important stage of the policy pro-
cess and that monitoring would have been in place for the QCS. It was proposed that there 
would be regular updates on areas to be monitored and it would have been chartered 
throughout the QCS. Nexus believed setting targets from the start of the policy process 
and then periodically checking the performance of these targets would help to inform 
future policy making decisions “because you have an idea of what’s working and what’s 
not.” Similarly, an interview with INTU agreed from an apolitical position that monitor-
ing is important if it is used correctly and as a benchmark to work towards, saying “You 
can have the policy in place but what’s the point if you don’t monitor it.”  
However, there would appear to be a lack of interest in the current bus policy for 
Tyne and Wear because the 2012 bus strategy which led the QCA has not been updated 
since. Therefore, the bus policy objectives remain the same which were included in in the 
2011-2021 LTP. This could also suggest that the policy in place was tailored to suit the 
requirements of the QCS proposal. In line with this, one bus operator mentioned that 
Nexus were “making it up as they went along”. However, Nexus mentioned they are cur-
rently refreshing the bus strategy with the involvement of local bus operators. Overall it 
is evident that there were some issues with the policy and legislation in place because a 
board chaired by the Traffic Commissioner for the North East found that Nexus failed to 
comply with three out of the five statutory requirements in accordance to The Transport 
Act 2000. It is also evident that there was an unclear link between designing the policy, 
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setting targets and suitable measures to achieve those targets, and monitoring those targets 
for a QCS to be implemented.  
Interviews with Nexus, the bus operators and NEECC indicated a key barrier for 
why the QCS failed to be implemented was actually due to the legislation in place at the 
time and not the actual policy. They believed that the policies in place were “sound” and 
that there was general agreement between Nexus and the bus operators about the objec-
tives they were trying to achieve. With most interviewees suggesting the legislation was 
a barrier and with no other QCS implemented in the UK over the past 15 years, it is quite 
evident that there are flaws within the Local Transport Act which provide the statutory 
requirements to implement a QCS at the time.  
2. Availability of resources: Resources such as financial support are important; 
however, where resources are limited, it is necessary to maximise the use of 
available resources. 
The interviews revealed Nexus had the resources in place in terms of funds to promote 
the scheme. They felt policy resources may have been an issue for other local authorities 
to promote the scheme but their Managing Director did a “good sales pitch” and they 
“spent millions putting the business case together and making sure it was legally sound”. 
However, there appeared to be concerns over the costs of running the scheme. When 
question 1 of the interview asked how much the scheme would cost, there was some dis-
crepancy between the answers. The cost of the scheme indicated by Nexus did not match 
that of the bus operators and therefore the bus operators believed this was a key reason 
why the scheme was not implemented.  
In contrast to the opinions of Nexus who felt resources were not an issue, all three 
bus operators felt strongly that policy resources were a key barrier to the implementation 
of the QCS. They believed it wasn’t financially sustainable, would cost the local tax payer 
a huge amount of money with no real benefits, and involve issues in the future in terms 
of pension liabilities. Furthermore, the bus operators suggested Nexus would take away 
the resources of the bus operators if the QCS was to come into effect. They felt Nexus 
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could “just see the profits bus companies make each year” and it would “help their fund-
ing gap that they were going to have in the future”.  
After the decision by the Traffic Commissioner that Nexus failed 3 out of the 5 
tests, Nexus declined the opportunity to appeal the decision because it would have been 
“very costly”. This highlights the importance of policy resources because if Nexus went 
for a VPA in 2009, they would have saved a lot of their resources. On the contrary, if they 
had the funding in place to appeal the decision by the Traffic Commissioner, they could 
have won their case and gained more in terms of resources.  
3. Intra-organisation support and communication: Policy staff need relevant 
training, supervision and support within their organisation when dealing with 
complex policy issues. 
The result of the QCS being rejected would suggest the bus operators had stronger intra-
organisation and communication in comparison to Nexus. Nexus felt the bus operators 
“corralled much bigger legal teams” to take them on which indicates they had more sup-
port. Several mistakes were made by Nexus which would also indicate a lack of support 
and communication. For example, they admitted to making “changes along the way” and 
these changes were held against them by the QCS Board. They also admitted to having 
“weaker parts” of their case and “some mistakes” made by their consultants. Furthermore, 
they could not prove to the QCS board the affordability of the scheme, which was one of 
the tests they failed. Meanwhile, the bus operators had the support and communication to 
work against Nexus and to find their flaws. One bus operator said, “A lot of the work our 
financial advisors did in proving the QCS wasn’t sustainable and Nexus’ figures were 
wrong based on our financial data.” This higher level of support and communication of 
the bus operators was therefore one contributing factor to the rejection of the QCS.  
4. Characteristics of organisations: Both formal structural features of organisa-
tions and informal attributes of their personnel (including size, competency and 
workload of staff). 
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Both Nexus and bus operators felt the characteristics of their organisation was not a bar-
rier for the implementation of the scheme. Nexus felt they were “quite lucky” because 
they were “quite a big organisation and drafted in key people and from a very senior 
level”. They also believed these people were “competent in what they do”. However, 
Nexus contradicted themselves when one interviewee from Nexus said, “it took about a 
year to educate 3 people” on work they had done in the past 5 years. Therefore, this shows 
that they may not have had the staff capacity in place that they had originally stated. 
Nexus also indicated that a key reason for why they failed to meet the requirements 
of the QCS was due to being a “small firm with a small legal team and economic advis-
ers.” They also felt that the bus operators had staff who were “commercially minded” and 
“clever people” who worked against their case for a QCS. The fact that this was a key 
reason for why the scheme was not implemented proves that the bus operators held 
stronger characteristics within their organisation, in comparison to Nexus. This also sup-
ports the opinions of the bus operators who felt Nexus lacked important characteristics 
within their organisation. Although the bus operators felt Nexus were “short of expertise”, 
they mentioned that there were some staff from Nexus that were “good people” and who 
they would work with regularly. However, they felt that “certainly size and competency 
of staff” was an issue.  
5. Economic, social and political environments: Current and future economic, so-
cial and political environments play an important role on the outcome of the 
policy process. 
This case study revealed several barriers associated with economic social and political 
conditions. Economic barriers were evident when the QCS Board rejected the scheme 
because Nexus could not prove its affordability and value for money. In line with this, 
the bus operators stated that Nexus had spent “£2.4 – 2.6 million of “tax payer’s money” 
to prepare the proposal for the scheme.  
In terms of social barriers, Nexus said one of the motivations for the QCS was to 
create a more stable network for the people living in Tyne and Wear. They feel the current 
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network “…creates a lot of instability…and then people can’t rely on the services” be-
cause the bus operators “tend to chance the network 8 or 9 times a year reflecting changes 
in demand such as a new shopping centre opening”. Meanwhile, an interview with INTU 
revealed that their only concern was with getting people to their shopping centre regard-
less of how the bus services were run, stating “At the end of the day we want people to 
get to our shopping centres by a public or private company – we would support either.” 
Although Nexus pointed out many benefits of the QCS for serving the area, it was evident 
in the proposal that their services would not extend to Durham and Northumberland which 
are areas covered by NECA. Therefore, this could have created another social barrier if 
the scheme was implemented.  
Political barriers were also evident during the QCS proposal. For example, Nexus 
pointed out that the NECA area was unable to decide on the election of a new mayor 
which was a barrier to developing a bus strategy for the Tyne and Wear area. They sug-
gested it was “very political and everyone wants to be the leader”. They also mentioned 
that NECA asked the Government for more money and the Government then scraped the 
deal because they couldn’t decide on a Mayor.  
6. Policy champions: Policy implementation should not be restricted to one policy 
champion and instead needs several policy champions who are responsible, 
competent and motivated to see the policy through from beginning to end. 
It is quite evident from the interviews that there were two lines of policy champions. 
These include both the team from Nexus and the 3 main bus operators, including Go 
North East, Stagecoach and Arriva. Interviews with Go North East said Arriva had a 
lesser role because they were the “minority player in the market” and therefore Go North 
East and Stagecoach were the main policy champions who worked together. The inter-
views suggested that both Nexus and the bus operators worked equally hard dealing with 
the QCS inquiry, however it was the bus operators who saw the case follow through from 
beginning to end. An interview with the bus operators revealed they were successful be-
cause they decided to tackle Nexus “from a critical point of view” and to determine that 
the QCS was “unaffordable and not practical”. 
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7. Bureaucratic power: Hierarchical control in an organisation is important; how-
ever, hierarchical power must not be used to overrule policy decisions by other 
members within the organisation. 
Issues with bureaucratic power was raised during an interview with Nexus who revealed 
that extra data provided by the bus operators could have helped to inform people about 
what the scheme would deliver. However, they suggested that they didn’t want to share 
this data because “it also adds another layer of bureaucracy with meetings and the bus 
companies aren’t used to that exposure”. No further issues in terms of bureaucratic power 
or hierarchical control were highlighted in this case study.  
8. Collaboration and interaction between those involved in the policy process: Col-
laboration and interaction is necessary between key actors involved in the policy 
process, including policy makers, local authority staff, local and national gov-
erning bodies, regional transport partnerships, bus operators and transport 
practitioners working within the transport field. 
Collaboration and interaction were important factors for the preparation of the QCS. This 
was evident where the Tyne and Wear ITA directed Nexus, on behalf of NECA, to inves-
tigate the possibility of developing a QCS across the region as a possible mechanism for 
achieving the objectives set out in the 2012 bus strategy. Further collaboration and inter-
action took place between Nexus and the 3 main bus operators in the area (Stagecoach, 
Go North East and Arriva) to determine whether a VPA could be an alternative mecha-
nism to a QCS. During the lead up to the QCS inquiry, regular meetings were also held 
with local councillors, INTU and NEECC.  
In terms of the QCS development, Nexus proposed that Governance arrangements 
be set up where local councillors would have regular meetings with Nexus, the bus oper-
ators and members of the public to talk about issues effecting the bus network. This indi-
cates that Nexus were willing to collaborate and interact with key actors involved in the 
scheme.  
 Chapter 7: Case study results 
   Page 156
  
However, it was also evident from the onset that collaboration and interaction were 
barriers to the implementation of the QCS. This was particularly noticeable when Nexus 
said the relationship between themselves and the bus operators was “damaged” during 
the QCS process. Furthermore, they stated that the bus companies were unwilling to share 
data and this in turn prevented the scheme from being implemented. In response to this, 
the bus operators were unwilling to share data because they felt the Combined Authority 
wanted to take “control” of the bus services in Tyne and Wear and to “make profits” from 
these services. This clearly indicates poor collaboration and interaction between those 
involved in the policy process can dictate the outcome of the implementation process. 
This is also evident where the QCS proposal was seen to take off due to good collabora-
tion and interaction between those involved, and then slowly deteriorated towards the end 
due to poor collaboration and interaction between Nexus and the bus operators, resulting 
in the scheme not being implemented.  
9. Policy remodelling: Limited changes to the policy should occur from the design 
stage right through to the implementation stage. 
A contributing factor to the QCS not being implemented was due to changes which oc-
curred during the design stage. Nexus admitted that there were avoidable problems when 
making a case for a QCS and this would have contributed to the scheme not being imple-
mented. They said they made “changes along the way” which were held against them. 
This in turn made the bus operators believe Nexus were plugging the gaps as they went 
along and developed a new plan for the scheme. Nexus also pointed out that the general 
public did not welcome changes and this was a barrier for during the QCS proposal be-
cause “nobody likes changes” and “there’s a natural resistance to change”. This indicates 
the importance of having limited changes to the policy from the design stage right through 
to the implementation stage. 
10. Opposition, conflict and ambiguities: Opposition, conflict and ambiguities are 
inevitable including public opposition, political power, local and national elec-
tions, conflicts between neighbouring authorities over budgets, bus wars and 
open-access to data by bus operating companies. 
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From the early stages of conducting the interviews, it was quite clear that opposition, 
conflict and ambiguities had a negative impact on the QCS proposal. In terms of opposi-
tion, the Tyne and Wear PTUG supported Nexus and were in favour of the scheme, how-
ever they strongly opposed the opinions of the bus operators about the scheme. The bus 
operators pointed out that they “…invited them to presentations but the difficulty was that 
didn’t want to listen and they didn’t want to hear what we had to say - they had already 
made their minds up…”.  
Meanwhile, opposition from the public was mixed and Nexus felt it was “50/50” 
because some people bought into the idea of the QCS, while “some people even wrote 
into us to tell us how much they objected.” An interview with INTU revealed that they 
didn’t see public opposition because “…people thought they were getting the London and 
the Oyster card”. Similarly, an interview with NEECC suggested there wasn’t any public 
opposition because they didn’t feel the public were “engaged with the debate”. This broad 
range of answers identified in the interviews suggest that people were not fully aware of 
the intentions of the scheme and therefore resulted in mixed opinions from many people.  
Conflicts and ambiguities also played a key role in the rejection of the QCS. This 
was particularly evident with the relationship between Nexus and the local bus operators. 
While Nexus stated the relationship was “damaged” during the QCS process, they also 
suggested there were originally “good links” but the QCS had resulted in the bus operators 
using “a lot of time and resources” to “fighting” their case and ultimately, they were suc-
cessful.   
Similarly, the bus operators felt this relationship was damaged and conflict and op-
position was particularly evident during the interviews when one bus operator said, 
“There were statements from one of the big operators about burning down bus operators 
than giving it over to Nexus if the scheme happened…”. This indicates the enormity of 
conflict between Nexus and the bus operators and the level of opposition for the scheme. 
However, the bus operators also suggested that relationships between Nexus and them-
selves have improved since the QCS proposal and that they are “…trying to build the 
relationship…” and have started “…working together”.  
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On the contrary, it was interesting to hear the opinions of NEECC and INTU who 
remained apolitical throughout the interviews. They suggested that this “serious break-
down in the relationship” was obvious trough press coverage and that there actually 
“…trying to deliver the same thing but arguing over who were better to implement the 
scheme”. Consequently, these interviews have revealed that the level of opposition, con-
flict and ambiguities are key barriers which prevented the QCS being implemented.  
7.2.4 Summary of case study 1 
The first case study has examined the QCS in Tyne and Wear that was rejected in 2015. 
In order to understand why this scheme was not implemented, a theoretical analysis was 
carried out using the decision support framework. Eight of the ten variables identified 
barriers to this scheme. Firstly, there were barriers associated with the policy objectives 
and it was found that the 2012 bus strategy which led the QCA has not been updated 
since. As a result of this outdated document, Nexus expressed concerns over the current 
targets in place and doubt whether some of the targets are still “relevant”. Meanwhile, the 
interviews revealed that monitoring was an important stage of the policy process and that 
monitoring would have been in place for the QCS. It is therefore evident that there was 
an unclear link between designing the policy, setting targets and suitable measures to 
achieve those targets, and monitoring those targets for a QCS to be implemented. Another 
key barrier which had an impact on the scheme includes the legislation that was in place. 
Prior to the QCS proposal in Tyne and Wear, no other QCS was implemented in the UK 
over the past 15 years. This clearly indicates that there are flaws within the current 
Transport Act which provides the statutory requirements to implement a QCS – it is “too 
difficult” to use. 
Next, a document review and interviews revealed that there were many concerns 
over the availability of resources for the scheme. On the 3rd November 2015, the QCS 
Board issued their decision and rejected the scheme proposal for a QCS because the 
scheme was unaffordable and the councils would eventually have run out of money to 
keep the buses running. Nexus argued that resources were not an issue, however all three 
bus operators strongly felt policy resources was a key barrier to the implementation of the 
QCS. They believed it was financially unsustainable, would cost the local tax payer a 
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huge amount of money with no real benefits, and involve issues in the future in terms of 
pension liabilities. Furthermore, the bus operators suggested Nexus would take away the 
resources of the bus operators if the QCS was to come into effect. 
It is evident from the interviews that Nexus lacked intra-organisation and commu-
nication in comparison to the bus operators. The bus operators “corralled much bigger 
legal teams” to take them on which indicates they had more support. Nexus admitted to 
having “weaker parts” of their case and “some mistakes” made by their consultants. Fur-
thermore, they could not prove to the QCS board the affordability of the scheme, which 
was one of the tests they failed. 
Both Nexus and bus operators felt the characteristics of their organisation was not 
a barrier for the implementation of the scheme. However, it is clear from the interviews 
that Nexus lacked important characteristics because they mentioned “it took about a year 
to educate 3 people” on work they had done in the past 5 years. They also mentioned they 
had a “small firm with a small legal team and economic advisers.” Therefore, this shows 
that they did not have the competent staff in place, which they had originally stated. 
Meanwhile, the operators appeared to have stronger characteristics within their organisa-
tion where it was revealed that they had staff who were “commercially minded” and 
“clever people” who worked against their case for a QCS. 
This case study revealed several barriers associated with economic social and po-
litical conditions. Economic barriers were evident when the QCS Board rejected the 
scheme because Nexus could not prove its affordability and value for money. Social bar-
riers were evident where the QCS proposed by Nexus would not extend to Durham and 
Northumberland which are areas covered by NECA. Meanwhile, political barriers were 
also evident during the QCS proposal when the NECA area was unable to decide on the 
election of a new mayor which was a barrier to developing a bus strategy for the Tyne 
and Wear area. This political complexity was summed up by one interview who said that 
in Tyne and Wear “it’s very political and everyone wants to be the leader”.  
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Collaboration and interaction between those involved in the policy process were 
also key barriers for the QCS. This was particularly noticeable when Nexus said the rela-
tionship between themselves and the bus operators was “damaged” during the QCS pro-
cess. Furthermore, they stated that the bus companies were unwilling to share data and 
this in turn prevented the scheme from being implemented. Another implementation chal-
lenge associated with the QCS was policy remodelling, where Nexus made several 
changes during the design stage which were held against them.  
Finally, it was evident that opposition, conflict and ambiguities had a negative im-
pact on the QCS proposal. The Tyne and Wear PTUG particularly opposed the opinions 
of the bus operators and were very much in support of Nexus and their plans for a QCS. 
There was also some opposition from the public and the interviews suggested that this 
was because some people were not fully aware of the intentions of the scheme. Conflicts 
and ambiguities also played a key role in the rejection of the QCS. The interviews re-
vealed that bus operators used a lot of time and resources” to “fighting” their case and 
ultimately they were successful. This in turn “damaged” the relationship between NEXUS 
and the bus operators.  
In contrast to the eight variable of the framework which highlighted the barriers, 
two variables were less problematic. The interviews revealed that policy champions were 
in place to help develop the case for a QCS by Nexus. The Union set up by the 3 main 
bus operators (Go North East, Stagecoach and Arriva) also included key policy champi-
ons to help prepare a proposal for a VPA. Another variable which was a lesser barrier for 
the QCS included bureaucratic power or hierarchical control.  
7.3 Case Study 2 – Fastlink Scheme, Glasgow City 
The second case study examines the Fastlink bus rapid transit (BRT) Scheme in Glasgow 
City, Scotland. The following sub-sections include a case narrative, which will then help 
inform issues arising from the case, followed by theoretical analysis and concluding re-
marks on this case study. 
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7.3.1 Case narrative 
The following sub-section presents a narrative of the second case study on the Glasgow 
Fastlink Scheme. A total of eight interviews were carried out with 11 representatives who 
were involved in the scheme. These include representatives from Strathclyde partnership 
for Transport (SPT), Transport Scotland, Scottish Association for Public Transport 
(SAPT), Confederation of Passenger Transport (CPT), Strathclyde Bus Quality Partner-
ship Board, Stagecoach, First Group, and the National Health Service (NHS). A list of 
interviewees and their role can be seen in table 7.5.  
Table 7.5: Fastlink Scheme interview participants 
Interview               Organisation 
Number of 
participants 
Role of participant in    
organisation 
1 
Strathclyde partnership for 
Transport (SPT) 
1 Bus Development Manager 
2 Transport Scotland 1 
Regional Transport Partner-
ship Policy Advisor 
3 
Scottish Association for Public 
Transport (SAPT) 
2 President and Chairman 
4 
Confederation of Passenger 
Transport (CPT) 
1 Managing Director 
5 
Strathclyde Bus Quality Partner-
ship Board 
1 Chairman 
6 Bus Company - Stagecoach 2 
Managing Director and 
Commercial Director 
7 Bus Company - First Group 1 Network Planning Manager 
8 National Health Service (NHS) 1 Senior Researcher 
9 Glasgow City Council 1 Assistant Group Manager 
7.3.1.1 Statutory Quality Partnership (SQP) 
SQP schemes were introduced by the Scottish Government under Section 3 of the 
Transport (Scotland) Act 2001 as amended by the Transport (Scotland) Act 2005, as the 
preferred mechanism to improve quality of bus service provision. The development of a 
SQP scheme is also a specific objective contained within the document “Moving into the 
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Future: An Action Plan for Buses in Scotland (Bus Action Plan)” which promotes and 
shares best practice with a view to raising the standard of quality in the bus industry. A 
SQP is a statutory agreement and a partnership arrangement whereby a transport authority 
provides “specified facilities” and sets quality standards to be observed by bus operators 
for using those facilities. These specified facilities can include extensive bus priority 
measures along the routes, improved bus stop and access measures, improved bus shelters 
and enhanced bus route monitoring (Scottish Government, 2009).  
According to the “Statutory Quality Partnership Best Practice Guidance” document 
produced by the Scottish Government (2009), the 2001 Act empowers a transport author-
ity, or two or more authorities acting jointly, to make a SQP scheme covering the whole 
or any part of their area, or combined area. For an authority to establish a SQP scheme, it 
must be able to demonstrate that it will: 
 
 To any extent implement their relevant general policies in the area that the area 
to which the proposed scheme relates; and: 
either: 
 improve the quality of local services and facilities provided in the area to which 
the proposed scheme relates in such a way as to bring material benefits to persons 
using those services and facilities or; 
 reduce or limit traffic congestion, noise or air pollution. 
Before a SQP can be implemented, the transport authority must address seven key 
stages for establishing a SQP, as highlighted in figure 7.2. The first stage includes a re-
view which identifies the aims and objectives of bus policy in the area, a review of the 
existing partnerships in the area, the aims and objectives of a SQP and how the transport 
authority help achieve a SQP. The next stage involves pre-consultation where the 
transport authority agrees to develop a SQP and an informal consultation is carried out. 
This is followed by the next stage which includes the delivery of SQP and a draft is pre-
pared on the governance and resolution of the scheme. Formal consultation can then take 
place with the bus operators, transport authorities, bordering transport authorities, chief 
office of police, Scottish traffic commissioner and other transport bodies. The public are 
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also provided notice of the proposed scheme. The final stages involve publishing and 
implementing the scheme, followed by monitoring and reporting on the outcome of the 
scheme.  
Bus operators wishing to participate in the SQP must give a written undertaking to 
the Traffic Commissioner that they will provide the specified standard of service when 
using the facilities. This will become part of the conditions of registration and the Traffic 
Commissioner has the power to act against any operator who fails to meet the conditions. 
The following sections discuss the Fastlink SQP, which is the fifth such agreement to be 
implemented in the Strathclyde area and was jointly made by SPT and Glasgow City 
Council (GCC).  
 
Figure 7.2: Stages in establishing a SQP (Scottish Government, 2009) 
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7.3.1.2 Fastlink proposal 
The origins of the Fastlink proposal date back to the mid-1990s when SPT published a 
set of plans for the reintroduction of trams in Glasgow. This was known as the Strathclyde 
Tram Project and included a 20-kilometre route using disused railway lines and tunnels 
as well as running in part on some roads in the city alongside other traffic. The proposal 
also included plans for future expansion of the tram network to stretch across the Greater 
Glasgow area. However, there were many objections to the proposed tram and the parlia-
mentary Commissioners ruled against the scheme.  
Next GCC and SPT developed a working partnership and the Clyde Translink pro-
ject was developed. A study was carried out known as the Clyde Corridor Transport Study 
(CCTS) which identified the need for enhanced public transport along the Clyde Corridor 
and therefore a bus rapid transit (BRT) metro system was recommended. BRTs have been 
implemented around the world for decades as a solution for moving large numbers of 
people at a relatively fast speed in densely populated urban areas (Hensher and Golob, 
2008). According to Wright and Hook (2007), a BRT can be defined as: 
“A high-quality bus based transit system that delivers fast, comfortable, and 
cost-effective urban mobility through the provision of segregated right-of-
way infrastructure, rapid and frequent operations, and excellence in market-
ing and customer service. BRT essentially emulates the performance and 
amenity characteristics of a modern rail-based transit system but at a fraction 
of the cost.” (Wright and Hook, 2007) 
The ‘Clyde Fastlink’ was designed and it was proposed that this new BRT system 
would include “high quality, quick and frequent services operating with trained drivers, 
quality shelters and priority over other traffic along its route including segregated road-
way, bus lanes and traffic signal priority” (Glasgow City Council, 2010). 
In 2006, an Outline Business Case (OBC) was completed and planning permission 
was approved for the Northern Corridor - Phase 1 route from the city centre to the west 
of Glasgow Harbour at an estimated cost of £32m. An initial section of the route was 
constructed, however a lack of funding meant the route could not be continued.  
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In 2007, the Scottish Government was approached for funding to extend the project 
into a Regional Scheme incorporating Clydebank in the north and Renfrew and Glasgow 
Airport in the south. There were also several key stakeholders including Renfrewshire 
Council, West Dunbartonshire Council and NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde. In 2008, 
further feasibility studies were carried to consider inclusion of an eastern extension to 
include the Commonwealth Games Athletes Village and Clyde Gateway. 
However, in 2009, the Scottish Government carried out a review known as the Scot-
tish Government's Strategic Transport Projects Review (STPR) and found the Clyde 
Fastlink to be 'not of national significance' and rejected it from its list of priority schemes. 
The review indicated that there was a lack of regional impact, failure to tackle congestion 
around Glasgow Central station and there was a lack of clear impact on reducing emis-
sions. Subsequently, following representations by SPT and GCC, Clyde Fastlink was ac-
cepted by the Government to be a priority element of the STPR. 
In 2010, another OBC was submitted to the Scottish Government and sets out the 
Fastlink scheme in 3 phases (figure 7.3) with budgeted construction costs (including op-
timism bias, inflation and fixed contract allowance): 
Table 7.6: OBC budget construction costs 
Phasing Option Cost 
Benefit to Cost 
Ratio 
Regional Scheme: Glasgow City Centre to Clydebank 
and Renfrew Ferry 
£183m 3.04 
Inner Regional Scheme: Glasgow City Centre to Brae-
head and Riverside Museum 
£60m 3.82 
Core Scheme: Glasgow City Centre to Sothern General 
Hospital and SECC 
£37m 1.82 
Low economic growth for the corridor was assumed to reflect the current economic 
downturn at the time of the feasibility study. The Benefit to Cost Ratios (BCR) identified 
the Regional and Inner Regional Schemes as 3.04 and 3.82 respectively, which indicated 
strong economic justification in both cases. Meanwhile, the BCR for the Core Scheme 
was 1.82 indicated lower, but still acceptable, economic justification. The Core Scheme 
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had a lower ratio as a result of its costs disproportionate to its length due to the minimum 
quantity of vehicles required to deliver the intended high levels of service. Following this 
analysis, the Inner Regional Scheme was identified as the best performing option to meet 
the scheme objectives. The Fastlink scheme included six objectives in line with both na-
tional, regional and local policy considerations. These objectives were also used for eval-
uating and monitoring success of the scheme. These included:  
 “To reduce travel time (target 20%) and the cost of travel to existing and new 
developments along the Clyde corridor;  
 To improve accessibility, and thereby help to reduce social exclusion, to key ar-
eas, facilities and services along the Clyde corridor such as healthcare, educa-
tion, employment and tourist attractions; 
 To support growth, development and regeneration along the Clyde corridor in the 
residential, commercial and retail sectors;  
 To ensure high quality integration of new and existing public transport along the 
Clyde corridor;  
 To improve safety, particularly for vulnerable public transport users, along the 
Clyde corridor; and  
 To reduce the adverse environmental effects of transport along the Clyde corridor 
through modal shift, sustainable trip patterns and reducing the growth rate of 
congestion on main corridors.” (BRT UK, 2015). 
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Figure 7.3: Clyde Fastlink route layout (GCC, 2010) 
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In 2011, the final business case was submitted and SPT advised the Scottish Gov-
ernment that the Inner Regional Scheme was the preferred option and requested funding 
to deliver the Fastlink Scheme. SPT also requested for £24 m to the European Regional 
Development Fund to help support the scheme. Two major contributing elements of the 
Fastlink Scheme included public transport provision for the 2014 Commonwealth Games 
and the new Queen Elizabeth University Hospital (QEUH) to be opened in 2015. While 
SPT were successful in obtaining the funding required for the Fastlink Scheme, there 
were however delays as the money was delivered in phases much later than planned.  
7.3.1.3 Fastlink preparation 
The key route connections of the Fastlink were proposed for within Glasgow’s city centre. 
The route connects with Central Station, Queen Street Station and Buchanan Bus Station, 
and then runs along the Clydeside via the International Financial Services District, the 
ClydeArc Bridge, Digital Media Quarter and Govan to the QEUH (figure 7.4). To en-
courage modal shift to public transport, the route was designed to incorporate a number 
of key bus priority features, including: 
 Segregated Busways  
 Bus Lanes  
 Bus Priority Traffic Signalling  
 Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) bus lane enforcement  
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An example of a bus priority measure can be seen in the following figure (7.5) 
which shows an aerial plan of a roundabout in Govan which has been signalised and 
modified to include a west bound contraflow bus only link. 
 
Figure 7.5: Aerial plan of a roundabout in Govan (Wright and Hook, 2007) 
The scheme also includes passenger facilities such as high quality interchange, 
safety lighting, CCTV, signage and travel information and distinctive “Fastlink” brand-
ing. There are also new Fastlink halts which include help points, high access kerbs and 
RTPI. The following image shows a Fastlink halt during being constructed on Union 
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Figure 7.6: Fastlink halt during construction (Source: Author’s image) 
However, a desktop review revealed that there were no plans for walking or cycling 
infrastructure included within the scheme design. This resulted in public opposition and 
opposition from cycling activists such as a campaigning group from the Strathclyde area 
known as ‘Gobike’ who objected to the Fastlink proposals because of the exclusion of 
cycles and the potential danger posed to people on bikes by the new traffic layout. To 
resolve this issue, GCC prepared a package of measures to improve the connections for 
walking and cycling in relation to the Fastlink project and presented it to SPT.  
7.3.1.4 Fastlink outcome 
SPT led the steering group involved in delivering the scheme. The steering group were 
responsible for overseeing various duties were satisfied to meet grant conditions with 
agreement between the organisations involved. These organisations included GCC, Ren-
frewshire Council, Transport Scotland, NHS Greater Glasgow & Clyde and CPT. Mean-
while GCC and SPT would meet regularly via the Fastlink Working Group to monitor 
progress on a ‘day by day’ basis and report to the Steering Group and respective corporate 
governance requirements within SPT and GCC. 
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The final business case also stated that there was a need to kick-start funding for 
the initial operations. Therefore, SPT invited local bus operators to participate in a mini 
competition which offered capital support for environmentally-friendly buses as part of a 
wider drive to establish sustainable, high-quality commercial bus services on the Fastlink 
corridor and associated routes to the QEUH. Both McGill’s Bus Service and Stagecoach 
Western Buses responded to the mini-competition SPT Partnership Board approved the 
following awards for Fastlink Network Enhancement;  
 “The award of Network Enhancement Grant (NEG) to Stagecoach Western Buses 
at a cost of approximately £1,150,000 for a 4 year period commencing 31 August 
2015, or a date thereafter to be agreed with SPT.  
 The award of Network Enhancement Grant to McGill’s Bus Service at a cost of 
approximately £1,300,000 for a 4 year period commencing 31 August 2015, or a 
date thereafter to be agreed with SPT.” (SPT, 2015) 
Contracts were then exchanged between SPT and Stagecoach. This included fund-
ing for 7 brand new Euro 6 vehicles and for Stagecoach to commit to a four year period 
commencing 31 August 2015. These new vehicles would be operated on their frequent 
(every 10 minutes during M - F) X19 Fastlink Service, and extend the route to QEUH, 
Govan, City Centre, Glasgow Royal Infirmary and Easterhouse. This in turn would secure 
the requirements to have a high quality, frequent (every 10 minutes), attractive and envi-
ronmentally friendly service delivered on the full Fastlink route, backed by a four year 
agreement with the operator. However, McGill’s did not take up their offer of funding 
and indicated that they were are unlikely to do so following a review of their services 
operating on the Fastlink corridor to the QEUH. 
It was proposed that the Fastlink scheme would be completed by the time the new 
hospital - which has 10,000 staff and 750,000 visitors and patients per annum - opened in 
April 2015. The new bus priority infrastructure and passenger facilities at the hospitals 
Arrivals Square transport hub are fundamental in providing suitable access to the jobs and 
services located at the site by fast, frequent and high quality local bus services. However, 
the scheme encountered several delays. This included delays in the city centre where there 
were traffic changes to give buses priority and delays due to the upgrade of the Govan 
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bus-Subway interchange. Further delays were experienced during the implementation of 
the scheme where interviews revealed safety concerns over the Fastlink design, which 
were not apparent through a desktop review. For example, Transport Scotland pointed 
out that there was a section of the Anderson Quay that collapsed into the river Clyde, 
while CPT pointed out the bus drivers who were concerned for the safety of people be-
cause there had been incidences of people walking along or off the side of the segregated 
busway along the river Clyde. Meanwhile, other delays occurred on the Fastlink route 
where there were problems with traffic lights and buses weren’t given priority, resulting 
in added extra time to bus journeys. Both McGill and Stagecoach drivers stopped using 
the Fastlink bus lanes because they were too slow. 
While the hospital opened in April 2015, a further 1km of construction works were 
to be completed. According to the NHS, the construction works meant that it was “ex-
tremely difficult” for people to travel to the hospital because public transport provided by 
the Fastlink was not in place as planned. Furthermore, the parking restriction of 1 km 
around the site of the hospital resulted in congestion problems near the site as staff, pa-
tients and visitors of the hospital were parking nearby in residential areas. This in turn 
created opposition from local residents. For example, local residents living in Linthouse, 
which is located beside the hospital, feared that having new bus lanes and parking re-
strictions enforced would damage local businesses in the area. According to SPT, the 
design of a scheme like the Fastlink will “always be a challenge” because road space is 
required and parking spaces are taken away. This in turn creates opposition, particularly 
where people are not bus users in some cases.  
To help overcome these issues associated with opposition, several changes were 
made to the scheme based on the feedback from the public. Extensive Stakeholder con-
sultation was completed on the scheme from public exhibitions, presentations to affected 
housing associations, statutory consultation within the TRO process and councillor brief-
ings. While it is known that the scheme involved amendments, details of the exact 
amendments are unknown and were unobtainable from both the interviews and a desktop 
review.  
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A month later, the Fastlink was opened and a number of local bus services regis-
tered with the Traffic Commissioner for Scotland to operate on the Fastlink in accordance 
with the Fastlink SQP. Some of these bus services operate fully on the Fastlink, while 
some operate on parts of the Fastlink route serving nearby local communities. Table 7.7 
shows that the largest number of services on the Fastlink operates between the QEUH 
and Glasgow City Centre, while a further significant number of services operate between 
the QEUH and other destinations. The majority of these services operate via the new 
Arrivals Square transport hub at the QEUH which incorporates bus priority infrastructure 
and passenger facilities which are part of the Fastlink SQP.  
Table 7.7: Bus services in operation between QEUH and Glasgow City Centre (SPT, 2015) 














Mon-Fri 0518-0001 6 
Sat 0608-0001  





Mon-Fri 0600-2353 6 
Sat 0600-2353  
Sun 0600-2353  
McGill’s 23 
Glasgow Ren-




Mon-Fri 0600-2353 4 
Sat 0600-2353  
Sun 0600-2353  
McGill’s 26 
Glasgow Ren-





Mon-Fri 0600-2353 4 
Sat 0600-2353  
Sun 0600-2353  
    Total 20 
Interestingly, an interview with the NHS revealed that there are “no particular peak 
times and very often there are buses that are empty”. They indicated that there are out-
patient appointments every 15 minutes throughout the day and for the number of appoint-
ments over a year, “the number of buses available are tiny”. A desktop review of the 
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current Fastlink timetable which indicates a high frequency of services, contradicts the 
opinion of the NHS representative where they suggest there are not enough services to 
suit out-patient appointments.  
SPT (2015) highlighted there was an uplift in services, including Fastlink routes, to 
the QEUH from approximately 14 to 86 buses per hour, during the main day Monday to 
Friday, to a wide spread of destinations. Furthermore, a survey undertaken by NHS 
Greater Glasgow & Clyde found that over 65% of respondents felt that there had been an 
improvement in bus services since the new hospitals opened. They also felt it was easy to 
access the hospital by bus, including by Fastlink Services. 
The Transport (Scotland) Act 2001 indicates that a SQP scheme must set out the 
specified facilities provided by the transport authority and the specified standards of local 
services to be delivered by operators (Transport Scotland, 2017). These facilities and 
standards are required to secure improvements in bus services. SPT therefore developed 
a regime to assess the on-going effectiveness of the Specified Facilities and Bus Operator 
Standards to help deliver and sustain the required benefits and to identify areas for poten-
tial improvement. This regime tracks the operation of the Scheme against key outputs and 
associated targets. The key outputs to be monitored include: 
 Punctuality and reliability of bus services;  
 Bus patronage;  
 Bus service quality and passenger satisfaction;  
 Route traffic performance. 
However, an interim monitoring report was published in 2015 on the Fastlink 
Scheme, and it appears that the key targets associated with the Fastlink Scheme are heav-
ily focused on reducing travel time (target 20%) and the cost of travel to existing and new 
developments along the Clyde Corridor. This includes an initial reduction target of 15% 
and a final goal of 20% on completion of the scheme including City Centre. An update 
on the performance of the Fastlink Scheme provided by SPT in 2015 in terms of journey 
time performance compared to both the reference case (i.e. without Fastlink) and the pro-
ject targets. According to SPT, this data was estimated using a combination of traffic 
modelling, snapshot surveys, limited operator data and timetable schedules. They also 
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indicate that these findings are aligned with positive feedback they had received from 
operators and the public following the upgrades and modifications to traffic signalling 
along the route. A monitoring plan is illustrated in table 7.8 which was developed by the 
partners involved in the scheme including SPT, GCC and the local bus operators.  






Bus patronage Bus operator 6 months 
Bi-annual bus operators 
scheme review report 
Service quality Bus operator 6 months 
Bi-annual bus operators 
scheme review report/ Re-
vised schedule 6 









Technical note/ Service relia-
bility trend 
Journey times Bus operator Upon request Technical note 
Route traffic perfor-
mance 
Council 6 months 
Route traffic performance re-
port 
Facilities update Council 6 months Revised schedule 2 
Passenger satisfac-
tion 
SPT Annually Passenger satisfaction reports 
Inspections SPT 6 months Inspection reports 
Overall scheme re-
view 
Council and SPT Annually Annual scheme review report 





A final outcome of the Fastlink Scheme includes a £3.14 million package of works 
which was agreed between GCC and SPT, to deliver bus priority measures and improved 
passenger facilities within Glasgow City Centre. These works are currently underway and 
include the delivery of further journey time savings for all bus services operating in the 
City Centre (e.g. up to 180 buses per hour in Union Street) in alignment with the targets 
set out in the final business case.  
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7.3.2 Issues arising from the case 
The following sub-sections discuss the issues that arose from the case study in terms of 
design, existing bus policy document, policy targets, monitoring of bus polices and bar-
riers to implementing the scheme. 
7.3.2.1 Issues with scheme design 
A key issue that was not raised during the interviews but was discovered during a desktop 
review was that there were no plans for walking or cycling infrastructure included when 
the scheme was designed. This resulted in public opposition, especially from cycling ac-
tivists, because of the exclusion of cycles and the potential danger posed to people on 
bikes by the new traffic layout.  
Further issues with the scheme design occurred which caused delays to implement 
the scheme. These delays occurred because of a section of the Anderson Quay that col-
lapsed into the river Clyde, the upgrade of the Govan bus-Subway interchange and further 
road works and traffic management requirements. This in turn meant the scheme was not 
delivered on time for the opening of the new hospital. Similar delays occurred when the 
Fastlink was expected to be in operation for the Commonwealth games held in Glasgow 
in 2014.  
While the new hospital was opened, more design issues appeared where 1km of 
construction works were still to be completed. Parking restrictions of 1km around the site 
of the hospital resulted in congestion problems near the site and opposition from local 
residents. According to SPT, there has been no mechanism implemented to this day to 
help alleviate the congestion caused by the parking restrictions since the Fastlink route 
was completed. From a public health perspective, the NHS revealed that the council have 
policies on limiting the car parking and they “don’t want to be responsible for paying for 
private car parking” and instead want to encourage people to walk and cycle to work. 
Another example of design issues with the scheme occurred where there were prob-
lems with traffic lights and buses weren’t given priority, resulting in added extra time to 
bus journeys. Therefore, both McGill and Stagecoach drivers stopped using the Fastlink 
bus lanes for a period because they were too slow. Given the barriers associated with the 
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scheme design, the Chair of Strathclyde Bus Partnership believes if SPT had a bigger 
budget, then “the scheme would have been designed better”.   
7.3.2.2 Existing bus policy document, policy targets and monitoring of bus polices 
At a regional level, the current bus policy document in place is ‘A Catalyst for Change’, 
the statutory Regional Transport Strategy (RTS) for the west of Scotland 2008-21 and 
was approved by Scottish Ministers in 2008. This document includes a range of solutions 
across Strathclyde to enhance and develop the transport network, infrastructure and ser-
vices, and to promote sustainable development and travel choices. At a local level, the 
latest bus policy document for the Glasgow City area was published by GCC in November 
2013 called ‘Getting Ahead of Change’, the Glasgow City Centre Strategy and Action 
Plan 2014- 2019. This strategy is aimed at tackling the city centre’s economic, planning, 
environmental and traffic issues. Both the RTS and LTS outline the commitments to sup-
porting the delivery of Fastlink and to delivering traffic management measures to facili-
tate the movement of all buses, including the Fastlink services, through the city centre. 
According to SPT, there is a section on buses in the LTS which flows from the RTS 
and sets out “…broader principals supporting accessibility, improving the network and 
reliability of the network.” SPT also points out that the Fastlink scheme fits within the 
RTS and there is a direct reference to the scheme in the strategy. In terms of the im-
portance of having this document in place, SPT believe: 
“It is absolutely crucial to have these documents in place. They set out your 
direction of travel in terms of you of how you allocate your funds and take 
these things forward. We’ve just started the process of looking into refreshing 
our strategy. This is to help get more people onto the bus.” [Interview 1] 
Similarly, GCC pointed out that it is “important” to have bus policy documents in 
place. However, there were some discrepancies in opinions about the importance of hav-
ing a bus policy document in place. According to the Chair of Strathclyde Bus Partner-
ship, these documents are necessary, but not sufficient, stating:  
“They give you some kind of framework to make political agreement and to 
make priorities. That’s the story of transport in the UK for 60 or 70 years. 
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Glasgow’s LTS says lots of worthy things and it doesn’t look very different 
from other LTS’s. The Fastlink is just a bus, it’s not much more than an ex-
citing new bus and just does what it has to do.” [Interview 5] 
The Chair of Strathclyde Bus Partnership pointed out that the targets set by SPT are 
“… mostly about passenger satisfaction and usage but there is a big long comprehensive 
list of targets for monitoring which is part of the quality partnership.” They also believe 
targets have an impact on how bus policies are implemented in Glasgow/SPT area, stat-
ing; 
“…we continue to fail to meet targets and this make things worse. This rein-
forces the decline in patronage and you can argue this isn’t smart travel. The 
data is based on raw passenger numbers, which is one measure that doesn’t 
necessarily tell you how the buses are responding to changes in the economy. 
We have a danger that we continue to reinforce how bad things are.” [Inter-
view 5] 
This clearly indicates that there are some concerns with the targets set in the Glas-
gow/SPT area. However, SPT pointed out that they maintain an adequate network using 
the RTS as a guideline in terms of targets and that they are “…trying to get modal shift 
and improve accessibility” so the cases they put forward to “…help build a better case at 
a local level, such as the Fastlink.” In response to targets which are met in the area, they 
believe it is the bus operators who hold responsibility to meet these targets, stating; 
“The board principles impact on how we deal with policy. 97% of the regis-
tered mileage is commercially operated and it’s up to the operator to decide 
the frequency, fares and times. The final 3% we end up throwing in supported 
networks such as weekends, evenings.” [Interview 1]  
Most interviews carried out for this case study indicated it is important for moni-
toring to be in place to aid the implementation of bus policy measures. SPT believe mon-
itoring is “very important” and “absolutely essential” in terms of what was done and what 
could be done. They also indicate the importance of board meeting to monitor the perfor-
mance, stating: 
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“We work closely at a ground level with bus operators in the area. At an indi-
vidual level we pick up what’s working well and not working well and where 
we can make improvements. For the quality partnership scheme, they have 
boards and governing bodies. We will meet next February and we will com-
ment on various aspects of the quality partnership scheme, and look at how it 
is performing.” [Interview 1] 
Similarly, they pointed out the importance of monitoring, stating: 
“Monitoring of the success of any scheme is important in order to provide 
support for future expansion and implementation.” [Interview 9] 
While the Chair of Strathclyde Bus Partnership points out the importance of 
monitoring, they suggested there are many concerns over the monitoring that is in 
place for the Fastlink Scheme, such as commercial confidentiality issues and access 
to data from the bus operator. 
“Monitoring is always important and we’re not very good at it. I think if we 
had better monitoring in place it would have a successful impact on buses 
because the infrastructure isn’t that very expensive, in comparison to rail”. 
“I think monitoring is a good thing and we don’t tend to do enough of it or do 
it particularly well. That said, monitoring in the bus sector is much more dif-
ficult because of commercial confidentiality issues and getting data from the 
operators can sometimes be hard, and that doesn’t help the industry’s case.” 
[Interview 5] 
SPT believe more bus policy measures such as the Fastlink Scheme would be im-
plemented as planned and without problems, if stricter monitoring was in place. They 
suggested it is “important” to demonstrate success and monitoring is therefore “…abso-
lutely essential for further investment”. They also indicated that they are monitoring the 
Fastlink scheme in a “sustainable way”. However, the Chair of Strathclyde Bus Partner-
ship disagreed with the opinion of SPT and did not believe bus policy measures would be 
implemented as planned and without problems, if stricter monitoring was in place. They 
suggest it would depend on what the stricter monitoring regimes indicate. For example; 
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“If the Fastlink was generating new journeys and benefits then there would be 
a strong case, but they’re not. So I don’t think it matters how well they are 
monitoring. They should stick to the general investment case and measure it, 
which is quite weak at the minute. But that’s because of the level of car own-
ership and money put into new roads.” [Interview 5] 
In terms of what constitutes good practice in monitoring a scheme like the Fastlink, 
the Chair of Strathclyde Bus Partnership suggests monitoring should be more focused on 
“…how many people are on that actual route, how many buses they travel on, how much 
they pay and what are the satisfaction levels are.” However, they also indicate the diffi-
culties for SPT to collect this data due to the expenses involved, stating: 
“SPT does make an attempt to measure this but it’s expensive because it 
largely qualitative data and takes a lot of passenger survey data to do it. I 
would like to see monitoring on what the investment does to the economy and 
does it produce the jobs that it says it would do. It’s very hard and very ex-
pensive to do but that’s best practice.” [Interview 5] 
7.3.2.3 Policy implementation and barriers to implementation 
It would appear that the greatest barrier to implement the Fastlink Scheme came from 
public opposition. An interview with First Group revealed that this opposition was a 
result of the public not seeing the benefits of the scheme. In Linhouse, where part of the 
route was being constructed, residents were unhappy with the idea of having new bus 
lanes and parking restrictions enforced. Furthermore, it was feared that the new route 
would damage local businesses in the area. Transport Scotland pointed out public oppo-
sition was evident where there were concerns over the number of services running. How-
ever, they now believe public perception has improved because people “like the new 
buses because they are clean and tidy”. According to SPT, public opposition is “inevita-
ble” due to the size of the scheme, however they felt it was important to take the views 
of the public on board. To help over these issues associated with opposition, a number 
of changes were made to the scheme based on the feedback from the public. Extensive 
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Stakeholder consultation was completed on the scheme from public exhibitions, presen-
tations to affected housing associations, statutory consultation within the TRO process 
and councillor briefings. As a result, a number of amendments were made to the scheme.  
While SPT were successful in obtaining the funding required for the Fastlink 
Scheme, there were however delays as the money was delivered in phases much later 
than planned. According to the Chair of Strathclyde Bus Partnership, it made the delivery 
longer than it should be and “a lack of money was a barrier in that sense”. However, they 
suggested it was implemented quite well in comparison to other schemes in the UK. In 
response to this, Transport Scotland said the do not pay out money in advance and they 
only paid out what SPT anticipated they would spend. SPT therefore felt “fortunate to 
secure the funding from Scottish Government and European funding” because it took 
several years to get to that point.  
A lack of local government interest and support for the Fastlink also appeared to 
be another key barrier for the implementation of the scheme. SAPT believe politicians 
tend to be interested in schemes that give “publicity” such as road schemes for lorries 
and cars, but not buses. They also believe politicians like to fund schemes where they 
“can cut a ribbon afterwards and they don’t get opportunities like that for extending bus 
lanes”. Therefore, they don’t want to spend money on schemes like the Fastlink. As a 
result of this, SAPT doesn’t believe the Fastlink was the best option of schemes to be 
implemented. Instead, they would have preferred to see bus corridors or buses that co-
ordinated with the rail. They also feel there should be more emphasis on parking charges 
because they argued that currently the car parks owned by the councils charge low prices 
for short stay parking. They suggested the Fastlink Scheme was implemented due to a 
“panic over the new hospital” being built. The Chair of Strathclyde Bus Partnership also 
shared a similar view and believed “…funding for the fastlink was very political” and it 
was “…one of those projects that was in the right place at the right time”. They also felt 
it was “…another cheap and nasty transport system designed to solve the problem of a 
major public investment in the wrong place”.  
With a lack of support from politicians, SAPT believed that the councils in the 
area had given up supporting buses and as a result it was SPT who had to deal with the 
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Fastlink Scheme. Another reason for this lack of support could be due to local authorities 
experiencing spending cuts and reduced staff numbers in recent years. According to 
SAPT, it is much easier to get funding for tram and rail schemes in comparison to bus, 
partly due to their being a lack of support for the bus operators. The Chair of Strathclyde 
Bus Partnership also believes it is much easier to get funding for rail because it “…runs 
quite well and attracts people away from the bus”. However, this contradicts earlier find-
ings in the case study where it was found that SPT published a set of plans in the mid-
1990s for the reintroduction of trams in Glasgow but the parliamentary Commissioners 
ruled against the scheme and in turn the scheme was downgraded to the BRT Fastlink.  
Nevertheless, SAPT believed SPT were short staffed and “stressed” while prepar-
ing the scheme. SAPT suggested that “SPT are [run by] appointed members and coming 
up to elections they tend to listen to the people so they can get voted back in.” Instead, 
they suggested Glasgow City needs a stronger transport governance system in place like 
in Manchester. Other barriers highlighted by SAPT included a lack of internal expertise 
and the current legal framework in place. They also felt the bus operators don’t have 
enough staff to look at radical plans to put in integrated transport systems and SPT don’t 
have the full powers for regulation either. 
An interview with SPT revealed that the greatest barrier to making the scheme a 
success was “having the support of the bus operators and the public”. Therefore, they 
felt it was important to make sure the offer was right and demonstrated that the “vehicles 
would run reliably and all the things the passengers expect (good shelters, CCTV, safely, 
security, good information provided, both written and electronically at stops) was abso-
lutely key”. 
According to CPT, another barrier for the scheme was that “people didn’t fully 
understand the business case” and were unsure as to why they signed up to the scheme. 
Some of the operators had to buy new vehicles to operate the service due to the Euro 
standard that was required and to meet the new interior design criteria. Therefore, at 
different stages during the preparation of the scheme, there was “potential for someone 
to pull out because they didn’t understand the business case”. Meanwhile, CPT felt there 
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was a “love hate” relationship between public and operators until people understood 
overall what the scheme would achieve.  
An interview with SPT also highlighted other barriers associated with the scheme. 
These included an “image problem” and this is related to the “reliability and quality of 
services, cleanliness, smart ticketing etc.” of buses. In general, they believe local imple-
mentation is “challenging” talking between all parties involved “continues to be a chal-
lenge”. 
7.3.3 Theoretical analysis of Glasgow Fastlink Scheme 
In line with the theoretical analysis carried out on the questionnaires and telephone inter-
views, this section will also analysis the results obtained in the interviews carried out with 
representatives from the Glasgow City area on the Fastlink Scheme. The 10 variables of 
the decision support framework are used to analyse the results of the interviews and this 
in turn will help determine the barriers and enablers which have an impact on bus policy 
implementation. Furthermore, it will address the third research objective to help meet the 
aim of this thesis. 
 
1. Policy objective:  A written bus policy document should be in place, showing a 
clear link between policy objectives, measures and the setting and monitoring 
of targets. 
The Fastlink scheme included six key objectives in line with both national, regional and 
local policy considerations. Under the SQP scheme, a regime was developed to track the 
operation of the Scheme against key outputs and associated targets. However, a desktop 
review of such monitoring reveals the ‘Fastlink Route Performance Report’ published on 
28th October 2015 was the last time such monitoring took place and no further monitoring 
reports have been published since then. An interview with CPT revealed that a lack of 
monitoring is not only evident for the Fastlink Scheme, but also for other transport poli-
cies within Scotland. In particular, they felt that there is a lack of monitoring for the cur-
rent LTS, stating “someone needs to check what is done against the key objectives in the 
strategy”. They suggested the reason for this lack of monitoring comes back to the “avail-
ability of resources” and the money isn’t there to carry out such monitoring. Similarly, an 
 Chapter 7: Case study results 
   Page 185 
interview with CPT revealed that while the National Government set objectives, there is 
no strict regime in place to deliver these objectives and “…they don’t have to deliver 
them”. They suggested there needs to be a radical overhaul on how to deal with transport 
in Scotland and acknowledged that The Scottish Government, Transport Scotland, RTP, 
and local authorities are doing their bit but “…somebody somewhere needs to pull these 
together”. With regards the Fastlink Scheme, they felt the biggest problem is getting the 
buses through traffic congestion but there is a lack of realistic targets in place to help 
improve this situation. SPT also indicated other policies can get in the way of the success 
of the scheme. For example, a lack of packing restrictions at the QEUH delayed buses to 
and from the hospital and in moving through junctions nearby. As a result, both McGill 
and Stagecoach drivers stopped using the Fastlink bus lanes for a period during 2015 
when the hospital first opened. These barriers indicate that there was an unclear link be-
tween designing the policy, setting targets and implementing suitable measures to achieve 
those targets, and monitoring those targets for implementation of the Fastlink Scheme. 
 
2. Availability of resources: Resources such as financial support is important; 
however, where resources are limited, it is necessary to maximise the use of 
available resources. 
The Fastlink Scheme was successful in securing funding from the Scottish Government 
which included £40 million to deliver the core route between Glasgow City Centre and 
the QEUH. A further £3.14 million package of works was also agreed between GCC and 
SPT, to deliver bus priority measures and improved passenger facilities within Glasgow 
City Centre. An interview with Transport Scotland pointed out that they provided funding 
based on what SPT anticipated they would spend. However, an interview with SPT re-
vealed that there were in fact delays in obtaining this funding which then resulted in de-
lays with the delivery of the scheme. An interview with the Chair of Strathclyde Bus 
Partnership suggested this delay in receiving the funding was a key barrier to implement-
ing the scheme on schedule. However, they also pointed out the scheme was implemented 
quite well in comparison to other schemes in the UK where some bus schemes remain 
unfinished due to a lack of funding. Similarly, an interview with CPT suggested that with-
out the various bodies involved in the steering group, the scheme may not have been 
implemented. They believe there is an appetite to implement such schemes in the UK, 
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however a lack of resources is preventing the schemes from being implemented. They 
also indicated that without the Government stepping in to provide the funding for the 
Fastlink Scheme and the various resources in place to push the project forward, it would 
be impossible to implement the scheme.  
 
3. Intra-organisation support and communication: Policy staff need relevant 
training, supervision and support within their organisation when dealing with 
complex policy issues. 
While it would appear SPT were successful in delivering the Fastlink Scheme, the inter-
views revealed that there were barriers associated with intra-organisation support and 
communication. For example, an interview with SAPT revealed that SPT “don’t have the 
internal expertise compared to bus operators and the legal framework isn’t helping”. They 
felt the current framework in place isn’t working and the bus operators don’t have enough 
staff to look at radical plans to put in integrated transport systems. SPT also don’t have 
full powers for regulation which is also a key barrier for their organisation, especially 
when dealing with the complexity of the policy issues involved. Similarly, while SPT 
were the scheme promoter, they were dependant on GCC for implementing anything on 
the roadway since GCC are the roads authority. This highlights the importance of relevant 
training, supervision and support within their organisation. However, Stagecoach felt they 
were “quite fortunate to be dealing with SPT” because they didn’t experience any prob-
lems while working with them and felt that the staff at SPT were “very experienced 
transport professionals”. An interview with GCC also revealed that external consultants 
were employed to help SPT with several tasks to deliver the scheme, which highlights the 
importance of providing support when dealing with complex issues.  
 
4. Characteristics of organisations: Both formal structural features of organisa-
tions and informal attributes of their personnel (including size, competency and 
workload of staff). 
An interview with SAPT revealed that local authorities experienced big spending cuts 
and reduced staff and therefore had given up supporting buses in the area. They indicated 
that it was SPT who were then responsible for buses and the Fastlink scheme, however 
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the extra workload created stress for the staff. They also gave another example of where 
SPT received £288 million in funding for the upgrade of the Glasgow underground metro 
system, however “they only have one person” in charge of the project. An interview with 
SPT supports the opinions of SAPT because they highlighted that characteristics of their 
organisation was a barrier due to the “…size of the scheme the level of engagement with 
the public transport authority and the operators”. This would suggest that while SPT were 
successful in delivering the Fastlink Scheme, there were some key barriers which their 
organisation experienced in terms of the workload and limited numbers or capacity of 
staff to deliver the scheme. Meanwhile, GCC did not mention any problems associated 
with workload and limited staff which were raised by SAPT.  
 
5. Economic, social and political environments: Current and future economic, so-
cial and political environments play an important role on the outcome of the 
policy process. 
Economic, social and political environments play an important role in the Fastlink 
Scheme. From a political perspective, it was quite clear that the support was there and 
this is evident through the steering group led by SPT involved, which included support 
from GCC, Renfrewshire Council, Transport Scotland, NHS Greater Glasgow & Clyde 
and CPT. However, the interviews revealed that there were some concerns associated 
with the social environments surrounding the Fastlink Scheme. In particular, several in-
terviewees mentioned an image problem associated with using the bus. An interview CPT 
revealed that buses don’t get the same acknowledgement or support as rail and “…the 
balance is wrong somewhere”. Similarly, an interview with the Chair of Strathclyde Bus 
Partnership indicated that the biggest problem in Glasgow and the west of Scotland is the 
competition between buses and rail. They feel that rail “…runs quite well and attracts 
people away from the bus”. Therefore, they believe the Fastlink Scheme was a “bad idea” 
and isn’t of “…high quality in comparison to those kinds of schemes you see all over 
Europe”. They also felt the Fastlink “looks and feels terrible to use”.  
On a related note, SAPT highlighted a socio-demographic issue: in comparison to 
Edinburgh, where people with a wide range of incomes use the bus, wealthier residents 
of the east side of Glasgow tend to use the train over bus services. They also suggest 
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“people with lower incomes don’t complain and don’t know how to push it, whereas the 
people with higher incomes can make this push which is generally for rail”. Additionally, 
they believe that while recent studies show travel demand is expected to increase in the 
coming years, rail is in a better position for modal shift than bus. SAPT also pointed out 
other barriers associated with the social environments surrounding the Fastlink. For ex-
ample, they suggest the while most people can understand discussions about buses, there 
are a lot of “jargon words” used. They also feel that there is less press coverage on buses 
and the “bus operators and user groups are partly to blame for this”, indicating there are 
no informative Bus User Group in the Glasgow area. This suggests that these barriers 
could be avoided if there were active bus operators and user organisations to help encour-
age and promote good practice, and to represent the views and interests of operators who 
run the Fastlink service and passengers who use the service.  
 
6. Policy champions: Policy implementation should not be restricted to one policy 
champion and instead needs several policy champions who are responsible, 
competent and motivated to see the policy through from beginning to end. 
Policy champions played an important role in the Fastlink Scheme. It would appear it was 
SPT who were the influential drivers to implement the scheme, while the motivation and 
commitment from other champions were also very important. An interview with SPT 
indicated the importance of the relationship they had with the bus operators and felt they 
“couldn’t have made it work otherwise”. However, according to the Chair of Strathclyde 
Bus Partnership, the scheme would not exist without SPT’s involvement, stating “I doubt 
that local government would find it that big of a deal to go and spend £60 million on it”. 
They felt the local government would be in a position to improve bus corridors but would 
lack “technical and professional willingness to focus on that type of project”. According 
to Transport Scotland, they felt they had a good relationship with the steering group in-
volved and they “sought commitments” that the Fastlink would be running by the time 
the new hospital would be running and there were deadlines to meet. However, an inter-
view with CPT revealed that there were often “…heated debates but at the end of the day 
we shook hands and made it work”. It is therefore evident that policy champions who are 
committed and willing to work together on a project are crucial for implementation.  
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7. Bureaucratic power: Hierarchical control in an organisation is important; how-
ever, hierarchical power must not be used to overrule policy decisions by other 
members within the organisation. 
The interviews revealed that there were no issues associated with bureaucratic power with 
the organisations involved with the Fastlink Scheme. 
  
8. Collaboration and interaction between those involved in the policy process: Col-
laboration and interaction is necessary between key actors involved in the policy 
process, including policy makers, local authority staff, local and national gov-
erning bodies, regional transport partnerships, bus operators and transport 
practitioners working within the transport field. 
An interview with SPT revealed the importance of collaboration for the Fastlink Scheme. 
They felt collaboration with locals who supported the development, political buy-in, part-
nerships working with the public transport agencies (the roads authority) and the opera-
tors was “absolutely crucial”. They believed it was important to work together regularly 
and to “build support for what you are trying to achieve”. Similarly, they felt it was im-
portant to engage with the public, bus users and operating staff who were for and against 
what they were trying to achieve and so they “took time to plan appropriately”. SPT fur-
ther pointed out that they were “very thankful” to GCC for their support for the Fastlink 
while working closely with them. They highlighted key barriers such as the size of the 
scheme and the engagement with the public transport authority and the operators (in terms 
of making sure traffic lights were working appropriately and the services were in place) 
as “challenges” which may have prevented the scheme from being implemented. There-
fore, they suggested that collaboration between all parties involved is vital because “local 
implementation continues to be a challenge”.  
From a bus operator perspective, Stagecoach said they had a “good relationship” 
with the staff at SPT who were heavily involved in the project. They felt this in turn 
“prevented any misunderstandings or lack of action” and expressed personal relationships 
and the relationship between people who work for the operator and local authority is very 
important. Therefore, they felt this relationship was “part of what helped” the scheme to 
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succeed. Similarly, GCC felt a “…good partnership, hard work and determination to com-
plete the works by all parties involved including the staff from SPT, GCC, external con-
sultants, contractors and public utility companies” enabled the scheme to succeed.  
 
9. Policy remodelling: Limited changes to the policy should occur from the design 
stage right through to the implementation stage. 
Some changes were made during the implementation process of the Fastlink Scheme to 
alleviate issues that arose. According to SPT, public opposition was “inevitable” due to 
the size of the scheme and given the importance of the public to use the scheme, they felt 
it was “important to take their views on board”. Therefore, SPT made several changes to 
the scheme based on the feedback from the public to help improve the scheme. An inter-
view with GCC also indicated public opposition was a “primary barrier” and a number of 
amendments were made to the scheme as a result based on public exhibitions, presenta-
tions to affected housing associations, statutory consultation within the Traffic Regulation 
Orders (TROs) process, and councillor briefings.  
 
10. Opposition, conflict and ambiguities: Opposition, conflict and ambiguities are 
inevitable including public opposition, political power, local and national elec-
tions, conflicts between neighbouring authorities over budgets, bus wars and 
open-access to data by bus operating companies. 
It is quite evident from the interviews and a desktop review that public opposition was a 
key barrier for the Fastlink Scheme. Several newspaper articles online outlined this op-
position and suggested that delays meant that the improved journey times anticipated with 
the new bus lanes was not being realised (Daily Record, 2015). An interview with the 
NHS revealed that it was “extremely difficult” for their staff to get to work because of 
these delays. Furthermore, bus operators temporarily stopped using the partially-segre-
gated bus lanes in a dispute over hold-ups along the Fastlink route.  
According to Transport Scotland, the biggest complaint from the public was con-
cerns over the number of services running. They believed once the public were aware of 
these services, “public perception was good, people were happy and they like the new 
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buses because they are clean and tidy”. Similarly, an interview with CPT revealed that 
there was a “love hate relationship” between the public and the bus operators but this was 
a lesser barrier once the public understood what was being achieved. They mentioned this 
was particularly a barrier for the bus operations because “people on the buses complain 
to the bus companies, not the council”. However, they believe the bus operators overcame 
this barriers because of the huge increase in the number of buses to the hospital. In con-
trast to this, an interview with the Chair of Strathclyde Bus Partnership suggested public 
opposition occurred because some people thought it was a “…waste of money because it 
wasn’t a road they were building”. They believe the real issue was that SPT were “trying 
to make better bus priority of existing roads” and therefore this attracted opposition. From 
a bus operator perspective, Stagecoach mentioned that the public were concerned over 
the appropriateness of spending a large amount of money on a busway that is relatively 
lightly used. However, they felt these concerns were a less important factor in terms of 
Fastlink. 
An interview with SAPT revealed that a key barrier included a “lack of local gov-
ernment interest” and they believed politicians only tend to be interested in schemes that 
give publicity, for example road schemes for lorries and cars, not buses. They believe 
politicians prefer to fund things “where they can go cut a ribbon afterwards”. They also 
suggested there is a lack of political interest because “they don’t get opportunities like 
that for extending bus lanes and they don’t like to spend money like that.” Furthermore, 
they believe it is easier for politicians to get funding for tram and rail schemes in com-
parison to bus. However, they pointed out that leading up to elections, the politicians 
“tend to listen to the people so they can get voted back in”. This highlights the overarching 
impact of political power on schemes like the Fastlink.  
7.3.4 Summary of case study 2 
The second case study has examined the Fastlink BRT Scheme in Glasgow City. To help 
understand the success of the scheme, the barriers and enablers were identified by carry-
ing out a theoretical analysis using the decision support framework. Seven variables of 
the framework were useful in identifying the barriers to the scheme. Firstly, there were 
barriers associated with policy objectives. While the scheme included six key objectives 
in line with both national, regional and local policy considerations, there was little focus 
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on targets outside passenger satisfaction, speed and usage. Meanwhile, a monitoring re-
port was published on 28th October 2015 but no further monitoring reports have been 
published since then. It is therefore evident that there is an unclear link between designing 
the policy, setting targets and implementing suitable measures to achieve those targets, 
and monitoring those targets for implementing the Fastlink Scheme.  
Next it was found that the availability of resources was a barrier for the scheme. 
While SPT obtained funding for the scheme, there were in fact delays in obtaining this 
funding which then resulted in delays with the delivery of the scheme. Intra-organisation 
support and communication was also seen as a barrier where it was revealed that SPT 
“don’t have the internal expertise compared to bus operators and the legal framework 
isn’t helping”. Similarly, while SPT were the scheme promoter, they were dependant on 
GCC for implementing anything on the roadway since they are the roadway authority. 
Characteristics of organisations was also identified as a barrier when SAPT revealed that 
local authorities experienced big spending cuts and reduced staff and therefore were less 
able to implementing policies to support buses. They indicated that it was SPT who were 
then responsible for buses and the Fastlink scheme, however the extra workload created 
additional pressures for SPT staff.  
The framework also revealed economic, social and political environments as a bar-
rier to the implementation of the scheme. For example, the interviews revealed that in-
comes in Glasgow City are skewed towards the lower end of the scale. According to 
SAPT, “people with lower incomes don’t complain and don’t know how to push it, 
whereas the people with higher incomes can make this push which is generally for rail”. 
Those who live in the east side of Glasgow tend to use the train over bus services and this 
therefore suggests there is an image problem associated with using the bus and Fastlink.  
Another barrier associated with the scheme included policy remodelling where sev-
eral amendments were made to the scheme as a result based on public exhibitions, presen-
tations to affected housing associations, statutory consultation within the TROs process, 
and councillor briefings. A final barrier for the implementation of the scheme included 
opposition, conflict and ambiguities. A desktop review revealed that there were no plans 
for walking or cycling infrastructure included within the scheme design. This resulted in 
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public opposition and opposition from cycling activists such as a campaigning group from 
the Strathclyde area. Further opposition was seen when the Fastlink was still being con-
structed when the hospital opened in May 2015. This created difficulties for staff, visitors 
and patients travelling to the hospital, and therefore opposition occurred from residents 
because people were parking in the residential areas. Meanwhile there was conflict and 
opposition from the bus drivers who were concerned for the safety of people because 
there had been incidences of people walking along or off the side of the bus paths along 
the river Clyde. Finally, there was evidence of opposition, conflict and ambiguities when 
an interview with SAPT revealed that a key barrier included a “lack of local government 
interest” and they believed politicians only tend to be interested in schemes that give 
publicity. They believe politicians prefer to fund things “where they can go cut a ribbon 
afterwards” and leading up to elections, politicians “tend to listen to the people so they 
can get voted back in”. 
In contract to the seven variables of the framework which highlighted the barriers, 
three variables identified the enablers which helped to implement the scheme. First, pol-
icy champions played an important role in the Fastlink Scheme. It would appear that SPT 
were the influential drivers to implement the scheme, while the motivation and commit-
ment from other champions were equally important. Second, the interviews and a desktop 
review revealed that there were no issues associated with bureaucratic power with the 
organisations involved with the Fastlink Scheme. Finally, it was quite clear from the in-
terviews that the success of the scheme was a result of collaboration and interaction be-
tween those involved in the policy process. An interview with GCC pointed out that the 
collaboration between all parties involved was vital because “local implementation con-
tinues to be a challenge”. They also felt that a good partnership, hard work and determi-
nation to complete the works by all parties involved including the staff from SPT, GCC, 
external consultants, contractors and public utility companies enabled the scheme to suc-
ceed.  
Overall, the Fastlink Scheme appeared to be in a state of some flux from the design 
stage right through to delivery. From an early stage, SPT did not have from everyone the 
full support they needed to deliver the scheme. They lacked political support partly be-
cause not everyone fully understood the intentions of the scheme. SPT addressed this in 
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part by trying to make the scheme work as they went along. The design of the scheme 
was also problematic and this is particularly noticeable given part of the scheme has yet 
to be completed. These design problems resulted in delays and modifications such as 
those to accommodate walking and cycling while restrictions at the hospital created op-
position and reduced the effectiveness of the scheme. Meanwhile the distribution of fund-
ing for the scheme was also problematic. Although the funding was there, it was delivered 
in stages which created further delays. If SPT had the support and funding in place, un-
necessary problems which occurred during the implementation stage such as delays, 
could have been prevented. The state of flux could also suggest that there was a lack of 
guidance in place and there was insufficient planning to deal with many of the barriers 
that were faced as the scheme was being implemented. Many of the issues which occurred 
during the implementation of the Fastlink scheme could have been avoided if more plan-
ning and guidance were initially in place. 
7.4 Case Study 3 – Lode Lane Route Enhancement Scheme, Solihull 
The third case study examines the LLRE Scheme in Solihull, England. The following 
sub-sections include a case narrative, which will then help inform issues arising from the 
case, followed by theoretical analysis and concluding remarks on this case study. 
7.4.1 Case narrative 
The following sub-sections present a narrative of the third case study on the LLRE 
Scheme. A total of seven interviews were carried out with seven representatives who were 
involved in the scheme. These include representatives from Solihull Metropolitan Bor-
ough Council (MBC), Solihull Ratepayers, Transport for West Midlands (TfWM), Na-
tional Express West Midlands and Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) Plant. A list of interviewees 
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Solihull Connected Lead - Transport 
Strategy and Programmes 
2 1 
Solihull Council Lead Member - Capi-
tal Programme and LTP Chairman 
3 Solihull Ratepayers 1 
Secretary of the Solihull Ratepayers' 
Association 
4 
Transport for West 
Midlands 
1 
Network Development and Delivery 
Manager 
5 1 Bus Scheme Development Manager 
6 
National Express West 
Midlands 
1 Commercial Manager 
7 
Jaguar Land Rover 
Plant 
1 
Acting UK Transport & Planning 
Manager 
7.4.1.1 Lode Lane Route Enhancement Scheme Proposal 
On 29 January 2015, the Greater Birmingham and Solihull Local Enterprise Partnership 
(GBSLEP) announced the expansion of its Local Growth Fund with an extra £21.4m to 
be invested in the area between 2016 and 2021. While this Growth Fund was to be spent 
in later years, it also provided some opportunities to bring forward project expenditure if 
required. 
Meanwhile, Centro, West Midlands Passenger Executive, National Express West 
Midlands and the local bus operator were working together to form new ideas to improve 
public transport along the radial corridors into the town centre. According to TfWM, they 
carried out a series of bus network reviews across the region in the seven districts in the 
past eight years. They examined the local bus network and interventions to improve ser-
vices and change routes. Solihull was of interest because it has the most productive econ-
omy in the Midlands and includes important assets such as Birmingham Airport, the NEC, 
Jaguar Land Rover, Birmingham and Blythe Valley Business Parks and Solihull Town 
Centre. Solihull is also a central location on the national motorway and rail networks 
which provides access to key sectors such as automotive manufacturing, ICT, business 
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and professional services, creative industries and construction. Moreover, the Lode Lane 
corridor provides direct access to 12,500 jobs at Jaguar Land Rover and 19,000 jobs 
within Solihull Town Centre, including Solihull Hospital (Solihull Metropolitan Borough 
Council, 2015). 
Solihull MBC were at the early stages of preparing the LLRE Scheme at the time 
of the Local Growth Fund announcement. Although they submitted a detailed business 
case with a bid to GBSLEP, it was expected that funding for the scheme could become 
available sooner due to underspend within the GBSLEP’s Local Growth Fund programme 
for 2015/16. According to Solihull MBC (2015), the scheme “attracted a high level of 
interest from the GBSLEP’s funding team” and therefore the Council was encouraged to 
submit the scheme for early delivery. Subsequently, the scheme was put forward and a 
funding award of £1,790,000 was confirmed in April 2015 for delivery in 2015/16. Centro 
and National Express West Midlands also recognised the schemes potential and the bid 
was further supported by a £450,000 contribution from Centro towards scheme delivery 
and £1,800,000 contribution from National Express towards the replacement all of their 
buses on the route with brand new Euro VI standard vehicles. 
Since the scheme was brought forward, the detailed design, costing and procure-
ment had to progress simultaneously instead of sequentially. This resulted in further de-
sign work and consultation which identified the potential for bus priority and cycle im-
provements between Rowood Drive and Solihull Bypass. As these improvements fell out-
side the original scope of the scheme, it was proposed that they would be delivered as 
part of a later scheme phase. Therefore, it was proposed that the scheme would be deliv-
ered in two phases. 
The proposed LLRE Scheme consisted of corridor improvements along the B425 
Lode Lane corridor, between Hobs Moat Road and Solihull Town Centre, but with a par-
ticular objective of enhancing connectivity between North Solihull and the UK Central 
Hub area to Solihull Town Centre. The corridor carries approximately 32,000 vehicles 
daily and forms the busiest bus corridor in the Borough. It has a total of nine bus services 
operating along the route, providing a total of 32 inbound bus services per hour in the 
peak period and 28 bus services per hour in the inter-peak period. The B425 Lode Lane 
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is the busiest bus corridor in Solihull, however it is heavily congested. According to the 
Solihull MBC (2015), the route includes over 1600 inbound bus passengers between 
07:30 - 09:30, representing over 30% of total person trips into Solihull along the Lode 
Lane corridor in the AM peak. Meanwhile, the mode share for bus for trips into Solihull 
Town Centre has remained steady at approximately 17% in recent years, despite a con-
tinued downward trajectory in bus use across the UK, outside London. As a result of this 
congestion, the bus services experience significant delay, particularly inbound to Solihull 
Town Centre during the AM peak. A study by Solihull MBC (2015) shows that vehicles 
were experiencing more than 60 seconds delay per mile on the B425 Lode Lane corridor. 
These delays hinder the ability of the operators to run a service that is both competitive 
and reliable. Furthermore, it was expected that these delays would worsen in time due to 
further traffic growth.  
According to TfWM, the operators also identified key congestion points and in-
dicted that they would commit to improve services if the issues were addressed. They also 
highlighted that they had different reasons for implementing the scheme but shared the 
same objective. For example, the bus operators wanted to “save money” in the long term 
while TfWM wanted the scheme to be implemented “for the interest of the passenger”.  
Solihull MBC (2015) also carried out an exercise called ‘Traffic Master’ to forecast 
bus journey time savings along Lode Lane between a point 200m north of the Lode 
Lane/Dovehouse Lane junction and Poplar Road, Solihull Town Centre. Figure 7.7 illus-
trates the predicted bus journey time savings along the route (in blue).  
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Figure 7.7: Lode Lane predicted journey saving times (Solihull MBC, 2015) 
Meanwhile, several other issues were highlighted by Solihull MBC (2015) in their 
business case to GBSLEP. They indicated the B425 Lode Lane was the worst performing 
corridor in Solihull in terms of bus reliability (including punctuality) and journey time 
delay in the peak hours. This in turn caused journey time delay, affected expansion plans 
in the town centre and affected the attractiveness of public transport as a viable alternative 
to the car. There was poor accessibility in terms of bus journey times between North 
Solihull and East Birmingham Regeneration areas which in turn reduces access to jobs 
and services in Solihull Town Centre and other economic activity in the south of the Bor-
ough. The existing transport system was also unable to cope with increased traffic levels. 
They believed new transport infrastructure and services were urgently needed to assist 
with the delivery of the future Town Centre Local Plan and UK Central growth. An in-
terview with Solihull MBC highlighted the importance of taking advantage of national 
investment in the area and to exploit the role Solihull plays regionally. Therefore, they 
felt it was important to accommodate future growth by making use of infrastructure in 
place, reallocating road space and recognising that there is a corridor there for public 
transport which is “far more efficient than just trying to achieve that through cars”. Fur-
thermore, a new high-speed railway called the High Speed 2 (HS2) will be implemented 
in the coming years. This will include the development of the UK Central Hub Solihull 
(the Hub) and the creation of the first high speed rail interchange outside London. This 
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will bring new opportunities for economic growth in the area and therefore the LLRE 
Scheme is needed to assist with the delivery of the UK Central Hub area which proposes 
an additional 20,000 jobs and 250,000 square metres of residential uses around the HS2 
Interchange area alone.  
Further key benefits were also outlined by Solihull MBC (2015) for the proposed 
LLRE Scheme. For example, in the short to medium term, it was expected the scheme 
would enhance transport connectivity between HS2 Interchange and Solihull Town Cen-
tre. It would also improve public transport access into the town centre and Jaguar Land 
Rover, which would help unlock infrastructure barriers to realising Solihull Town Cen-
tre’s economic growth potential. The scheme also proposed to create 45 construction jobs 
and an additional 1,982 jobs in the town centre and Jaguar Land Rover, in addition to 137 
new homes. Meanwhile, it was predicted that further development of Solihull Town Cen-
tre would include a further 11.75 hectares of development with the potential to deliver 
7,400 more jobs and 263 more homes. Improved mobility could increase access to em-
ployment, education and leisure/retail opportunities, whilst giving employers access to 
larger labour markets and more customers. There is also the opportunity to improve eco-
nomic growth by attracting new business and increasing global competitiveness.  
The LLRE scheme was also predicted to play an important role in accommodating 
travel demand and buses are one of the most efficient movers of people and one of the 
only modes of transport that can rapidly accommodate increases in travel demand. The 
LLRE scheme also includes quantifiable benefits such as a decrease in delays at junctions 
along route and improved bus journey times and bus patronage. Non-quantifiable benefits 
include journey quality and ambiance and increase of physical activity and access to ser-
vices.  
Meanwhile, in the long term, it was expected the scheme would provide the initial 
stages of a future rapid transit corridor between these two strategic nodes. The scheme 
also forms part of the UK Central Growth and Infrastructure Plans (shared strategy for 
investment and growth between public and private sector stakeholders within the area) 
which will make a major contribution to economic growth in the LEP area (The newly 
West Midlands Combined Authority (WMCA) comprises of 19 local authorities and three 
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Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), which includes Greater Birmingham and Solihull 
LEP). This has the potential to triple the area’s contribution to LEP Gross Domestic Prod-
uct (GDP) by more than £14.2bn per annum by 2040.  
7.4.1.2 Scheme Preparation 
The LLRE Scheme would include new bus lanes along three sections of the road on the 
Solihull bound side only and use Lode Lane’s relatively wide carriageway to accommo-
date an additional traffic lane. The proposed sections of new bus lane are between: 
 Dovehouse Lane and Rowood Drive 
 Moat Lane and Hermitage Road 
 Keresley Close and Poplar Road 
 
The following infrastructure improvement measures were also expected from the 
LLRE Scheme: 
 introduction of a new bus gate;  
 new bus and cycle only lanes;  
 signals with priority green for bus movements;  
 optimisation of current timing at signalised junctions including provision of se-
lective vehicle detection (SVD);  
 enhanced cycle crossing facilities;  
 removal of red route clearway and replaced with red route carriageway mark-
ings;  
 improvement in crossing facilities to bus stops;  
 maintenance works to enhance highway assets along the corridor; 
 improved bus stop infrastructure including new shelters and RTPI; and 
 quality and frequency improvements to service numbers 957 and 71 bus fleets. 
 
Figure 7.8 illustrates the LLRE Scheme area and figure 7.9 contains the original 
drawings prepared by Atkins titled “Solihull MBC B425 Route Enhancement”.   
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Figure 7.8: LLRE Scheme area (Solihull MBC, 2015) 
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Figure 7.9: Solihull MBC B425 route enhancement (Solihull MBC, 2015) 
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In terms of the delivery team, Solihull MBC was the project sponsor but also un-
dertook the project management, detailed design, contract preparation and supervision of 
the scheme. A policy champion from Solihull MBC, who was the project manager of the 
scheme and lead contact, was responsible for undertaking regular project control meet-
ings, liaising with those involved with the delivery of the scheme, ensuring timescales 
and budgets were met and any issues were identified early. The champion also played an 
important role to try overcome obstacles such as local Councillors who were initially 
against the scheme and could not see its benefits. TfWM, formally known as Centro, 
supported Solihull MBC with data and provided bus infrastructure and bus shelters for 
the scheme. Atkins (a consultant) carried out the initial feasibility and preliminary design 
and worked with TfWM. Solihull MBC were proactive in engaging with JLR Plant and 
an interview with JLR indicated that they were “…happy to work with Solihull MBC and 
the National Express…” to encourage more bus usage. According to TfWM, it was a 
collaboration of partners that brought the scheme forward. At the delivery stage, Solihull 
MBC consulted with TfWM to help deal with customers and general queries along the 
way. They also helped with bus stop infrastructure and getting information out to bus 
operators about disruptions that would be caused with works. 
In order to achieve the benefits of the LLRE Scheme, it was proposed that the 
scheme would meet the following key objectives: 
 To contribute to a high quality public transport system in Solihull Town Centre;  
 To ensure a reliable and safe bus service;  
 To support the future and further growth of Solihull Town Centre;  
 To complement the emerging connectivity package at the Hub (including HS2) 
and Solihull Town Centre as part of the UKC Master Plan;  
 To provide quality bus access and interchange into Solihull Town Centre; 
 To improve connectivity from the East Birmingham North Solihull Regeneration 
Areas to Solihull town centre; and 
 To improve air quality. 
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These objectives have also been set to support local transport policy objectives. 
This includes related performance aims for 2015/16 set out in the West Midlands LTP3 
2011-2026 by Centro (2011), including: 
 Increase bus patronage by 5% from 2010/11 baseline levels by 2015/16 (July 
2013 annual results show 8% decline from base);  
 Increase the proportion of trips by public transport into the 9 Strategic LTP cen-
tres during the AM Peak by 50% by 2015/16;  
 80% of bus services operating between ‘1 minute early and 5 minutes late’ by 
2015/16; and  
 Improve access to employment. 
 
The LLRE Scheme also addresses 4 key ambitions of the bus policy document 
called ‘Transforming Bus Travel’ by Centro (2009) and entails: 
 Promotion of space-efficient modes of transport, including local bus services;  
 Smoothing traffic flows and improving journey time reliability for all users;  
 Promotion of low carbon modes of transport, including local bus services; and 
 Increasing public transport network capacity, including bus network capacity. 
 
It also aims to meet the bus visions as part of this document, including: 
 Reversing the recent decline in bus use, and then establishing healthy, sustainable 
increases in bus patronage are integral to the overall strategy if increased travel 
demand is going to be successfully accommodated; and  
 Buses are particularly important for local journeys into main centres. 
 
A feasibility study was carried out by Solihull MBC which identified three principal 
scenarios to assess the benefits of providing bus priority along the radial corridors into 
Solihull Town Centre. The three scenarios include do-nothing, do-something and do-
maximum. Table 7.10 illustrates the qualitative option testing was carried out on all sce-
narios. 
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Table 7.10: Qualitative advantages and disadvantages of the 3 scenarios (Solihull MBC, 2015) 









 Does not cause any disruption asso-
ciated with construction; 
 Maintains existing capacity levels 
for all traffic; 
 Maintains minimum crossing widths 
for pedestrians. 
 Corridor already exhibits high de-
gree of congestion during the 
peaks; 
 Does not offer a pilot opportunity 
to trial public transport measures 
as part of the UKC/HS2; 











 Offers a pilot opportunity to trial 
public transport measures as part of 
the UKC/HS2; 
 Provides significant journey time 
savings; 
 Minimal impact to other traffic; 
 Provides very high value for money; 
 Deliverable in one financial year; 
 Opportunity to provide holistic im-
provement along entire corridor; 
 Up to 7% modal shift onto bus. 
 Requires land acquisition at Soli-
hull Hospital; 
 Significant loss of trees and vis-
ual screening they offer outside 
Solihull Hospital; 
 Significant diversion of utilities 









 Offers a pilot opportunity to trial 
public transport measures as part of 
the UKC/HS2; 
 Provides significant journey time 
savings; 
 Opportunity to provide holistic im-
provement along entire corridor; 
 Up to 9% modal shift onto bus; 
 Likely to provide high value for 
money. 
 Requires compulsory purchase 
order at JLR; 
 Significant costs associated with 
diversion of 600mm water main; 
 A six lane carriageway outside 
JLR could cause problems for pe-
destrians; 
 Removal of off-carriageway cycle 
lane; 
 Relatively high capital cost; 
 Requires land acquisition at Hos-
pital; 
 Loss of trees and the visual 
screening they offer outside Hos-
pital; 
 Significant diversion of utilities 
outside Hospital; 
 Could not be implemented within 
one financial year. 
Based on the qualitative advantages and disadvantages of the 3 scenarios, the ‘do-
something’ option was the preferred way forward for a LLRE scheme. This option deliv-
ers journey time savings of up to seven minutes for bus passengers whilst delivering min-
imal detriment to other modes such as private vehicles. It ensures that all modes benefit 
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from the infrastructure changes, given it contains a fewer number of ‘dis-benefits’ than a 
more extensive ‘do-maximum’ scheme. Furthermore, it ensures value for money in com-
parison to the other options. The following table (7.11) presents the cost estimate for the 
do-something option: 
Table 7.11: Cost estimate for the do-something option (Solihull MBC, 2015) 
Cost heading Cost 
Design £125,000 
Construction £992,600 
Site supervision £99,260 
30% Optimism bias (construction) £297,780 
Utilities £1,100,000 
Land Acquisition £250,000 
Bus Investment £1,800,000 
Total £4,664,640 
 
When the LLRE Scheme was being proposed, the off-peak journey time along the 
route was 12.2 minutes while the AM peak period increased to 20.5 minutes. It was pre-
dicted the implementation of the LLRE Scheme would reduce the AM peak journey times 
to 13.7 minutes and in turn provide a reduction of 6.8 minutes per bus per passenger. The 
forecasted reductions in journey times on patronage are outlined in table 7.12. This table 
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ney time (minutes) 
Modelled patron-
age increase 
58 56.7 49.9 9% 
70 113.4 106.6 5% 
71 106.05 99.25 6% 
72 109.2 102.4 6% 
73 65.1 58.3 8% 
957 55.65 48.85 9% 
966 91.35 88.35 3% 
S1 15.75 12.75 9% 
Average Forecast Increase in Patronage 7% 
According to Solihull MBC (2015), the business case for the LLRE Scheme out-
lines the monitoring and evaluation process which is measured against the key objectives. 
It was proposed that Centro would liaise with the bus operators for data already available 
to avoid incurring additional costs. Meanwhile monitoring and data collection would be 
synchronised with wider Council data collection where possible and would be undertaken 
at regular intervals, associated with LTP and wider planning exercises. The scheme out-
comes are measured against the following data: 
 Existing bus journey times 
 Junction performance including queues at junctions where highway modelling in-
dicates measurable change 
 Cycle number survey 
 Bus journey time data 
 Environmental data 
 Existing patronage 
 Existing satisfaction levels (all modes) 
 
It is proposed that the evaluation for the LLRE Scheme would be assessed through 
the following three phases: 
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1. Data collection; 
2. Evaluation of collected data for technical assessment; and 
3. Benefit realisation. 
 
7.4.1.3 Scheme Outcome 
Several obstacles were experienced when the LLRE scheme was being implemented. For 
example, a dedicated right turn lane was required where there were concerns for the safety 
at a crossing where there were several lanes of traffic. There were also slight adjustments 
to the TRO at Ratcliffe House because residents objected to the bus lane affecting access 
to the frontage of their property. Furthermore, cycle lanes were removed which were orig-
inally planned to be included in the scheme. This in turn created opposition and particu-
larly negative perceptions around reallocation of road space, priority at junctions and im-
pact on traffic. To overcome these barriers associated with opposition, Solihull MBC car-
ried out consultations with local residents and ward members to assess the best options to 
deal with issues raised in petitions. 
The purchase of land from the nearby hospital was also required to complete the 
LLRE Scheme. Meanwhile, amendments were made during the scheme design where 
there was a proposal put to JLR for the transfer of some land adjacent to the highway for 
the scheme. However, they were unable to agree terms on the cost of the purchase and 
the transfer was rejected.  
Further obstacles were experienced when several structural defects were discovered 
during waterproofing of the canal bridge on Lode Lane as seen in figure 7.10. The bridge 
therefore required eight weeks of repairs which involved strengthening of the bridge from 
above as well as repair of a bridge beam from below. Solihull MBC were also required 
to replace trees which were removed along Lode Lane as part of this scheme. 
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Figure 7.10: Canal Bridge on Lode Lane (Solihull Observer, 2016) 
In June 2016, the first phase of the LLRE scheme was completed which included 
two stretches of bus lane located between the canal bridge and the junction with Rowood 
Drive and between the junction with Grove Road and Poplar Road. The second phase was 
completed in November 2016 which consists of a new bus lane on Lode Lane, between 
Moat Lane and Hermitage Road. According to TfWM, a major scheme similar to the 
LLRE would take approximately 2.5-4 years to implement, from inception right through 
to delivery. However, as the LLRE scheme exploited specific funding opportunities the 
scheme was delivered under two years. A total of £4.5m was invested, including £1.1m 
from Solihull Council and TfWM, £1.7m from Central Government through the Greater 
Birmingham and Solihull LEP Growth deal and £1.8m contributed by the National 
Express. 
As the LLRE scheme was implemented at the end of 2016, monitoring of the 
scheme is still being carried out. According to TfWM, there has been “… an increase in 
speed by around 6 minutes…” although they are “…trying to compare it as a percentage 
because it’s easier to quantify the improvements then”. TfWM also indicated that there is 
“…around 60% reduction in journey time but it’s still being monitored”. Therefore, this 
scheme can be judged a success because it is on target to meet its key objectives identified 
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in section 7.4.1.2, and to reduce congestion, improve connectivity, reliability and bus 
speed on the B425 Lode Lane corridor.  
7.4.2 Issues arising from the case 
The following sub-sections discuss the issues that arose from the case study in terms of 
design, existing bus policy document, policy targets, monitoring of bus polices and bar-
riers to implementing the scheme. 
7.4.2.1 Issues with scheme design 
A time limit to design the LLRE scheme was a key barrier for implementing the scheme. 
According to Solihull MBC there was a time limit that they had to work towards and the 
availability of local growth funding also had a time limit which meant they had to “pack 
a lot into the timescale”. However, this time limit can also be seen as an opportunity 
because Solihull MBC felt they worked well with the timescale and the scheme attracted 
funding which was matched funded with the LTP, local growth funding and contributions 
from TfWM. However, they pointed out that they would have preferred more time to 
design the scheme because there were a number of factors which affected the timescale 
of the scheme which meant design amendments occurred during the implementation stage 
of the scheme. An interview with Solihull MBC revealed that several modifications were 
required to address local concerns. For example, a dedicated right turn lane was required 
where there were concerns for the safety at a crossing where there were several lanes of 
traffic. 
Another key barrier discovered during a desktop review and the interviews was the 
need to purchase land for the scheme. For example, an interview with JLR revealed that 
amendments were made to the scheme design where the transfer of land was rejected, 
stating: 
“There was a proposal put to JLR for the transfer of some land adjacent to the 
highway for the scheme. However, whilst the business was amendable, it was 
not possible to agree terms on the cost of the purchase. The scheme was then 
amended.” [Interview 7] 
 Chapter 7: Case study results 
    Page 211 
A similar problem occurred when Solihull MBC mentioned that they needed to 
purchase land from Solihull Hospital, “…which went ok in the end”. They also mentioned 
that a local resident rejected the purchase of their garden frontage, stating: 
“We also had problems with one particular local resident where we had to buy 
some front gardens. The resident wasn’t going to play ball but we got over 
that in the end. We only found this out while we were doing the scheme.” 
[Interview 1] 
Meanwhile, an interview with Solihull Ratepayers Association indicated that they 
had “…mixed feelings about the scheme because the road doesn’t lend itself easily to put 
in bus lanes”. Therefore, they believed that the design team were required to “…fudge 
the road space”. They also felt congestion is still a barrier in the area, contrary to the 
findings by TfWM and Solihull MBC who indicated that the LLRE scheme alleviated 
congestion within the area. 
“The peak period tends to be coming in than going out. There is much more 
congestion coming in to Solihull than going out. There are cars parked in the 
residential areas for the last few years.” [Interview 3] 
7.4.2.2 Existing bus policy document, policy targets and monitoring of bus polices 
Both the interviews and a desktop review revealed that Solihull does not have a specific 
bus strategy. The latest transport document includes the ‘Solihull Connected Transport 
Strategy 2016’ and according to Solihull MBC this document includes “greater emphasis 
around the role of sustainable transport and public transport” for the area. The ‘Solihull 
Connected Transport Strategy Delivery Plan 2016-2036’ also discusses the proposed 
LLRE Scheme. A desktop review revealed that Solihull also does not have a LTP, how-
ever the area is covered in the ‘West Midlands Local Transport Plan 2011-2026’ and bus 
policy for Solihull is captured within this document. However, TfWM pointed out that 
the LTP is “…quite light on buses unfortunately”. At a regional level, the guiding strategy 
for the TfWM area is the Strategic Economic Plan (SEP), while the West Midlands Stra-
tegic Transport Plan, 'Movement for Growth' supports this SEP. However, TfWM pointed 
out that “there is nothing defined around the strategy” in relation to bus policy within 
these documents.  
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According to TfWM, the transport strategy in place accommodates the anticipated 
increase levels of trip demand. They believe it is “…very difficult to build in more road 
capacity and it’s probably not the right policy direction to build in new capacity for cars”. 
Therefore, they indicated that the philosophy taken for the LLRE Scheme was very much 
about maximising and optimising the use of existing road space. Thereby, they concen-
trated on the B425 Lode Lane corridor as having potential for intervention. This is due to 
the corridor having links to key growth areas and moreover the opportunity to improve 
the highways where there were “…dead carriageway and space that wasn’t doing very 
much, especially with high levels of peak congestion”.  
Although Solihull does not have a specific bus strategy, an interview with Solihull 
MBC suggested that it is very important to have some form of bus policy documents in 
place because it helpful for “…setting out the case for investing in the area”. They also 
suggested that there needs to be strong political leadership in place because there is often 
a “…lack of understanding around the policy…” and not everyone understands what the 
council is trying to achieve. Furthermore, they suggested having a political champion for 
local bus policy and early engagement with stakeholders all lead to success. 
TfWM also pointed out that there are other helpful mechanisms in place for imple-
menting bus policy. This includes a strong partnership with the bus operators through the 
bus alliance, which is an organisation which includes the bus operators and other key 
stakeholders such as district councils, police etc. They also indicated that TfWM have a 
group who “…effectively sets policy for buses…” but is not included in the LTP. How-
ever, a desktop review and the interviews revealed no further information on this group 
who set targets for buses. Interestingly, TfWM mentioned in the interview that they don’t 
feel a bus policy documents are as important as having an economic strategy in place, 
stating: 
“I don’t think a bus policy document is important at all. I think it’s really im-
portant to have an economic strategy because that’s the drive for schemes and 
I think too many transport planners focus on output around different modes. 
It’s about saving journey time and it’s all the means instead of the ends.” [In-
terview 4] 
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TfWM therefore believe it is most important in a regional context for the West 
Midlands area to have a SEP which sets out the growth agenda for the region which then 
“…filters down from a transport perspective what you need to deliver”. They believe this 
is “…far more important than having a bus strategy”.  
In terms of targets, the LLRE scheme did not set targets which it was required to 
meet. However, the modelled predictions outlined in table 6.12 could be construed as 
targets given the scheme was approved based on these predictions. According to Solihull 
MBC, they instead measure the outcomes of the scheme in terms of “increasing social 
and economic activity and the number of jobs in the town centre”. They also indicated 
that they work with TfWM to “identify priority in interventions” to put an attractive pub-
lic transport in place but they feel they are currently “not in a position” where they need 
to set targets. Meanwhile, TfWM pointed out that the bus alliance sets targets for the West 
Midlands region and the LLRE Scheme helps to meet these targets. However, these tar-
gets were set before the implementation of the scheme.  
The interviews revealed mixed opinions about the importance of setting targets for 
the LLRE Scheme. The Solihull Ratepayers Associations believe targets are important 
and that “…it’s not good enough them saying they don’t set targets”. In contrast to this, 
TfWM “…don’t think targets are the right way to go”. Instead they believe there should 
be less focus on delivering the means, stating: 
“We are just focused on delivering the means, but it’s all about the ends. I’d 
happily take a decline in targets and still have significant increases on patron-
age on some really important corridors where local residents have a really 
good bus services and have really good access to economic activity.” [Inter-
view 5] 
Monitoring appears to be an important component of the LLRE Scheme. An inter-
view with Solihull MBC revealed that they are required to show that they are achieving 
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outcomes10 and that they need to focus on monitoring and evaluation. They also men-
tioned that they will “…probably go through identifying a monitoring framework and 
report one year after its implementation”. Currently, the LLRE Scheme is largely moni-
tored through traffic flows and the National Express also carry out monitoring and pro-
vide TfWM with their data. According to TfWM, they have a “…good monitoring system 
in place” and can do comparisons with the data provided by the bus operators. This is a 
result of having “…a good relationship with the bus operators, particularly the National 
Express”. Meanwhile Solihull MBC pointed out that their transport team monitor bus 
patronage and they receive feedback from local members to pick up any problems such 
as where motorists are held up in traffic. There are also passenger champions who twice 
a year they do a survey on satisfaction which is then monitored. 
“We also have passenger champions who monitor and check on reliability, 
bus shelters and attitude of drivers. They do make themselves known to the 
drivers and they chat to the passengers to see how clean the buses are and if 
they are driven properly”. [Interview 2] 
However, Solihull MBC believe in general “monitoring and evaluation can have 
less focus” as soon as they move onto other projects. Instead, they believe monitoring and 
evaluation should be more focussed because “if you don’t monitor, you don’t know 
what’s working and so by monitoring it gives us a good indication of what we need to do 
with other schemes to make them a success”. Similarly, TfWM pointed out that there is 
a need for continuous monitoring in place, stating: 
“If we had this continuing monitoring in place, we would have been able to 
evaluate where things aren’t working and really target investment where we 
do know bus priority is working. We need to look at the bigger picture espe-
cially where things aren’t working and there is no opportunity to mitigate the 
problem or make it work better. It’s absolutely important for the success of 
new schemes like Lode Lane.” [Interview 4] 
                                                 
10 Outcomes are the end results that are achieved by meeting the objectives, whereas, targets are an indicator 
established to determine how successfully you are achieving the objectives. 
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TfWM therefore believe if stricter monitoring was in place, more schemes like the 
LLRE scheme would be implemented, stating:  
“Because we monitor the route, we were able to use it as an example for other 
places. There’s a lot of bus priority on the network that’s been in there a long 
time and it’s just not working. We will now start carrying out a review and 
collect evidence so I can say to colleagues and districts this isn’t working and 
I have a scheme where I can make it work a bit better and Lone Lane will be 
helpful in that regard.” [Interview 5] 
They also believe the scheme would be politically easier to implement which may 
in turn give them more support from local businesses, stating: 
“If stricter monitoring was in place, I think it might make some of the politics 
easier. We could do with more support from the businesses such as in Solihull 
town centre where they would benefit from it. I don’t think they are aware of 
this.” [Interview 5] 
TfWM also pointed out the importance of stricter monitoring to help review bus 
policy measures in place, stating: 
“Once you implement bus policy measures, it needs to be under constant re-
view. Its poor bus policy measures that perpetuate perceptions of bus lanes 
you get from the general public. If some bus lanes are on a network not doing 
much and not helping traffic, then we should be taking decisions because they 
shouldn’t be there in the first place.” [Interview 4] 
Other barriers were also identified in relation to bus policy. An interview with the 
National Express indicated that although a council can have a policy, decisions are still 
driven by local politicians. They believe that while there can be agreement about a bus 
policy, “the actual implementation of it is still down to one individual to decide whether 
it can happen” and find this “…frustrating”. TfWM shared a similar view and believe 
there is a “political issue” when it comes to long term plans and policies. They also indi-
cated that it is difficult to find someone in the council to translate policy into practise, 
stating: 
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“Even if the funding is available, it can be hard to find someone in the council 
so focused on delivering it. It’s easy say it but when it comes around to deliv-
ering it, suddenly it’s more difficult for them and I think it’s a challenge for 
them to translate some of those policies into practical schemes on the ground.” 
[Interview 5] 
TfWM also pointed out that there is an issue with the regulatory framework in place. 
They find it challenging to deal with policy where they don’t have control over bus 
measures whereby the bus operators have the control, stating: 
“Sometimes there might be a policy measure we want to implement. For ex-
ample, we are about to have an election for a new mayor in the West Midlands 
and some of the mayor candidates are saying they want to reduce fares. But 
we can’t reduce fares in policy because the fares aren’t in our control. That 
would be up to the operators. If we want to improve emissions we can’t do 
that either because they are not our buses. Same with WIFI.” [Interview 5] 
7.4.2.3 Policy Implementation and barriers to implementation 
A desktop review and all seven interviews revealed that public opposition was a key bar-
rier associated with the implementation of the LLRE Scheme. According to Solihull 
MBC, there were particularly negative perceptions around reallocation of road space, pri-
ority at junctions and impact on traffic. They believed this was linked to declining pat-
ronage around public transport and was unlikely to improve until the “…right infrastruc-
ture is put in place”. They also indicated that demonstrating the scheme would involve 
“…little or no material impact on general traffic…” and “…addressing local concerns…” 
were key challenges associated with the scheme. However, they identified that bus prior-
ity needs road space which leads to problems with residents and car users. They indicated 
that “car users especially don’t like hold-ups so with road space you can get conflict”. 
Therefore, they suggested there needs to be “…better engagement with residents…” and 
getting the public and stakeholders on board is equally important. TfWM shared a similar 
view and believed there is a negative perception from the public when bus priority is 
introduced, stating: 
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“There needs to be a change in mind set about buses. It doesn’t help that buses 
are privatised and people think bus companies just want to make money. 
That’s not the case and we have a very good relationship with them. There is 
a perception that we are just trying to help the buses make money. Actually, 
it’s for the public good.” [Interview 4] 
Several examples were provided during the interviews where public opposition was 
a key barrier for the implementation of the LLRE Scheme. Solihull Ratepayers Associa-
tion indicated that there was a lot of objections to cutting down trees and there were strong 
objections to getting access to various locations. For example, “…delivery vehicles 
couldn’t get into the car parks” of the JLR site and therefore the traffic lights had to cope 
with all that. Solihull MBC also pointed out that there were “…major problems with big 
businesses at Radcliffe House…” and there were objections to TROs to stop vehicles 
going into their properties. Therefore, Solihull MBC were “threatened with judicial re-
view…” but negotiated their way out of it. 
Meanwhile, Solihull MBC pointed out that there was particularly a lot of rejection 
from local residents due to the “…right turn into Bayfield Road and that also goes to a 
school”. They believe that “there is a need to satisfy local residents along the route…” 
especially to avoid objections when TROs are being implemented as this can “…cause 
great unrest amongst residents”. They also feel public opposition is the greatest barrier to 
overcome and people don’t like change or buses. TfWM also shared a similar view, stat-
ing: 
“I think anything you do will create opposition. If we change a load of bus 
services, 99% will see the benefits but the 1% will be the loudest. Sometimes 
you just have to accept there is going to be opposition and just have to carry 
on. People don’t like change.” [Interview 5]) 
TfWM also pointed out that they “…seldom get public opposition…” when they 
are consulting on a bus strategy but it mainly occurs when they are “…trying to imple-
ment the scheme”. This could suggest that there is a greater change of opposition when a 
scheme has been agreed or expected to be implemented, which reverts back to people not 
liking change.  
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Furthermore, public opposition occurred for the implementation of the LLRE 
Scheme as a result of buses having a poor image, stating: 
“It’s a massive issue in Solihull because in the south of the borough in partic-
ular, people are generally well educated and like to get involved in local is-
sues. Those type of people don’t generally use the bus. Those using the Lode 
Lane are generally coming from the north side which is quite deprived in com-
parison with low levels of car users and low levels of education. So public 
opposition was a massive barrier to us and that then manifested into political 
issues.” [Interview 2] 
To overcome these barriers associated with opposition, Solihull MBC carried out 
consultations with residents and ward members to assess the best options to deal with 
issues raised in petitions. They also indicated that it was helpful to be working with Soli-
hull MBC, stating: 
“We did find it quite challenging to get any bus measures in and around the 
region due to opposition. Working with Solihull Council was quite refreshing. 
They were keen to deliver it and could see the benefits of putting in bus lanes. 
We have a good relationship with the bus operators too.” [Interview 2] 
Time limitations to prepare the scheme were another key barrier and TfWM pointed 
out that they were under pressure to complete various stages of the business case such as 
stakeholder consultation, additional consultation, TROs and leading times for land acqui-
sition. They also indicated that having to complete these stages of the scheme at one time 
created problems. However, TfWM felt they were successful in meeting the timescale 
because the key stakeholders worked together efficiently, stating:  
“One thing that frustrates me, particularly working in a local authority envi-
ronment, there’s a lot of people trying to pull the brakes and we couldn’t do 
that so it was useful in getting the job done. We all had to pull together to meet 
the timescale.” [Interview 5] 
They also indicated that their time management can be an exemplar for other dis-
tricts who are planning to implement bus priority like the LLRE Scheme.  
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“I’m very much focused now on bringing forward schemes which are more 
quick-win, below five million and improving bus journey times and speed. 
Lode Lane has been helpful with that and it is proving to be an exemplar. I 
can now speak to other districts about maximising road space and try get seg-
regation in for buses without affecting cars and traffic.” [Interview 5] 
Reshaping or changes to bus policy during implementation also appeared to be a 
barrier for the implementation of the LLRE Scheme. TfWM pointed out that several 
changes occurred when the scheme was passed onto other members with different roles 
for implementing the scheme.  
“Reshaping or changes to policy do happen quite a lot when it comes to im-
plementation when you have a transport planner with a concept of a scheme 
and that might change from a design perspective with the highways team. That 
happened a lot with this scheme, where we would come up with the scheme. 
It would be passed on to the highways team and they would assume the client 
role and go in changing loads of things and it loses its scope. If there were any 
changes you would have to revert back to the client”. [Interview 4] 
Political support was another key barrier associated with the LLRE Scheme. TfWM 
pointed out that Lode Lane has more people using buses in the morning peak hour than 
there are people using cars. They believe it is important to show that the LLRE Scheme 
is about moving people and not traffic, and that they are trying to help or speed up the 
majority of those people during the peak hours in the morning to access employment and 
economic activity. However, they feel “people in general don’t like bus lanes and bus 
users are a voice that is not heard by politicians”. For this reason, they believe the biggest 
barrier to implementing schemes like the LLRE Scheme is “…political”. They indicated 
that, politically, bus priority is quite difficult to implement because it affects car users. 
Therefore, they believe there should be more of a desire to do smaller scale schemes like 
the Lode Lane bus priority and getting support from politicians is important. 
Solihull MBC shared a similar view and believe it is important to have a “…stable 
political administration because if you don’t, you could go from one scheme to another 
with different politics and different views of doing it”. Meanwhile, TfWM believe that 
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once the schemes are implemented, it is important to demonstrate that they are successful 
and to act as an exemplar to show that they are working well. They also feel that “there 
needs to be really strong enforcement of bus lanes that are kept under constant review” 
but political support is needed to help achieve that.  
A final barrier associated with the LLRE Scheme included priorities of staff. TfWM 
pointed out that at a local level, all local authorities have staff to deliver the scheme but 
“…too many authorities are delivering road schemes that benefit car drivers”. However, 
they feel that the support from the policy champion from Solihull MBC was helpful be-
cause they “…wanted to drive change”. They also highlighted the importance of having 
a political champion for the implementation of the LLRE Scheme, stating: 
“Lode Lane had a champion who could see the benefits of the scheme but it 
wasn’t without challenge because there were lots of local members who were 
against the scheme and couldn’t see the benefits. Too few politicians and de-
cision makers use the bus and that’s also a massive obstacle which is why we 
sometimes still focus on the wrong priorities. There is always funding and you 
just need the priorities right and political champion to do it.” [Interview 5] 
7.4.3 Theoretical analysis of Lode Lane Route Enhancement Scheme 
This section will analysis the results obtained in the interviews carried out with represent-
atives from the Solihull area on the LLRE Scheme. The 10 variables of the decision sup-
port framework are used to analyse the results of the interviews and this in turn will help 
determine the barriers and enablers which have an impact on bus policy implementation. 
Furthermore, it will address the third research objective to help meet the aim of this thesis. 
1. Policy objective:  A written bus policy document should be in place, showing a 
clear link between policy objectives, measures and the setting and monitoring 
of targets. 
A contributing factor to the LLRE Scheme was evident where those involved with the 
policy process shared the same policy objectives. While the bus operators want to save 
money, TfWM wanted to tackle congestion issues in Solihull and to improve connectivity 
for passengers. Therefore, those involved had different reasons for wanting to implement 
 Chapter 7: Case study results 
    Page 221 
the scheme but they shared the same policy objective for the scheme to succeed. However, 
there appeared to be some challenges in place to deliver the scheme and it was noted that 
it was difficult to translate some policies into practice because of a lack of political sup-
port to help deliver the scheme. The interviews revealed that although a council can have 
a policy, decisions are still driven by local politicians. Furthermore, while those involved 
can agree on a policy, the actual implementation of the scheme still comes down to one 
individual to decide whether it can happen. 
Both the interviews and a desktop review revealed that Solihull does not have a 
specific bus strategy or a LTP. However, bus policy for Solihull is captured within the 
‘West Midlands Local Transport Plan 2011-2026’ but according to TfWM, it focuses 
lightly on buses. Meanwhile, at a regional level, the guiding strategy for the TfWM area 
is the SEP, while the West Midlands Strategic Transport Plan, 'Movement for Growth' 
supports this SEP. However, it was discovered that there is nothing defined around the 
strategy in relation to bus policy within these documents. Therefore, while it is evident 
that there is a lack of bus policy documents in place to support the LLRE schemes, it 
would appear that the scheme was supported in terms of an economic development policy 
context, not specifically a transport or bus policy context.  
In terms of policy measures, there appeared to be issues around the regulatory 
framework which can have a negative impact of bus measures being implemented. For 
example, during the election for a new mayor in the West Midlands, candidates where 
wanting to reduce fares. However, candidates cannot reduce fares because they at that 
time did not have that control. Similarly, they cannot improve emissions or introduce 
WIFI because they don’t have control over these measures either. TfWM also pointed out 
that while they have a good relationship with the bus operators, the delivery of some bus 
measures can be a challenge due to a lack of direct control.   
A desktop review and the interviews revealed that LLRE scheme did not set specific 
targets which it was required to meet. Instead, the outcomes of the scheme were measured 
in terms of increasing social and economic activity and the creation of jobs in the town 
centre. Meanwhile, the bus alliance sets targets for the West Midlands region and the 
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LLRE Scheme helps to meet these targets. However, these targets were set before the 
implementation of the scheme. 
Monitoring also appears to be an important component of the LLRE Scheme. Cur-
rently, the scheme is largely monitored through traffic flows and the National Express 
also carry out monitoring and provide TfWM with their data to perform comparisons. 
Solihull MBC also have a transport team who monitor bus patronage and they receive 
feedback from local members to pick up any problems such as where motorists are held 
up in traffic. There are also passenger champions who twice a year they do a survey on 
satisfaction which is then monitored. However, while monitoring appears to be an im-
portant component of the LLRE Scheme, the interviews revealed that in general monitor-
ing and evaluation can have less focus when they move onto other projects and it is there-
fore important to have a strict monitoring regime in place.  
Overall, the Scheme appeared to be successful in setting scheme objectives, how-
ever the scheme does not set specific targets and some measures were difficult to imple-
ment. In contrast to this, monitoring of the scheme appears to be successful. Therefore, 
this indicates that there is an unclear link between designing the policy, setting targets 
and suitable measures to achieve those targets, and monitoring those targets for imple-
menting the LLRE Scheme. 
2. Availability of resources: Resources such as financial support is important; 
however, where resources are limited, it is necessary to maximise the use of 
available resources. 
In general, funding is a key barrier for the implementation of bus schemes because of the 
bidding process in place and recent cuts to council funding. However, it would appear 
that Solihull MBC maximised the use of available funding because while there was no 
one major fund available for the scheme, they were required to assemble funding from a 
variety of sources. Meanwhile, the availability of resources appeared to be an enabler for 
implementing the scheme due to an unexpected underspend within the GBSLEP’s Local 
Growth Fund programme for 2015/16. This meant Solihull MBC received funding sooner 
than anticipated and were required to spend it quite quickly. This in turn put pressure on 
Solihull MBC to be focused on delivering the scheme at a fast pace. On the contrary, the 
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delivery of the scheme may not have worked out so well if there had been less time pres-
sure on staff. 
3. Intra-organisation support and communication: Policy staff need relevant 
training, supervision and support within their organisation when dealing with 
complex policy issues. 
Intra-organisation support and communication were key components which helped to im-
plement the LLRE Scheme. The case study revealed that there was strong support and 
communication between Centro, West Midlands Passenger Executive, National Express 
West Midlands and the local bus operator. This was also evident prior to the LLRE 
Scheme when the organisations worked together for many years when they carried out a 
series of bus network reviews across the region. Therefore, this support and communica-
tion between the organisations involved may be because of having previous experience 
of working together. Further evidence of support and communication were identified with 
the bus operators through the bus alliance and this included collaboration between the bus 
operators and other key stakeholders. While there were many challenges faced during the 
implementation of the scheme such as public opposition, it was vital for the existence of 
support and communication between those involved in delivering the scheme. 
4. Characteristics of organisations: Both formal structural features of organisa-
tions and informal attributes of their personnel (including size, competency and 
workload of staff). 
Characteristics of the organisations involved in the LLRE Scheme appeared to be a barrier 
in the form of the workload with which staff had to deal. As the scheme was brought 
forward, the detailed design, costing and procurement had to progress simultaneously in-
stead of sequentially. Therefore, staff were faced with time limitations to prepare the 
scheme and were under pressure to complete various stages of the business case such as 
stakeholder consultation, additional consultation, TROs and leading times for land acqui-
sition. Other barriers associated with the characteristics of the organisations were raised 
during the interviews including competency of staff and priorities of staff. However, this 
case study has revealed a strong relationship between the operator, JLR and a policy 
champion at Solihull MBC which highlights the importance of having a good working 
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relationship within and out with their own organisation. This also highlights that both 
formal structural features and informal attributes played an important role in delivering 
the LLRE Scheme. 
5. Economic, social and political environments: Current and future economic, so-
cial and political environments play an important role on the outcome of the 
policy process. 
Economic, social and political environments played an important role on the outcome of 
the LLRE Scheme. At the time of the scheme being proposed, economic conditions were 
particularly helpful for developing the business and to demonstrate the expected impact 
of the scheme as a result of having the economic conditions which were in place. Solihull 
was of particular interest because it has the most productive economy in the Midlands 
and includes important assets such as Birmingham Airport, the NEC, Jaguar Land Rover, 
Birmingham and Blythe Valley Business Parks and Solihull Town Centre. Solihull is also 
a central location on the national motorway and rail networks which provides access to 
key sectors such as automotive manufacturing, ICT, business and professional services, 
creative industries and construction. The Lode Lane corridor also provides direct access 
to jobs at JLR, Solihull Hospital and within Solihull Town Centre. Furthermore, the new 
HS2 will bring new opportunities for economic growth in the area and will assist with the 
delivery of the UK Central Hub area which proposes new jobs and residential areas. The 
scheme also forms part of the UK Central Growth and Infrastructure Plans which will 
make a major contribution to economic growth in the LEP area.  
Social environments appeared to be a barrier for the implementation of the LLRE 
Scheme. For example, car users especially are a key barrier for implementing the scheme 
because there are some drivers who don’t like hold-ups and road space being taken away 
from them. Therefore, there is negative perception from drivers when a scheme like the 
LLRE Scheme is introduced. Meanwhile, there is an image problem with buses which 
was identified as a “…massive issue…” in Solihull. TfWM indicated that people living 
in the south of the borough are generally well educated and like to get involved in local 
issues. By comparison, they suggested those travelling on the Lode Lane corridor are 
generally coming from the north side which is quite deprived in comparison with low 
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levels of car users and low levels of education – yet they were less vocal than those from 
the south, even though they would benefit from the scheme.  
Political conditions were also another key barrier associated with the LLRE 
Scheme. This was evident when TfWM explained that Lone Lane has more people using 
buses than cars in the morning peak, however people fail to understand that the LLRE 
Scheme is about moving people and not modes, and that they are trying are trying to help 
or speed up most of those people during the peak hours in the morning to access employ-
ment and economic activity. TfWM believe bus users are a voice that is not heard by 
politicians and for this reason, they believe the biggest barrier to implementing schemes 
like the LLRE Scheme is political. They also indicated that, politically, bus priority is 
quite difficult to implement because it affects car users. Overall, the case study has re-
vealed that a lack of political support results in a lack of understanding around bus policy, 
uncertainty about what the council is trying to achieve and a lack of support to keep under 
constant review enforced bus lanes. Therefore, there is a desire to implement smaller scale 
schemes like the LLRE Scheme but getting support from politicians is vital. 
6. Policy champions: Policy implementation should not be restricted to one policy 
champion and instead needs several policy champions who are responsible, 
competent and motivated to see the policy through from beginning to end. 
A key policy champion from Solihull MBC played an important role in implementing the 
LLRE Scheme. Many of those interviewed could see this policy champion as responsible, 
competent and motivated and as someone who could see the benefits of the scheme and 
wanted to drive change. The champion was responsible for undertaking regular project 
control meetings, liaising with those involved with the delivery of the scheme, ensuring 
timescales and budgets were met and any issues were identified early. The champion also 
played an important role to try overcome obstacles such as local member who were 
against the scheme and couldn’t see the benefits. However, it would appear that the cham-
pion received strong support from those involved in the scheme and who worked at Cen-
tro, West Midlands Passenger Executive, National Express West Midlands and the local 
bus operator. Meanwhile, there was also support from passenger champions who twice a 
year do a survey on passenger satisfaction. 
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7. Bureaucratic power: Hierarchical control in an organisation is important; how-
ever, hierarchical power must not be used to overrule policy decisions by other 
members within the organisation. 
The case study provided limited evidence of hierarchical control or power within the or-
ganisations involved. TfWM revealed that several changes occurred to the scheme design 
when the scheme was passed onto other members with different roles for implementing 
the scheme. For example, the highways team “…assumed the client role…” and therefore 
they had the power to make changes or control other changes which occurred during the 
scheme”. However, it is not known from the data collected for this case study if changes 
by the highways team had an impact on the scheme.  
8. Collaboration and interaction between those involved in the policy process: Col-
laboration and interaction is necessary between key actors involved in the policy 
process, including policy makers, local authority staff, local and national gov-
erning bodies, regional transport partnerships, bus operators and transport 
practitioners working within the transport field. 
Collaboration and interaction between the key actors involved in the LLRE Scheme were 
important factors for implementing the scheme. This was evident prior to the initial 
scheme proposal where Centro, West Midlands Passenger Executive, National Express 
West Midlands and the local bus operator were working together to develop new ideas to 
improve public transport along the radial corridors into the town centre. Following the 
decision to implement the scheme further collaboration and interaction between the key 
actors involved was identified. For example, TfWM supported Solihull MBC with data, 
Atkins worked with TfWM on the initial feasibility and preliminary design, Solihull MBC 
were proactive in engaging with JLR about their site and the National Express shared 
their data with Centro to carry out monitoring and evaluation of the scheme which in turn 
avoided incurring additional costs. Solihull MBC also collaborated with TfWM to help 
deal with customers and general queries along the way. This case study therefore revealed 
the importance of collaboration and interaction between the key actors involved to deliver 
the scheme. 
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9. Policy remodelling: Limited changes to the policy should occur from the design 
stage right through to the implementation stage. 
A number of changes occurred during the implementation of the LLRE Scheme and this 
in turn created challenges. Changes included the removal of cycle lanes, repairs to the 
canal bridge on Lode Lane and adjustments to the TRO at Ratcliffe House. Meanwhile a 
proposal was put to JLR for the transfer of some land adjacent to the highway for the 
scheme, however they could not agree terms on the cost of the purchase and the scheme 
was therefore amended. Reshaping or changes to bus policy during implementation was 
also identified as a barrier when the scheme was passed onto other members with different 
roles during the implementation process. For example, when the transport planner has a 
different concept of the scheme and this then gets changed by the highways team with a 
different concept from a design perspective. These changes resulted in delays for deliv-
ering the scheme and are therefore identified as barriers which hindered the success of 
the scheme.  
10. Opposition, conflict and ambiguities: Opposition, conflict and ambiguities are 
inevitable including public opposition, political power, local and national elec-
tions, conflicts between neighbouring authorities over budgets, bus wars and 
open-access to data by bus operating companies. 
Public opposition was identified as one of the key barriers associated with the implemen-
tation of the LLRE Scheme. Although Solihull MBC could demonstrate that the scheme 
would involve little or no material impact on general traffic, there was still opposition 
from the public. This opposition was associated with cutting down trees, getting access 
to various locations and TROs to stop vehicles going into properties of residents. There-
fore, public opposition was identified as a major barrier for the implementation of the 
LLRE Scheme and created unrest amongst residents. To overcome these barriers associ-
ated with opposition, Solihull MBC carried out consultations with local residents and 
ward members to assess the best options to deal with issues raised in petitions.  
In terms of political power, it was noted that too few politicians and decision makers 
use the bus and this can create a massive obstacle as they are focused on the wrong pri-
orities. Nonetheless, given the success of the LLRE Scheme it would appear there was 
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enough political power to help deliver the scheme. Therefore, political power is a key 
component which can influence schemes such as the LLRE Scheme. It would also appear 
that there were no real concerns related to bus wars or open-access to data by bus operat-
ing companies for the implementation of the LLRE Scheme. Instead, it was apparent that 
the National Express were helpful in sharing data with Centro to carry out monitoring and 
evaluation of the scheme. Meanwhile conflicts between neighbouring authorities over 
budgets did not appear to be a barrier for the implementation of the LLRE Scheme. Alt-
hough TfWM discussed the bidding process in place and the importance of winning bids 
to implement schemes like the LLRE Scheme, the interviews did not reveal any conflicts 
between neighbouring authorities over budgets. 
7.4.4 Summary of case study 3 
The third case study has examined the LLRE Scheme in Solihull. To help understand the 
success of the scheme, the barriers and enablers were identified by carrying out a theo-
retical analysis using the decision support framework. Six variables of the framework 
identified the barriers to the scheme which include policy objectives, characteristics of 
organisations, social and political environments, bureaucratic power and policy remodel-
ling. In contract to these six variables of the framework, four variables identified the en-
ablers which helped to implement the scheme. These include the availability of resources, 
a policy champion, intra-organisation support and communication and collaboration and 
interaction between those involved in the policy process. Overall, the LLRE scheme 
proves to be an exemplar of successful bus policy implementation.  
7.5 Case Study 4 – ABC Scheme, Dundee City 
The fourth and final case study examines the ABC Multi-Operator Smart Ticketing 
Scheme, Scotland. The following sub-sections include a case narrative, which will then 
help inform issues arising from the case, followed by theoretical analysis and concluding 
remarks on this case study. 
7.5.1 Case narrative 
The following sub-section presents a narrative of the fourth case study on the ABC Multi-
Operator Smart Ticketing Scheme in Dundee. A total of five interviews were carried out 
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with eight representatives who were involved in the scheme. These include representa-
tives from Xplore Dundee, Stagecoach, Dundee City Council (DCC), Transport Scotland 
and Tactran. A list of interviewees and their role can be seen in table 7.13 below.  




Role of participant in 
organisation 
1 
National Express Xplore Dundee - 




2 Stagecoach East Scotland 1 Project Manager 
3 Dundee City Council 1 
Sustainable Transport 
Team Leader 
4 Transport Scotland 2 
Head of Concession 
Travel & Integrated Tick-
eting, 
5 Tactran 1 
Non-Councillor Member 
of Partnership Board 
7.5.1.1 Smart ticketing and voluntary partnership agreements (VPA) 
Smart ticketing is an important element of a modern public transport system. The Inte-
grated Transport Smartcard Organisation (ITSO) supplies smart ticketing to transport au-
thorities and bus operators and provides specification to deliver smart, integrated and in-
teroperable ticketing across Great Britain. An ITSO smartcard is an electronic travel ticket 
which can be loaded onto a micro-chipped smartcard or mobile phone which then allows 
passengers of public transport to seamlessly hop on and off buses, trams or trains without 
having to use cash or a purchasing a paper ticket (ITSO, 2017). According to Transport 
Scotland (2012) all 7,100 buses in Scotland are equipped with ITSO smart ticket ma-
chines and were installed between 2006 and 2010.  
In 2011, a study was commissioned by Transport Scotland to help improve policy 
towards smart and integrated ticketing. As part of the study, PricewaterhouseCoopers 
LLP (PwC) produced an Outline Business Case (OBC) for smart & integrated ticketing 
in Scotland. The OBC indicated that there were fundamental uncertainties around the 
achievability of benefits for smart and integrated ticketing. Furthermore, it was found that 
the bus operators had shown limited appetite for discussions about integrated ticketing. 
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Other concerns with smart ticketing were also highlighted by ITSO (2017) and they indi-
cated that the original equipment on buses have a credible lifespan of at least 5 years and 
therefore will need to be replaced. The equipment also does not contain dual readers 
which means they cannot read EMV (contactless bank cards). Meanwhile, bus operators 
have expressed some concerns about the quality and speed of repairs by suppliers. 
To help deal with the issues associated with smart ticketing, the “2012 Smart Tick-
eting Delivery Strategy” was published by Transport Scotland, (and which is currently 
under review). The objective of this document was to bring all interested parties up to a 
common level of understanding around smart ticketing, in non-technical language, and to 
stimulate interest, discussion and feedback. This in turn would help meet the long-term 
vision for all journeys on buses in Scotland to have form of smart ticketing. The strategy 
highlights they key benefits of smart ticketing which include: 
For Passengers: 
 Ease of use 
 Access to new ticket types 
 Greater choice on how to pay for travel 
For Operators: 
 Less cash handling 
 Greater information about customers 
 Greater marketing opportunities 
 Revenue protection 
 Potential for increased patronage 
 Quicker boarding times 
 Ability to develop new ticket products 
For Society: 
 Modal shift to public transport 
 Perception of a more modern public transport network 
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However, since the bus sector is a deregulated market in the UK (outside of Lon-
don), bus operators are not legally required to introduce smart ticketing. There is also no 
existing legislation covering smart ticketing, however, there is legislation which enables 
the creation of regional ticketing schemes on buses. Section 28 of the Transport (Scot-
land) Act 2001 gives local authorities a duty to determine ticketing arrangements for local 
bus services in their area. If those arrangements are not made, the local authority has a 
duty to seek to secure the agreement of those services. If the local authority is unable to 
secure that agreement, section 29 of the same Act indicates that the local authority, or two 
or more local authorities, may introduce a ticketing scheme if it was of interest to the 
public and enabled them to implement their relevant general policies (Transport Scotland, 
2012).  
There are several ticketing schemes implemented across Scotland such as Zonecard 
in west central Scotland and the Grasshopper scheme in Aberdeen and Aberdeenshire. 
However, these schemes came about on a voluntary basis and did not require the use of 
the provisions in the 2001 Act, nor has any other scheme used these powers. Meanwhile, 
the governance arrangements for these schemes are also based on VPA between those 
involved. (Transport Scotland, 2012).  
A VPA is a written agreement that would be entered into by the local authorities 
and local bus operators. In a VPA, local authorities would commit to providing infrastruc-
ture like priority lanes, stops and interchanges and negotiate arrangements for use of that 
infrastructure. Meanwhile, the bus operators would meet this with commitments on vehi-
cle standards, maximum fares, frequencies and timings. 
Bus operators have also developed their own smart ticketing offerings. For exam-
ple, Stagecoach introduced ITSO smart ticketing across their entire network of services 
in Scotland while in 2002, Lothian Buses introduced smart ticketing, although it is a pro-
prietary system and therefore not interoperable with other schemes. In March 2016, Scot-
land’s five largest bus operators (Stagecoach, First, Lothian Buses, McGills and Xplore 
Dundee) also made a series of commitments to the Transport Minister to introduce smart 
ticketing. A key reason for these commitments was due to the lack of a multi-operator 
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ticket which was hindering modal shift, hence why the government felt it was important 
to introduce smart ticketing.  
7.5.1.2 ABC Scheme proposal 
On the 18th March 2017, bus operators across Scotland outlined their commitment to de-
liver multi-operator smart ticketing for millions of Scottish bus customers. All major op-
erators in the UK had previously made a commitment to various government bodies that 
in conjunction with their own commercial products (which are delivered by smart format) 
to seek and deliver several products with a view to make it easier for people to travel in a 
multi-operator environment. This commitment was made in the UK at a ministerial level 
in England while a similar commitment was made in Scotland by Transport Scotland. 
The All Bus Companies (ABC) scheme was proposed for Dundee which allows 
passengers to travel across Dundee and the surrounding areas with one smart ticket. This 
scheme was one of several pilot schemes as part of Transport Scotland’s vision to intro-
duce smarter travel across Scotland. The three other pilot schemes include the Grasshop-
per in Aberdeen, with further schemes proposed for Edinburgh and Glasgow. The ABC 
scheme was therefore proposed as one of Scotland’s first smart multi-operator travel 
schemes which would be launched across the North East of Scotland by a VPA between 
local bus operators and local authorities, with support from Transport Scotland, as a 
means of introducing smarter travel. The VPA involved the councils for Dundee, Angus 
and Fife, Stagecoach, Moffet Williamson and National Express Xplore Dundee. The 
launch of ABC would also be part of a country-wide scheme which aims to pave the way 
for seamless travel between bus, rail, ferry and subway. Figure 7.11 illustrates the ABC 
scheme and its boundaries within the Dundee area.  
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Figure 7.11: ABC Scheme and boundaries (Stagecoach, 2017) 
According to Stagecoach, the ABC was a good starting point to carry out a pilot 
study because there is a reasonably small number of operators with a good operating en-
vironment in place and the city is isolated in terms of the zones involved. Therefore, 
Dundee was an ideal pilot before moving to “more challenging environments” in Glasgow 
and Edinburgh which are bigger cities.  
The ABC Scheme was partly introduced because the Transport Minister at the time 
said he wanted to see more smart ticketing and the bus operators in the industry working 
together more closely. However, if the operators in Dundee were unable to launch smart 
ticketing, Transport Scotland would design a scheme themselves and therefore National 
Express took the lead on the ABC Scheme. National Express also had the technology in 
place which facilitated them to work with Stagecoach to develop multi operator smart 
ticketing. 
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In terms of the costs, the scheme is funded predominantly by the private sector and, 
according to National Express, the costs were only marginal for the operators in Dundee 
to deliver the scheme. Meanwhile the back office which covers the country required sub-
stantial investment and cost millions of pounds. National Express pointed out that the 
smart environment is built around a banking standard at back office which is very 
weighty, very specification driven and extremely secure so the transactions associated 
with delivering a smart product are encoded almost identically to how transactions in the 
banking environment are encoded. There is also a double level of security applied to a 
simple transaction which requires a number of ‘keys’ to translate them. This in turn cost 
approximately 10 million pounds but once the back office was built, the roll out for the 
ABC Scheme and other smart ticketing schemes are relatively marginal. 
The implementation of the ABC Scheme required internal efforts and time as op-
posed to financial investments. Most of the staff time was required by the bus companies. 
In terms of technical costs, the bus operators already had the ticket machines in place 
while Stagecoach and National Express had smart cards in place. However, Moffet and 
Williamsons were required to invest in smart cards which cost one pound each. Further 
costs included £25,000 on marketing and the launch of the new product, which was 
funded by the partners involved.  
The low costs were one of several motivations to implement the scheme. Another 
motivation for the scheme was that it could be expanded on the market which is called 
the “near-market” by making it easier for people to travel on buses by breaking down the 
barriers in terms of a lack of product knowledge so people had an understanding of which 
bus operator “owns” the tickets and which bus they can use the different tickets on. It also 
gives a simple option of having one ticket so passengers do not have to worry about which 
bus to use. Therefore, the simple concept of the ABC Scheme was to enable people to use 
tickets on “all the buses” in Dundee.  
7.5.1.3 ABC Scheme preparation 
The ABC Scheme offers passengers unlimited travel, every day and is valid on all bus 
company routes across Dundee and the surrounding areas. It includes an electronic ticket 
in the form of a plastic card with an embedded microchip that stores the travel tickets. 
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The ABC ticket can be purchased from any bus driver from the start of journey or it can 
be loaded onto current smartcards such as the Stagecoach card, Xplore Dundee Discover 
card, Moffat and Williamson card, National Entitlement card and Young Persons or Kidz 
card. The passenger can also purchase a new smart card from the driver when boarding 
the bus, Dundee bus station or the travel shop on Commercial Street. The smartcards are 
free of charge, re-usable and can be loaded on the bus with smart tickets including ABC 
Day or ABC Week passes. 
Once the smartcard is purchased, it is placed on the ticket reader of the bus and the 
driver is informed of which ABC ticket type is required to be loaded onto the smartcard 
by the passenger. This is the same procedure for the renewal of tickets where the driver 
can load the required ticket type into the smartcard in exchange of the cost for the chosen 
ticket type. Tickets can also be renewed at Xplore Dundee travel shop or the Stagecoach 
travel shop at the bus station. Child tickets are valid for customers aged 5-15 years old 
and children under 5 travel for free on all bus services. The ABC ticket types are provided 
in table 7.14.   
Table 7.14: ABC multi-operator ticket types (XPlore Dundee, 2016) 
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Schedule 6 of ABC ticketing agreement indicates the steps to be taken for revenue 
distribution. The smartcard sales made by each participating bus operator each month are 
recorded through each operator’s electronic ticketing machine systems. One hundred per-
cent of the total revenue collected from the smartcards by each operator is paid to the 
Scheme Administrator (DCC). The administrators analyse the data on how the tickets 
have been used and the revenue is then distributed among the participating operators 
based on the sum patronage as recorded by the operators. According to National Express, 
“…it works very well”.  
7.5.1.4 ABC Scheme outcome 
According to National Express, the scheme took 18 months of planning, preparation and 
testing of the system before it was implemented. There were also discussions on the lo-
gistics and meetings between Transport Scotland, the councils and local bus operators on 
how the scheme would work for the customer. However, the scheme encountered several 
delays which were raised during the interviews. National Express pointed out that there 
were delays in getting the balance right between Scottish laws and English laws when 
making contracts with the lawyers and legal team for the scheme. The scheme was also 
delayed by a couple of months caused by an issue in the secure access modules which sit 
inside the ticket machines, the equivalent to a sim card in a mobile phone. Also, config-
uration issues were encountered with these machines and there were problems with the 
hardware of the software and hardware of the computer.  
On 12 September 2016, bus passengers could purchase the ABC multi-operator 
tickets which brought convenience to bus passengers across the whole of Dundee and 
surrounding areas. Since the launch of the scheme, DCC carry out regular analysis of the 
number of passenger journey trips per month. On average, there have been 30,000 pas-
senger journey trips on smart tickets a month, which is 2% of the total trips made by bus 
in the Dundee area. DCC also pointed out that during the first few months of the scheme 
being implemented, there was growth in the sale of smart tickets. However, since August 
2017, the sale of smart tickets has plateaued. Therefore, further marketing has been pro-
posed to help improve smart ticket sales.  
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In terms of monitoring, there is no contract between Transport Scotland and the bus 
operators. However, Transport Scotland pointed out that there is an understanding and 
agreement with smart zone cities to carry out monitoring and to provide updates about 
the state of these projects as they are implemented, followed by monthly statistics on the 
schemes performance. It is also in the early stages of implementation and therefore re-
quires more time to collect data required to monitor.   
Given the success of the ABC Scheme, it is proposed that the ABC Scheme will be 
extended into Angus, Perth, Kilross and Fife. A bid has been placed as part of the Tay 
Cities Deal to extend the scheme and if the bid is successful, there will be potential for 
other bus operators to join Moffet and Williamson, Stagecoach and Xplore Dundee to 
operate the scheme. This in turn will support the objectives of the Tay City deal by sup-
porting economic growth for the long-term unemployed progressing into employment 
and improving access to training and job opportunities as well as social activities. 
Phase one of the ABC Scheme is now completed, which involved the implementa-
tion of the ABC smart ticketing in Dundee City and the surrounding area. Phase two is 
currently being proposed which would extend the scheme to Angus, Perth, Kilross and 
Fife. Phase three would extend the use of the ABC smart ticketing to students and Stage 
four would introduce specialist products such as EMV contactless technology. However, 
there have been delays with progressing into phase two which was originally proposed to 
begin in March 2017 due to local elections being announced. This was followed by a 
national election and no decisions or approvals have since been made on progressing with 
phase two of the scheme.  
7.5.2 Issues arising from the case 
The following sub-sections discuss the issues that arose from the case study in terms of 
design, existing bus policy document, policy targets, monitoring of bus polices and bar-
riers to implementing the scheme. 
7.5.2.1 Issues with scheme design 
Many barriers were associated with the design of the ABC Scheme and this was inevitable 
as Dundee were the first in the urban network and Scotland to start from scratch and build 
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a smart ticketing scheme. Transport Scotland pointed out key issues associated with the 
scheme design which resulted in the scheme being delayed. Firstly, they indicated that 
prior to the scheme, there was a lack of stakeholder buy-in and felt they could have done 
more to get them involved and have their support. Secondly, they highlighted that relying 
on bus operators and their resources caused delays, stating: 
“Also, we underestimated the length of time it takes for technical upgrades to 
the operators’ estates so we have learnt from that. Obviously, you are relying 
on bus operators and their resources and if something happens at a bus depot 
then it’s all hands on deck and they’re not working on your project so it’s 
about building contingency into your plans for these types of events. [Inter-
view 4] 
There also appears to be an issue with the information about the scheme provided 
online. An interview with Tactran revealed that the information provided on the DCC 
website, Stagecoach website and the Travel Dundee website described the ABC differ-
ently and therefore appeared confusing for someone looking for information about the 
scheme. It was also pointed out in the previous section (7.7.1.4) that further marketing 
has been proposed to help improve smart ticket sales. This appears necessary as DCC 
revealed that many people have not heard about the ABC scheme and therefore requires 
further marketing and advertising. They also suggested that Stagecoach promoted the 
scheme very well but National Express failed to promote the scheme when it was 
launched, stating:  
“Xplore Dundee haven’t promoted it very well. The website doesn’t promote 
it very well and there’s limited advertising on the bus. They have over 100 
buses and I’ve been on buses where there’s nothing to tell the passenger about 
the ABC. That is disappointing and I feel they are letting everyone else down 
with this lack of advertisement. It’s not our place to make them do it and I can 
only complain.” [Interview 5] 
It would appear that further improvements are needed for the design to make the 
ABC ticket product more attractive for passengers. For example, intermodal transporta-
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tion could enable more passengers to avail of the ABC smart ticket product if it was in-
terlinked with other modes such as rail. However, National Express pointed out that while 
there are talks about intermodal, “…it’s a long way down the line in terms of how it is 
perceived and how it works”. They also suggested the scheme design could improve with 
the inclusion of contactless, stating: 
“Contactless is the way forward and a lot of other places at looking at. Smart 
is going to be around for a long time and so there is a lot of discussion on 
contactless. But who pays for the administration of that scheme is where a lot 
of the problems are”. [Interview 1] 
Several issues were also associated with the vending machines required for the 
smart cards. This included an issue in the secure access modules which sits inside ma-
chines and also configuration issues with the machines. National Express also pointed out 
that a lot of the problems were to do with the hardware of the software and hardware of 
the computer, stating: 
“Uploading a sheer amount of codes and staffs from a load of different prod-
ucts took such a long time to upload. One of the requirements was that it must 
be able to take every smart card in the UK so every machine is enabled to take 
a smart card. For example, it should be possible for someone with Cornish 
smart card to come on and buy one of our products on our vehicle as part of 
the compliance for this smart ticketing.” [Interview 1] 
National Express further pointed out that it took a long time to upload all the cards 
for the ABC product. Once the operators received the software, they had to be written, 
implemented and tested and this in turn caused delays and the launch date for the scheme 
had to be pushed back. DCC identified this as a key barrier for the ABC Scheme and 
indicated that while the bus operators had the correct ticket machines, they didn’t have 
the right backup. They believe that until they invest in the right equipment, they can’t 
progress forward and move onto the next phases of the scheme. Meanwhile, Transport 
Scotland explained the difficulties of these ticket machines, stating: 
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“Although we have over 11 years of experience, you don’t just pull them out 
of the box and plug them in. There needs to be time and resources in place to 
make sure they work from a technical perspective. You also have to make sure 
when you go live to passengers that you don’t have any flakiness.” [Interview 
4] 
Transport Scotland further pointed out that if customers have a bad experience, this 
would have a long-term impact on how they perceive smart ticketing. Therefore, they feel 
that they “…can’t afford to get it wrong and you need to implement it confidently…” so 
passengers will have a good experience and tell others about their good experience. They 
suggest if passengers have a bad experience, they will be less inclined to avail of the ABC 
Scheme.  
7.5.2.2 Existing bus policy document, policy targets and monitoring of bus polices 
Dundee City currently does not have a bus strategy or a bus policy document in place, as 
has been the case for the past 17 years. DCC feel this is something that they should have, 
however they indicated that they are “…not overly fussed…” about these documents and 
instead they refer to a RTS (2008 – 2023) produced by Tactran. Interestingly, DCC indi-
cated that the push to implement the scheme by the Scottish government, First Minister 
and the Transport Minister were more important than having documents in place to aid 
them with the implementation of the scheme: 
“I don’t think these documents are important at all. For me, the most important 
thing was the Scottish government, First Minister and the Transport Minister 
saying if you don’t implement the scheme, we’ll make you do it. So, they got 
things moving and we were one of the first cities to do it.” [Interview 3] 
Meanwhile Transport Scotland feel that the while there is a RTS in place, they are 
“…helpful but not absolutely vital”. Instead, they believe bus policy documents are there 
for people to study and to get a flavour for what the council or Transport Scotland is 
trying to achieve and why. They suggested policy documents can become out of date and 
they can become compromised by a change in their available resources. Therefore, they 
feel it is important to have a balance between a policy document and the ability to form 
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relationships with key stakeholders. They also believe there is a consensus in Scotland 
that they are less important, stating: 
“I think there is a general consensus in this part of Scotland away from having 
these documents. In general, there is an agreement that TS drives the policy 
around smart ticketing and have the resources such as skills, people, expertise 
and it’s not just about money. The LAs and regional transport partnerships 
will do their best to try and support and supplement what we are doing here at 
TS.” [Interview 4] 
According to National Express, there were two key champions in the bus operating 
company who had the willingness and drive to deliver the ABC Scheme and be the first 
in Scotland to happen from scratch, instead of developing other policies. They indicated 
this was a big step forward for the operating companies, stating: 
“Before the 2001 transport act, there was no way we could approach Moffet 
and Williamson and Stagecoach to develop a network ticket. Now that is al-
lowed to happen and it has benefits for the travelling public. Hopefully it will 
grow for the whole market, not just for each of our markets." [Interview 1] 
Most interviews have revealed that there are concerns over the language used to 
explain bus policy and many people can get lost in translation. For example, Stagecoach 
feel local authorities are not specialists in relation to smart ticketing and therefore they 
are required to simplify the terminology used, stating: 
“It’s not a criticism but there are not of a significant specialist resource to 
integrated systems. Things can get lost in translation and it’s a real barrier. 
What I end up doing, while I’m happy to engage with them and help them, I 
have to remember to write in English and try to translate to them in a simpler 
way.” [Interview 2] 
Transport Scotland pointed out that there is a risk with smart ticketing as it can be 
over-complicated. Therefore, they suggest there is a general agreement that smart ticket-
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ing is the way forward but bus policy should not include much more other than to encour-
age and support smart ticketing whenever these opportunities arise. Similarly, DCC 
pointed out that it is important that smart ticketing is not over-complicated, stating: 
“…if you’re not careful, everyone loses interest. People stop attending meet-
ings and the meetings stop happening, people forget about it. We were trying 
to work collectively on how to improve the network.” [Interview 3] 
A desktop review and the interviews revealed limited information about the moni-
toring in place for the ABC Scheme. As the scheme is a VPA, Transport Scotland pointed 
out that there is no contract between themselves and the bus operators for monitoring to 
take place. Stagecoach indicated that instead, they captured quite distinctively what they 
wanted to get out of stage 1 and at the end of the delivery, there was a “…checkbox before 
stage 1 was closed down”. This showed that they had the key elements in place, a product 
that could be loaded, a customer service regime in place and a market regime design to 
stop modern build up. Meanwhile, Transport Scotland pointed out that they receive 
monthly data from DCC but they want to wait until the scheme has been implemented for 
a year to carry out monitoring, stating: 
“In Dundee, the administration does share with us the monthly totals which is 
useful for us and I think there is a wider passenger research piece of work that 
needs to be done. But we need to wait until the scheme has been in place for 
a year because if you don’t then you get a response from something that is still 
growing and it might not tell you the full story.” [Interview 4] 
Although there is limited information about monitoring in place for the ABC 
Scheme, the interviews revealed that there are keys areas of the scheme which are meas-
ured. According to DCC, there are key performance indicators (KPI’s) and these include 
the number of people buying smart tickets. However, DCC pointed out that the bus com-
panies helped them to collect this data. The number of passenger trips on smart tickets is 
collected monthly and satisfaction with bus services is also measured. The Scottish 
Household survey released data which asked the people of Dundee how they feel about 
bus services in the area. According to DCC, this satisfaction is measured as part of the 
KPI every year and if they were required to measure success in terms of bus policy, they 
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would refer back to this data. They also believe this is the only reliable way of judging 
how people feel about buses. However, DCC pointed out that a lack of access to data 
from the bus operators is preventing other parts of bus policy to be measured, stating: 
“One thing I don’t have and I don’t get is bus patronage numbers from the bus 
companies. They do not share that information with us so I don’t know if there 
are less people travelling on the buses now in comparison to a year ago. They 
are cagey about sharing that information and they might say we never asked 
for it but they never offered.” [Interview 3] 
Transport Scotland also pointed out that, specifically for the ABC Scheme and 
wider parts of bus policy, it is important to measure the policy in place to determine the 
success of it, stating: 
“It would be unusual to put in a policy without means to measure it, whether 
it was in terms of volume or satisfaction. You need to understand if your pol-
icy has been a success or not.” [Interview 4] 
In contrast to this, Tactran believe most measurements aren’t measurable in terms 
of policy and that quite often measurements don’t mean much, stating: 
“For example, if there was an increase in patronage in the winter time, this is 
probably due to the weather and people wanting to use the bus. Quite often 
the measurements don’t mean that much. But the only way of testing policy is 
by measurements. Maybe there should be more measurement on passenger 
satisfaction and how people see things being operated and less on counting 
numbers." [Interview 5] 
Interestingly, the interviews revealed mixed opinions about having monitoring in 
place. DCC opposed the idea of having monitoring and feel that they are “…overly bu-
reaucratic”, stating:  
“One of the things that annoys me about working at a local authority is that 
when you get external funding, they always want monitoring and evaluations. 
They request too much information. I just like to deliver…and you don’t need 
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to monitor or evaluate a project to see if it’s been successful or not.” [Interview 
3] 
In contrast to this, Transport Scotland believe monitoring is “…always helpful and 
good practice…” for schemes like the ABC Scheme, stating: 
“You need a plan and you need to know if you are on target to achieve it. 
Especially in the public sector if we are putting money and effort in to it, we 
are accountable for it and we will be audited on it. In general, you would ex-
pect that there would be governance and monitoring in place to measure the 
success and it would enable you to implement other similar schemes.” [Inter-
view 4] 
Similarly, Tactran believe that monitoring should be in place to justify what was 
spent during the implementation of the scheme. They also suggest bids for a scheme 
should include money for monitoring, stating: 
“You have to have some means of monitoring. You bid for the money but you 
never actually put money in for monitoring. None of us learn if we can’t mon-
itor. The money you bid for should include money for monitoring and when 
you put in your bid it should say the process of monitoring that it will be used.” 
[Interview 5] 
Furthermore, they believe there should be more conference papers on monitoring 
so others can learn from mistakes made. However, they suggested “people aren’t brave 
enough to say if they have failed…” and “people don’t want to talk about things that 
weren’t a success”.  
In terms of targets, a desktop review and the interviews revealed no information 
about targets set for the ABC Scheme. Tactran pointed out that targets are a problem 
because “… people aim to deliver the targets, not the policy”. They also feel targets don’t 
reflect the policy, stating: 
“Targets are only things you can measure but when you set a policy you quite 
often set targets which are the nearest thing you can find which don’t actually 
 Chapter 7: Case study results 
    Page 245 
represent the policy. I spend more time filling in reports about measuring 
things which didn’t really mean anything.” [Interview 5] 
7.5.2.3 Policy implementation and barriers to implementation 
Several barriers were highlighted by the bus operators which had an impact on the ABC 
Scheme. National Express pointed out that one of the biggest barrier is the revenue for 
parking in Dundee City, stating: 
“It’s quite profitable for DCC and they don’t want to lose that revenue but 
they also don’t want to be pressurised with problems with traffic congestion 
and air quality issues.” [Interview 3] 
Therefore, they believe DCC promote car parks and the cost of parking in Dundee 
is quite reasonable in comparison to cities like Edinburgh and Glasgow. Using the bus 
associated with the ABC Scheme can then be less attractive in comparison to driving a 
car. National Express also pointed out that there is one area in Dundee that is deemed as 
one of the most polluted areas in Europe which is also the location of a carpark built by 
DCC. They also feel this is a political barrier, stating: 
“At the same time, they tried to persuade the buses to reroute their vehicles 
out of that area. The council aren’t very proactive in trying to reduce the 
amount of cars going there because of the revenue. So, there are quite a lot of 
political barriers involved too.” [Interview 1] 
National Express also pointed out that of the biggest barriers for the ABC Scheme 
was the infrastructure and the policies being implemented in the Dundee area. They feel 
that there is a lack of coherence with the road maintenance policy and the implementation 
of road maintenance against what they are trying to achieve by moving people around. 
They feel this is particularly a problem when the council have a “…5 year road mainte-
nance plan…” and they are required to carry out road works, stating: 
“We often find this 5 year plan gets accelerated and they have no game plan 
when it comes to utilities. They openly say that utilities will be digging up a 
road and they (the council) could have a major plan in place and utilities will 
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come along and dig up several roads which creates absolute havoc for the bus 
network. The extra resources we have to put in to make sure our services are 
reliable is astronomical and it’s not even acknowledged by the road mainte-
nance planners.” [Interview 1] 
Another barrier identified in this case study includes local elections. As previously 
mentioned, stage 2 of Dundee ABC Scheme was put on hold because of local elections 
being announced. This was followed by a national election and no decisions or approvals 
have since been made. Stagecoach identified these elections as a barrier, stating: 
“No one would approve the decisions or make the decisions on scope until 
after the elections. We got though the local elections and then we had a na-
tional election and again it’s on freeze. It’s just waiting to see who will be in 
charge of Dundee and Tayside once things are settled down.” [Interview 2] 
Conflict between the bus operators and the council was identified as another key 
barrier in this case study. Stagecoach pointed out that they often “…don’t see eye to eye 
on things”. They feel that while the council have an obligation to provide transport for 
targeting groups, they don’t feel there are enough passengers availing of the ABC 
Scheme, stating: 
“Our business is a mass market and we make very little per passenger, it’s 
only a few pence per journey so we rely on making money by carrying a vol-
ume and mass of people, then all of those pennies add up as you carry 1.2 
billion people per year…but it becomes expensive and difficult when we have 
such a small amount of people using it. If you have over 100 of these small 
schemes carrying 100/200 people, it just gets stuck in testing for months and 
months because it’s a lot of work.” [Interview 2] 
A lack of data provided by the bus operators was identified as another barrier. DCC 
pointed out that they don’t receive data from the bus operators in relation to bus patronage 
numbers, therefore they can’t identify if there are fewer people travelling on the buses 
now in comparison to a year ago. 
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“They are cagey about sharing that information and they might say we never 
asked for it but they never offered. I have verbally asked for the information 
but they will never cough up the information. I don’t know which routes are 
profitable in Dundee.” [Interview 3] 
DCC further pointed out that a reason for this lack of data is because they don’t 
have control over the buses in terms of fares, routes, frequency or other quality aspects 
such as the politeness of bus drivers. Therefore, they feel that these issues are with the 
bus companies and then “…feel annoyed…” when people blame the council if there is a 
problem. 
Priorities of staff and staff time were identified as other barriers for this case study. 
For example, Stagecoach pointed out that externally, they had a lot of requests from pol-
iticians, local government bodies, and the wider environment. Therefore, they found it 
difficult to prioritise their resources. Meanwhile, DCC pointed out that the bus operators 
were reluctant to see the ABC Scheme as a useful scheme to invest time and effort into 
doing. They felt they had had other priorities every year and it wasn’t until 2016 when 
they ready to deliver the product. Similarly, Transport Scotland pointed out that the bus 
operators became interested in the ABC Scheme when they saw the pilot scheme in Ab-
erdeen was a success. Meanwhile, DCC indicated that they could not have implemented 
the ABC Scheme alone and they needed the bus operators to drive it forward. However, 
during the implementation of the scheme, DCC pointed out in the interviews that they 
were aware of proportion of time taken from the bus operators to work on the ABC 
Scheme and therefore felt the costs of the scheme were mainly “staff time” for the bus 
operators.  
Although the pressure from Transport Scotland can be considered an enabler to 
implement the ABC Scheme, DCC felt it was a barrier for the bus operators because they 
were under pressure from Transport Scotland, stating: 
“The bus operators were making all sorts of excuses like they don’t have the 
technological equipment and they weren’t allowed to collude with each other. 
Competition meant they weren’t able do this. Eventually the Scottish govern-
ment said no, we want it, you’ll do it and we’ll legislate to make it happen. 
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Fearful of having something imposed upon them, the bus companies started 
moving forward and Dundee was one of the first cities to deliver it.” [Inter-
view 3] 
Transport Scotland also shared a similar view with DCC and pointed out that dis-
cussions with the bus operators were “…quite heated at times…” but the bus industry 
recognised that they had to demonstrate that it was being more progressive and that it was 
working in a collaborative way. Transport Scotland wanted to see something simple like 
the Oyster card in London and instructed to the bus operators that they would impose it 
if they didn’t implement it. Therefore, part of the motivation for the bus operators was a 
recognition that the relationship between the government and industry was starting to 
deteriorate and they had to do something to turn that around.  
The smart cards for the ABC Scheme were also a barrier in some instances. For 
example, National Express pointed out that it was confusing at first for the bus drivers to 
understand how the new system worked because they had to accept other smart cards 
from the other bus companies on their buses. There was also an issue with understanding 
the process for when there was a problem with a customer’s card. Similarly, Stagecoach 
felt the smartcards were a barrier and that “…it can get very confusing for a driver no 
matter what training regime you put in place” and the business rules are very difficult are 
very difficult rules for the driver. Meanwhile, Transport Scotland pointed out that smart 
ticketing is complex because if the cards don’t work then they can’t be relied on. Further-
more, with a deregulated bus market, there is no contract between the Scottish Govern-
ment and the bus operators so at any time the bus operators could walk away from a 
problem associated with the smart cards. They also pointed out they “don’t have that 
safeguard with smart ticketing” because of the deregulated market.   
Tactran suggested that there is a barrier related to the economic interest of the op-
erator. They believe bus operators are “…tightly focused on making a profit…” and that 
they “…sometimes can’t look outside the box”. While preparing for the ABC Scheme, 
they indicated that they had many “…battles…” with the bus operators over profits and 
an independent consultancy to calculate the profits was required. They also pointed out 
that they needed to negotiate with the bus operators, stating: 
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“We have to spend a lot of time working out their individual agendas and we 
had to negotiate with them so they could see the benefits of the scheme. They 
all wanted to get additional money out of it so we had to persuade them that 
an integrated ticket would bring them in more money. Growing their market 
by 1 or 2% isn’t that interesting to them. You have to show them that they will 
get potentially more than that but it’s hard to show that.” [Interview 5] 
Furthermore, they feel they can be a restriction themselves and can undermine what 
the council are trying to do. Therefore, they feel that there is friction between the operators 
and councils because of two different viewpoints. DCC shared a similar view and indi-
cated that their relationship with the bus operators isn’t always easy because they are 
“…very much driven by profits and they need to make money on all their routes”. They 
also indicated that is it sometimes difficult to work in partnership with the bus operators, 
stating:  
“The people of Dundee expect the council to protect them when the bus ser-
vices are being curtailed or withdrawn. That is sometimes an awkward situa-
tion to be in because you’re working in partnership with the bus companies 
but at the same time they’re cutting back within reason because they’re saying 
the routes aren’t profitable and DCC don’t have the money to plug the gaps.” 
[Interview 3] 
Tactran also feel that the bus operating staff are not very good at selling services 
and this was a barrier for the ABC Scheme because they don’t portrait what the scheme 
represents, stating: 
“They are old style bus drivers who sit there and see tickets. But in some in-
stances, they are the first and only person you see when getting on and off a 
bus.” [Interview 5] 
They also suggested that the key actors involved in the implementation of the ABC 
Scheme don’t all recognise the importance of each other. They believe that it is quite 
difficult for “...everyone to work together in the public transport industry” while “…some 
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people don’t want to work together...” Therefore, they feel that other schemes like the 
ABC Scheme can’t be implemented if they “…don’t work as a team”. 
According to Stagecoach, the barrier for a scheme like the ABC Scheme is “…al-
ways political…” in terms of commercial concerns for the bus operators and they must 
be weary of having a number of commercial concerns working together with their indi-
vidual investment interests, stating: 
“They may feel that producing this product for example may threaten what’s 
known in the trade as existing revenue stream. So, you may have a very prof-
itable revenue stream which is built around existing customers using single 
operator products and that’s one of the key barriers you need to reflect on…” 
[Interview 2] 
A final barrier for the ABC Scheme was highlighted by DCC who indicated that 
there is a need to clean up the bus services in terms of air quality, especially for the Xplore 
Dundee fleet as they don’t have any new buses. This is therefore an issue that will need 
to be resolved in the future to improve the buses which are part of the ABC Scheme.  
7.5.3 Theoretical analysis of ABC Smart Ticketing Scheme 
In line with the theoretical analysis carried out on the questionnaires and telephone inter-
views, this section will also analyse the results obtained in the interviews carried out with 
representatives from Dundee City on the ABC Smart Ticketing Scheme. The 10 variables 
of the decision support framework are used to analyse the results of the interviews and 
this in turn will help determine the barriers and enablers which have an impact on bus 
policy implementation. Furthermore, it will address the third research objective to help 
meet the aim of this thesis. 
1. Policy objective:  A written bus policy document should be in place, showing a 
clear link between policy objectives, measures and the setting and monitoring 
of targets. 
The policy objectives of ABC Scheme appeared to be a barrier because the objectives for 
the bus operators were different to those of Transport Scotland. The bus operators are 
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very much driven by profits and were reluctant to be involved in the scheme. However, 
Transport Scotland wanted to see something simple like the Oyster card in London and 
instructed to the bus operators that they would impose it if they didn’t implement it. 
Therefore, it is evident that both the bus operators and Transport Scotland had different 
objectives for the ABC Scheme and the bus operators were somewhat forced to be part 
of the scheme.  
As previously mentioned, the scheme encountered a delay due to the written policy 
in place when contracts were being made with the lawyers and legal team for the scheme. 
National Express pointed out that “…the Scottish laws are so different to the English 
laws…” This barrier is likely to be a result of the VPA in place and in line with the com-
mitment by all major operators in the UK to various government bodies to deliver smart 
ticketing. The concept of a VPA is contained within the Bus Services Act in England, 
however the Scottish Government is currently considering these in the context of Scottish 
legislation. Therefore, the VPA for the ABC Scheme had less structure than if it was a 
VPA proposed in England – it has no legislative basis.  
The case study has also revealed that Dundee City currently does not have a bus 
strategy or a bus policy document in place for the past 17 years but refer to the RTS 
produced by Tactran. There was consensus amongst those interviewed that these docu-
ments are less important are not required for the delivery of the ABC Scheme. Therefore, 
a lack of these documents was not identified as a barrier for the ABC Scheme.  
In terms of setting and monitoring of targets, a desktop review and the interviews 
revealed limited information about the monitoring or targets in place for the scheme. 
However, the scheme did reveal that there are keys areas of the scheme which are meas-
ured. This unclear link between policy objectives, measures and the setting and monitor-
ing of targets may be a result of the VPA in place which involves no contracts between 
the bus operators and Transport Scotland.   
2. Availability of resources: Resources such as financial support are important; 
however, where resources are limited, it is necessary to maximise the use of 
available resources. 
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Several examples of the availability of resources as a barrier were identified in this case 
study. Firstly, the availability of resources was a barrier for the bus operators because 
they received a lot of requests from politicians, local government bodies and from the 
wider environment. Although they had the technology and money in place, they struggled 
with prioritising their resources and finding the time to deal with requests from the various 
bodies. The bus operators also pointed out that due to works being carried out in terms of 
road maintenance, they had to put extra resources in place which were “…astronomi-
cal…” and this compounded their challenges. Meanwhile, the bus operators had made the 
most financial investments in comparison to other stakeholders involved in the scheme 
and Transport Scotland provided very little funding to the scheme even though they im-
posed it on the bus operators.  
The availability of resources also appeared to be a barrier due to a lack of 
knowledge, advertisement and marketing around the scheme. It was found that infor-
mation provided about the ABC Scheme were different on the DCC website, Stagecoach 
website and the Travel Dundee website which is then confusing for customers. Mean-
while, the sales of tickets have plateaued which may be because of poor advertising and 
marketing. Therefore, the scheme requires further improvements in these aspects.  
3. Intra-organisation support and communication: Policy staff need relevant 
training, supervision and support within their organisation when dealing with 
complex policy issues. 
Intra-organisation support and communication was a barrier in terms of understanding 
the ABC ticket product. Stagecoach pointed out the new product was particularly confus-
ing for the bus drivers. They also pointed out that they were required to spend more time 
with the smaller operators advertising them on how to upgrade the product and deliver 
the product. However, Stagecoach indicated that across the UK, it is impossible to deliver 
this because there are so many stakeholders who require their help and it is then very 
confusing for the bus drivers no matter what training regime is put in place. Although 
intra-organisation and communication can be a barrier in this instance, Stagecoach did 
however indicate that there needs to be a specialist level of staff in what they can support 
and the priority with which their group or product can assign things to them. However, 
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they are experiencing increasing demands internally and from bus operators across the 
UK. It would therefore appear that there is support for bus operators in the UK on the 
general concept of the smart ticketing product, however there is a lack of support within 
the companies on more complex issues with the product which can be seen as a barrier 
for the bus drivers who have difficulty using them.  
4. Characteristics of organisations: Both formal structural features of organisa-
tions and informal attributes of their personnel (including size, competency and 
workload of staff). 
The characteristics of the organisations involved was a barrier in this case study, particu-
larly for the bus operators. This included internal efforts and time by the bus operators to 
deliver the scheme and especially from the policy champions, both of whom are smart 
ticketing specialists and worked at National Express. It was also evident from the inter-
views that not everyone involved fully understood smart ticketing and this was particu-
larly a barrier for bus drivers. It was also found that, prior to the scheme, the bus operators 
were reluctant to be involved and to invest their time and effort. This meant the scheme 
started later than anticipated as required the involvement of the bus operators. Therefore 
commitment, competency and workload of staff were key barriers for the implementation 
of the ABC Scheme. 
5. Economic, social and political environments: Current and future economic, so-
cial and political environments play an important role on the outcome of the 
policy process. 
Economic environments played an important role on the outcome of the ABC Scheme. 
This scheme was one of several pilot schemes as part of Transport Scotland’s vision to 
introduce smarter travel across Scotland. Dundee City was chosen to carry out a pilot 
study because there is a reasonably small number of operators with a good operating en-
vironment in place and the city is isolated in terms of the zones involved. Therefore, Ab-
erdeen was an ideal pilot before moving to “more challenging environments” in Glasgow 
and Edinburgh which are bigger cities. 
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In contrast to the economic environment, the social environments was a barrier for 
the ABC Scheme. The case study revealed that some bus operators have created this prob-
lem because they don’t all agree that there are benefits to using the scheme. It was dis-
covered in the interviews that there is a negative perception of how some bus drivers 
communicate with customers availing of the scheme. Perhaps the reason for this is that 
bus drivers still don’t fully understand the benefits of the scheme and therefore there is a 
learning curve in that respect.  
Similar to social environments, political environments were also seen as a barrier 
for the ABC Scheme. This was particularly the case for the bus operators because they 
have their own commercial concerns and there was a danger that the ABC product would 
threaten existing revenue stream. For example, if they have a very profitable revenue 
stream built around existing customers using single operator products. However, the bus 
operators had little choice in the matter as Transport Scotland imposed this scheme on 
them. Therefore, the plans and ambitions of National government bodies be political in 
this instance. 
6. Policy champions: Policy implementation should not be restricted to one policy 
champion and instead needs several policy champions who are responsible, 
competent and motivated to see the policy through from beginning to end. 
This case study has revealed that there were two key policy champions for the implemen-
tation of the ABC Scheme, both of whom are smart ticketing specialists and worked at 
National Express. These policy champions had the willingness and drive to make it hap-
pen and to be the first such scheme in Scotland. While the ABC Scheme was a govern-
ment initiative, they felt the bus operators were able to take the lead and deliver the 
scheme. The policy champions were particularly important for this scheme as DCC 
pointed out, they could not have implemented it on their own. It was also revealed that 
the bus operators weren’t seeking support from DCC and were willing to do it themselves 
with the support of their policy champions.  
7. Bureaucratic power: Hierarchical control in an organisation is important; how-
ever, hierarchical power must not be used to overrule policy decisions by other 
members within the organisation. 
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The case study revealed limited bureaucratic power or hierarchical control and therefore 
this is identified as a less significant implementation barrier. However, National Express 
pointed out that when a road maintenance five-year plan gets accelerated, the council can 
start digging up roads which then creates “…havoc…” for the bus operators and the bus 
services in place. Another example of bureaucratic power was identified when the ABC 
Scheme came about because of it being imposed by Transport Scotland. The bus operators 
were reluctant to be involved in the scheme but with the power of Transport Scotland, 
they were somewhat forced to be a part of it. This was also summarised by DCC on what 
Transport Scotland said to the bus operator’s – “you implement this or we will impose it 
upon you”.  
8. Collaboration and interaction between those involved in the policy process: Col-
laboration and interaction is necessary between key actors involved in the policy 
process, including policy makers, local authority staff, local and national gov-
erning bodies, regional transport partnerships, bus operators and transport 
practitioners working within the transport field. 
Collaboration and interaction between those involved in the ABC Scheme was key for 
successful implementation. As soon as the vision was released from the Scottish Govern-
ment to implement smart ticketing, there was a willingness from the parties involved to 
deliver it. The ambitions for the scheme were captured by Transport Scotland and DCC 
and this was evident through the number of stages which were set out to deliver the 
scheme. However, Transport Scotland and DCC could not have delivered the scheme 
without the support of the bus operators. The case study revealed that there was a reason-
able amount of consultation and engagement with the stakeholders and this helped to 
build a relationship between the parties involved. This was an important part of delivering 
the scheme as it ensured a common understanding and scope on what was to be delivered. 
9. Policy remodelling: Limited changes to the policy should occur from the design 
stage right through to the implementation stage. 
The key changes which occurred during the ABC Scheme included the introduction of 
smart, integrated and interoperable ticketing. However, limited changes to the policy oc-
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curred once the product was introduced. This in turn can be an enabler for the implemen-
tation of the scheme because it was decided from the beginning how the scheme would 
be implemented and it was completed without significant changes.  
10. Opposition, conflict and ambiguities: Opposition, conflict and ambiguities are 
inevitable including public opposition, political power, local and national elec-
tions, conflicts between neighbouring authorities over budgets, bus wars and 
open-access to data by bus operating companies. 
Opposition, conflict and ambiguities were identified as barriers for the implementation of 
the ABC Scheme. While DCC and the bus operators collaborated and interacted, there 
were many examples of conflict and ambiguities provided in the interviews. The bus op-
erators have different expectations for the scheme as they are a commercial business and 
driven by profits. They feared that they would selling existing travel to existing passen-
gers at a slightly cheaper price but there would be no future growth. This resulted in 
heated discussions between the bus operators and DCC. Meanwhile, part of the motiva-
tion for the scheme was due in part to perceptions of a deteriorating relationship between 
the government and industry and the need to turn this around. Further conflict was iden-
tified between both DCC and the bus operators related to profits and road maintenance 
organised by DCC that affected bus services.  
Both local and national elections were barriers for the implementation on the ABC 
Scheme and this resulted in the scheme being delayed and it has not yet moved onto the 
proposed stage 2 due to these elections. The case study also suggests councillors will only 
discuss the successful parts of the scheme due to the publicity attached to it and the public 
are unaware of the unsuccessful parts of the scheme.  
Meanwhile, conflict between the bus operators involved was avoided in this scheme 
because DCC acted as an ‘honest broker’ as the bus operators are not allowed to speak to 
each other over uncompetitive practices. Bus wars and public opposition were also not 
identified as barrier for the implementation of the ABC Scheme and it appeared people 
in Dundee welcomed the scheme. 
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7.5.4 Summary of case study 4 
The fourth and final case study has examined the ABC Multi-Operator Smart Ticketing 
Scheme in Dundee. To help understand the success of the scheme, the barriers and ena-
blers were identified by carrying out a theoretical analysis using the decision support 
framework. Seven variables of the framework identified the barriers to the scheme which 
include policy objectives, policy resources, intra-organisation support and communica-
tion, characteristics of organisations, social and political environments, bureaucratic 
power and opposition, conflict and ambiguities. In contract to these seven variables of the 
framework, two variables identified the enablers which helped to implement the scheme. 
These include policy champions, and collaboration and interaction between those in-
volved in the policy process. Also, a lack of policy remodelling can be seen as an enabler 
for the implementation of the scheme. Overall, the ABC Scheme is an example of suc-
cessful implementation, however given the scheme is still quite recent, further monitoring 
is required to determine its future.  
7.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has presented the findings from interviews conducted with industry repre-
sentatives based on four case studies within the UK. The four case studies include the 
Quality Contract Scheme in Tyne and Wear, the Fastlink Scheme in Glasgow, a Bus Pri-
ority Scheme in Solihull and a Smart Ticketing Scheme in Dundee. The decision support 
framework was used to analyse the interviews and this in turn helped to determine the 
barriers which have an impact on bus policy implementation in the UK. Furthermore, this 
chapter has addressed the third research objective to help meet the aim of this thesis. 
Table 7.15 below provides a summary of the key barriers and enablers identified in the 
four case studies. 
The four case studies were analysed using elements of the decision support frame-
work which were then divided into high, medium and low impacts. Five elements of the 
framework were rated as a high impact. Four of these elements were rated as high impact 
barriers including policy objective, characteristics of organisations, economic, social and 
political environments and opposition, conflict, and ambiguities. One element of the 
framework was rated as a high impact enabler – that of policy champions. Next, four 
elements of the framework were rated as medium barriers: availability of resources, intra-
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organisation support and communication, and policy remodelling. One element of the 
framework was rated as a medium impact enabler: collaboration and interaction between 
those involved in the policy process. Finally, one element of the framework was rated as 
a low impact: this was bureaucratic power. 
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√ √ √ √     
Barrier: All four case studies revealed an 
unclear link between designing the policy, 
setting targets and suitable measures to 
achieve those targets, and monitoring those 




















√ √  √   √  
Barrier: (1) CS1: QCS was financially un-
sustainable and rejected by Traffic Com-
missioner. (2) CS2: delays in obtaining 
funding; delays with delivery of scheme. (3) 
CS4: bus operators struggled to prioritise re-
sources and deal with requests from various 
bodies; bus operators made most financial 
investments; lack of knowledge, advertise-
ment and marketing around scheme.  
Enabler: (1) CS3: Solihull MBC maxim-
ised the use of available funding; under-
spend within the GBSLEP’s Local Growth 










































√ √  √   √  
Barrier: (1) CS1: Nexus made “changes 
along the way” and “some mistakes” were 
made by their consultants. (2) CS2: SPT 
don’t have internal expertise or full powers 
for regulation in comparison to bus opera-
tors; bus operators don’t have enough staff 
to look at radical plans to put in integrated 
transport systems. (3) CS4:  lack of support 
within bus companies on complex issues 
with ABC product; bus drivers have diffi-
culty using product. 
Enabler: (1) CS3: organisations worked to-
gether for a number of years and carried out 
a series of bus network reviews across re-
gion. 
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√ √ √ √     
Barrier: (1) CS1: Took a year to educate 3 
people on work done in 5 years; small firm 
with small legal team and economic advis-
ers (Nexus); bus operators commercially 
minded working against QCS case; size and 
competency of staff (Nexus). CS2: extra 
workload created stress for the staff; size of 
scheme; level of public engagement. (3) 
CS3: workload of staff; scheme working 
simultaneously instead of sequentially; 
competency of staff; priorities of staff. (4) 
CS4: internal efforts and time by the bus op-
erators to deliver the scheme; bus operators 
incompetent with understanding smart tick-
eting; bus operators reluctant to be involved 

































√ √ √ √     
Barrier: (1) CS1: Nexus could not prove its 
affordability and value for money; QCS 
proposal indicated that it would not extend 
to Durham and Northumberland; NECA 
area was unable to decide on election of new 
mayor. (2) CS2: image problem associated 
with using bus; competition between buses 
and rail; less press coverage to encourage 
bus usage. (3) CS3: negative perception 
from drivers; lack of political support 
around understanding bus policy, uncer-
tainty about what the council is trying to 
achieve, and reviewing bus lanes. (4) CS4: 
bus operators don’t all portray benefits of 
using scheme; negative perception of how 
some bus drivers communicate with cus-
tomers; danger that ABC product would 
threaten existing revenue stream of bus op-
erators; Transport Scotland imposed 















    √ √ √ √ 
Enabler: (1) CS1: Go North East and 
Stagecoach were policy champions who 
saw the case follow through from beginning 
to end. (2) CS2: SPT were the policy cham-
pions and were committed and willing to 
work with other stakeholders involved. (3) 
CS3: One key policy champion from Soli-
hull MBC who was responsible, competent, 
motivated and wanted to drive change. (4) 
Two key policy champions from National 
Express who had willingness and drive to 
implement scheme. 
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√   √  √ √  
Barrier: (1) CS1: bus operators didn’t want 
to share data with Nexus because it adds an-
other layer of bureaucracy. (2) CS4: road 
maintenance five year plan creates 
“…havoc…” for the bus operators and the 
bus services in place. 
Enabler: (1) CS2: limited evidence of bu-
reaucratic power. (4) CS3: limited evidence 




















































√     √ √ √ 
Barrier: (1) CS1: Relationship between 
Nexus and bus operators was “damaged”; 
bus companies were unwilling to share data. 
Enabler: (1) CS2: Collaboration with lo-
cals who supported development, political 
buy-in, public transport agencies and opera-
tors. (2) CS3: TfWM provided Solihull 
MBC with data; Atkins worked with TfWM 
on initial feasibility and preliminary design; 
Solihull MBC engaged with JLR about site; 
National Express shared data with Centro to 
carry out monitoring and evaluation; Soli-
hull MBC collaborated with TfWM to deal 
with customers and general queries. (3) 

















√ √ √     √ 
Barrier: (1) CS1: Nexus made changes dur-
ing scheme proposal. (2) CS2: Changes re-
quired due to feedback from public. (3) 
CS3: Changes include removal of cycle 
lanes, repairs to the canal bridge on Lode 
Lane and adjustments to the TRO at 
Ratcliffe House. 
Enabler: (1) CS4: Decided from the begin-
ning how scheme would be implemented 




































√ √ √ √  
   Barrier: (1) CS1: TWPTUG supported the 
scheme but strongly opposed the opinions 
of the bus operators; opposition from pub-
lic; breakdown in the relationship between 
Nexus and bus operators. (2) CS2: delays to 
scheme resulted in opposition; public con-
cerned over appropriateness of cost of 
scheme; lack of local government interest 
and support. (3) CS3: public opposition; 
lack of government interest and support. (4) 
CS4: bus operators had different expecta-
tions to DCC. Local and national elections 
delayed scheme. 
Note: CS refers to case study. Yellow = high impact; orange = medium impact, green = low impact. 
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1. Policy objective:  A written bus policy document should be in place, showing a 
clear link between policy objectives, measures and the setting and monitoring 
of targets. 
Overall there were varying results from the different case studies in relation to policy 
objectives, and no clear evidence that a written bus policy document is essential for im-
plementation.  In CS1 (the QC attempt by Nexus), the policy document (the 2012 Bus 
Strategy) was important in helping to justify the application by Nexus for Quality Con-
tract powers.  On the other hand, since then, the strategy has not been updated and there 
was a general lack of data showing progress against its targets. CS2 (Glasgow Fastlink) 
found that the original scheme was related to policy objectives, but that there is a lack of 
monitoring in place and the ‘Fastlink Route Performance Report’ published in 2015 was 
the last time such monitoring took place and no further monitoring reports have been 
published since then, which some interviewees found to be a barrier to scheme ac-
ceptance. CS3 (the Lode Lane bus priority scheme in Solihull) revealed that it was diffi-
cult to translate some policies into practice because of a lack of political support to help 
deliver the scheme (which relates to point 5 in this framework). This may have been be-
cause there was a lack of bus policy documents in place to support the LLRE schemes 
and that the scheme was instead supported in terms of an economic development policy 
context, not specifically a transport or bus policy context. Meanwhile, the scheme does 
not set specific targets, but its monitoring appears to be successful. Finally, CS4 indicated 
that the policy objectives of the ABC Scheme appeared to be a barrier because the objec-
tives for the bus operators were different to those of Transport Scotland and the bus op-
erators were somewhat forced to be part of the scheme (showing the importance of agree-
ment on the objectives, although also showing that this is not an insurmountable barrier). 
Overall, the case studies revealed an unclear link between designing the policy, setting 
targets and suitable measures to achieve those targets, and monitoring those targets for 
implementation, and they showed clearly that a scheme did not have to be in a policy 
document, or even aligned with a policy document’s objectives, for it to be implemented. 
2. Availability of resources: Resources such as financial support are important; 
however, where resources are limited, it is necessary to maximise the use of 
available resources. 
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Three out of the four case studies identified availability of resources as a barrier. CS1 
revealed that in the opinion of the bus operators the QCS was financially unsustainable, 
would cost the local tax payer a huge amount of money with no real benefits, and involve 
issues in the future in terms of pension liabilities. Therefore, the scheme was rejected by 
the Traffic Commissioner. CS2 indicated that there were delays in obtaining funding 
which then resulted in delays with the delivery of the scheme. CS4 revealed that the bus 
operators struggled to prioritise their resources and finding the time to deal with requests 
from various bodies. Meanwhile, the bus operators had made the most financial invest-
ments in comparison to other stakeholders involved in the scheme. It was also found that 
there was a lack of knowledge, advertisement and marketing around the scheme. In con-
trast to these three case studies, CS3 indicated resources were an enabler to implement 
the LLRE Scheme because Solihull MBC maximised the use of available funding and the 
underspend within the GBSLEP’s Local Growth Fund programme for 2015/16 was also 
helpful. 
3. Intra-organisation support and communication: Policy staff need relevant 
training, supervision and support within their organisation when dealing with 
complex policy issues. 
Three out of the four case studies identified intra-organisation support and communica-
tion as a barrier. CS1 indicated that some errors were made by Nexus in their preparation 
of the case for the Quality Contract where they made “changes along the way”, had 
“weaker parts” of their case and “some mistakes” made by their consultants. They were 
also challenged by a relative lack of staff capacity to plan the business case for the QCS.  
Meanwhile, the bus operators had the financial and legal support and the communication 
resources to work against Nexus and to find flaws in the case for the QCS. CS2 found 
that SPT do not have as much internal expertise as the bus operators, but it was also found 
that the current framework in place isn’t working and the bus operators don’t have enough 
staff to look at radical plans to put in integrated transport systems. Finally, CS4 suggests 
there is support for bus operators in the UK on the general concept of the smart ticketing 
product, however there is a lack of support and capacity within the companies on dealing 
with the more complex issues with the product. In contrast to these case studies, CS3 
revealed that prior to LLRE Scheme, the organisations involved worked together well for 
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a number of years and carried out a series of bus network reviews across the region., 
implying that this pre-existing communication was an enabler for the LLRE scheme.  
Overall, the case studies show that intra-organisational support and communication are 
clearly very important enablers for implementation. 
4. Characteristics of organisations: Both formal structural features of organisa-
tions and informal attributes of their personnel (including size, competency and 
workload of staff). 
All four case studies revealed the characteristics of organisations as a barrier. CS1 indi-
cated that it took Nexus a year to educate 3 people on work they had done in the past 5 
years. They also indicated that a key reason for why they failed to meet the requirements 
of the QCS was due to being a “small firm with a small legal team and economic advis-
ers.” Meanwhile, they felt that the bus operators had staff who were “commercially 
minded” and worked against their case for a QCS. Size and competency of staff within 
Nexus was also raised as an issue. CS2 revealed that SPT experienced extra workload and 
this created stress for the staff. The size of the scheme and the level of engagement with 
the public transport authority and the operators was also identified as a barrier. CS3 indi-
cated the workload of staff was a barrier as the scheme was brought forward and therefore 
worked simultaneously instead of sequentially. Staff were faced with time limitations to 
prepare the scheme and were under pressure to complete various stages of the business 
case. Competency of staff and priorities of staff were also raised as an issue. Similarly, 
CS4 revealed that the internal effort and time required by the bus operators to deliver the 
scheme were seen as a barrier. It was also found that not everyone involved fully under-
stood smart ticketing and this was particularly a barrier for bus drivers. Meanwhile, prior 
to the scheme, the bus operators were reluctant to be involved which meant the scheme 
started later than anticipated.  
5. Economic, social and political environments: Current and future economic, so-
cial and political environments play an important role on the outcome of the 
policy process. 
All four case studies revealed economic, social and political environments as a barrier. 
CS1 indicated economic barriers were evident when the QCS Board rejected the scheme 
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because Nexus could not prove its affordability and value for money. Social barriers were 
evident where the QCS proposal indicated that it would not extend to Durham and North-
umberland and political barriers were evident when the NECA area was unable to decide 
on the election of a new mayor. CS2 revealed that there were social barriers due to an 
image problem associated with using the bus, competition between buses and rail and less 
press coverage to encourage bus usage. CS3 revealed economic conditions were helpful 
to deliver the LLRE Scheme as Solihull has the most productive economy in the Mid-
lands. However, social environments were a barrier due to a negative perception from 
drivers when the scheme was introduced. Political environments were also a barrier due 
to a lack of political support around understanding bus policy, uncertainty about what the 
council is trying to achieve and a lack of support to keep under constant review enforced 
bus lanes. Finally, CS4 revealed that economic environments were helpful to implement 
the ABC Scheme due to the small number of operators with a good operating environ-
ment. In contrast to this, social environments were seen as a barrier where bus operators 
don’t all market the benefits of using the scheme and there is negative perception of how 
some bus drivers communicate with customers availing of the scheme. Finally, political 
environments were a barrier for the bus operators because they have their own commer-
cial concerns and there was a danger that the ABC product would threaten existing reve-
nue stream. However, the bus operators had little choice in the matter as Transport Scot-
land imposed this scheme on them. 
6. Policy champions: Policy implementation should not be restricted to one policy 
champion and instead needs several policy champions who are responsible, 
competent and motivated to see the policy through from beginning to end. 
All four case studies highlighted the importance of the role of policy champions and how 
they enabled the schemes to succeed, or not succeed as seen in CS1. CS1 revealed that 
both Nexus and the bus operators worked equally hard when dealing with the QCS in-
quiry, however it was the bus operators who saw the case follow through from beginning 
to end which included Go North East and Stagecoach. CS2 indicated that SPT were the 
policy champions for the Fastlink Scheme and they were committed and willing to work 
with the other stakeholders involved. CS3 revealed a key policy champion from Solihull 
MBC played an important role in implementing the LLRE Scheme. This champion was 
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identified as responsible, competent, motivated, and wanted to drive change. Finally, CS4 
revealed the ABC scheme had two key policy champions from National Express. These 
policy champions had the willingness and drive to implement the scheme and be the first 
in Scotland to happen from scratch. 
7. Bureaucratic power: Hierarchical control in an organisation is important; how-
ever, hierarchical power must not be used to overrule policy decisions by other 
members within the organisation. 
Two case studies revealed bureaucratic power as a barrier. CS1 indicated that the bus 
operators didn’t want to share data with Nexus because “it also adds another layer of 
bureaucracy with meetings and the bus companies aren’t used to that exposure”. Mean-
while, CS4 revealed that when a road maintenance five year plan gets accelerated, the 
council can start digging up roads which then creates “…havoc…” for the bus operators 
and the bus services in place. The bus operators were also reluctant to be involved in the 
scheme but Transport Scotland had the power to enforce the scheme upon them. In con-
trast to these case studies, CS2 and CS3 revealed limited evidence of bureaucratic power 
and therefore could be considered an enabler as it did not have a negative impact on the 
implementation of the schemes involved.  
8. Collaboration and interaction between those involved in the policy process: Col-
laboration and interaction is necessary between key actors involved in the policy 
process, including policy makers, local authority staff, local and national gov-
erning bodies, regional transport partnerships, bus operators and transport 
practitioners working within the transport field. 
CS1 revealed that collaboration and interaction between those involved in the policy pro-
cess were key barriers for the QCS. This was particularly noticeable when Nexus said the 
relationship between themselves and the bus operators was “damaged” during the QCS 
process. Furthermore, they stated that the bus companies were unwilling to share data and 
this in turn prevented the scheme from being implemented. In contrast to this, three case 
studies revealed collaboration and interaction between those involved in the policy pro-
cess were enablers to implement the schemes involved. CS2 indicated that collaboration 
with locals who supported the development, political buy-in, partnerships working with 
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the public transport agencies (the roads authority) and the operators was “absolutely cru-
cial”. The bus operators had a “good relationship” with the staff at SPT and this helped 
the scheme to succeed. Similarly, CS3 revealed TfWM supported Solihull MBC with 
data, Atkins worked with TfWM on the initial feasibility and preliminary design, Solihull 
MBC were proactive in engaging with JLR about their site and the National Express 
shared their data with Centro to carry out monitoring and evaluation of the scheme which 
in turn avoided incurring additional costs. Solihull MBC also collaborated with TfWM to 
help deal with customers and general queries along the way. Finally, CS4 revealed that 
there was a reasonable amount of consultation and engagement with the stakeholders and 
this helped to build a relationship between the parties involved. This was an important 
part of delivering the scheme as it ensured a common understanding of what was to be 
delivered. 
9. Policy remodelling: Limited changes to the policy should occur from the design 
stage right through to the implementation stage. 
Three case studies revealed policy remodelling as a barrier. CS1 revealed Nexus made 
changes which made the bus operators believe Nexus were “plugging the gaps” as they 
went along and developed a new plan for the scheme. The general public did not welcome 
changes and this was a barrier for during the QCS proposal because “nobody likes 
changes” and “there’s a natural resistance to change”. CS2 indicated SPT made several 
changes to the scheme based on the feedback from the public to help improve the scheme. 
CS3 revealed that changes included the removal of cycle lanes, repairs to the canal bridge 
on Lode Lane and adjustments to the TRO at Ratcliffe House. Meanwhile a proposal was 
put to JLR for the transfer of some land adjacent to the highway for the scheme, however 
they could not agree terms on the cost of the purchase and the scheme was therefore 
amended. It was also established that the scheme was passed onto other members with 
different roles during the implementation process. In contrast to these case studies, CS4 
revealed policy changes were an enabler for the scheme because it was decided from the 
beginning how the scheme would be implemented and it was completed without signifi-
cant changes. 
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10. Opposition, conflict and ambiguities: Opposition, conflict and ambiguities are 
inevitable including public opposition, political power, local and national elec-
tions, conflicts between neighbouring authorities over budgets, bus wars and 
open-access to data by bus operating companies. 
All four case studies revealed opposition, conflict and ambiguities as a barrier for the 
implementation of the schemes. CS1 indicated that the Tyne and Wear PTUG supported 
Nexus and were in favour of the scheme, however they strongly opposed the opinions of 
the bus operators. Opposition from the general public was mixed because people were 
not fully aware of the reasons for the scheme. It was also revealed that there was a “serious 
breakdown in the relationship” between Nexus and the bus operators which prevented the 
QCS from being implemented. CS2 revealed that delays to the scheme resulted in public 
opposition and opposition from hospital staff. The general public also expressed concerns 
over the appropriateness of spending a large amount of money on a busway that is rela-
tively lightly used. Meanwhile, the case study revealed a lack of local government interest 
and support was a barrier. Similarly, CS3 identified public opposition as a key barrier due 
to the cutting down of trees, getting access to various locations and TROs to stop vehicles 
going into properties of residents. In terms of political power, it was also noted that too 
few politicians and decision makers use the bus and this can create an obstacle as they are 
focused on the wrong priorities. Finally, CS4 revealed conflict and ambiguities were bar-
riers because the bus operators had different expectations for the scheme as they are a 
commercial business and driven by profits and this resulted in heated discussions with 
DCC. Further conflict was identified between both DCC and the bus operators related to 
profits and road maintenance. Both local and national elections were also barriers for the 
scheme and this resulted in the scheme being delayed. 
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Chapter 8: Theoretical synthesis and discussion   
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter will present the findings from the three main sources of data collected. This 
includes the theoretical analysis of the questionnaires, telephone interviews and case stud-
ies. The theoretical analysis was based on the application of the decision support frame-
work to the three sets of data, separately. The three sets of data will now be triangulated 
and analysed again using elements of the framework which are then divided into high, 
medium-high, medium-low, and low impacts. As previously mentioned, triangulation is 
important for verification and increases validity by incorporating the various methods 
used in this research. 
This chapter will also discuss the overall results from this research and will carry 
out further triangulation by combining the findings from the literature review with the 
theoretical analysis of the three sets of data. The overall results identified in this chapter 
will address the fourth research objective to help meet the aim of this thesis. For ease of 
reference, the fourth research objective is addressed in table 8.1. Finally, this chapter will 
discuss the results in relation to the “real world” applicability for policy makers and plan-
ners. 




To build on theoretical literature and 
current views and experiences of key 
players/stakeholders to help improve 
the implementation of bus policy at a 
local level. 
This objective draws on the results from the liter-
ature review and empirical analysis in order to 
obtain insights into current bus policy implemen-
tation and associated challenges. This includes 
theoretical analysis of the data collected to iden-
tify the key barriers to bus policy implementation 
at a local level in Great Britain. 
8.2 Theoretical synthesis of results  
Table 6.3 presented a summary of the theoretical analysis of the questionnaires and tele-
phone interviews. Each element of the decision support framework was divided into high, 
 Chapter 8: Theoretical synthesis and discussion 
    Page 270 
medium, and low impacts. This technique helped to measure the impact of each element 
of the framework and to identify the key barriers associated with the implementation of 
bus policy at a local level.  Four elements of the framework were rated as a high impact. 
These include: policy objective; availability of resources; intra-organisation support and 
communication; and characteristics of organisations. Three elements of the framework 
were ranked as a medium impact: economic, social and political environments; collabo-
ration and interaction between those involved in the policy process; and opposition, con-
flict, and ambiguities.  
As previously mentioned in chapter 7 of this thesis, the case studies were included 
in this research to complement the findings from the questionnaires and telephone inter-
views and in turn help inform the research questions. Furthermore, the case studies were 
selected due to their comparability since they include the same phenomenon under inves-
tigation (the implementation of bus policy) and follow similar transport policy frame-
works (Scotland and England) (Yin, 1994 p.13). Table 7.15 presented a summary of the 
theoretical analysis of the case studies to identify the key barriers associated with the 
implementation of bus policy at a local level. Two elements of the framework were rated 
as a high impact, including policy objective and the characteristics of organisations. Four 
elements were rated as a medium-high impact including: availability of resources; intra-
organisation support and communication; economic, social and political environments; 
and opposition, conflict, and ambiguities. Meanwhile, three elements were rated as a low-
medium impact including: bureaucratic power; collaboration and interaction between 
those involved in the policy process; and policy remodelling.  
Table 8.2 presents the overall theoretical synthesis of the three sets of data to deter-
mine which barriers have the greatest and least impact on the implementation of bus pol-
icy at a local level in Great Britain. Based on the results, each element in the framework 
was ranked as high, medium-high, medium-low, or low. It was found that the results from 
the three sets of data remained relatively consistent throughout the data collection process 
and there were no major changes when analysing the results. For example, there were no 
cases of an element of the framework changing from a ‘high’ impact to ‘low’ impact 
barrier. Instead it would have remained as a ‘high’ impact barrier or changed to ‘medium-
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high’. However, this is a qualitative ranking by the author not intended for robust appli-
cation but merely for ease of presenting and discussing the results.  
The overall results show that two elements of the framework were rated as a high 
impact, including policy objective; and the characteristics of organisations. Four elements 
were rated as a medium-high impact including: availability of resources; intra-organisa-
tion support and communication; economic, social and political environments; and oppo-
sition, conflict, and ambiguities. Meanwhile, three elements were rated as a low-medium 
impact including: bureaucratic power; collaboration and interaction between those in-
volved in the policy process; and policy remodelling. Finally, one element of the frame-

















































18% of local authorities do not 
have a specific bus policy docu-
ment in place. "Coherence and 
comprehensibility of the written 
policy" was identified as one of 
the greatest barriers to imple-
mentation. 
 Most officers said they do not have a 
specific bus policy in place. All agreed it 
is important to have a policy document in 
place. The majority felt that, related 
closely to the policy document, it was im-
portant to have monitoring in place to 
achieve bus policy measures. They felt 
that policy measures would be imple-
mented as planned and without problems 
if stricter monitoring were in place.  
All four case studies revealed an unclear link be-
tween designing the policy, setting targets and 
suitable measures to achieve those targets, and 




















 Ranked as the greatest barrier to 
implementation. "Limited fund-





Ranked the greatest barrier to implemen-
tation. Lack of resources prevented coun-
cils from meeting targets. 
CS1: QCS was financially unsustainable and re-
jected by Traffic Commissioner. CS2: Delays in 
obtaining funding and delays with delivery of 
scheme. CS4: Bus operators struggled to priori-
tise resources and deal with requests from various 
bodies. Also made most financial investments. 
Lack of knowledge, advertisement and marketing 
around scheme.  CS3: Solihull MBC maximised 
the use of available funding but still ensuring that 






























































Ranked fourth highest barrier to 
implementation. 
Half of the officers said communication 
was a barrier to implementation. A broad 
range of communication barriers was 
highlighted including between neigh-
bouring authorities, bus operators, stake-
holders, politicians and the public. 
CS1: Nexus made “changes along the way” and 
“some mistakes” were made by their consultants. 
CS2: SPT don’t have internal expertise or full 
powers for regulation in comparison to bus oper-
ators. Bus operators don’t have enough staff to 
look at radical plans to put in integrated transport 
systems. CS4:  Lack of support within bus com-
panies on complex issues with ABC product. Bus 
drivers have difficulty using product. CS3: Or-
ganisations worked together for several years and 



























Ranked as the second highest 
barrier to implementation. 15 of-
ficers could not indicate the num-
ber of teams within the council's 
transport department who have 
responsibility for the implemen-
tation of bus policies. 
Most officers did not agree this was one 
of the greatest barriers. However, staffing 
difficulties such as shortage of staff or 
over-worked staff was raised on several 
occasions. Two officers did not know the 
number of teams responsible for imple-
mentation of bus policies. 
CS1: Took a year to educate 3 people on work 
done in 5 years. Small firm with small legal team 
and economic advisers (Nexus). Bus operators 
commercially minded working against QCS case. 
CS2: Extra workload created stress for the staff. 
Size of scheme and level of public engagement an 
issue. CS3: Workload, competency and priorities 
of staff a barrier. Scheme worked simultaneously 
instead of sequentially. CS4: Internal efforts and 
time by the bus operators to deliver the scheme 
an issue. Bus operators had an incomplete under-
standing of smart ticketing. Reluctant to be in-

























































 Officers identified key barriers in 
their area as "bus wars between 
operators"; "political will of 
members"; "physical space and 
layout of roads" and "high car 
ownership." 
Barriers include political constraints and 
support (or lack of it), the impact of 
neighbouring authorities, current eco-
nomic climate and public opposition. 
CS1: Nexus could not prove its affordability and 
value for money. QCS would not extend to 
Durham and Northumberland. NECA area was 
unable to decide on election of new mayor. CS2: 
Image problem associated with using bus. Com-
petition between buses and rail. Less press cover-
age to encourage bus usage. CS3: Negative per-
ception from drivers. Lack of political support 
around understanding bus policy. Uncertainty 
about what the council is trying to achieve, and 
reviewing bus lanes. CS4: Bus operators don’t 
portray benefits of using scheme. Negative per-
ception of how some bus drivers communicate 
with customers. Danger that ABC product would 
threaten existing revenue stream of bus operators. 


















Ranked as having a lesser impact 
on implementation. 
Four officers did not agree with the ques-
tionnaire that this had a lesser impact on 
implementation. Several examples of 
how competent and motivated staff can 
have an impact on other staff involved in 
the policy process. 
CS1: Go North East and Stagecoach were policy 
champions who saw the case through from begin-
ning to end. CS2: SPT were policy champions 
and were committed and willing to work with 
other stakeholders involved. CS3: One key policy 
champion from Solihull MBC who was responsi-
ble, competent, motivated and wanted to drive 
change. CS4: Two key policy champions from 
National Express who had willingness and drive 










































Ranked as having a lesser impact 
on implementation. 
Three officers did not agree with the 
questionnaire that this had a lesser impact 
on implementation. One officer indicated 
that there needs to be a “one council ap-
proach” instead of several departments 
because they had many instances of de-
partments not telling each other every-
thing and scowling with each other over 
resources. 
 
CS1: Nexus has limited evidence when preparing 
the QCS. CS4: Road maintenance five year plan 
creates “havoc” for the bus operators and the bus 
services in place. CS2: Limited evidence of bu-






















































 Ranked as having a lesser impact 
on implementation. 
Most officers highlighted the importance 
of the interaction between the councils 
and bus operators and felt it was "key" to 
have "a good strong partnership arrange-
ment" 
CS1: Relationship between Nexus and bus oper-
ators was “damaged”. Bus companies were un-
willing to share data. CS2: Enabler included col-
laboration with locals who supported develop-
ment, political buy-in, public transport agencies 
and operators. CS3: TfWM provided Solihull 
MBC with data. Atkins worked with TfWM on 
initial feasibility and preliminary design. Solihull 
MBC engaged with JLR about site. National Ex-
press shared data with Centro to carry out moni-
toring and evaluation. Solihull MBC collaborated 
with TfWM to deal with customers and general 
queries. CS4: Consultation and engagement took 









































 Ranked as having a lesser impact 
on implementation. 
One officer said policy change prevented 
their council implementing policy 
measures. Another officer said partners 
and stakeholder working groups are key 
so that policy does not change during im-
plementation. 
CS1: Nexus made changes during scheme pro-
posal. CS2: Changes required due to feedback 
from public. CS3: Changes include removal of 
cycle lanes, repairs to the canal bridge on Lode 
Lane and adjustments to the TRO at Ratcliffe 
House. CS4: Decided from the beginning how 
scheme would be implemented and completed 
































Ranked as having a lesser impact 
on implementation. Some offic-
ers identified key barriers in their 
area as "bus wars between opera-
tors," "public opinion influenc-
ing outcomes." 
Barriers include conflict and ambiguities 
between councils and the public, local 
bus operators who competed with each 
other, and neighbouring councils who 
were fighting amongst each other for 
budgets. 
CS1: TWPTUG supported the scheme but 
strongly opposed the opinions of the bus opera-
tors. Opposition from public. Breakdown in the 
relationship between Nexus and bus operators. 
CS2: Delays to scheme resulted in opposition. 
Public concerned over appropriateness of cost of 
scheme. Lack of local government interest and 
support. CS3: Public opposition and lack of gov-
ernment interest and support. CS4: Bus operators 
had different expectations to DCC. Local and na-
tional elections delayed scheme. 
Medium-
High 
Note: CS refers to case study; Darker red = higher impact; Lighter red = lower impact
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1. Policy objective:  A written bus policy document should be in place, showing a 
clear link between policy objectives, measures and the setting and monitoring 
of targets. 
All three sets of data revealed that there are good reasons to argue that a written bus policy 
document should be in place to implement bus policy at a local level. The officers who 
completed the questionnaires identified “coherence and comprehensibility of the written 
policy" as one of the greatest barriers to implementation. On the other hand, the same 
questionnaire found that 18% of local authorities do not have a specific bus policy docu-
ment in place. The telephone interviews also revealed similar issues: whilst most officers 
interviewed said they did not have a specific bus policy document in place, they all agreed 
that it is important to have this document in place.  The officers noted the importance of 
this document in terms of communicating with local stakeholders and politicians, under-
standing of what they need to achieve, dealing with conflict from the public and politi-
cians who might have a different perception on a particular policy, and a way to identify 
key milestones to be achieved. However, there are no sanctions and no drive for this doc-
ument to be in place. Meanwhile, this lack of a local bus policy document in many au-
thorities is most likely linked to the abolition of the requirement for a separate bus strategy 
in the 2008 Local Transport Act. On the other hand, despite the importance placed on the 
policy document by the officers interviewed, the case studies revealed that a scheme did 
not have to be in a policy document for it to be implemented. For example, Solihull MBC 
(CS3) does not have a specific bus strategy or bus document in place, while Dundee City 
has not had a bus strategy or a bus policy document in place for the past 17 years.  
In terms of policy objectives, the questionnaires revealed that officers included the 
listed policy objectives mentioned in the questionnaire, which demonstrates that councils 
recognise the importance of having a stated bus policy as part of their overall transport 
objectives. However, the case studies enabled a deeper investigation into the importance 
of written bus policy and it was found that overall, there was no clear evidence that a 
written bus policy document is essential for implementation. This was evident in CS1 (the 
Quality Contract attempt by Nexus) when the policy document in place (the 2012 Bus 
Strategy) was important in helping to justify the application by Nexus for Quality Con-
tract powers. However, this document has not been updated since, which suggests it is 
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less essential for implementation of other policies in Tyne and Wear and was to an extent 
merely produced in order to help to support a particular course of action. CS3 (the Lode 
Lane bus priority scheme in Solihull) revealed that it was difficult to translate some pol-
icies into practice because of a lack of political support to help deliver the scheme. The 
lack of bus policy documents in place to support the LLRE scheme was however not 
especially important given that the scheme was instead placed firmly in an economic de-
velopment policy context (access to jobs), not specifically a transport or bus policy con-
text. Meanwhile, CS4 (ABC smart ticketing scheme in Dundee) indicated that the policy 
objectives of the Scheme appeared to be a barrier because the objectives for the bus op-
erators were different from those of Transport Scotland. For example, the objectives of 
the bus operators were to increase profits and the number of passengers using their ser-
vices, whereas Transport Scotland wanted to introduce smart ticketing and something 
simple like the Oyster card in London. However, the bus operators were concerned that 
the introduction of smart ticketing could have a negative impact on their business and that 
they could potentially lose profits and customers. In contrast to these three schemes, CS2 
(Glasgow Fastlink) found that the original scheme was clearly related to policy objectives 
– although this did not in this case particularly aid its smooth implementation or reduce 
other implementation barriers. Overall, the case studies suggest that a scheme did not 
have to be aligned with the objectives of a bus policy document, for it to be implemented. 
Closely related to policy objectives was the issue of setting targets and monitoring 
whether they are achieved. The questionnaires, telephone interviews and case studies re-
vealed inconsistencies about the importance of this. Although the questionnaire results 
revealed that councils are setting objectives, there were many areas of concern highlighted 
throughout the questionnaire in terms of the importance of setting and meeting targets.  
For example, more than half of the officers indicated that they do not set targets. The 
telephone interviews revealed similar concerns where only one officer said they met all 
their targets while three officers said they met most of their targets. However, when the 
officers were asked if targets have an impact on how policies are implemented in their 
city, more than half of the officers said they do. However, concerns were expressed that 
either targets were not set or being met. The telephone interviews revealed that these 
concerns are due to a lack of funding; a lack of political will; a lack of communication 
within the council and the community; and a lack of advertisement and marketing. The 
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case studies also revealed concerns over setting and meeting targets. Although CS2 re-
vealed that targets are set by SPT which are mostly about passenger satisfaction and usage 
for the Fastlink Scheme, CS1 revealed a general lack of data showing progress against its 
targets since the QCS proposal, while CS3 and CS4 did not set targets for the specific 
schemes.  
The three sets of data also examined bus measures and monitoring in place to assess 
whether those measures had been delivered and had achieved objectives. These findings 
from the questionnaires reveal that, regardless of the policy objectives selected, the same 
policy measures were the most popular. With only a few minor exceptions, the order of 
popularity of measures was the same when cross-referenced against all of the policy ob-
jectives. This suggests that these measures were not chosen to meet specific policy ob-
jectives but for other reasons such as contributing towards several objectives simultane-
ously or being easier or cheaper to implement. For example, bus information is likely to 
be relatively easy to implement due to the duties and powers that local authorities have 
in this area under both the 1985 and 2000 Transport Acts; and because it is a relatively 
uncomplicated and uncontroversial measure. In comparison to this, control over maxi-
mum fares is something much more difficult to implement due to limited legal powers 
for local authorities in this area, as also outlined in this section. 
The questionnaire results revealed that continued and regular monitoring of bus 
policy objectives is being carried out by councils. Meanwhile, the majority of officers 
who took part in a telephone interview felt it was important to have monitoring in place 
to achieve bus policy measures. For example, two officers mentioned that they monitor 
congestion, reliability and comfort. Furthermore, most officers agreed bus policy 
measures would be implemented as planned and without problems if stricter monitoring 
was in place. However, as one officer pointed out, there is no funding attached to doing 
well and achieving bus policy measures.  
There appeared to be some contradiction between the questionnaire results and the 
telephone interviews when asked what they thought constituted good practice in monitor-
ing.  According to the questionnaire, “coherence and comprehensibility of the written 
policy” was one of the greatest barriers to implementation, whereas the majority of offic-
ers from the telephone interviews did not agree with this being one of the greatest barriers. 
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The case studies also revealed concerns over the monitoring regime in place for the spe-
cific bus schemes. The LLRE Scheme (CS3) is successful in terms of monitoring, how-
ever, there appears to be a lack of monitoring in place for the Fastlink Scheme (CS2) and 
the ‘Fastlink Route Performance Report’ published in 2015 was the last time such moni-
toring took place and no further monitoring reports have been published since then, which 
indicates to be a barrier to scheme acceptance. Meanwhile CS4 revealed limited infor-
mation about the monitoring in place for the ABC Scheme. However, although the 
scheme is similar to an English VPA, there is no contract between DCC and the bus op-
erators for monitoring to take place. 
Although there are concerns about the level of monitoring that is in place, the results 
indicate that councils do in fact think it is important to have monitoring in place to im-
prove their chances of future funding. It also highlights the importance of having clear 
strategies and tactics, rather than simply implementing policies that are “do-able.” This, 
in turn, may improve policy development and collaboration, and promote an environment 
of stakeholder engagement because external stakeholders can understand the guiding 
logic and see evidence of progress. Moreover, robust monitoring regimes help to develop 
a sound evidence base to influence decision making and to monitor performance. 
Overall, the questionnaires, telephone interviews and case studies revealed an un-
clear link between designing the policy, setting targets and suitable measures to achieve 
those targets, and monitoring those targets for implementation. Moreover, the case studies 
suggest that a bus scheme did not have to be in a policy document, or even aligned with 
a policy document’s objectives, for it to be implemented. 
 
2. Availability of resources: Resources such as financial support are important; 
however, where resources are limited, it is necessary to maximise the use of 
available resources. 
The three sets of data identified the availability of resources as a key barrier to the imple-
mentation of bus policy. The officers from the questionnaires were asked to identify 
which barriers have the greatest and least impact on implementation. The greatest barriers 
included the availability of resources, while “limited funding” was identified as a key 
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reason for this barrier. However, the previous element of this framework revealed con-
cerns with the unclear link between policy objectives and measures and the setting and 
monitoring of performance targets. Therefore, the results from the questionnaires sug-
gested that this may be due to the over-emphasis on the availability of resources, which 
is seen as the greatest barrier to implementation based on several references made 
throughout the questionnaires. It was also suggested that this unclear link indicates that 
councils are in fact placing too much emphasis on "what" is needed to implement policy 
(i.e., resources) and instead they should be placing more emphasis on "how" to implement 
the policy in terms of targets, measures, and performance monitoring. Moreover, once 
this is clear, councils can then direct resources where needed.  
Similar to the questionnaires, the telephone interviews revealed that the availability 
of resources was ranked the greatest barrier to impact implementation. For example, a 
lack of policy resources prevented the councils having a bus policy document, achieving 
targets, bus policy measures and working to their full potential.  
Three out of the four case studies also identified availability of resources as a bar-
rier. CS1 revealed that the QCS was judged by the Traffic Commissioner to be financially 
unsustainable, would cost the local tax payer a large amount of money with (according to 
the Commissioner) no real benefits, and involve issues in the future in terms of pension 
liabilities, and it was therefore rejected. Another example of the availability of resources 
as a barrier was identified in CS2 which indicated that there were delays in obtaining 
funding which resulted in consequent delays in the delivery of the scheme. CS4 also re-
vealed that the bus operators struggled to prioritise their resources and find the time to 
deal with requests from various bodies. This was mainly due to the pressure from 
Transport Scotland who imposed the scheme upon them, however, the priority of the bus 
operators was their business and commercial concerns.  
Meanwhile, the bus operators had made the most financial investments in compar-
ison to other stakeholders involved in the scheme. It was also found that there was also a 
lack of knowledge, advertisement and marketing around the scheme. In contract to these 
three case studies, CS3 indicated resources were an enabler to implement the LLRE 
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Scheme because Solihull MBC maximised the use of available funding and the under-
spend within the GBSLEP’s Local Growth Fund programme for 2015/16 was also help-
ful. 
These findings highlight the difficultly that local authorities face in allocating re-
sources to new transport policy initiatives. This is unsurprising, as lack of funding is the 
easiest and most natural barrier to nominate, but this does not mean that unlimited re-
sources would ensure bus policy implementation. Nonetheless, undertaking a policy ini-
tiative and without financial resources to follow it through, or at the very least knowing 
where those resources might come from, suggests poor planning. 
3. Intra-organisation support and communication: Policy staff need relevant 
training, supervision and support within their organisation when dealing with 
complex policy issues. 
The results from the questionnaires provided limited information about intra-organisation 
support and communication within the local authorities. As previously mentioned, this 
could be due to officers answering the questionnaire questions in the broader context of 
their experiences of bus policy in their city, and not thinking only about working within 
their organisation. Therefore, this highlights the importance of including further methods 
of data collection such as telephone interviews and case studies to explore the role of 
organisations when dealing with bus policy and to determine any support or communica-
tion issues within these organisations.  
Both the telephone interviews and case studies revealed that a lack of communica-
tion can have a negative impact on how policies are implemented. For example, half of 
the officers said communication was a barrier to implementation and this was particularly 
a barrier between neighbouring authorities, bus operators, stakeholders, politicians and 
the public. The telephone interviews also revealed that a lack of intra-organisation support 
and communication can also have an impact on how councils meet targets and how bus 
policies are monitored. 
Similarly, three out of the four case studies identified intra-organisation support and 
communication as a barrier. CS1 indicated that some errors were made by Nexus in their 
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preparation of the case for the Quality Contract where they made “changes along the 
way”, had “weaker parts” of their case and “some mistakes” made by their consultants. 
They were also challenged by a relative lack of staff capacity to plan the business case 
for the QCS.  Meanwhile, the bus operators had the financial and legal support and the 
communication resources to work against Nexus and to find flaws in the case for the QCS 
– clear evidence that the opponents of the scheme had greater organisational capacity and 
resources than did its promoters. CS2 found that SPT do not have as much internal ex-
pertise as the bus operators, but it was also found that the current framework in place isn’t 
working and the bus operators don’t have enough staff to look at radical plans to put in 
integrated transport systems. Finally, CS4 suggests there is support from bus operators in 
the UK for the general concept of the smart ticketing product, however there is a lack of 
support and capacity within the companies on dealing with the more complex issues with 
the product. Another example of communication as a barrier was identified in CS4 when 
a road maintenance five-year plan was introduced by the councils which created “havoc” 
for the bus operators and the bus services in place. In contrast to these case studies, CS3 
revealed that prior to LLRE Scheme, the organisations involved worked together well for 
a number of years and carried out a series of bus network reviews across the region., 
implying that this pre-existing communication was an enabler for the LLRE scheme.  
Overall, the findings from the telephone interviews and case studies show that intra-or-
ganisational support and communication are clearly very important enablers for imple-
mentation. 
4. Characteristics of organisations: Both formal structural features of organisa-
tions and informal attributes of their personnel (including size, competency and 
workload of staff). 
The questionnaires, telephone interviews and case studies revealed the characteristics of 
organisations as a key barrier associated with the implementation of bus policy at a local 
level. It was revealed in the questionnaires that 15 officers did not know the number of 
teams within their council's transport department who have responsibility for the imple-
mentation of bus policies. However, as previously mentioned, this could suggest either 
that they did not know whether there were such teams within the council, or that they 
simply do not have teams within the council responsible for the implementation of bus 
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policies, because the councils are small and have few staff. Another question in the ques-
tionnaire asked the officers for their perception of planned and actual implementation for 
the previous LTP/S. Some 14% of officers did not answer this question, which could 
indicate that they were not aware of their success. While these examples suggest that the 
characteristics of organisations are a barrier for the implementation of bus policy, it was 
important to explore these issues further using telephone interviews and case studies. 
In comparison to the questionnaires, the majority of officers interviewed did not 
agree that the characteristics of the organisation was one of the greatest barriers. How-
ever, staffing difficulties such as shortage of staff or over-worked staff were raised on 
several occasions and were considered to have a negative impact on policy implementa-
tion. 
Meanwhile, all four case studies revealed the characteristics of the organisation as 
a barrier. CS1 indicated that staff from Nexus did not have the expertise for understanding 
the QCS process and therefore required several years of training to prepare the proposal. 
They also indicated that a key reason for why they failed to meet the requirements of the 
QCS was due to being a “small organisation with a small legal team and economic advis-
ers.” Meanwhile, they felt that the bus operators had staff who were “commercially 
minded” and worked against their case for a QCS. Number and competency of staff within 
Nexus was also raised as an issue. CS2 revealed that SPT also experienced extra workload 
with the Fastlink project and this created stress for the staff. The size of the scheme was 
also identified as a barrier. CS3 indicated the workload of staff was a barrier as the scheme 
was brought forward and therefore worked simultaneously instead of sequentially. Staff 
were faced with time limitations to prepare the scheme and were under pressure to com-
plete various stages of the business case. Competency of staff and priorities of staff were 
also raised as an issue. Similarly, CS4 revealed that internal efforts and time by the bus 
operators to deliver the scheme were a barrier. It was also found that not everyone in-
volved was competent about understanding smart ticketing and this was particularly a 
barrier for bus drivers. Meanwhile, prior to the scheme, the bus operators were reluctant 
to be involved which meant the scheme started later than anticipated. They felt they had 
had other priorities every year and it wasn’t until 2016 when they ready to deliver the 
product. 
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5. Economic, social and political environments: Current and future economic, so-
cial and political environments play an important role on the outcome of the 
policy process. 
The questionnaire revealed limited information about economic, social and political en-
vironments. However, as previously mentioned, it should be cautioned that questionnaires 
are sometimes completed by respondents in an abstract way without linking consideration 
of the questions to cases of implementation that might have made respondents think about 
the issues in a more "hands-on" way and thus about the economic, social and political 
environment in which they were working.  For example, it was quite surprising that “eco-
nomic, social and political environments” were judged to be less important in their influ-
ence on the implementation process than some other factors, as one might expect such 
factors to be quite critical to political support for a scheme or measure. Therefore, further 
methods of data collection such as questionnaires and telephone interviews were essential 
to explore these areas in detail and to determine what impact they have on the implemen-
tation of bus policy at a local level. Again, this shows the importance of having a mixed 
methodology for this research.  
The case studies suggest that economic conditions are a lesser barrier in comparison 
to social and political environments. CS3 revealed economic environments were helpful 
to deliver the LLRE Scheme as Solihull has the most productive economy in the Mid-
lands. Meanwhile, CS4 revealed that economic environments were helpful to implement 
the ABC Scheme due to the small number of operators with a good operating situation. 
This highlights the importance of the current economic climate, which is essential for 
implementation of bus schemes such as the LLRE Scheme and ABC Scheme. Moreover, 
it highlights how the current economic climate also affects the outcome of targets and 
monitoring of bus policy measures. 
By comparison, the results indicated that social and political conditions have an 
impact on the implementation of bus schemes. CS2 revealed that there were social barri-
ers due to an image problem associated with using the bus, competition between buses 
and rail and less press coverage to encourage bus usage. However, social environments 
were a barrier due to a negative perception from drivers when the scheme was introduced. 
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CS4 also revealed social conditions were a barrier where bus operators don’t all portray 
the image of the benefits of using the scheme and there is negative perception of how 
some bus drivers communicate with customers availing of the scheme. 
The telephone interviews identified several examples of where political conditions 
had an impact on the relationship between objectives and results. It was found that polit-
ical constraints and support prevented councils from having a bus policy document in 
place, implementing bus policy measures and achieving targets. For example, measures 
that get political support at a general level (e.g., there should be more bus priority) may 
attract much less support once they require adding a bus lane on a specific street. Political 
conditions were also a barrier due to a lack of political support around understanding bus 
policy, uncertainty about what the council is trying to achieve and a lack of support to 
keep under constant review enforced bus lanes. The case studies also revealed examples 
of political barriers. For example, political barriers were evident in CS1where the QCS 
proposal indicated that it would not extend to Durham and Northumberland. Meanwhile, 
political barriers were evident when the NECA area was unable to decide on the election 
of a new mayor. CS4 indicated political conditions were a barrier for the bus operators 
because they have their own commercial concerns and there was a danger that the ABC 
product would threaten existing revenue stream. However, the bus operators had little 
choice in the matter as Transport Scotland imposed this scheme on them. The results 
found that there was considerable mention of “political will” or lack thereof as a barrier. 
There may seem to be some contradiction in this finding since most authorities studied 
appeared to have documented bus policies that had been adopted politically but this per-
haps shows that political support can be obtained for general strategy but may evaporate 
at the level of individual schemes. 
6. Policy champions: Policy implementation should not be restricted to one policy 
champion and instead needs several policy champions who are responsible, 
competent and motivated to see the policy through from beginning to end. 
The questionnaire indicated that policy champions had a lesser impact on implementation. 
Again, this could be due to officers answering the questionnaire questions in a much 
broader context in relation to their experiences of bus policy in their city, and not within 
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their organisation. Therefore, further methods of data collection including telephone in-
terviews and case studies were important to explore the impact of policy champions on 
implementation.  
In comparison to the questionnaire, four officers who took part in the telephone 
interviews did not agree policy champions had a low impact on implementation. The in-
terviews revealed several examples of how competent and motivated staff can have an 
impact on other staff involved in the policy process. For example, one officer said com-
petent and motivated staff enabled them to have a good partnership arrangement and they 
have been able to grow bus patronage in recent years. Furthermore, policy champions can 
have an impact on the development and implementation of bus policies and achieving 
targets. The interviews also revealed negative motivation and attitudes of staff could po-
tentially jeopardise the working relationship between the council staff and bus operators. 
This was evident when one officer noted that when staff don’t have an interest or involve-
ment, buses can be seen as a second-class mode of travel. 
The case studies enabled a deeper investigation into determining the importance of 
policy champions. All four case studies highlighted the importance of the role of policy 
champions and how they enabled the schemes to succeed, or not succeed as seen in CS1. 
CS1 revealed that both Nexus and the bus operators worked equally hard when dealing 
with the QCS inquiry, however it was the bus operators who saw the case follow through 
from beginning to end which included Go North East and Stagecoach. CS2 indicated that 
SPT were the policy champions for the Fastlink Scheme and they were committed and 
willing to work with the other stakeholders involved. CS3 revealed a key policy champion 
from Solihull MBC played an important role to implementing the LLRE Scheme. This 
champion was identified as responsible, competent, motivated, and wanted to drive 
change. Finally, CS4 revealed the ABC scheme had two key policy champions from Na-
tional Express. These policy champions had the willingness and drive to implement the 
scheme and be the first in Scotland to happen from scratch. Overall, the case studies pro-
vide fruitful examples of the importance of having a policy champion in place to deliver 
bus schemes. 
 Chapter 8: Theoretical synthesis and discussion 
    Page 288 
7. Bureaucratic power: Hierarchical control in an organisation is important; how-
ever, hierarchical power must not be used to overrule policy decisions by other 
members within the organisation. 
The questionnaires and telephone interviews revealed limited information on bureaucratic 
power and whether it had an impact on the implementation of bus policy at a local level. 
Similar to the third, fifth and sixth elements of the framework, further methods of data 
collection such as case studies were required to explore the impact of bureaucratic power 
in detail.  
The case studies revealed several examples of how bureaucratic power had a nega-
tive impact on councils. For example, CS1 indicated that the bus operators didn’t want to 
share data with Nexus because “it also adds another layer of bureaucracy with meetings 
and the bus companies aren’t used to that exposure”. Meanwhile, CS4 revealed that the 
bus operators were also reluctant to be involved in the ABC scheme but Transport Scot-
land had the power to enforce the scheme upon them. 
These examples indicate that there are issues associated with bureaucratic power 
between organisations, rather than within organisations. Moreover, bureaucratic power is 
particularly an issue between bus operators and government bodies such as Transport 
Scotland and local councils. 
8. Collaboration and interaction between those involved in the policy process: Col-
laboration and interaction is necessary between key actors involved in the policy 
process, including policy makers, local authority staff, local and national gov-
erning bodies, regional transport partnerships, bus operators and transport 
practitioners working within the transport field. 
The questionnaires suggested that poor collaboration and low levels of interaction be-
tween those involved in the policy process had a negative impact on bus implementation 
at a local level. For example, a question in the questionnaire asked the officers if bus 
measures in their cities were implemented as planned and without problems. The result 
indicated that the policy measures facing barriers are those that require collaboration and 
action by the operators, where the local authority has little control. It was also found that 
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operators do not always view participation in various bus schemes to be in their best 
commercial interests, which often reduces their readiness to participate. Similarly, CS1 
revealed that poor collaboration and interaction between those involved in the policy pro-
cess were key barriers for the QCS. This was particularly noticeable when Nexus said the 
relationship between themselves and the bus operators was “damaged” during the QCS 
process. Furthermore, they stated that the bus companies were unwilling to share data and 
this in turn prevented them from planning the scheme more accurately and therefore from 
being implemented. 
However, both the telephone interviews and the other three case studies revealed 
collaboration and interaction between those involved in the policy process is important 
for bus policy implementation at a local level. Most officers who took part in the tele-
phone interviews highlighted the importance for the interaction between the councils and 
bus operators and felt it was key to have a good strong partnership arrangement. Several 
examples were also mentioned during the interviews that highlight the importance of the 
interaction between policy makers, implementers from various levels of government, and 
other actors. The officers felt good interaction was needed for policy implementation, 
achieving targets and to grow bus patronage. 
Three case studies revealed collaboration and interaction between those involved in 
the policy process were enablers to implement the schemes involved. CS2 indicated that 
collaboration with locals who supported the development, political buy-in, partnerships 
working with the public transport agencies (the roads authority) and the operators was 
“absolutely crucial”. The bus operators had a “good relationship” with the staff at SPT 
and this helped the scheme to succeed. Similarly, CS3 revealed TfWM supported Solihull 
MBC with data, Atkins worked with TfWM on the initial feasibility and preliminary de-
sign, Solihull MBC were proactive in engaging with JLR about their site and National 
Express shared their data with Centro to carry out monitoring and evaluation of the 
scheme which in turn avoided incurring additional costs. Solihull MBC also collaborated 
with TfWM to help deal with customers and general queries along the way. Finally, CS4 
revealed that there was a reasonable amount of consultation and engagement with the 
stakeholders and this helped to build a relationship between the parties involved. This 
was an important part of delivering the scheme as it ensured a common understanding 
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and scope on what was to be delivered. These results indicate that collaboration and in-
teraction between bus operators, policy makers, implementers from various levels of gov-
ernment, and other actors is key for implementation. 
9. Policy remodelling: Limited changes to the policy should occur from the design 
stage right through to the implementation stage. 
While the questionnaires provided limited information on policy remodelling, both the 
telephone interviews and case studies revealed policy remodelling as a barrier for imple-
menting bus policy at a local level. For example, one officer said policy change prevented 
their council implementing particular policy measures. Another officer said partners and 
stakeholder working groups are key so that policy does not change during implementa-
tion. 
Meanwhile, three case studies revealed policy remodelling as a barrier for imple-
menting the schemes. CS1 revealed Nexus made changes which made the bus operators 
believe Nexus were plugging the gaps as they went along and developed a new plan for 
the scheme. CS2 indicated SPT made a number of changes to the scheme based on the 
feedback from the public to help improve the scheme. CS3 revealed that changes included 
the removal of cycle lanes, repairs to the canal bridge on Lode Lane and adjustments to 
the TRO at Ratcliffe House. Meanwhile a proposal was put to Jaguar Land Rover for the 
transfer of some land adjacent to the highway for the scheme, however they could not 
agree terms on the cost of the purchase and the scheme was therefore amended. It was 
also established that the scheme was passed onto other members with different roles dur-
ing the implementation process.  
In contrast to these case studies, CS4 revealed policy changes were an enabler for 
the scheme because it was decided from the beginning how the scheme would be imple-
mented and it was completed without significant changes. These findings highlight the 
importance of limited remodelling when implementing bus policy at a local level. 
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10. Opposition, conflict and ambiguities: Opposition, conflict and ambiguities are 
inevitable including public opposition, political power, local and national elec-
tions, conflicts between neighbouring authorities over budgets, bus wars and 
open-access to data by bus operating companies. 
The questionnaires revealed opposition, conflict and ambiguities had a limited impact on 
implementation. However, some officers identified key barriers in their area as "bus wars 
between operators" and "public opinion influencing outcomes." The findings from the 
questionnaire also suggest that the unclear link between policy objectives, measures and 
the setting and monitoring of targets, could even be related to political decisions not to 
want to identify unmet targets and/or may relate to the difficulty of collecting data and 
monitoring progress in the achievement of certain policies. Meanwhile, like “economic, 
social and political environments”, it was also surprising that opposition, conflict, and 
ambiguities were judged to be less important in their influence on the implementation 
process than some other factors. It is also expected that such factors would be quite critical 
to political support for a scheme or measure.  
The results of the telephone interviews revealed that there were contradictions with 
the questionnaires and most officers did not agree public opposition had a lesser impact 
on implementation. In fact, the interviews provided several examples of barriers including 
conflict and ambiguities between councils and the public, local bus operators who com-
peted with each other, and neighbouring councils who were fighting amongst each other 
for budgets. Furthermore, the interviews revealed that these conflict and ambiguities can 
have an impact on developing measures and implementing bus policies at a local level. 
Similarly, all four case studies revealed opposition, conflict and ambiguities as a 
barrier for the implementation of the schemes. CS1 indicated that the Tyne and Wear 
PTUG supported Nexus and were in favour of the scheme, however they strongly opposed 
the opinions of the bus operators. Opposition from the public was mixed because people 
were not fully aware of the intentions of the scheme. It was also revealed that there was 
a “serious breakdown in the relationship” between Nexus and the bus operators which 
prevented the QCS from being implemented. CS2 revealed that delays to the scheme re-
sulted in public opposition and opposition from hospital staff. The public also expressed 
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concerns over the appropriateness to spend a large amount of money on a busway that is 
relatively lightly used. Meanwhile, the case study revealed a lack of local government 
interest and support was a barrier. Similarly, CS3 identified public opposition as a key 
barrier due to the cutting down of trees, getting access to various locations and TROs to 
stop vehicles going into properties of residents. In terms of political power, it was also 
noted that too few politicians and decision makers use the bus and this can create a mas-
sive obstacle as they are focused on other priorities. Finally, CS4 revealed conflict and 
ambiguities were barriers because the bus operators had different expectations for the 
scheme as they are commercial businesses and driven by profits and this resulted in heated 
discussions with DCC. Further conflict was identified between both DCC and the bus 
operators related to profits and road maintenance. Both local and national elections were 
also barriers for the scheme and this resulted in the scheme being delayed. 
These findings suggest opposition, conflict and ambiguities are key barriers to imple-
mentation. However, the framework has previously highlighted the importance of policy 
champions and collaboration and interaction between those involved in the policy process 
to prevent issues associated with opposition, conflict and ambiguities. For example, pub-
lic opposition was a key barrier for the LLRE Scheme, however a policy champion was 
central to overcoming this barrier to implement the scheme.  
8.3 Discussion of results 
This research investigated barriers to the implementation of bus policies by local author-
ities in Great Britain. Analysis of the questionnaires, telephone interviews and case stud-
ies using the decision support framework revealed six barriers to have a particularly high 
impact on implementation. These include “bus policy document," “availability of re-
sources," “intra-organisational support and communication," “the characteristics of the 
organisation”, “economic, social and political environments”, and “opposition, conflict 
and ambiguities”. Three of these factors are in large part internal to the implementing 
organisation, which it must address itself if implementation is to be successful. Mean-
while, three factors are external to the implementing organisation and implementation is 
influenced by other conditions which the organisation has no direct control over.  
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All three sets of data ranked the policy document as one of the greatest barrier to 
implementation. This was noticeable where 18% of the officers from the questionnaire 
and the majority of officers interviewed did not have a specific bus policy document in 
place. However, it was interesting to see all officers interviewed expressed the importance 
of this document. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) state that implementation requires 
statutory goals and objectives; the background of the policy; definition of key terms; and 
the policy’s target groups. Meanwhile Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) point out that im-
plementation is an interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to achieve 
those. Given all three sets of data ranked policy document as one of the greatest barrier 
to implementation, it is clear that there is a lack of support around policy objectives, which 
suggests why some officers interviewed said they did not have a specific bus policy doc-
ument in place. The case studies enabled a deeper investigation into the importance of 
written bus policy and it was found that overall, and in contrast to the questionnaire survey 
and interview results, there was no clear evidence that a written bus policy document is 
essential for implementation. For example, Solihull MBC (CS3) does not have a specific 
bus strategy or bus document in place, while Dundee City has not had a bus strategy or a 
bus policy document in place for the past 17 years.  
Other concerns over the coherence and comprehensibility of the policy include 
achieving the objectives set in the written policy document. Although the questionnaire 
results reveal that councils are setting objectives, there were many areas of concern high-
lighted throughout the questionnaire in terms of setting targets and implementing 
measures to achieve these objectives.  The interviews showed that more than half of the 
officers believed targets have an impact on how policies are implemented in their city, 
but concerns were expressed that either targets were not set or were not monitored. This 
is consistent with the finding by Van de Velde and Wallis (2013) that success is dependent 
upon the co-existence of a policy environment generally supportive of public transport. 
Thus, while the case presented here must be understood within the specific regulatory 
context of public transport in Britain outside London, the lessons summarised in Table 
8.2 remain generalisable in terms of the need for a supportive and coherent policy frame-
work for policy implementation. 
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Although annual monitoring reports were abolished during the Local Transport Act 
2008, the questionnaire results revealed that continued and regular monitoring of bus pol-
icy objectives is being carried out by councils. Meanwhile, all three sets of data indicated 
the importance of having a monitoring regime in place. However, the case studies re-
vealed concerns over the monitoring regime in place and this was noticeable in CS2 where 
there appeared to be a lack of monitoring in place for the Fastlink Scheme. Similarly, CS4 
revealed limited information about the monitoring in place for the ABC Scheme. A lack 
of monitoring in place could potentially cause problems as identified by Spear and 
Lightowler (2005), where the absence of a systematic LTS annual reporting process made 
it more difficult to assess how Scottish authorities have used their LTSs to deliver im-
provements on the ground, contribute to their objectives or offer value for money for the 
resources provided. Furthermore, the absence of LTS annual monitoring also meant the 
problems with LTSs could not be addressed. Similarly, Gössling et al. (2016, p.83) found 
“insufficient monitoring tools” as a barrier related to developing and implementing in-
centives related to climate policy. 
Gunn (1978) suggests that for “perfect implementation” adequate time and suffi-
cient resources must be made available; the required combination of resources must be 
actually available; and tasks must be fully specified in the correct sequence. Van Meter 
and Van Horn (1975) and Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) also point out that policy re-
sources should include appropriate funding. However, the three sets of data also ranked 
the availability of resources as one the greatest barrier to implementation. The interviews 
revealed that a lack of funding was preventing councils from achieving targets and there 
was a need for further financial support to help achieve targets. Therefore, authorities 
must be certain from the planning stage that there are sufficient resources available to 
support the initiative once implemented. Also, a lack of financial support could also be 
linked to a lack of political support during the implementation stage to access the required 
funds. These findings are consistent with research by McTigue et al. (2017), Preston 
(2016), Lindholm and Blinge (2014), Argyrioua et al. 2012, p.87), Marsden and May 
(2006), and Gaffron (2003) highlighting the difficultly that local authorities face in allo-
cating resources to new transport policy initiatives. This is unsurprising, as lack of fund-
ing is the easiest and most natural barrier to nominate, but this does not mean that unlim-
ited resources would ensure successful bus policy.  
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Another high-impact barrier, intra-organisational support and communication, was 
ranked fourth in the questionnaire, while the telephone interviews revealed that there were 
concerns in some councils over the communication between neighbouring authorities, bus 
operators, stakeholders, politicians, and the public. It is also worth noting that McTigue 
et al. (2017) found intra-organisational communications were not well-documented by 
local authorities, which limited their ability to monitor the effect of such relationships on 
policy implementation. It is also evident that communication and cooperation are essen-
tial for implementation, which is also recognised by policymakers. For example, the Scot-
tish Government (2005) reported that local bus networks are more likely to be successful 
if there is "a close working partnership between the local authority and the bus operators." 
These findings are consistent with Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) who suggest there 
needs to be consistent inter-organisational communication and enforcement activities and 
Gunn (1978) who believes that there must be perfect communication and co-ordination 
between participants. 
Several top-down theorists indicate the importance of the characteristics of the or-
ganisations. For example, Sabatier and Mazmanian (1981) believe the implementation 
process needs to be legally structured to enhance compliance; and leaders and implement-
ing agencies require significant managerial and political skills and commitment to the 
goals. Gunn (1987) believes there should be minimal dependency relationships between 
implementing agencies, and Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) suggest formal structural 
features of organisations and informal attributes of their personnel are important. These 
include bureaucratic structure, type of managerial power, organisational culture, and in-
tergovernmental relations with other agencies and stakeholders (Van Meter and Van 
Horn, 1975). However, the characteristics of the organisations were also found to be a 
high-impact barrier to implementation, although there were some discrepancies on this 
point. The questionnaires ranked this second, while the interview respondents did not 
explicitly rate this as one of the greatest barriers. However, staffing difficulties, such as 
shortage of staff or over-worked staff, were raised several times. This is consistent with 
the finding of De Gruyter et al. (2015) that the “uncertainty over implementation respon-
sibilities” a “general lack of ownership” can have a negative impact on implementing 
travel plans. The finding of Ison and Rye (2003) that a “policy champion," "political sta-
bility," and "trust in terms of the parties’ involved” are needed for policy implementation 
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was not explicitly recognised here but did come through in the comments and case studies 
regarding a lack of financial support from politicians to implement the policies that they 
have set.  
Since completing the empirical work in this thesis, it was found that the third vari-
able of the framework “intra-organisation support and communication” related to the 
fourth variable of the framework, “characteristics of organisations”, in many instances 
(both of these variables included the work of the top-down theorists including Sabatier 
and Mazmanian (1981), Gunn (1978), Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) and Pressman 
and Wildavsky (1973)).For example, workload of staff can be a result of the training, 
supervision or support that they are provided with. Therefore, it is recommended by the 
author that both variables are combined in the decision support framework. This adjust-
ment is important for other scholars working in policy implementation as it will avoid 
confusion when dealing with both elements of the framework.  
A final high-impact barrier included opposition, conflict, and ambiguities. This was 
ranked as a medium impact barrier in the questionnaire and telephone interviews, how-
ever there were some conflicts between the questionnaires and interview findings. This 
likely reflects the fact that questionnaires are sometimes completed by respondents in an 
abstract way without linking consideration of the questions to particular cases of imple-
mentation that might have made respondents think about the issues in a more "hands-on" 
way. For example, less consideration may have been given to circumstances external to 
the implementing agency as suggested by the top-down theorists Gunn (1978), Van Meter 
and Van Horn (1975) and Pressman and Wildavsky (1973). It is also quite surprising that 
the questionnaire and telephone interviews judged “economic, social and political envi-
ronments” and “opposition, conflict, and ambiguities” to be less important in their influ-
ence on the implementation process than some other factors, as one might expect such 
factors to be quite critical to political support for a scheme or measure. However, the case 
studies enabled a deeper analysis of these elements and both were raised to a “high im-
pact” barrier. This highlights the importance of multiple cases which provides an extra 
dimension of cross-case analysis and can lead to richer theory building (Gronhaug, 2001). 
Moreover, the case studies revealed economic, social and political conditions (based on 
studies by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), Gunn 
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(1978), and Sabatier and Mazmanian (1981)) can be considered a greater or lesser barrier 
in some instances. For example, CS3 revealed economic conditions were helpful to de-
liver the LLRE Scheme as Solihull has the most productive economy in the Midlands. 
However, social environments were a barrier due to a negative perception from drivers 
when the scheme was introduced and political environments were also a barrier due to a 
lack of political support. For this reason, it is recommended by the author to divide this 
variable into three separate variables. This adjustment will be valuable for other scholars 
working in policy implementation as it will help them to differentiate between the three 
conditions and the barriers associated with those conditions.  
Barriers that were highlighted as having a medium impact on implementation were 
associated with bureaucratic power; collaboration and interaction between those involved 
in the policy process; and policy remodelling. These were identified as a lesser impact in 
the questionnaires but higher in the interviews and case studies, which may be indicative 
of the more abstract nature of the questionnaire as compared to the real-world experience 
of the interviewees, which also highlights the importance of complementary research 
methods. These barriers are also associated with bottom-up approaches identified in stud-
ies by Lipsky (1971, 1980), Hjern et al. (1978), Elmore (1980), Rein (1983), and Grindle 
and Thomas (1990). This suggests that barriers associated to bus policy implementation 
are more likely going to be experienced from a top-down approach. Furthermore, policy 
remodelling, which taken from the work of Rein (1983) and Grindle and Thomas (1990), 
was found in this study to be less important because it was sometimes confused with 
‘bureaucratic power’ by those who took part in the interviews and were considered similar 
as changes to policy is most likely due to bureaucratic power. For this reason, the author 
recommends removing the ninth variable of the framework, policy remodelling. Again, 
this is an important adjustment for other scholars working in policy implementation as it 
will avoid confusion when dealing with both elements of the framework. 
Finally, policy champion was ranked the lowest barrier to impact implementation. 
This was not surprising as policy champions can be considered an enabler as they are 
central to overcoming barriers to implementing bus policy. Nonetheless, a lack of policy 
champions can be a barrier to implementation as the case studies revealed negative moti-
vation and attitudes of staff could potentially jeopardise the working relationship between 
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council staff and bus operators. This is similar to the findings of Marsden and May (2006) 
where they suggested a strong political champion can achieve significant improvements 
in a short period of time, as did Ison and Rye (2003). To overcome the barriers associated 
with policy champions, it is important to meet the conditions set by the top-down ap-
proaches identified in this research. For example, Gunn (1978) states that those in author-
ity must be able to demand and obtain perfect compliance. Similarly, Sabatier and Maz-
manian (1981) believe leaders and implementing agencies require significant managerial 
and political skills and commitment to the goals. Meanwhile, Van Meter and Van Horn 
(1975) and Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) suggest implementing agencies should ex-
press his or her cognitive ability and willingness to understand the policy, his or her tech-
nical expertise, his or her level of support for the policy, and values like efficiency, effec-
tiveness, equity, ethics, and empathy. 
In terms of implications, Ballantyne et al. (2014) suggested that a generic decision-
making framework would help overcome the barriers associated with the interaction be-
tween local authorities and freight stakeholders. The decision support framework and 
findings of this research, as presented in Table 8.2, could similarly form the basis of a 
decision support framework for the local transport policy implementation process. 
8.4 Policy implications 
Chapter 1 of this thesis explains how recent studies show that there is a steady decline in 
bus mileage and bus usage across Great Britain, which has a damaging effect on the bus 
network. This has a negative impact on economic, social, and health benefits, and the 
quality of life suffers due to a lack of physical access to jobs, health, education, and amen-
ities (Banister, 2000). To overcome the problems associated with the decline in bus pat-
ronage and bus mileage, this research aimed to identify barriers to implementation of bus 
policies in Great Britain. The theoretical contribution of this study helps to further our 
understanding of implementation in the context of bus policy at a local level. While the 
new decision support framework helped to identify the key barriers associated with im-
plementation, it is now important to determine how these findings can relate to the “real 
world” applicability for policy makers and planners and help overcome the issues associ-
ated with the decline in bus mileage and bus usage across Great Britain.  
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This research has identified the “coherence and comprehensibility of the written 
policy" as one of the greatest barriers to implementation. It has also highlighted that pub-
lic transport officers agree that it is important to have a bus policy document in place. On 
the other hand, despite the importance placed on the policy document by the officers in-
terviewed, the case studies revealed that a scheme did not have to be in a policy document 
for it to be implemented. However, several examples were provided on the importance of 
this document in terms of communicating with local stakeholders and politicians, under-
standing of what they need to achieve, dealing with conflict from the public and politi-
cians who might have a different perception on a particular policy, and a way to identify 
key milestones to be achieved. Therefore, this research supports the views of the officers 
who believe it is important to have a bus policy document in place. It also suggests that 
the governments should reintroduce a statutory requirement for a separate bus strategy 
for all local authorities in Great Britain. Furthermore, sanctions should be in place where 
local authorities fail to produce an up-to-date bus policy document. 
This research has also identified several concerns about the level of monitoring that 
is in place and it has found that councils do in fact think it is important to have monitoring 
in place to improve their chances of future funding. This research supports the opinions 
of the councils and believes it is important to have clear strategies and tactics, rather than 
simply implementing policies that are “do-able.” This, in turn, may improve policy de-
velopment and collaboration, and promote an environment of stakeholder engagement 
because external stakeholders can understand the guiding logic and see evidence of pro-
gress. 
The findings in this research suggest there is some confusion between a recognition 
of the importance of targets and an unclear responsibility and focus on setting and meeting 
them. This is most likely due to the political sensitivity of the topic, while public account-
ability exerts some influence in this area. Nonetheless, this research suggests targets are 
important and should be included by local authorities when dealing with bus policy as 
they can influence decision making and provide sound evidence base. 
This research argues that the entire policy implementation process is undermined 
by the presence of an unclear link among policy objectives and measures and the setting 
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and monitoring of performance targets, which appears to stem in part from the lack of a 
tactical link between the higher level strategic objectives and the operational aspects of 
policy implementation. One reason for this may be the over-emphasis on the availability 
of resources, which is seen as the greatest barrier to implementation based on several 
references made throughout the questionnaires and interviews. This unclear link indicates 
that councils are in fact placing too much emphasis on "what" is needed to implement 
policy (i.e., resources) and instead they should be placing more emphasis on "how" to 
implement the policy in terms of targets, measures, and performance monitoring. Once 
this is clear, councils can then direct resources where needed.  
When dealing with local bus policy, this research would encourage local authority 
staff and policy makers to consider intra-organisational support and communication for 
implementation. Those involved in the policy process should be provided with relevant 
training, supervision and support when dealing with complex policy issues. Several ex-
amples were provided in this research to highlight the importance of intra-organisational 
support and communication. CS2 indicated that while SPT were the scheme promoter, 
they were dependant on GCC for implementing anything on the roadway since they are 
the roadway authority. This highlights the importance of relevant training, supervision 
and support within their organisation. An interview with GCC also revealed that external 
consultants were employed to help SPT with several tasks to deliver the scheme, which 
highlights the importance of providing support when dealing with complex issues. In line 
with the fourth element of the decision support framework, this research argues that rel-
evant training, supervision and support can help overcome the staffing difficulties such 
as shortage of staff or over-worked staff, which were raised on several occasions in this 
research and were considered to have a negative impact on policy implementation. It 
could also help to deal with barriers external to the implementing organisation such as 
economic, social and political conditions.  
This research has identified policy champion as a low impart barrier, however, sev-
eral examples were provided which highlights the importance of having a policy cham-
pion, who is responsible, competent, motivated, and wants to drive change. It also rec-
ommends that for policy to be implemented, there must be collaboration and interaction 
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between key actors involved in the policy process, including policy makers, local author-
ity staff, local and national governing bodies, regional transport partnerships, bus opera-
tors and transport practitioners working within the transport field. Both policy champions 
and collaboration and interaction help to build a relationship between the parties involved 
which is important for delivering bus policy and ensuring a common understanding and 
scope on what is to be delivered. Moreover, collaboration and interaction are a step for-
ward to bringing those involved in the process together to overcome the decline in bus 
mileage and bus usage across Great Britain. 
Both a policy champion and collaboration and interaction between key actors in-
volved in the policy process are essential for tackling other key barriers identified in the 
decision support framework. For example, they can ensure limited changes due to bu-
reaucratic power. They can also ensure that limited changes to the policy occurs from the 
design stage right through to the implementation stage. Furthermore, they can help to 
overcome opposition, conflict and ambiguities due to public opposition, political power, 
local and national elections, conflicts between neighbouring authorities over budgets, bus 
wars and open-access to data by bus operating companies. 
The overall conclusion of the research highlights the relationship between policy 
design and policy implementation in meeting transport policy objectives. Moreover, it is 
essential to regularly monitor performance in meeting specified targets. The deregulation 
of the bus sector in the UK means that in some cases, a lack of control over the imple-
mentation of certain measures places limits on policy implementation and results in the 
frequent implementation of policy measures that are achievable rather than those that are 
necessary for achieving policy objectives. 
By applying this decision support framework to an analysis of policy implementa-
tion reporting, it can not only be used to evaluate the quality of reporting in individual 
cases, but also reveal to what extent the reporting process is able to address all the required 
elements of successful policy implementation, and thus achieve its overall goal of aiding 
policymakers and planners. The findings from this research helps policymakers to predict 
what makes implementation successful and to address problems and issues through im-
proved policies and regulations, as well as to anticipate and plan for likely barriers.  
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8.5 Summary 
This chapter has presented the overall findings from the questionnaires, telephone inter-
views and case studies. The key barriers were ranked as high, medium-high, medium-
low, and low. This ranking system helped to identify which barriers had the greatest im-
pact on bus policy implementation. It has also explained how these findings relate to the 
literature and its applicability to the “real world” for local authority staff and policy mak-
ers.  
The next and final chapter of this thesis presents a set of conclusions to the research. 
The three research questions will be answered and a summary will be provided on key 
contributions, limitations of the current research and directions for future research. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusions  
9.1 Introduction 
The current debate on transport policy in the UK is focused on the need for a sustainable 
transport system. Buses play a vital role in achieving a sustainable transport system as 
they are the most frequently used and most accessible mode of public transport. However, 
the literature shows that the governance and the delivery of sustainable transport policies 
are not producing the desired outcomes (Hull, 2009) and the application of such policies 
in real situations remains inconsistent. This is evident across the UK where there has been 
a decrease in bus patronage and bus mileage. To address this gap, the aim of this research 
was to identify barriers to implementation of bus policies in Great Britain and three re-
search questions were developed for this thesis: 
1. What are the current perceptions of public transport officers in Great Britain on 
issues associated with the implementation of bus policies? 
2. What factors have been barriers and enablers to the implementation of bus 
schemes within Great Britain? 
3. What are the greatest barriers to bus policy implementation at a local level, as 
identified through the analysis of the data collected in this research?  
 
To help answer these research questions, a mixed methodology (consisting of three 
independent methodologies) was adopted in this research. Chapter 4 (methodology) of 
this thesis provides the justification for the chosen methodologies and the research meth-
ods required for data collection. The findings from this research were presented in chapter 
5 (questionnaire results), 6 (telephone interview results), and 7 (case study results) and 
included theoretical analysis based on the application of the ten-point decision support 
framework. The three sets of data were then triangulated in chapter 8 (theoretical synthe-
sis and discussion) using the decision support framework develop from the literature. The 
findings were also discussed in relation to the “real world” applicability for policymakers 
and planners. 
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This final chapter concludes the thesis by providing a summary of key findings and 
original contributions to knowledge in the field of bus policy implementation. These find-
ings enhance knowledge in understanding the barriers and challenges faced by the local 
authorities, which can greatly inform transport policy formation and improve the policy 
implementation process. A critique of the research approach and the limitations incurred 
is then presented, followed by a discussion of future research avenues. 
9.2 Summary of findings  
Three research questions facilitated in addressing the aim and objectives of this study and 
are answered as follows: 
1. What are the current perceptions of public transport officers in Great Britain on 
issues associated with the implementation of bus policies? 
The second objective of this research was to evaluate the views and experiences of public 
transport officers in identifying areas of consensus and differences on issues associated 
with the delivery of bus policies within Great Britain. A survey methodology using an 
online questionnaire as a research method was used to gather data based on the views and 
experiences of the public transport officers. This was followed by a single case study 
methodology using semi-structured telephone interviews as a research method to further 
collect data which was based on the results of the questionnaire. The questionnaire and 
interview questions were placed under five key themes, while the data was analysed under 
these themes for ease of presenting the results.  
The first theme, “policy documentation”, shows that there is a general consensus 
that there are problems associated with current bus policy documentation. The second 
theme, “policy responsibility”, found differences in general due to a certain level of mis-
communication and unclear allocations of responsibility within local authorities when it 
comes to bus policy implementation. Next, the third theme, “policy targets”, indicates 
that there is general consensus on the issues associated with policy targets and that there 
are concerns about whether targets are met. Meanwhile, the fourth theme, “performance 
monitoring”, showed general consensus when discussing the issues associated with mon-
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itoring. Finally, the fifth theme, “implementation barriers” indicates that there is consen-
sus on some barriers associated with bus policy implementation including availability of 
resources/limited funding, fierce competition between operators, political will of mem-
bers, physical space and layout of roads, high car ownership, and public opinion influ-
encing outcomes. However, there were some differences identified in the interviews on 
some barriers associated to bus policy implementation. Most officers felt in particular that 
public opposition and the relationship between key people in council and local bus oper-
ators have a significant impact on implementation. 
Overall, the questionnaire and interviews have revealed general consensus that 
there is an unclear link between designing the policy, setting targets and suitable measures 
to achieve those targets, and monitoring those targets for implementation. However, there 
appear to be differences in views in terms of policy responsibility, which indicates that 
there is uncertainty about who is responsible for the delivery of bus policies. The differ-
ences identified in the interviews on some barriers associated to bus policy implementa-
tion is most likely linked to this uncertainly about who is responsible for the governance 
and delivery of bus policy. 
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Table 9.1: Key findings from questionnaires and interviews 














  Coherence and comprehensibility of the written policy identified as one of 
the greatest barriers to implementation (questionnaire) 
 18% of local authorities do not have a specific bus policy document in 
place (questionnaire) 

















 Unsuccessful in implementing bus policy measures (questionnaire and inter-
views) 
 15 respondents did not identify how many different teams were within their 
council's transport department (questionnaire) 
 Eight out of ten officers said they knew the number of teams within their 
council's transport (interview) 
 Certain level of miscommunication and lack of responsibility within local 
authorities when it comes to bus policy implementation (interview) 
 Concerns highlighted throughout in terms of achieving bus policy objectives, 












 One council said they met all their targets while three officers said they met 
the majority of their targets (questionnaire) 
 Councils did not set targets for the number of vehicle kilometres per annum 
(74%), fares (70%), cost per passenger journey for services (65%), and age 
and quality of vehicles (51%) (questionnaire) 
 Reasons for not meeting targets included a lack of communication within the 
council and the community, lack of advertisement and marketing, lack of 
funding or financial support and political will (interview) 
 Six officers said they set targets in their council. Three officers said there 
was little progress on setting targets since the latest LTP/S came into effect 
(interview) 
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 Most popular form of monitoring included service reliability and punctuality 
(60%), number of passengers per annum (53%), and number of passengers 
satisfied with bus services (41%) (questionnaire) 
 Majority of officers felt it was important for monitoring to be in place to 
achieve bus policy success (questionnaire and interview) 
 Policy measures would be implemented as planned and without problems if 
stricter monitoring were in place (interview) 
 Councils want monitoring in place to improve their chances of future funding 
















 The availability of resources is the greatest barrier to implementation (ques-
tionnaire and interview) 
 Barriers having a lower impact on implementation included public opposi-
tion, the relationship between key people in council and local bus operators, 
and reshaping or changes to policy measures by local implementation front-
line staff (questionnaire) 
 Key barriers to implementation include limited funding, fierce competition 
between operators, political will of members, physical space and layout of 
roads, high car ownership, and public opinion influencing outcomes (ques-
tionnaire) 
 Majority of officers did not agree that public opposition and the relationship 
between key people in council and local bus operators had a lesser impact on 
implementation (interview) 
 Agreed reshaping or changes to policy measures by local implementation 
frontline staff had a lesser impact (interview) 
 Half of the officers said communication among staff involved in the policy 
implementation process, and motivation and attitudes of those responsible 
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2. What factors have been barriers and enablers to the implementation of bus 
schemes within Great Britain? 
The third objective of this research was to evaluate the views and experiences of key 
players/stakeholders in identifying challenges and barriers associated with the delivery of 
four different bus schemes within Great Britain. While the previous research question 
gave a broad overview on issues associated with the delivery of sustainable bus policies 
within Great Britain, this research question is answered by refocusing the lens on the 
specific area of research. Therefore, four case studies were conducted to enable a deeper 
investigation into bus policy implementation at a local level. The key findings can be 
summarised under three major issues: 
Issues with scheme design: 
A key barrier included the schemes being the first attempt at implementation of their kind 
(QCS and ABC Scheme), while the legislation was a problem for the QCS and the ABC 
product was a problem for the ABC Scheme. Further common issues associated with the 
scheme design included opposition from the bus operators (QCS and Fastlink) and oppo-
sition from the public (Fastlink and LLRE). Time limits to deliver the scheme (LLRE) 
and delays due to poor planning (Fastlink) were also barriers due to the scheme designs. 
Existing bus policy document, policy targets and monitoring of bus policies: 
Overall, the case studies share similar results with the questionnaire and telephone inter-
views and suggest that a key barrier to implementation of bus schemes is an unclear link 
between designing the policy, setting targets and suitable measures to achieve those tar-
gets, and monitoring those targets for implementation. Moreover, the case studies suggest 
that a bus scheme did not have to be in a policy document, or even aligned with a policy 
document’s objectives, for it to be implemented. 
Policy Implementation and barriers to implementation: 
Other barriers to have a negative impact on implementation include public opposition, 
conflict between councils and bus operators, lack of data from bus operators, lack of 
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skilled staff and expertise, lack of political support, and delays as a result of elections and 
money delivered in phases.  
3. What are the greatest barriers to bus policy implementation at a local level, as 
identified through the analysis of the data collected in this research?  
The fourth objective of this research was to build on theoretical literature and current 
views and experiences of key players/stakeholders to help improve the delivery of sus-
tainable transport policies at a local level. A review of literature was carried out on the 
theoretical approaches to policy implementation. It examined the theoretical approaches 
to implementation and focused on both top-down and bottom-up theoretical approaches. 
Both approaches were firstly analysed and then combined to distinguish a relationship 
between the two. A new decision support framework consisting of ten critical variables 
was then developed and then used to analyse the three sets of data collected in this study. 
The analyses of the questionnaires and telephone interviews were based on the opinions 
and perceptions of public transport officers who work in local authorities in Great Britain 
and would be considered an expert in bus policy at a local level. Meanwhile, the analysis 
of the case studies was based on the opinions and perceptions of a variety actors from the 
bus industry, local and national government, NGOs and consultants. 
The overall results show that two elements of the framework were rated as a high 
impact, including policy objective; and the characteristics of organisations. Four elements 
were rated as a medium-high impact including: availability of resources; intra-organisa-
tion support and communication; economic, social and political environments; and oppo-
sition, conflict, and ambiguities. Meanwhile, three elements were rated as a low-medium 
impact including: bureaucratic power; collaboration and interaction between those in-
volved in the policy process; and policy remodelling. Finally, one element of the frame-
work was rated as a low impact barrier which includes policy champions. It is recom-
mended that local authority staff and policy makers use this decision support framework 
to help avoid the barriers associated with bus policy implementation. 
Since completing the empirical work in this thesis, it is recommended by the author 
for some elements of the framework to be revised. For example, by conducting the theo-
retical analysis several times throughout this research, it was found that the third variable, 
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“intra-organisation support and communication”, related to the fourth variable of the 
framework, “characteristics of organisations”, in many instances. For example, workload 
of staff can be a result of the training, supervision or support that they are provided with. 
Therefore, it is recommended that both variables are combined and identified in the 
framework as: 
 
 “Characteristics of organisations: Both formal structural features of organisations 
(relevant training, supervision and support) and informal attributes of their per-
sonnel (including size, competency and workload of staff)”. 
 
It is also recommended that the fifth variable of the framework, “economic, social 
and political environments”, is divided into three separate variables. These are three im-
portant conditions which can affect bus policy implementation, differently. For example, 
CS3 revealed economic conditions were helpful to deliver the LLRE Scheme as Solihull 
has the most productive economy in the Midlands. However, social environments were a 
barrier due to a negative perception from drivers when the scheme was introduced and 
political environments were also a barrier due to a lack of political support. This shows 
that, in this instance, the fifth variable of the framework could be considered both a barrier 
and an enabler. For this reason, it is recommended to divide this variable into three sepa-
rate variables. These three new variables would read as follows: 
 
 Economic environments: Current and future economic environments play an im-
portant role on the outcome of the policy process. 
 Social environments: Current and future social environments play an important 
role on the outcome of the policy process. 
 Political environments: Current and future political environments play an im-
portant role on the outcome of the policy process. 
 
A final recommendation is to remove the ninth variable of the framework, “policy 
remodelling”. This variable was confused on several occasions with the seventh variable, 
“bureaucratic power”. It is understandable that these variables were confused as changes 
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to policy is most likely due to bureaucratic power. The revised framework would now 
consist of 10 elements to be considered for successful policy implementation. 
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Decision support framework (revised) 
 
1. Policy objective: A written bus policy document should be in place, showing a 
clear link between policy objectives, measures and the setting and monitoring of 
targets. 
 
2. Availability of resources: Resources such as financial support is important; how-
ever, where resources are limited, it is necessary to maximise the use of available 
resources. 
 
3. Characteristics of organisations: Both formal structural features of organisations 
(relevant training, supervision and support) and informal attributes of their per-
sonnel (including size, competency and workload of staff). 
 
4. Economic environments: Current and future economic environments play an im-
portant role on the outcome of the policy process. 
 
5. Social environments: Current and future social environments play an important 
role on the outcome of the policy process. 
 
6. Political environments: Current and future political environments play an im-
portant role on the outcome of the policy process. 
 
7. Policy champions: Policy implementation should not be restricted to one policy 
champion and instead needs several policy champions who are responsible, com-
petent and motivated to see the policy through from beginning to end. 
 
8. Bureaucratic power: Hierarchical control in an organisation is important; how-
ever, hierarchical power must not be used to overrule policy decisions by other 
members within the organisation. 
 
9. Collaboration and interaction between those involved in the policy process: Col-
laboration and interaction is necessary between key actors involved in the policy 
process, including policy makers, local authority staff, local and national govern-
ing bodies, regional transport partnerships, bus operators and transport practi-
tioners working within the transport field 
 
10. Opposition, conflict and ambiguities: Opposition, conflict and ambiguities are in-
evitable including public opposition, political power, local and national elections, 
conflicts between neighbouring authorities over budgets, bus wars and open-ac-
cess to data by bus operating companies. 
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9.3 Recommendations for policymakers and transport planners 
The aim of this research is to identify why bus policies are not implemented successfully 
at a local level and to provide recommendations for effective implementation and better 
decision making that will aid policymakers and transport planners. This section addresses 
the fifth and final research objective to meet the aim of this research. For ease of refer-
ence, the fifth research objective is addressed in table 9.2 




To provide policy makers and 
transport planners with recommenda-
tions for effective implementation and 
better decision making when imple-
menting bus policy at a local level in 
Great Britain. 
This objective seeks to use the findings in this re-
search to provide recommendations to help poli-
cymakers and transport planners to predict what 
makes implementation successful and to address 
problems and issues through better policies and 
regulations, as well as to anticipate and plan for 
likely barriers. 
 
This research proposes the following eight recommendations to help policymakers 
and transport planners to predict what makes implementation successful and to address 
problems and issues through better policies and regulations, as well as to anticipate and 
plan for likely barriers: 
1. The interviews revealed that a lack of funding was preventing councils from 
achieving targets and there was a need for further financial support to help achieve 
targets. It is recommended that authorities must be certain from the planning stage 
that there are sufficient resources available to support the initiative once imple-
mented. 
 
2. “Coherence and comprehensibility of the written policy" was identified as one of 
the greatest barriers to implementation. This research supports the views of the 
officers who believe it is important to have a bus policy document in place. It 
recommends that the governments should reintroduce a statutory requirement for 
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a separate bus strategy for all local authorities in Great Britain. Furthermore, sanc-
tions should be in place where local authorities fail to produce an up-to-date bus 
policy document. 
 
3. This research has identified several concerns about the level of monitoring that is 
in place and it has found that councils do in fact think it is important to have 
monitoring in place to improve their chances of future funding. This research rec-
ommends policymakers and transport planners to have clear strategies and tactics, 
rather than simply implementing policies that are “do-able.” 
 
4. The findings in this research suggest there is some confusion between a recogni-
tion of the importance of targets and an unclear responsibility and focus on setting 
and meeting them. This research recommends that targets should be included by 
local authorities when dealing with bus policy as they can influence decision mak-
ing and provide sound evidence base. 
 
5. This research argues that the entire policy implementation process is undermined 
by the presence of an unclear link among policy objectives and measures and the 
setting and monitoring of performance targets. This research recommends that 
councils should place less emphasis on "what" is needed to implement policy and 
instead they should be placing more emphasis on "how" to implement the policy 
in terms of targets, measures, and performance monitoring. Once this is clear, 
councils can then direct resources where needed.  
 
6. When dealing with local bus policy, this research would recommend local author-
ity staff and policy makers to consider intra-organisational support and commu-
nication for successful implementation. Those involved in the policy process 
should be provided with relevant training, supervision and support when dealing 
with complex policy issues. This in turn can help overcome the staffing difficul-
ties such as shortage of staff or over-worked staff and it could also help to deal 
with barriers external to the implementing organisation such as economic, social 
and political conditions. 
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7. This research recommends that for policy to be implemented successfully, there 
must be collaboration and interaction between key actors involved in the policy 
process. Both policy champions and collaboration and interaction help to build a 
relationship between the parties involved, ensure limited changes due to bureau-
cratic power and changes to the policy, and help to overcome opposition, conflict 
and ambiguities. 
 
8. This research recommends that policy makers and transport planners apply the 
decision support framework developed in this research to evaluate their own local 
transport policy implementation process, thus anticipate and plan for likely barri-
ers. 
9.4 Contribution to literature 
The literature explains how recent studies show that there is a steady decline in bus mile-
age and bus usage across Great Britain, which has a damaging effect on the bus network. 
However, the literature has also indicated that there are no studies which specifically ad-
dress the implementation process for bus policies at a local level in Great Britain. This 
research has therefore contributed to the literature and addressed this gap by exploring 
the current situation of bus policy in Great Britain to determine which barriers have the 
greatest impact on implementation.  
Coherence and comprehensibility of the written policy was identified as one of the 
greatest barriers to implementation. Public transport officers agree that it is important to 
have a bus policy document in place, however, the case studies enabled a deeper investi-
gation into the importance of a written bus policy and it was found that overall, there was 
no clear evidence that a written bus policy document is essential for implementation. This 
research also found concerns about achieving the objectives set in the written policy doc-
ument and setting targets and implementing measures to achieve these objectives. This is 
consistent with the finding by Van de Velde and Wallis (2013) in terms of the need for a 
supportive and coherent policy framework for policy implementation.  
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There were also several concerns about the level of monitoring in place for local 
bus policy. It was found that councils do in fact think it is important to have monitoring 
and it is important to have clear strategies and tactics, rather than simply implementing 
policies that are “do-able.” This confirms the findings by Spear and Lightowler (2005) 
and Gössling et al. (2016, p.83) who found insufficient monitoring tools to be a barrier to 
implementation, as seen in this research. Therefore, this research suggests that the gov-
ernments should reintroduce a statutory requirement for a separate bus strategy and an 
annual monitoring report for all local authorities in Great Britain. Furthermore, sanctions 
should be in place where local authorities fail to produce an up-to-date bus policy docu-
ment and monitoring report.   
Availability of resources was identified as another key barrier to implementation. 
In particular, a lack of funding was preventing councils from achieving targets and there 
was a need for further financial support to help achieve targets. This study suggests that 
authorities must be certain from the planning stage that there are sufficient resources 
available to support the initiative once implemented. A lack of financial support could 
also be linked to a lack of political support during the implementation stage to access the 
required funds. These findings are consistent with research by McTigue et al. (2017), 
Preston (2016), Lindholm and Blinge (2014), Argyrioua et al. 2012, p.87), Marsden and 
May (2006), and Gaffron (2003) highlighting the difficultly that local authorities face in 
allocating resources to new transport policy initiatives.  
This research has also found intra-organisational support and communication to be 
a key barrier to implementation and there are concerns in some councils over the com-
munication between neighbouring authorities, bus operators, stakeholders, politicians, 
and the general public. Nonetheless, the research has found that communication and co-
operation are essential for implementation, which is also recognised by policymakers 
such as the Scottish Government (2005) who reported that local bus networks are more 
likely to be successful if there is "a close working partnership between the local authority 
and the bus operators." When dealing with local bus policy, this research would encour-
age local authority staff to provide staff with relevant training, supervision and support, 
especially when dealing with complex policy issues. In line with the fourth element of 
the decision support framework, this research argues that relevant training, supervision 
 Chapter 9: Conclusions 
    Page 317 
and support can help overcome the staffing difficulties such as shortage of staff or over-
worked staff, which were raised on several occasions in this research and were considered 
to have a negative impact on policy implementation. It could also help to deal with barri-
ers external to the implementing organisation such as economic, social and political con-
ditions, and opposition, conflict and ambiguities which were identified as barriers to im-
plementation in this research.  
Similar to Marsden and May (2006) who highlights the importance of a strong po-
litical champion, this research has also found that a strong policy champion is important 
when implementing bus policy. Moreover, collaboration and interaction between key ac-
tors involved in the policy process is also essential for tackling barriers to the implemen-
tation of bus policy. Both factors can ensure limited changes due to bureaucratic power 
and they can also ensure that limited changes to the policy occurs from the design stage 
right through to the implementation stage. Furthermore, they can help overcome opposi-
tion, conflict and ambiguities due to public opposition, political power, local and national 
elections, conflicts between neighbouring authorities over budgets, bus wars and open-
access to data by bus operating companies.  
Overall, this research has identified several concerns with bus policy implementa-
tion. The most obvious concern is the unclear link between policy objectives and 
measures and the setting and monitoring of performance targets, which appears to stem 
in part from the lack of a tactical link between the higher level strategic objectives and 
the operational aspects of policy implementation. One reason for this may be the over-
emphasis on the availability of resources, which is seen as one of the greatest barriers in 
this research. This unclear link indicates that councils are in fact placing too much em-
phasis on "what" is needed to implement policy (i.e., resources) and instead they should 
be placing more emphasis on "how" to implement the policy in terms of targets, measures, 
and performance monitoring. Once this is clear, councils can then direct resources where 
needed. Meanwhile, the deregulation of the bus sector in the UK means that in some 
cases, a lack of control over the implementation of certain measures places limits on suc-
cessful policy implementation and results in the frequent implementation of policy 
measures that are achievable rather than those that necessary to the successful achieve-
ment of policy objectives.  
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This research has also made a theoretical contribution by developing a new decision 
support framework. Both top-down and bottom-up approaches to implementation were 
combined to develop the new decision support framework. The research has found that 
by applying this decision support framework to an analysis of policy implementation re-
porting, it can not only be used to evaluate the quality of reporting in individual cases, 
but also reveal to what extent the reporting process is able to address all the required 
elements of policy implementation, and thus achieve its overall goal of aiding policymak-
ers and planners.  
The findings from this research helps policymakers and planners to predict what 
makes implementation successful and to address problems and issues through improved 
policies and regulations, as well as to anticipate and plan for likely barriers. Moreover, 
addressing these barriers can help tackle the decline in bus mileage and bus usage across 
Great Britain. 
9.5 Limitations of research 
The questionnaire was limited to public transport officers who worked in local authorities 
in Great Britain and would be considered an expert in bus policy at a local level. There-
fore, the survey methodology used in this research can be considered as a small-scale 
survey in terms of the number of participants eligible to take part. While the best efforts 
were made to encourage the officers to participate in a follow-up interview, only 10 of-
ficers agreed. These officers were particularly difficult to recruit due to the small-scale 
survey. Furthermore, the officers who completed the questionnaire were unable to allo-
cate more of their time to be further involved in this research. 
The case studies reported in this research involved four bus schemes in Great Brit-
ain. Unfortunately, this research was limited to four case studies due to the considerable 
amount of resources and time required for data collection. The case studies were also 
limited to Great Britain only, which limits the potential generalisation of the findings. 
Nonetheless, Eisenhardt (1989) argue that the number of cases are important and a mini-
mum of four to a maximum of 10 should be included. Therefore, given the resources and 
time available to conduct the case studies, the author believes that the four case studies 
were sufficient for this research.  
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In addition, the number of interviewees were limited due to the limited number of 
appropriate industry representatives involved in those cases. This was particularly the 
case for CS4 where it was found challenging to obtain enough interviewees due to the 
scheme being much smaller, with less people involved, in comparison to the other three 
case studies. However, the interviewees involved in the case studies offered valuable 
knowledge on bus policy implementation that would not have been possible through a 
different research design. 
Another limitation of the CSR is that with a large amount of data collected, it was 
impossible to present all the findings in this thesis. Therefore, the data was reduced to a 
manageable format that can then be presented, described and explained (discussed in 
chapter 4). However, there was potential to lose the richness of the data derived from the 
interviews. To avoid this problem, the data was collected, analysed and interpreted, mak-
ing use of triangulation where possible to strengthen interpretations and using the evi-
dence to answer the three research questions.  
Based on the results of the three sets of data in this research, each element in the 
decision support framework was ranked as high, medium-high, medium-low, or low. This 
is a qualitative ranking by the author not intended for robust application but merely for 
ease of presenting and discussing the results. It does not claim ultimate truth and the 
framework itself is subject to new evidence by additional data collection. Instead, the 
decision support framework devised in this research is simply a generic decision-making 
framework to aid local authority staff and policy makers to identify the key barriers and 
challenges associated with bus policy implementation at a local level. 
9.6 Recommendations for future research 
Based on the limitations identified in the previous section, there are several recommen-
dations for future research.  
The aim of this research was to identify barriers to implementation of bus policies 
by local authorities in Great Britain, which can then be generalised both to bus policy in 
other countries and more broadly to local transport policy. Therefore, there is scope for 
further research by means of collaboration between researchers in different countries or 
 Chapter 9: Conclusions 
    Page 320 
regions to access local bus policy implementation. A comparative case study could be 
conducted to understand how bus policy implementation differ in each case study so les-
sons can be learnt from the countries involved. 
The survey methodology used in this research involved an online questionnaire with 
56% of public transport officers who worked in local authorities in Great Britain and 
would be considered an expert in bus policy at a local level. The views and experiences 
of local bus policy was limited to these public transport officer, however, it is recom-
mended that this methodology could be further expanded by involving other key actors 
involved in local bus policy. Similar to those who participated in the case study interviews 
of this research, a variety of experts in the area of local bus policy could be targeted to 
conduct a questionnaire based on their views and experiences, which could be different 
to those of the public transport officers. These include actors from the bus industry, local 
and national government, NGOs and consultants. Interviews with a variety of experts 
would enable a wider range of views on the given topic and therefore results would be 
less bias. Furthermore, a larger sample size would provide a stronger evidence base of the 
effectiveness of local bus policy implementation and a greater level of statistical confi-
dence. 
This research included a multiple case study methodology, consisting of four bus 
schemes in Great Britain. The case studies included interviews conducted with industry 
representatives based on these bus schemes to investigate the implementation of local bus 
policy. However, additional case studies conducted in Great Britain could expand on this 
investigation and increase understanding on the barriers associated with bus policy im-
plementation. 
The decision support framework developed in this research is not evaluated against 
other hybrid theories and frameworks mentioned in the literature review (Elmore (1985); 
Matland (1995a, 1995b); and Goggin et al. (1990)). Instead, the new framework has been 
developed as an analytical lens through which to view the empirical data, and then further 
improved in the light of that process. However, there is an opportunity for future work to 
compare the new decision support framework developed in this research with other hybrid 
theories and frameworks. Moreover, the new framework developed can be considered as 
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a contribution to the ongoing development of theory and therefore can be further im-
proved and strengthened. For example, future research could be carried out to test this 
framework in other areas of policy implementation to assess whether it provides scholars 
and practitioners of implementation with an adequate framework to structure their work 
beyond the issues of bus policy implementation. Furthermore, the 10 elements of the 
framework can be modified and applied to policy affecting other transport modes, such 
as walking, cycling, freight, parking, etc. This would form a new decision support frame-
work for policy makers and practitioners working within the field of transport and help 
them to avoid barriers to policy development and implementation as seen by the frame-
work used in this thesis.  
Finally, CS1 found that Nexus had difficulties with designing the QCS scheme due 
to the legislation in place. While the policy in place was seen as “sound”, the legislative 
requirements were undoubtedly a major issue for Nexus. This appears to be linked to the 
fact that no QCS has been implemented in the UK (outside London) since it was intro-
duced in the 2000 Transport Act which therefore indicates concerns about the legislation 
currently in place. There have been a number of amendments to this act, with the latest 
being made by the Local Transport Act 2008 in England. The amended Acts saw the 
introduction of the possibility of different forms of partnerships and levels of partnership 
between bus companies and local authorities. These include Voluntary Quality Partner-
ship, Statutory Quality Partnership, and Quality Contract. A multiple case study method-
ology could be conducted to help identify the barriers attached to the QCS in terms of the 
legislative requirements. The case studies could include the QCS in Tyne and Wear, SQP 
for the Fastlink in Glasgow (as seen in this research) and a VPA for the Sheffield Bus 
Partnership (voluntary agreement between SYPTE, Sheffield City Council and bus oper-
ators First South Yorkshire, Stagecoach Sheffield, TM Travel and Sheffield Community 
Transport).  This would cast additional light on the degree to which the legislation does 
or does not act as a barrier to implementation of these policies. 
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Appendix A: Online questionnaire 
 
 
Local Authority Staff Questionnaire on Bus Policy Implementation 
 
Introduction 
My name is Clare McTigue and I am a second year PhD student at Edinburgh Napier Uni-
versity. I am carrying out my research at the Transport Research Institute (TRI) and I am under 
the supervision of Professor Tom Rye, who is the director of the Institute. 
I would like to invite you to participate in my research study and to help collect data for my 
thesis on “The Implementation of Transport Policy at a Local Level”. The data collected for 
this survey is specific to the implementation of bus policies at a local level. Therefore, I am 
contacting experts from local authorities in this area, who can give their opinions and per-
ceptions and comment on how bus policies are implemented in their area. 
The information I am looking for on bus policies includes some or all of the following: 
 
 Objectives for the local bus network and the targets to measure this 
 Measures e.g. bus lanes to help achieve the objectives 
 Documents that set out the above e.g. local transport plan/local transport strat-
egy. 
 
Your confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained and your personal privacy and iden-
tify will be protected. The collection, storage, disclosure and use of research data by the 
researcher will also comply with the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Edinburgh Napier 
University Data Protection Code of Practice. 
This survey will take approximately 10 minutes of your time. Please note if you don’t know 
the answer or don’t want to answer a particular question, please feel free to leave it blank. If 
you have any other comments or queries, please contact me at  
 
Thank you in advance for your participation.  
 
Please complete this survey by: 8th July 2016 
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Informed Consent Form 
  
Edinburgh Napier University requires that all persons who participate in research studies 
give their written consent to do so. Please read the following and sign it if you agree with 
what it says. 
 
1. I freely and voluntarily consent to be a participant in the research project on the topic 
of "Implementation of Transport Policies at a Local Level" to be conducted by Clare 
McTigue, who is a PhD student in the Edinburgh Napier School of Engineering and 
the Built Environment. 
2. The broad goal of this research study is to explore the implementation of bus policies 
at a local level. Specifically, experts from local authorities are contacted to give their 
opinions and perceptions and to comment on how bus policies are implemented in 
their area. The survey should take no longer than 10 minutes to complete. 
3. I have been told that my responses will be anonymised. My name will not be linked 
with the research materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in any report 
subsequently produced by the researcher. 
4. I also understand that if at any time during the questionnaire survey I feel unable or 
unwilling to continue, I am free to leave. That is, my participation in this study is 
completely voluntary, and I may withdraw from it at any time without negative con-
sequences. 
5. In addition, should I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I am free 
to decline. 
6. I have been given the opportunity to ask questions regarding the survey questionnaire 
and my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. 
7. I have read and understand the above and consent to participate in this study. My 
signature is not a waiver of any legal rights. Furthermore, I understand that I will be 
able to keep a copy of the informed consent form for my records. 
 
1. Do you understand and agree with the above terms? ✱ 
I agree 
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About You 
 
2. Please name your local authority: 
 
 
3. In which of the following ways are you involved with bus policy in your authority 
and/or region? 
 
Please tick all that apply: 
 
 Writing or developing bus policies for your city 
 Setting targets for local bus policy 
 Monitoring bus polices that are in place 
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Existing Bus Policy Document 
Existing bus policy documents include a written statement of what the authority wants buses 
to achieve with objectives, and the measures it will implement to deliver these objectives. 
4. How long has your council had a written local bus policy in place? (For example, a 
chapter in your Local Transport Plan/Local Transport Strategy (LTP/S) or a sepa-
rate Bus Strategy document) 
Please choose from the following options: 
 Less than 1 year 1 to 5 years 
6 to 10 years 
11 or more years 
We don’t have a local bus policy written down in a single document – it is more a col-
lection of actions and policies from different documents 
We don’t have any kind of local bus policy We are in the process of developing one 
 
5. What are your bus policy objectives? 
 Bus Policy Ob-
jective 
Economic: 
To help the transport system operate more efficiently  
 
To provide opportunities for fostering a strong, competitive economy and sustain-
able economic growth 
 
 
To maintain the transport infrastructure to standards that allow safe and efficient 




To improve safety, security and health, and in particular to cut the number and se-
verity of road casualties 
 
 
To promote equal access to transport  
 
Environmental: 




To contribute to national and international efforts to reduce transport's contribu-
tion to overall greenhouse gas emissions 
 
 
Please include any other bus policy objectives: 
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6. The following table provides a list of measures to achieve bus policy objectives. Please 






We considered this 
and we will imple-
ment in 
the future 
We considered this 
but we will not 
implement this 
We will look 
at this in the 
future 
 
Bus Stop Infrastructure:  















































Information and Ticketing:  




















































Marketing targeted at persuading 




















Marketing of bus services such as 










Bus Priority:  
Reviewing current bus lane network and 
its operation to ensure it is effective, legi-




























Council and operator working in partnership to deliver:  
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Policy Implementation 
 
7. How many different teams within the council's transport department have respon-
sibility for the implementation of bus policies? 
 




8. With regards to bus policies set out in your 2006 – 2011 Local Transport Plan 
(England) or most recent Local Transport Plan (Wales), or Local Transport Strat-
egy (Scotland), what is your perception of what was planned to be implemented, 
and what was actually implemented? 
         Most of the policies that were planned to be implemented, were implemented suc-
cessfully 
 More than half of the policies that were planned to be implemented, 
were implemented successfully 
  Less than half of the policies that were planned to be implemented, 
were implemented successfully 
  Very few of the policies that were planned to be implemented, were 
implemented successfully 
9. Bus policy measures are implemented as planned and without problems: 
 









Bus Stop Infrastructure:  























































Information and Ticketing:  
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plans 
Bus Priority:  
Reviewing current bus lane network and its operation to ensure 


































Council and operator working in partnership to deliver:  
















































































Previous Bus Policy Targets 
10. Have the targets related to buses set in the 2006 – 2011 Local Transport Plan (Eng-
land), or most recent Local Transport Plan (Wales), or Local Transport Strategy 
(Scotland) been met? 
 
Most of the targets set in the local transport plan/strategy are met 
More than half of the targets set in the local transport plan/strategy are met Less than half 
of the targets set in the local transport plan/strategy are met Very few of the targets set in 
the local transport plan/strategy are met 
We have no targets related to bus policy 
 
11. Please state which of the following bus policy targets were met: 
 
Yes No 
We didn't set a 
target 










































The things we have implemented e.g. km of new bus lanes 
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Monitoring of Bus Policies 
A number of transport acts require all local transport authorities in England and Wales to 
produce a LTP. In England, a separate annual monitoring or delivery report was also re-
quired until 2008 to show how the LTP/S was progressing, however this system of close 
monitoring was abandoned in recent years. 
 
12. Please state how bus policies and measures are currently monitored by your coun-
cil: 
We monitor (please tick all that apply):  
           Number of passengers per annum  
           Number of vehicle kilometres per annum  
          Cost per passenger journey for services  
 Number of passengers satisfied with bus services  
          Service reliability and punctuality 
Age and quality of vehicles 
The things we have implemented e.g. km of new bus lanes opened, number of new shel-
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Barriers to Implementation 
13. From the following table, please identify which barriers have the greatest impact 
on implementation and which have the least impact on implementation. Please 
note that 1 represents the least impact and 5 represents the greatest impact. 
 
 Barriers to Policy Implementation 
Least impact Greatest Im-
pact 
1 2 3 4 5 




































Motivation and attitudes of those responsible for develop-











Motivation and attitudes of those responsible for imple-











Reshaping or changes to policy measures by local 











Interaction between policy makers, implementers from vari-
ous levels of government, and other actors (e.g. interaction 

































Unforeseen practical problems (e.g. due to failure to 











Conflict, ambiguities or disputes between those involved 
within the implementation process i.e. not everyone in-



































Local politics e.g. change of political control of Council or 
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Closing comments 
14. Would you be interested in taking part in a case study interview? 
              Yes  
               No 
If yes, please provide your contact details in the box below: 
 
15. Would you like to receive a copy of the results? 
              Yes  
               No 
If yes, please provide your contact details in the box below: 
 
16. If you would like to make any further comments, please state these in the box below: 
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Q1. 18% of respondents said they don’t have a local bus policy doc-
ument.  
 
(a) Does your council have a bus policy document in place? 
Why or why not? 




Q2. Some councils identified several policy measures to be less suc-
cessful in their cities (e.g. maximum fares, integrated ticketing, and 
personal security such as CCTV and lighting). Is this the case in 






Q3. (i) How many different teams within your council's transport 
department have responsibility for the implementation of bus poli-
cies? 
 
Q3. (ii) 15 respondents did not identify how many different teams 
were within their council's transport department. Does this suggest: 
 
(a) They do not know whether there were such teams within 
the council? 
(b) They simply don’t have teams within the council responsi-
ble for the implementation of bus policies? 
 
 
Q4. The majority of respondents said policies were implemented 
successfully in the previous LTP/S. However, there were also many 
areas of concerns highlighted throughout the survey (in terms of 
achieving bus policy objectives, meeting targets, and barriers re-
lated to policy implementation). Do you think there may be some 
inconsistencies in how respondents answered the survey? 
 
 
Q5. Some councils said bus policy measures are not implemented 
as planned and without problems. Is this the case in your city? If so, 
does this apply to particular types of measures; and why do you 
think these implementation problems are experienced? 
 
 
Q6. The survey found “maximum fares” and “reviewing current bus 
lanes” as the least successful bus measures. Are these measures a 
problem in your city also? If so, why?  
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Previous Bus 
Policy Targets 
Q7. 44% of councils met most or more than half of their previous 
LTP/S targets related to buses. 
 
(a) How successful was your council for meeting its targets? 
(b) What more could councils do more to achieve targets?  
(c) What is preventing councils achieving targets? 
 
 
Q8. 19% of councils have no targets.  
 
(a) Does your council have targets? Why, or why not? 
(b) Do targets have an impact on how policies are imple-




Q9. (i) How important do you think it is for monitoring to be in 
place to achieve bus policy measures? Why?   
 
Q9. (ii) What do you think constitutes good practice in monitoring? 
 
 
Q10. Do you think more bus policy measures would be imple-





Q11. (i) The survey found that the greatest barriers to impact im-
plementation include: (a) availability of resources (e.g. funding), 
(b) characteristics of local authority (e.g. competence and size of 
staff), and (c) coherence and comprehensibility of the written pol-
icy. How do these barriers rank in your city? 
 
Q11. (ii) The survey found that the barriers to have a lesser impact 
on implementation include: (a) public opposition, (b) relationship 
between key people in Council and local bus operator(s), and (c) 
reshaping or changes to policy measures by local implementation 
frontline staff. Are these barriers also less influential in your city? 
  
Q11. (iii) Other barriers highlighted in the survey included (a) com-
munication amongst staff involved in the policy implementation 
process, and (b) motivation and attitudes of those responsible for 
developing or implementing bus policies. Could you give me an ex-
ample or two of where you have seen these barriers to impact im-
plementation in your city? 
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Appendix C: Case study questions 
Theme 1 - Scheme Background 
1. Explain a bit about the [scheme]: how does it work, how much did it cost, what area(s) 
it covers, and who was involved in delivering it?  
2. What were the motivations and benefits for the proposed [scheme]? 
3. Who were the key stakeholders involved in preparing and implementing the proposed 
[scheme]? 
4. What were [scheme location] involvement in preparing and implementing the pro-
posed [scheme]? 
5. Was the [scheme] implemented as planned?  Why or why not? 
6. In what ways do you feel that implementation (including detailed design and seeking 
funding) went well, and in what ways might it have been improved? 
 
Theme 2 - Existing bus policy document, policy targets and monitoring of bus polices 
7. Does [location local government] have an existing bus strategy and policy document 
(and/or is there a section in these documents about buses)? 
8. If so, how does the [scheme] fit with the policy document(s)?  Does the policy docu-
ment specifically mention the [scheme]? 
9. How important do you think it is to have this document in place in terms of being able 
to plan and implement this scheme? 
10. Does [scheme location] set bus policy targets? Why, or why not? 
11. Does the [scheme] have targets which it needs to meet? If so, what are they? 
12. Do targets have an impact on how bus policies are implemented in the [scheme loca-
tion] area? 
13. How important do you think it is for monitoring to be in place to aid the implementa-
tion of bus policy measures? Why?   
14. How is the [scheme] monitored? 
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15. What do you think constitutes good practice in monitoring of a scheme like this and 
to what extent do you feel that you and other stakeholders in the planning and delivery 
of the [scheme] carry out such monitoring? 
16. Do you think more bus policy measures such as the [scheme] would be implemented 
as planned and without problems, if stricter monitoring was in place? 
 
Theme 3 - Policy Implementation and barriers to implementation 
17. Are there other bus policy measures that have not been implemented successfully in 
[scheme location]? If so, do these implementation problems apply to all or just to 
particular types of measures; and why do you think these implementation problems 
are experienced? 
18. What needs to change in bus policy implementation to make it easier for more projects 
like the [scheme] to be implemented? 
19. Were there any key barriers that caused difficulties which may have prevented the 
[scheme] from being implemented? 
20. What policies/actions/factors enabled the [scheme] to succeed? 
21. This research so far has found that the greatest implementation barriers for bus policy 
measures include: (a) availability of resources (e.g. funding), (b) characteristics of 
local authority (e.g. competence and size of staff), and (c) coherence and comprehen-
sibility of the written policy. How did these barriers rank for the implementation of 
the [scheme]?  Were there other more important barriers? 
22. This research has found that the barriers to have a lesser impact on implementation 
include: (a) public opposition, (b) relationship between key people in Council and 
local bus operator(s), and (c) reshaping or changes to policy measures by local imple-
mentation frontline staff. Were these barriers also less influential for the implementa-
tion of the [scheme]? 
23. Can you give examples of other barriers that have previously impacted bus policy 
implementation in the [scheme location] area? 
 
